Case Summary
| Citation | Badri Rai v. State of Bihar1959 SCR 1141 : AIR 1958 SC 953 |
| Keywords | sec 10 IEA, conspiracy, |
| Facts | Ramji Sonar, was a gold smith by profession, and runs a shop. Inspector of Police, made a seizure of certain ornaments and molten silver from a vacant building in front of the house of Ramji. The seizure was made on the suspicion that the ornaments and the molten silver were stolen property, which were to be sold to Ramji in a shape which could not be identified with any stolen property. Both appellants met with police officer and offered for bribe to hush up the case. The Inspector told them to come to the police station. The first appellant, Badri (friend of Ramji), came to the police station, saw the Inspector, and offered to him a packet wrapped in a piece of old newspaper, containing Rs 500 in currency notes. He told the Inspector, that Ramji, had sent the money through him in pursuance of the talk that they had with him, in the evening of August 24, as a consideration for hushing up the case that was pending against Ramji. At the time the offer was made, several police officers, besides a local merchant, were present there. Inspector at once write down the FIR and took action. The case is related to Section 165A r/w120B of the IPC and Section 10 of the IEA. |
| Issues | Whether the statement made by Badri, that he had been sent by the Ram Ji with the money to be offered by way of bribe to the police officer, was admissible against Ram Ji. |
| Contentions | |
| Law Points | ➢ Court has responded in affirmative and held that, it was made in reference to common intention in pursuance of conspiracy. Conspiracy was to give the bribe to hush up the case. ➢ In this case Supreme Court also considered ratio of Mirza Akbar case and Blake case. The court said the previous incident where both the appellants approached the inspector for bribing him to hush up the case against second appellant was the clear evidence of the two persons having conspired to commit the offence of bribing the police officer. The above incident clearly indicates that the appellants had entered into a conspiracy to commit the offence. |
| Judgement | The court finally held in this case the consideration and the statement made by one conspirator against another in course of the conspiracy is clearly covered under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority | Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states, Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.—Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. |
Full Case Details
SINHA, J..- This appeal is directed against the concurrent judgments and orders of the
courts below, convicting the two appellants under Section 120-B read with Section 165-A of
the Indian Penal Code, and sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months, and to
pay a fine of Rs 200 each, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for 6 months. A separate conviction under Section 165-A has been recorded in
respect of the first appellant, Badri. Under this head, he has been sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for 18 months, the sentence to run concurrently with the sentence under the
common charge.
2. The facts as found by the courts below, which could not be sucessfully challenged
before us, are as follows: The second appellant, Ramji Sonar, is a gold smith by profession,
and runs a shop on the main road in the Village Naogachia. In that village, there is a police
station, and the shop in question is situated in between the police station building and the
residential quarters of the Inspector of police, who was the First Informant in the case,
resulting in the conviction and sentences of the appellants, as stated above. The first appellant,
Badri, runs a school for small boys in the same village, about 50 yards away from the shop
aforesaid, of the second appellant. On August 22, 1953, the First Informant, who, holding the
position of an Inspector of Police, was in charge of the police station, made a seizure of
certain ornaments and molten silver from a vacant building in front of the house of the second
appellant, Ramji. Those ornaments were being melted by six strangers coming from distant
places, with implements for melting, said to have been supplied by Ramji. The seizure was
made on the suspicion that the ornaments and the molten silver were stolen property, which
were to be sold to Ramji in a shape which could not be identified with any stolen property.
After making the seizure-list of the properties, thus seized, the police officer arrested Ramji,
as also the other six strangers. Ramji was released on bail that very day. Police investigations
into the case, thus started, followed. During that period, on August 24, 1953, at about 7.30
p.m., the Inspector was on his way from his residential quarters to the police station, when
both the appellants accosted him on the road, and Ramji asked him to hush up the case for a
valuable consideration. The Inspector told them that he could not talk to them on the road, and
that they should come to the police station. Thereafter, the Inspector reported the matter to his
superior officer, the DSP (PW 8) and to the Sub-Inspector, PW 9, attached to the same police
station. On August 31, the same year, the first appellant, Badri, came to the police station, saw
the Inspector in the central room of the thana, and offered to him a packet wrapped in a piece
of old newspaper, containing Rs 500 in currency notes. He told the Inspector, (PW 1) that the
second appellant, Ramji, had sent the money through him in pursuance of the talk that they
had with him, in the evening of August 24, as a consideration for hushing up the case that was
pending against Ramji. At the time the offer was made, a number of police officers, besides a
local merchant (PW 7), were present there. The Inspector at once drew up the first
information report of the offer of the bribe on his own statement, and prepared a seizure-list
of the money, thus offered, and at once arrested Badri, and put him in the thana lock-up. After
24
the usual investigation, the appellants were placed on their trial, with the result indicated
above.
3. Both the courts below have found that the prosecution case, a summary of which has
been given above, has been proved by good and reliable evidence, and that the defence case
that the prosecution was started by the Inspector out of spite and in order to defend himself
against the consequences of wrongfully arresting Ramji, was unfounded. We are not
impressed with the halting criticism of the evidence adduced in this case on behalf of the
prosecution, and accepted by the courts below. Ordinarily, this Court does not interfere with
concurrent findings of fact.
4. The only serious question raised in this appeal, is the point raised on behalf of the
second appellant, Ramji, as to whether the statement made by the first appellant, Badri, on
August 31, 1953, that he had been sent by the second appellant with the money to be offered
by way of bribe to the police officer, was admissible against him. The learned counsel for the
appellant was not able clearly to formulate his grounds of objection to the admissibility of that
piece of evidence, which is the basis of the charge against both the accused persons. Section
10 of the Evidence Act, is a complete answer to this contention.
The incident of August 24, when both the appellants approached the Inspector with the
proposal that he should hush up the case against the second appellant, for which he would be
amply rewarded, is clear evidence of the two persons having conspired to commit the offence
of bribing a public servant in connection with the discharge of his public duties. There cannot,
therefore, be the least doubt that the court had reasonable grounds to believe that the
appellants had entered into a conspiracy to commit the offence. Therefore, the charge under
Section 120-B had been properly framed against both of them. That being so, anything said or
done by any one of the two appellants, with reference to the common intention, namely, the
conspiracy to offer bribe, was equally admissible against both of them. The statement made
by the first appellant on August 31, that he had been sent by the second appellant to make the
offer of the bribe in order to hush up the case which was then under investigation, is
admissible not only against the maker of the statement — the first appellant — but also
against the second appellant, whose agent the former was, in pursuance of the object of the
conspiracy. That statement is admissible not only to prove that the second appellant had
constituted the first appellant his agent in the perpetration of the crime, as also to prove the
existence of the conspiracy itself. The incident of August 24, is evidence that the intention to
commit the crime had been entertained by both of them on or before that date. Anything said
or done or written by any one of the two conspirators on and after that date until the object of
the conspiracy had been accomplished, is evidence against both of them.
5. It was faintly suggested on behalf of the second appellant, that the charge under Section
120-B of the Indian Penal Code, had been deliberately added by the prosecution in order to
make the first appellant’s statement of August 31, admissible against the second appellant, as
otherwise, it could not have been used as evidence against him. As already indicated, the
incident of August 24, is a clear indication of the existence of the conspiracy, and the court
was perfectly justified in drawing up the charge under Section 120-B also. It is no answer in
law to say that unless the charge under that section had been framed, the act or statement of
one could not be admissible against the other. Section 10 of the Evidence Act, has been
25
deliberately enacted in order to make such acts and statements of a co-conspirator admissible
against the whole body of conspirators, because of the nature of the crime. A conspiracy is
hatched in secrecy, and executed in darkness. Naturally, therefore, it is not feasible for the
prosecution to connect each isolated act or statement of one accused with the acts or
statements of the others, unless there is a common bond linking all of them together.
Ordinarily, specially in a criminal case, one person cannot be made responsible for the acts or
statements of another. It is only when there is evidence of a concerted action in furtherance of
a common intention to commit a crime, that the law has introduced this rule of common
responsibility, on the principle that every one concerned in a conspiracy, is acting as the agent
of the rest of them. As soon as the court has reasonable grounds to believe that there is
identity of interest or community of purpose between a number of persons, any act done, or
any statement or declaration made, by any one of the co-conspirators, is, naturally, held to be
the act or statement of the other conspirators, if the act or the declaration has any relation to
the object of the conspiracy. Otherwise, stray acts done in darkness in prosecution of an
object hatched in secrecy, may not become intelligible without reference to the common
purpose running through the chain of acts or illegal omissions attributable to individual
members of the conspiracy.
6. It was also suggested that the statement made by the first appellant on August 31, about
the purpose of the payment, having been made after the payment, was not admissible in
evidence, because the object of the conspiracy had been accomplished before the statement in
question was made. Reliance was placed in this connection upon the decision of their
Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Mirza Akbar v. King-Emperor [AIR 1940 PC 176].
But that decision is itself an answer to the contention raised. The payment was made, and the
statement that it was being made with a view to hushing up the case against the second
appellant, is a part of the same transaction, that is to say, the statement accompanied the act of
payment of the bribe. Hence, it cannot be said that the statement was made after the object of
the conspiracy had already been accomplished. The object of the conspiracy was the hushing
up of the criminal case against the second appellant, by bribing the public servant, who was in
charge of the investigation of the case. The object of the conspiracy was yet far from being
accomplished, when the statement in question was made. The leading case on the subject is
that of R. v. Blake [(1844) 6 QB 126]. That decision is an authority both for the positive and
the negative aspects of the question. It lays down what is admissible and what is not
admissible. It held that the documents actually used in effectuating the objects of the
conspiracy, were admissible, and that those documents which had been created by one of the
conspirators after the object of the conspiracy had been achieved, were not admissible.
Section 10 of the Evidence Act is on the same lines. It is manifest that the statement in
question in the present case, was made by the first appellant in the course of the conspiracy,
and accompanied the act of the payment of the money, and is clearly covered by the
provisions of Section 10, quoted above. It must, therefore, be held that there is no substance
in the only question of law raised in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
