December 23, 2024
DU LLBFamily law 2Semester 2

R. Kuppayee v. Raja Gounder(2004) 1 SCC 295

Case Summary

CitationR. Kuppayee v. Raja Gounder(2004) 1 SCC 295
Keywordsalienation of property, bad gift, karta
FactsThe father had executed a registered deed of settlement in favour of his married daughter, of immovable properties, and had delivered possession to her, but later, he himself wanted to vitiate the settlement on the ground, that this being a joint family property, he was incapable of making a gift in favour of the daughter and even if he were so capable, the gift was bad as it was not of a small portion.
IssuesIs the gift/settlement of a fair amount of immovable property from the Joint Hindu Family property made by the father in favor of his married daughters valid?
Whether a gift made in the appellants’ favor within acceptable bounds, considering the family’s entire holding?
ContentionsPlaintiff’s contention
The appellant’s counsel argued that the respondent made the settlement out of genuine respect and affection for the appellants and that the appellants were given ownership of the property on the day the settlement document was signed. PW-2, who is familiar with the respondent, states that the respondent does not consume alcohol.
Defendant’s contention
The respondent claimed he had never signed a settlement agreement. The respondent was escorted to the Registrar’s office to witness the sale of a home site by his son-in-law, i.e., the spouse of appellant No.1. That he was used to consuming alcoholic beverages, and that the appellants and their respective spouses obtained the sale deed from him fraudulently via deception. The property in question, which belongs to him and his son as a joint Hindu family, could not be donated under any circumstances.
Law Points➢ The question as to whether a particular gift is within reasonable limits or not has to be judged according to the status of the family and the extent of the property gifted.
➢ A gift by the father, of a small portion of joint family property, in favour of his daughter, but not in favour of anyone else, is valid.
➢ The Supreme Court examined the whole question and held that it was competent for a father to make a gift of immovable property to a daughter, if the gift is of a reasonable extent having regard to the properties held by the family. The emphasis here is on gift of a reasonable extent. If, on the facts, it is found that the gift was not within reasonable limits, such a gift would not be upheld.
JudgementThe Supreme Court approves the appeal and vacates the judgments and decrees of the lower courts. The appellants are declared absolute proprietors of the suit property, and it permanently barred the respondent from interfering with the appellant’s peaceful ownership and enjoyment of the suit property.
Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority

Full Case Details

BHAN, J. – Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the courts below in dismissing the

suit filed by the plaintiff-appellants (hereinafter referred to as “the appellants”), the appellants

have come up in this appeal.

2. Shortly stated, the facts are: The appellants are the daughters of the defendant-respondent

(hereinafter referred to as “the respondent”). By a registered settlement deed, Exhibit A-1 dated

29-8-1985, the respondent hereinabove settled an extent of 12 cents of land comprised in S. No.

113/2, Thathagapatti village, Salem district in favour of the appellants. As per recitals in the

settlement deed, the settlement was made by the respondent out of natural love and affection for

the appellants and the possession of the property was handed over to them on the day the

settlement deed was executed. The schedule of the settlement deed shows that the total extent of

the property owned by the family was 3.16 acres. The gift made was of 12 cents along with

Mangalore-tiled house standing on the gifted land. It was also stated in the settlement deed that in

future neither the respondent nor any other male or female heirs would have a right over the

settled property.

3. After nearly 5 years, on 22-4-1990, the respondent and his associates asked the appellants

to vacate the property and tried to trespass into the property. Because of the attempt made by the

respondent to trespass into the property, the appellants filed Original Suit No. 451 of 1990 in the

Court of the District Munsif, Salem seeking relief of restraining the respondent and his associates

from interfering with the appellants’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property in

any way by way of a permanent injunction, or, for grant of relief deemed fit in the circumstances

of the case. The respondent resisted the suit and in the written statement filed by him, he took the

stand that he had not executed any settlement deed. That his son-in-law i.e. husband of Appellant

1 had purchased a house site and the respondent was taken to the Sub-Registrar’s office to

witness the sale deed. That he was used to taking liquor and taking advantage of his addiction to

liquor the appellants and their respective husbands fraudulently by misrepresentation instead got

the sale deed executed from him. The property in dispute being a joint Hindu family property

consisting of himself and his son could not be gifted under any circumstances.

4. In support of their respective pleas, the parties led their evidence. Appellant 1 stepped into

the witness box as PW 1. She admitted that the property was ancestral. That her father had settled

the property on her and her sister of his own will, out of natural love and affection for them. PW

2, the attesting witness to Exhibit A-1 stated that he knew the respondent. While he was standing

on the road and talking to some persons, he was called by the respondent to witness the

document. He went to the Sub- Registrar’s office along with the respondent. The respondent put

his signatures on Exhibit A-1 after reading the same. That he (himself) and Govindasamy signed

Exhibit A-1 as witnesses. Govindasamy has died. In the cross-examination he stated that he did

not know the contents of the document, Exhibit A-1. He showed his ignorance as to when, where

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or in whose name the stamp papers were purchased. He denied having knowledge of the fact as to

whether the respondent was in the habit of drinking liquor. The respondent in order to prove his

case stepped into the witness box as DW 1. He stated that the property was a joint Hindu family

property as the same had been purchased with the sale proceeds of the ancestral property. That his

son-in-law who was working in TVS had purchased some property and he was taken by his sonin-law to sign as a witness. He denied having executed the settlement deed in favour of the

appellants. He denied that he knew PW 2. It was stated that the possession of the appellants was

permissive as they were allowed to reside in the house to enable them to send their children to

school. He denied his signatures on the settlement deed, on the “vakalatnama” given by him to his

counsel as well as on the summons sent to him by the court. It was denied that he knew English.

It was also stated by him that his signatures were obtained fraudulently on the pretext of signing

as a witness on the document by which his son-in-law had purchased a house site. That the total

extent of the family-holding was 3.16 acres of land. He admitted that his son was residing

separately for the last 3 to 4 years but denied that he was retracting from the settlement deed on

the advice of his son. That he was in the habit of drinking.

5. No other evidence was led by any of the parties.

6. The trial court believed the evidence of the respondent. It was held that the respondent was

taken to the Sub-Registrar’s office to witness a document whereas a deed of settlement was got

executed from him. Testimony of PW 2, the attesting witness was discarded. It was held that the

deposition of PW 2 in fact supported the case put forth by the respondent to the effect that the

respondent was taken to the Sub-Registrar’s office to sign as a witness. The trial court further

held that since the property in dispute was ancestral in nature, the respondent had no

power/authority to make a gift of a part of the ancestral property in favour of his daughters. The

suit was dismissed. The order of the trial court was affirmed by the first appellate court as well as

by the High Court, aggrieved against which the present appeal has been filed.

7. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the findings recorded by the courts

below are wrong on facts as well as in law. Finding of fact regarding due execution of Exhibit A1 is vitiated due to misreading of the statement of the attesting witness, PW 2. That the father

being the kartahad the authority to make a gift of ancestral immovable property to a reasonable

extent out of the joint Hindu family property in favour of his daughters. That such authority of the

father is recognised in old Hindu textbooks as well as by the courts in recent times. Counsel

appearing for the respondent has controverted the submissions made by the counsel for the

appellants. It was argued that there was no misreading of evidence and that the finding recorded

by the courts below on facts could not be interfered with by this Court at this stage of the

proceedings. The respondent had no authority to make a gift of a part of the ancestral immovable

property and in any case, he could not have gifted the only residential house possessed by the

family.

8. The two points which arise for consideration in this appeal are:

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(i) whether the judgments of the courts below are vitiated because of the misreading of

the evidence of PW 2, the attesting witness to the settlement deed;

(ii) whether the gift/settlement made by the father in favour of his married daughters of a

reasonable extent of immovable property out of the joint Hindu family property is valid.

12. The trial court held that since the property was ancestral in nature, the respondent had no

authority/power to make a gift of a portion of the ancestral property in favour of his daughters. In

appeal the first appellate court accepted that the father could give away a small portion of the

ancestral property to his daughters out of the total holding of the family property but since in this

case the total extent of property owned by the family had not been proved, it could not be held

that the property gifted by the father was of a reasonable portion of the total holding of the

family. The High Court affirmed the finding recorded by the first appellate court.

13. The High Court of Madras in a series of judgments has taken the view that a father could

make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable property to his daughter as a part of

his moral obligation at the time of her marriage or even thereafter.

14. In AnivillahSundararamayyav. CherlaSeethamma [(1911) 21 MLJ 695]it was held that

a small portion of the ancestral immovable property could be given to the daughter at the time of

her marriage or thereafter and such a gift would be a valid gift. In this case 8 acres of ancestral

immovable property out of 200 acres of land possessed by the family were given in gift by the

father to his daughter after her marriage. Upholding the gift it was observed:

“P. Narayana Murthi for the first respondent

The present case is stronger than Kudutammav. Narasimhacharyulu[(1907) 17 MLJ

528] as it is the father that has given the property and not the brothers. A gift made to the

son-in-law belongs also to the daughter – vide Ghose’s Hindu Law [2nd Edn., p. 313],

footnote. There is a text of Vyasa to that effect. See Ghose , p. 389, for translation; vide

p. 360 also vice versa. A gift to the daughter would belong to the son-in-law. If it is

proper to make gifts at the time of marriage it would be equally proper if made

afterwards. Though the texts do not require gifts to be made to daughters at the time of

marriage, if made, they are not invalid. ChuramanSahuv. Gopi Sahu[ILR (1909) 37 Cal

1]referred to, where Mookerji, J. approves of Kudutammav. Narasimhacharyulu

(supra); Bachoov. Mankorebai[ILR (1907) 31 Bom 373].”

15. The same view was taken by the Madras High Court in PugaliaVettorammalv. Vettor

Goundan[(1912) 22 MLJ 321]. In this case it was held that a father could make gift to a

reasonable extent of the ancestral immovable property to his daughter. Gift made of 1/6th of the

total holding of the ancestral property was held to be valid. The same view has later been taken

by the Madras High Court in Devalaktuni Sithamahalakshmamma v. Pamulpati Kotayya[AIR

1936 Mad 825] and Karuppa Gounder v. Palaniammal[(1963) 1 MLJ 86]. A Full Bench of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court in CGT v. Tej Nath [(1972) 74 PunjLR 1] and the High Court of

Orissa in Tara Sahuani v. Raghunath Sahu[AIR 1963 Ori 50] have also taken the same view.

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16. The powers of the father or the managing member of the joint Hindu family vis-vis

coparcenary property have been summarised in paragraphs 225, 226 and 258 of Mulla’s Hindu

Law which reads:

225. Although sons acquire by birth rights equal to those of a father in ancestral

property both movable and immovable, the father has the power of making within

reasonable limits gifts of ancestral movable property without the consent of his sons for

the purpose of performing ‘indispensable acts of duty, and for purposes prescribed by

texts of law, as gifts through affection, support of the family, relief from distress and so

forth’.

226. A Hindu father or other managing member has power to make a gift within

reasonable limits of ancestral immovable property for ‘pious purposes’. However, the

alienation must be by an act inter vivos, and not by will. A member of a joint family

cannot dispose of by will a portion of the property even for charitable purposes and even

if the portion bears a small proportion to the entire estate. However, now see Section 30

of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

258. (1) According to the Mitakshara law as applied in all the States, no coparcener

can dispose of his undivided interest in coparcenary property by gift. Such transaction

being void altogether there is no estoppel or other kind of personal bar which precludes

the donor from asserting his right to recover the transferred property. He may, however,

make a gift of his interest with the consent of the other coparceners.

(2) As to disposition by will after the coming into operation of the Hindu Succession

Act, 1956, see Section 30 of the Act.

17. Combined reading of these paragraphs shows that the position in Hindu law is that

whereas the father has the power to gift ancestral movables within reasonable limits, he has no

such power with regard to the ancestral immovable property or coparcenary property. He can,

however, make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable property for “pious

purposes”. However, the alienation must be by an act inter vivos, and not by will. This Court has

extended the rule in paragraph 226 and held that t he father was competent to make a gift of

immovable property to a daughter, if the gift is of reasonable extent having regard to the

properties held by the family.

18. This Court considered the question of extended meaning given in numerous decisions for

“pious purposes” in Kamla Devi v. BachulalGupta[AIR 1957 SC 434]. In the said case, a Hindu

widow in fulfilment of an ante-nuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the

terms of marriage of her daughter, executed a registered deed of gift in respect of four houses

allotted to her share in a partition decree, in favour of her daughter as her marriage dowry, after

two years of her marriage. The partition decree had given her the right to the income from

property but she had no right to part with the corpus of the property to the prejudice of the

reversioners. Her stepsons brought a suit for declaration that the deed of gift was void and

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inoperative and could not bind the reversioners. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the

suit holding that the gift was not valid. This Court accepted the appeal and held that the gift made

in favour of the daughter was valid in law and binding on the reversioners.

19. This point was again examined in depth by this Court in Guramma Bhratar

Chanbasappa Deshmukh v. Mallappa Chanbasappa Deshmukh[(1964) 4 SCR 497] and it was

held:

18. The legal position may be summarized thus: The Hindu law texts conferred a

right upon a daughter or a sister, as the case may be, to have a share in the family

property at the time of partition. That right was lost by efflux of time. But it became

crystallized into a moral obligation. The father or his representative can make a valid

gift, by way of reasonable provision for the maintenance of the daughter, regard being

had to the financial and other relevant circumstances of the family. By custom or by

convenience, such gifts are made at the time of marriage, but the right of the father or his

representative to make such a gift is not confined to the marriage occasion. It is a moral

obligation and it continues to subsist till it is discharged. Marriage is only a customary

occasion for such a gift. But the obligation can be discharged at any time, either during

the lifetime of the father or thereafter. It is not possible to lay down a hard-and-fast rule,

prescribing the quantitative limits of such a gift as that would depend on the facts of each

case and it can only be decided by courts, regard being had to the overall picture of the

extent of the family estate, the number of daughters to be provided for and other

paramount charges and other similar circumstances . If the father is within his rights to

make a gift of a reasonable extent of the family property for the maintenance of a

daughter, it cannot be said that the said gift must be made only by one document or only

at a single point of time. The validity or the reasonableness of a gift does not depend

upon the plurality of documents but on the power of the father to make a gift and the

reasonableness of the gift so made. If once the power is granted and the reasonableness

of the gift is not disputed, the fact that two gift deeds were executed instead of one,

cannot make the gift anytheless a valid one.” (emphasis supplied)

20. Extended meaning given to the words “pious purposes” enabling the father to make a gift

of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits to a daughter has not been extended to

the gifts made in favour of other female members of the family. Rather, it has been held that a

husband could not make any such gift of ancestral property to his wife out of affection on the

principle of “pious purposes”. Reference may be made to Ammathayeev. Kumaresan[AIR 1967

SC 569]. It was observed “we see no reason to extend the scope of the words ‘pious purposes’

beyond what has already been done in the two decisions of this Court” and the contention rejected

that a husband could make any such gift of ancestral property to his wife out of affection on the

principle of pious purposes.

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21. On the authority of the judgments referred to above, it can safely be held that a father can

make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits, keeping in view, the total

extent of the property held by the family in favour of his daughter at the time of her marriage or

even long after her marriage.

22. The only other point which remains for consideration, is as to whether a gift made in

favour of the appellants was within the reasonable limits, keeping in view, the total holding of the

family. The total property held by the family was 3.16 acres. 12 cents would be approximately

1/26th share of the total holding. The share of each daughter would come to 1/52nd or 1/26th

share of the total holding of the family, which cannot be held to be either unreasonable or

excessive under any circumstances. Question as to whether a particular gift is within reasonable

limits or not has to be judged according to the status of the family at the time of making a gift, the

extent of the immovable property owned by the family and the extent of property gifted. No hardand-fast rule prescribing quantitative limits of such a gift can be laid down. The answer to such a

question would vary from family to family.

23. This apart, the question of reasonableness or otherwise of the gift made has to be assessed

vis-a-vis the total value of the property held by the family. Simply because the gifted property is a

house, it cannot be held that the gift made was not within the reasonable limits. As stated earlier,

it would depend upon a number of factors such as the status of the family, the total value of the

property held by the family and the value of the gifted property and so on. It is basically a

question of fact. However, on facts, if it is found that the gift was not within reasonable limits,

such a gift would not be upheld. It was for the respondent to plead and prove that the gift made by

the father was excessive or unreasonable, keeping in view, the total holding of the family. In the

absence of any pleadings or proof on these points, it cannot be held that the gift made in this case

was not within the reasonable limits of the property held by the family. The respondent has failed

to plead and prove that the gift made was to an unreasonable extent, keeping in view, the total

holding of the family. The first appellate court and the High Court, thus, erred in non-suiting the

appellants on this account.

24. For the reasons stated above, we accept the appeal, set aside the judgments and the

decrees passed by the courts below. It is held that the respondent had the capacity to make a gift

to a reasonable extent of ancestral immovable property in favour of his daughters. The gift was

not vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation. The appellants are held to be the absolute owners of

the suit property and the respondent is injuncted from interfering with the peaceful possession and

enjoyment of the suit property by the appellants perpetually. Parties shall bear their own costs.

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