November 22, 2024
Administrative lawDU LLBSemester 4

G.N. Nayak v. Goa University(2002) 2 SCC 712 : AIR 2002 SC 790

Case Summary

Citation
Keywords
Facts
Issues
Contentions
Law Points
Judgement
Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority

Full Case Details

On 10-8-1994, an advertisement was issued for the post of Professor, Marine Science.
The handout distributed to the applicants prescribed the minimum qualifications as:
“An eminent scholar with published work of high quality actively engaged in
research with 10 years of experience in postgraduate teaching and/or research at the
university/national-level institution including experience of guiding research at doctoral
level or an outstanding scholar with established reputation with significant contribution
to knowledge.”
Additional qualifications prescribed by the University Grants Commission were also
stated as:
“Specialization. – MSc, PhD in Marine Science or any related subject with
outstanding accomplishments of teaching and research in branches of Marine Science,
Marine Biology, Marine Biotechnology, Marine Geology, Chemical Oceanography or
Physical Oceanography with a proven record of publications in international journals.”
Both the appellant and Respondent 5 applied for the post. Both of them were Readers in
the Department of Marine Science, Respondent 5 being senior most. Both were called for
interviews on 13-9-1995. Sometime before the date of the interview a note was written by
Respondent 2 as Head of the Department to the Vice-Chancellor requesting for the holding of
an urgent interview for the appointment of Professor, Marine Science. The note placed on
record an appointment letter received by the appellant for appointment as Professor in
Geology in University of Gulbarga. The note extolled the qualities of the appellant and
concluded with the following paragraphs:
“8. HOD (Head of Department) submits that if Dr Nayak (the appellant) is
relieved from this Department, the Department and the University will lose a
dedicated and intelligent faculty whose services are very essential for this newly
emerged Department and the young Goa University in general at this juncture.
Goa University had already advertised a post of Professor in Marine
Sciences in January 1995 for which Dr Nayak is also an applicant. In the light of
above, it is earnestly requested that the Vice-Chancellor may kindly hold the
interviews as early as possible without re-advertising the same, so that Dr Nayak is
given a chance to answer the interview and if selected, may be retained by the
University.”
This note was endorsed by the Dean of the Faculty on 6-8-1995 who forwarded the note
with the endorsement that he fully agreed with the views expressed by Respondent 2 and
suggested that interviews should be held. Respondent 5 obtained a copy of this note and on
23-8-1995 wrote a letter to the Chancellor as well as to the Vice-Chancellor objecting to the
participation of Respondent 2 and the Dean of the Faculty in the selection on the ground that
he apprehended that they would be biased against him and that they had in writing disclosed
their bias in favour of the appellant. The Vice-Chancellor received the letter but did not reply.
188
Respondent 5 filed a writ application in the High Court in 1995 seeking to stop the
participation of Respondent 2 as well the nominee of the Vice-Chancellor in the selection
process. The writ petition was withdrawn. According to Respondent 5, the previous writ
application had been withdrawn because the Court had observed that the petition was
premature and also because the respondent-University had given an oral assurance to the
Court that Respondent 2 would not be participating in the selection process. This was denied
by the appellant and the University. On 13-9-1995, interviews were held as scheduled.
However, Respondent 2 did not take part in the selection process. The Selection Committee
found that neither the appellant nor Respondent 5 were suitable for the post.
In October 1995, a fresh advertisement was issued for the post. This time, although the
essential qualifications as advertised in 1994 remained the same, the additional qualifications
were amended so that the specialisation read: “Professor of Marine Science: Specialisation:
Any branch of Marine Sciences, namely, Physical Oceanography, Marine Chemistry, Marine
Geology or Marine Biology.” The requirement of “MSc-PhD in Marine Science or any
related subject with outstanding accomplishment of teaching and research and also with
proven record of publications in international journals” was done away with. A fresh
Selection Committee was constituted pursuant to the 1995 advertisement. It met on 20-5-

  1. This time Respondent 2 participated. The Committee recommended the appointment of
    the appellant. The appellant’s appointment was accepted by the Executive Council and a
    formal order appointing the appellant as Professor of Marine Science was issued to him on 8-
    6-1996.
    Respondent 5 filed a second writ petition challenging the selection of the appellant. The
    challenge was upheld by the High Court broadly on the following grounds:
    (1) the eligibility criteria as advertised for the purpose of selection had been illegally
    amended in disregard of the provisions of the statutes of the University; (2) the Selection
    Committee was not legally constituted; (3) no records had been maintained by the Selection
    Committee as to how the inter se grading was done between the candidates; (4) the selection
    process was vitiated by bias; (5) the appellant was not qualified and did not possess the
    essential qualifications as advertised for the post.
    RUMA PAL, J. – 18. To appreciate the arguments of opposing counsel on the merits, the
    framework of the law within which the events took place is noted. University of Goa was
    established in 1984 by the Goa University Act, 1984 (“the Act”). The Act provides for the
    management and running of the University by the statutes framed under Sections 22 and 23,
    ordinances under Section 24 and regulations under Section 25. Under the Act, the Lt.
    Governor of the Union Territory has been constituted ex-officio Visitor of the University. By
    virtue of an amendment to the Act in 2000, the Visitor is now known as the Chancellor of the
    University. The Chancellor is the Head of the University. Among the authorities of the
    University, we are concerned with the Executive Council and the Academic Council. The
    Executive Council is the principal executive body of the University (Section 18) and is
    empowered by Section 23(2) to make the statutes subject to the approval of the Chancellor
    dealing with a range of subjects including the appointment of teachers and other academic
    staff of the University. The Academic Council is, on the other hand, the principal academic
    189
    body of the University and is mandated to “subject to the provisions of the Act, the statutes
    and ordinances, coordinate and exercise general supervision over the academic policies of the
    University”.
  2. The first statutes of the University are set out in the Schedule to the Act. They have
    been amended from time to time and further, statutes have also been incorporated in the
    Schedule. We are concerned primarily with Statutes 8 and 15.
  3. Statute 8(1) empowers the Executive Council:
    “(i) to create teaching and academic posts, to determine the number and
    emoluments of such posts and to define the duties and conditions of service of
    Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other academic staff and Principal of colleges and
    institutions maintained by the University:
    Provided that no action shall be taken by the Executive Council in respect of
    the number, qualifications and the emoluments of teachers of the University and
    academic staff otherwise than after consideration of the recommendations of the
    Academic Council.”
  4. Statute 15 provides for constitution of the Selection Committee for making
    recommendations to the Executive Council for appointments to the various posts. The
    constitution of the Selection Committee varies according to the nature of the post. For the
    post of Professor, the Selection Committee is required to consist of the Vice-Chancellor, a
    nominee of the Chancellor (Visitor), the Head of the Department and in case of his nonavailability, a person nominated by the Planning Board from its members, the Dean of the
    Faculty concerned, one Professor to be nominated by the Vice-Chancellor and three persons
    not in the service of the University nominated by the Executive Council out of a panel of
    names recommended by the Academic Council for their special knowledge of or interest in
    the subject with which the Professor as the case may be, will be concerned.
  5. According to Respondent 5, the amendment of the qualifications for the post of
    Professor of Marine Science was illegal. It was contended that under Statute 8, it is the
    Executive Council which has to prescribe the qualifications after considering the
    recommendations of the Academic Council. According to Respondent 5, the qualifications
    which were prescribed in the 1995 advertisement and handout issued to the applicants in
    connection therewith had not been prescribed by the Executive Council nor recommended by
    the Academic Council. Whether this is so or not, this is not a grievance which could have
    been raised by Respondent 5. He knew that there was a change in the eligibility criteria for
    the post yet he applied for the post and appeared at the interview without protest. He cannot
    be allowed to now contend that the eligibility criteria were wrongly framed.
  6. We then come to the question of the qualifications of the appellant and whether he
    was qualified to have at all been considered for appointment to the post of Professor.
  7. If we analyse the 1995 advertisement and handout it will be seen that the minimum
    qualifications prescribed for a candidate were that he/she had to be:
    (a) an eminent scholar; (b) with work of high quality; (c) actively engaged in
    research; (d) with 10 years’ experience in postgraduate teaching and/or research at
    190
    the university/national-level institution including experience of guiding research at
    doctoral level; or
    (a) an outstanding scholar; (b) with established reputation; (c) with significant
    contribution to knowledge.
  8. For a candidate to be qualified under the second limb, apart from a brilliant academic
    record and having an established standing, the candidate must have been responsible for
    original research which had added to the field of the particular science, not in small measure
    but significantly. The appellant has not sought to justify his appointment under this limb but
    has claimed that he was qualified under the first. For the purposes of this judgment, we will
    assume that the appellant fulfilled the first three qualifications under the first limb. The
    difficulty arises in connection with the fourth requirement, namely, 10 years’ experience of
    teaching or research.
  9. The appellant claims in his biodata that he completed his post graduation in 1982 and
    acquired his Doctorate in the year 1986. On 17-12-1986, he was appointed as a Lecturer in
    the University after which he became a Reader on 19-6-1991. The advertisement was issued
    in October 1995 and the Selection Committee met on 20-5-1996. The appellant claims that if
    the research which was conducted by him for three years in connection with obtaining his
    Doctoral degree is counted in addition to his teaching experience, he is qualified.
  10. That a candidate can club together his qualifications of teaching and research to cover
    the 10 years’ period has been held in Kumar Bar Das (Dr) v. Utkal University [1999 SCC
    (L & S) 236]. The question still remains, would any kind of research at a university do?
    Strictly speaking and as a matter of legal interpretation, the phrase “research at the
    university/national-level institution” should be read ejusdem generis and in the context of the
    alternate qualifications specified viz. “teaching experience” and the last phrase “including
    experience of guiding research at doctoral level”. In other words, the research must be
    independent such that the researcher could guide others aspiring for Doctorate degrees and
    not the research where the researcher is striving for a Doctorate degree himself. The
    appellant’s research prior to 17-9-1986 was pre-doctoral. Consequently and according to the
    letter of the law, perhaps the appellant was not qualified to be considered as a candidate for a
    Professorship in 1996 since he had failed to meet the criteria by about four months.
  11. However, the Court would not be justified in adopting a legalistic approach and
    proceed on a technical view of the matter without considering the intention of the University
    in laying down the condition of eligibility, since it is for the University to decide what kind of
    research would be adequate to qualify for professorship. The University had intended,
    understood and consistently proceeded on the basis that the pre-doctoral research could be
    counted towards the 10 years’ experience clause. So did Respondent 5. When Respondent 5
    applied for the post when it was advertised in 1994 he did not have 10 years’ cumulative
    experience of teaching and post-doctoral research. Since he had obtained a Doctorate degree
    in November 1985, the University also considered his application and called him for an
    interview in September 1985, though according to a strict interpretation of the eligibility
    criteria Respondent 5 was not qualified. Finally in Kumar Bar Das, this Court in construing
    similar eligibility criteria has held that the research required could include pre-doctoral
    research experience.
    191
  12. Then it was said that the Selection Committee was faultily constituted. Statute 15 has
    already been quoted earlier. According to the Registrar’s affidavit, the Academic Council had
    prepared a panel of subject experts and forwarded it to the Executive Council. The panel as
    approved by the Executive Council was: (1) Prof. Subba Rao or Prof. V.V. Modi; (2) Dr J.
    Samant or Dr D. Chandramohan; (3) Prof. K.T. Damodaran or Prof. R.K. Banerjee, Prof.
    Subba Rao and Prof. V.V. Modi had both regretted their inability to be part of the Selection
    Committee. Dr D. Chandramohan who had been mentioned as an alternative choice by the
    Executive Council was inducted into the panel. According to Respondent 5, the panel of
    experts had been prepared by the Executive Council subject wise, the idea being to have
    experts from the specialised fields mentioned in the advertisement of October 1995. Our
    attention was drawn to the fact that Prof. Subba Rao was Professor, Immunology and
    Biochemistry and Professor Modi was from the Department of Biology and Biotechnology.
  13. There is nothing on the record which shows that the Executive Council had “paired”
    the experts according to their special field of knowledge. On the contrary, it has not been
    pointed out how the subjects of Immunology and Biochemistry on the one hand can be paired
    with Biology and Biochemistry and not with Marine Biology in which Dr Chandramohan is
    stated to be an expert. In fact each of the experts had been approved by the Academic Council
    as being fit to be in the Selection Committee. The Executive Council merely prepared the
    panel in order of preference. If the preferred members were unavailable, the other members
    approved by the Academic Council and recommended by the Executive Council could be
    empanelled. There has thus been no violation of Statute 15.
  14. The High Court, however, held that there was a further defect in the proceedings. The
    Selection Committee was constituted by the following persons: Prof. N.C. Nigam, ViceChancellor Chairman; Prof. S. Mavinkurve, Dean of the Faculty; Prof. U.M.X. Sangodkar,
    Head of Department (Respondent 2); Prof. D.J. Bhat, nominee of the VC; Ex-Admiral Dr
    Menon, nominee of the VC; Prof. K.T. Damodaran, subject expert; Prof. J. Samant, subject
    expert and Dr Chandramohan, subject expert as Members but the report of the Selection
    Committee records, “Shri/Dr D. Chandramohan regretted his/her ability to be present at the
    meeting.” With the absence of Dr Chandramohan the quorum would have been incomplete.
    According to the Registrar’s affidavit, this was a typographical error as Dr Chandramohan
    had in fact participated and signed the report. The statement of the Registrar on oath should
    have been accepted by the High Court, particularly when there was no allegation even on the
    part of Respondent 5 that Dr Chandramohan did not in fact sit on the Selection Committee.
  15. This brings us to the issue of bias.
  16. Bias may be generally defined as partiality or preference. It is true that any person or
    authority required to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter must act impartially.
    “If however, ‘bias’ and ‘partiality’ be defined to mean the total absence of
    preconceptions in the mind of the Judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no
    one ever will. The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are
    born with predispositions and the processes of education, formal and informal, create
    attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by
    definition, are prejudices.”
    192
  17. It is not every kind of bias which in law is taken to vitiate an act. It must be a
    prejudice which is not founded on reason, and actuated by self-interest — whether pecuniary
    or personal. Because of this element of personal interest, bias is also seen as an extension of
    the principles of natural justice that no man should be a judge in his own cause. Being a state
    of mind, a bias is sometimes impossible to determine. Therefore, the courts have evolved the
    principle that it is sufficient for a litigant to successfully impugn an action by establishing a
    reasonable possibility of bias or proving circumstances from which the operation of
    influences affecting a fair assessment of the merits of the case can be inferred.
  18. As we have noted, every preference does not vitiate an action. If it is rational and
    unaccompanied by considerations of personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, it would not
    vitiate a decision. For example, if a senior officer expresses appreciation of the work of a
    junior in the confidential report, it would not amount to bias nor would it preclude that senior
    officer from being part of the Departmental Promotion Committee to consider such junior
    officer along with others for promotion.
  19. In this case, Respondent 5 has relied on the note quoted earlier to allege bias against
    Respondent 2. No doubt Respondent 2 has, in the note, lavished praise on the performance of
    the appellant. As the Head of the Department it would be but natural that he formed an
    opinion as to the abilities of the Readers working under him. It is noteworthy that it was not
    Respondent 5’s case that Respondent 2’s praise of the appellant was unmerited or that
    Respondent 2 had any extraneous reasons or reason other than the competence of the
    appellant for selecting the appellant as Professor. We are also not persuaded as the High
    Court was, to infer bias merely because at the previous selection in September 1995 the
    appellant was found unsuitable. If the outcome of the previous selection was conclusive as to
    the non-suitability of the appellant for all times to come, it was conclusive as far as
    Respondent 5 as well. Yet Respondent 5 applied again because he knew that a reappraisal by
    a new Selection Committee at a later point of time might yield a different result.
  20. As for the failure to keep any record as to the grading of the candidates under Statute
    15, the procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee in making recommendations are
    required to be such as may be laid down in the ordinances. No ordinance was drawn to our
    notice which prescribes a particular mode of rating the respective merits of the candidates.
    When appointments are being made to posts as high as that of a Professor, it may not be
    necessary to give marks as the means of assessment. But whatever the method of
    measurement of suitability used by the Selection Committee, it was a unanimous decision and
    the courts will, in the circumstances obtaining in this case, have to respect that.
  21. Accordingly, we set aside the decision of the High Court and allow the appeal.

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