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RUMA PAL, J. – 1. The appellants were employees of the respondent no. 1 (ICRISAT).
Their services were terminated. They filed writ petitions before the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh against ICRISAT and the Union of India. The writ petitions were dismissed. The first
writ petition so dismissed was W.P. No. 2730/1981 (K.S. Mathew v. ICRISAT). A second
group of writ petitions was dismissed on 30th June 1988. The dismissals are the subject matter
of these appeals. Both the Division Benches held that ICRISAT was an international
organisation and was immune from being sued because of a notification issued in 1972 under
the United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947 and that a writ under Article 226
could not be issued to ICRISAT.
- What or who is ICRISAT? Was the High Court right in holding that it was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226?
- ICRISAT was proposed to be set up as a non-profit research and training centre by the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The CGIAR is an
informal association of about 50 government and non-governmental bodies and is cosponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, (FAO). The
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Environment Program (UNEP)
and the World Bank. The members of the CGIAR at the relevant time were the African
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank; Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United States, Ford Foundation, France, Germany, the InterAmerican Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the International Development Research Centre, Japan, Kellogg Foundation, Netherlands,
Norway, Rockefeller Foundation, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Nations
Development Programme and the United States of America. In addition there were
representatives from the five major developing regions of the world, namely, Africa, Asia and
the Far East, Latin America, the Middle East, Southern and Eastern Europe. - The object of setting up ICRISAT was to help developing countries in semi-arid
tropics to alleviate rural poverty and hunger in ways that are environmentally sustainable. The
developing countries include India, parts of South Asian, sub-Saharan and South and Eastern
Africa and parts of Latin America. The object was sought to be achieved by research and
development of scientific technologies which could improve the quantity and quality of
sorghum (bajra), pearl and finger millet, pigeon peas, chick peas and ground nut. - A memorandum of agreement was then entered into between the government of India
and the Ford Foundation (acting on behalf of the Consultative Group) on 28th March 1972
(referred to as the March agreement) for the establishment of ICRISAT. The agreement
provided that the principal headquarters of ICRISAT would be at Hyderabad, India. The
agreement recorded that lCRISAT would, inter alia, serve, as a world centre for conducting
research and training of scientists for the improvement of sorghum, millet, pigeon peas and
chick peas. - On 23rd June 1983, in view of growing indiscipline in the institute the director-general
issued a circular which inter alia stated:
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“A new set of disciplinary and appeal procedures for staff has been drafted and the
staff management joint council will be consulted in this regard. Until these
procedures are promulgated, procedures laid down in 1976 continue to apply. These
provide for minor and major penalties according to the schedule in annexure I. Where
the nature of the misconduct warrants a major penalty, an enquiry must be held
before the penalty can be proposed and awarded.” - A show cause notice was issued to the appellant calling for an explanation for the acts
of misconduct specified therein. The appellant gave an explanation on 25th July 1983. The
explanation was not found satisfactory and an enquiry officer was appointed to enquire into
the charges framed against the appellant. In August 1983, the appellant filed the writ
application which resulted in the impugned order. The prayer in the writ petition was for
issuance of a writ of mandamus directing ICRISAT to frame rules regarding the conditions of
service which “nearly approximate to the accepted custom of India” and to direct the Union of
India to take action for fulfillment of clause 6(a)(2) of the March agreement between the
Union of India and CGIAR. - It is not clear whether any copy of the writ petition was served on the respondents at
that stage. In any event, ICRISAT proceeded with the disciplinary enquiry against the
appellant. An inquiry notice was issued on 13th September 1983. The appellant did not
participate in the inquiry. Ultimately, the enquiry officer submitted a report to the personnel
manager on 17th October 1983 finding the charges against the appellant proved. The order of
termination was passed on 5th August 1983 by the principal administrator. In the order
dismissing the appellant, it was stated that the appellant would stand relieved with effect from
5th December 1983 and that the appellant would be entitled to three months’ salary in lieu of
notice consequent upon the cessation of his employment with ICRISAT. It does not appear
that the appellant’s writ petition was amended to challenge the order of dismissal. - The appellant’s arguments that the Union of India could not have granted immunity
from legal process to ICRISAT under the 1947 Act and that in any event the grant of such
immunity could not serve to curtail the courts’ constitutional power under Article 226,
proceeds on the basis that if it were not for such immunity, a writ could issue to ICRISAT. If
a writ did otherwise lie against a body, it is a moot point whether judicial review of its actions
could be excluded by grant of Immunity either by statute or by a statutory notification. Since,
in our view, no writ would lie against ICRISAT, therefore, further questions whether it could
or should have been granted immunity or whether the immunity debarred remedies under
Article 226 do not arise. - The facts which have been narrated earlier clearly show that ICRISAT does not fulfill
any of these tests. It was not set up by the government and, it gives its services voluntarily to
a large number of countries besides India. It is not controlled by nor is it accountable to the
government. The Indian government’s financial contribution to ICRISAT is minimal. Its
participation in ICRISAT’s administration is limited to 3 out of 15 members. It cannot
therefore be said that ICRISAT is a State or other authority as defined in Article 12 of the
Constitution. - It is true that a writ under Article 226 also lies against a ‘person’ for “any other
purpose”. The power of the High Court to issue such a writ to “any person” can only mean
the power to issue such a writ to any person to whom, according to well-established
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principles, a writ lies. That a writ may issue to an appropriate person for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by part III is clear enough from the language used. But the words
“and for any other purpose” must mean “for any other purpose” for which any of the writs
mentioned would according to well established principles issue. - A writ under Article 226 can lie against a “person” if it is a statutory body or
performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty. ICRISAT has not been set
up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define
what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are
similar to or closely related to those performable by the state in its sovereign capacity. The
primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of
agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be
a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of
India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. While the
Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the institute, it certainly cannot be
said that the ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training
facilities. - We are therefore of the view that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the
writ petition of the appellant was not maintainable against ICRISAT.
