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[Section 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance
(No. 66), 1949, provided:
A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes
of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may, by general or
special order in writing direct.
Compare the above provision with section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950:
A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of
cases as the State Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct.]
SAIYID FAZL ALI J. – This is an appeal by one Kathi Raning Rawat, who has been
convicted under Sections 302, 307 and 392 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentenced to death and to seven years’ RI, the sentences to run concurrently. The appellant
was tried by a Special Court constituted under the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures
(Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinance 66 of 1949), which was issued by the
Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on 2nd November, 1949, and his conviction and sentence were
upheld on appeal by the State High Court. He has preferred an appeal to this Court against the
decision of the High Court.
- The principal question which arises in this appeal is whether the Ordinance to which
reference has been made is void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution on the ground that it
violates the provisions of Article 14. It appears that on the 5th April, 1948, the Rajpramukh of
Saurashtra State promulgated an Ordinance called the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
(Adaptation) Ordinance, 1948 by which “the Criminal Procedure Code of the Dominion of
India as in force in that Dominion on the 1st day of April, 1948” was made applicable to the
State of Saurashtra with certain modifications. In the same month, another Ordinance called
the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance (Ordinance 9 of 1948) was
promulgated, which provided among other things for the detention of persons acting in a
manner prejudicial to public safety, maintenance of public order and peace and tranquillity in
the State. Subsequently, on 5th November, 1949, the Ordinance with which we are concerned,
namely, the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949,
was promulgated, which purported to amend the previous Ordinance by inserting in it certain
provisions which may be summarised as follows: - Section 9 of the Ordinance empowers the State Government by notification in the
Official Gazette to constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such area as may be
specified in the notification. Section 11 provides that a Special Judge shall try such offences
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or class of offences or such cases or class of cases as the State Government may, by general
or special order in writing, direct. Sections 12 to 18 lay down the procedure for the trial of
cases by the Special Judge, the special features of which are as follows:
(1) The Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being
committed to his court for trial;
(2) There is to be no trial by jury or with the aid of assessors;
(3) The Special Judge should ordinarily record a memorandum only of the substance
of the evidence of each witness; and
(4) The person convicted has to appeal to the High Court within 15 days from the
date of the sentence. - The Ordinance further provides that the provisions of Sections 491 and 526 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure shall not apply to any person or case triable by the Special Judge,
and the High Court may call for the record of the proceedings of any case tried by a Special
Judge and may exercise any of the powers conferred on an appellate court by Sections 423,
426, 427 and 428 of the Code. - From the foregoing summary of the provisions of the Ordinance, it will appear that
the difference between the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code and the
procedure to be followed by the Special Judge consists mainly in the following matters:
(1) Where a case is triable by a Court of Session, no commitment proceeding is
necessary, and the Special Judge may take cognizance without any commitment;
(2) The trial shall not be by jury or with the aid of assessors;
(3) Only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness is
ordinarily to be recorded;
(4) The period of limitation for appeal to the High Court is curtailed; and
(5) No court has jurisdiction to transfer any case from any Special Judge, or to
make an order under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. - It appears that pursuant to the provisions contained in Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the
Ordinance, the State Government issued a Notification H/35-5-C, dated the 9/11th February,
1951, directing the constitution of a Special Court for certain areas mentioned in a schedule
attached to the Notification and empowering such court to try the following offences, namely,
offences under Sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323 335, 341-344, 379-
382, 384-389 and 392-402 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as adapted and applied to the State
of Saurashtra, and most of the offences under the Ordinance of 1948. - In the course of the hearing, an affidavit was filed by the Assistant Secretary in the
Home Department of the Saurashtra Government, stating that since the integration of
different States in Kathiawar in the beginning of 1948 there had been a series of crimes
against public peace and that had led to the promulgation of Ordinance 9 of 1948, which
provided among other things for detention of persons acting in a manner prejudicial to public
safety and maintenance of public order in the State. Notwithstanding this Ordinance, the
crimes went on increasing and there occurred numerous cases of dacoity, murder, nosecutting, ear-cutting, etc. for some of which certain notorious gangs were responsible, and
hence Ordinance LXVI of 1949 was promulgated to amend the earlier Ordinance and to
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constitute Special Courts for the speedy trial of cases arising out of the activities of the
dacoits and other criminals guilty of violent crimes. - As has been already indicated, the main contention advanced before us on behalf of
the appellant is that the Ordinance of 1949 violates the provisions of Article 14 of the
Constitution, by laying down a procedure which is different from and less advantageous to
the accused than the ordinary procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code, and
thereby discriminating between persons who are to be tried under the special procedure and
those tried under the normal procedure. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on the
decision of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and Gajen Mali, in which
certain provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1949, have been held to be
unconstitutional on grounds similar to those urged on behalf of the appellant in the present
case. A comparison of the provisions of the Ordinance in question with those of the West
Bengal Act will show that several of the objectionable features in the latter enactment do not
appear in the Ordinance, but, on the whole, I am inclined to think that that circumstance by
itself will not afford justification for upholding the Ordinance. There is however one very
important difference between the West Bengal Act and the present Ordinance which, in my
opinion, does afford such justification, and I shall try to refer to it as briefly as possible. - I think that a distinction should be drawn between “discrimination without reason”
and “discrimination with reason”. The whole doctrine of classification is based on this
distinction and on the well-known fact that the circumstances which govern one set of persons
or objects may not necessarily be the same as those governing another set of persons or
objects, so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise as between persons
governed by different conditions and different sets of circumstances. The main objection to
the West Bengal Act was that it permitted discrimination “without reason” or without any
rational basis. Having laid down a procedure which was materially different from and less
advantageous to the accused than the ordinary procedure, that Act gave uncontrolled and
unguided authority to the State Government to put that procedure into operation in the trial of
any case or class of cases or any offence or class of offences. There was no principle to be
found in that Act to control the application of the discriminatory provisions or to correlate
those provisions to some tangible and rational objective, in such a way as to enable anyone
reading the Act to say: If that is the objective, the provisions as to special treatment of the
offences seem to be quite suitable and there can be no objection to dealing with a particular
type of offences on a special footing. The mere mention of speedier trial as the object of the
Act did not cure the defect, because the expression “speedier trial” standing by itself provided
no rational basis of classification. It was merely a description of the result sought to be
achieved by the application of the special procedure laid down in the Act and afforded no
help in determining what cases required speedier trial. - As regards the present Ordinance, we can discover a guiding principle within its four
corners, which cannot but have the effect of limiting the application of the special procedure
to a particular category of offences only and establish such a nexus (which was missing in the
West Bengal Act) between offences of a particular category and the object with which the
Ordinance was promulgated, as should suffice to repel the charge of discrimination and
furnish some justification for the special treatment of those offences. The Ordinance, as I
have already stated, purported to amend another Ordinance, the object of which was to
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provide for public safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and
tranquility in the State. It was not disputed before us that the preamble of the original
Ordinance would govern the amending Ordinance also, and the object of promulgating the
subsequent Ordinance was the same as the object of promulgating the original Ordinance.
Once this is appreciated, it is easy to see that there is something in the Ordinance itself to
guide the State Government to apply the special procedure not to any and every case but only
to those cases or offences which have a rational relation to or connection with the main object
and purpose of the Ordinance and which for that reason become a class by themselves
requiring to be dealt with on a special footing. The clear recital of a definite objective
furnishes a tangible and rational basis of classification to the State Government for the
purpose of applying the provisions of the Ordinance and for choosing only such offences or
cases as affect public safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and
tranquility. Thus, under Section 11, the State Government is expected to select only such
offences or class of offences or class of cases for being tried by the Special Court in
accordance with the special procedure, as are calculated to affect public safety, maintenance
of public order, etc., and under Section 9, the use of the special procedure must necessarily be
confined to only disturbed areas or those areas where adoption of public safety measures is
necessary. That this is how the Ordinance was intended to be understood and was in fact
understood, is confirmed by the Notification issued on the 9/11th February by the State
Government in pursuance of the Ordinance. That Notification sets out 49 offences under the
Indian Penal Code as adapted and applied to the State and certain other offences punishable
under the Ordinance, and one can see at once that all these offences directly affect the
maintenance of public order and peace and tranquility.
The Notification also specifies certain areas in the State over which only the Special
Court is to exercise jurisdiction. There can be no dispute that if the State Legislature finds that
lawlessness and crime are rampant and there is a direct threat to peace and tranquility in
certain areas within the State, it is competent to deal with offences which affect the
maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquility in those areas as a class
by themselves and to provide that such offences shall be tried as expeditiously as possible in
accordance with a special procedure devised for the purpose. This, in my opinion, is in plain
language the rationale of the Ordinance, and it will be going too far to say that in no case and
under no circumstances can a legislature lay down a special procedure for the trial of a
particular class of offences, and that recourse to a simplified and less cumbrous procedure for
the trial of those offences, even when abnormal conditions prevail, will amount to a violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution. I am satisfied that this case is distinguishable from the case
relating to the West Bengal Act, but I also feel that the legislatures should have recourse to
legislation such as the present only in very special circumstances. In the result, I would hold
that the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance is not
unconstitutional, and accordingly overrule the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Special
Court to try the appellant.
BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, J. – 26. It was set down for hearing on certain
preliminary points of law raised by the learned counsel for the appellant attacking the legality
of the entire trial on the ground that Section 11 of the Saurashtra Public Safety Measures
Ordinance 66 of 1949 passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra as well as the Notification
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issued by the State Government on 9/11th February, 1951, under which the Special Court was
constituted and the trial held, were void and inoperative. The first and the main ground upon
which the constitutional validity of the section and the notification has been assailed is that
they are in conflict with the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution. - It is not disputed that the language of Section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance, with
which we are now concerned, is identically the same as that of Section 5(1) of the West
Bengal Special Courts Act. - In the West Bengal Act there is a further provision embodied in clause (2) of Section
5 which lays down that no such direction as is contemplated by clause (1) could be given in
respect of cases pending before ordinary criminal courts at the date when the Act came into
force. No such exception has been made in the Saurashtra Ordinance. In the Calcutta cases
referred to above, the notification under Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act directed certain
individual cases in which specified persons were involved to be tried by the Special Court and
it was held by the High Court of Calcutta that Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts
Act to the extent that it empowers the State Government to direct any case to be tried by
Special Courts was void as offending against the provision of the equal protection clause in
Article 14 of the Constitution; and this view was affirmed in appeal by a majority of this
court. With regard to the remaining part of Section 5(1), which authorises the State
Government to direct, “offences, classes of offences…or classes of cases” for trial by Special
Courts, the majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court were of opinion that it was not
obnoxious to Article 14 of the Constitution. In the present case the notification, that was
issued by the Saurashtra State Government on 9/11th February, 1951, did not relate to
individual cases. The notification constituted in the first place a Special Court in the areas
specified in the schedule. It appointed in the next place a judge to preside over the Special
Court and finally gave a list of offences with reference to appropriate sections of the Indian
Penal Code which were to be tried by the Special Judge. If the view taken by the Chief Justice
of the Calcutta High Court and the majority of his colleagues is right, such notification and
that part of Section 11 of the Ordinance, under which it was issued, could not be challenged
as being in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution. This point did come up for
consideration before us in the appeals against the Calcutta decision with reference to the
corresponding part of Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act, but although a majority of this
court concurred in dismissing the appeals, there was no such majority in the pronouncement
of any final opinion on this particular point. - In my judgment in the Calcutta appeals I was sceptical about the correctness of the
view taken upon this point by the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and the
majority of his colleagues. The consideration that weighed with me was that as the learned
Judges were definitely of opinion that the necessity of speedier trial, as set out in the
preamble, was too elusive and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a proper
classification, the authority given by Section 5(1) of the Special Courts Act to the State
Government to direct any class of cases or offences to be tried by the Special Court would be
an unguided authority and the propriety of the classification made by the State Government
that is said to be implied in the direction could not be tested with reference to any definite
legislative policy or standard. Mr Sen, appearing for the State of Saurashtra, has argued
before us that in this respect the Saurashtra Ordinance stands on a different footing and he has
referred in this connection to the preamble to the original ordinance as well as the
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circumstances which necessitated the present one. As the question is an important one and is
not concluded by our previous decision, it merits, in my opinion, a careful consideration. - It may be stated at the outset that the Criminal Procedure Code of India as such has no
application to the State of Saurashtra. After the State acceded to the Indian Union, there was
an Ordinance promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 5th of April, 1948, which introduced the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of India (Act 5 of 1898) with certain
modifications into the Saurashtra State. Another ordinance, known as the Public Safety
Measures Ordinance, was passed on the 2nd of April, 1948, and this ordinance, like similar
other public safety measures obtaining in other States, provided for preventive detention,
imposition of collective fines, control of essential supplies and similar other matters. On 11th
of November, 1949, the present Ordinance was passed by way of amendment of the Public
Safety Measures Ordinance and inter alia it made provisions for the establishment of Special
Courts. Section 9 of this Ordinance empowers the State Government to constitute Special
Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such areas as may be specified in the notification. Section
10 relates to appointment of Special Judges who are to preside over such courts and Section
11 lays down that the Special Judge shall try “such offences or classes of offences… or classes
of cases as the Government of United State of Saurashtra may by general or special order in
writing, direct.” The procedure to be followed by the Special Judges is set out in Sections 12
to 18 of the Ordinance. In substance the Special Court is given the status of a sessions court,
although committal proceeding is eliminated and so also is trial by jury or with the aid of
assessors. The Special Judge has only to make a memorandum of the evidence and he can
refuse to summon any witness if he is satisfied after examination of the accused that the
evidence of such witness would not be material. Section 16(1) curtails the period of limitation
within which an accused convicted by the Special Judge has to file his appeal before the High
Court and clause (3) of the section provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to transfer
any case from any Special Judge or make any order under Section 491 of the Criminal
Procedure Code.
The ordinance certainly lacks some of the most objectionable features of the West Bengal
Act. Thus it has not taken away the High Court’s power of revision, nor does it expose the
accused to the chance of being convicted of a major offence though he stood charged with a
minor one. There is also no provision in the ordinance similar to that in the West Bengal Act
which enables the court to proceed with the trial in the absence of the accused. But although
the ordinance in certain respects compares favourably with the West Bengal Act, the
procedure which it lays down for the Special Judge to follow does differ on material points
from the normal procedure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code; and as these
differences abridge the rights of the accused who are to be tried by the Special Court, and
deprive them of certain benefits to which they would otherwise have been entitled under the
general law, the ordinance prima facie makes discrimination and the question has got to be
answered whether such discrimination brings it in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution. - The nature and scope of the guarantee that is implied in the equal protection clause of
our Constitution have been explained and discussed in more than one decision of this court
and do not require repetition. It is well settled that a legislature for the purpose of dealing with
the complex problems that arise out of an infinite variety of human relations, cannot but
proceed upon some sort of selection or classification of persons upon whom the legislation is
to operate. The consequence of such classification would undoubtedly be to differentiate the
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persons belonging to that class from others, but that by itself would not make the legislation
obnoxious to the equal protection clause. Equality prescribed by the Constitution would not
be violated if the statute operates equally on all persons who are included in the group, and
the classification is not arbitrary or capricious, but bears a reasonable relation to the objective
which the legislation has in view. The legislature is given the utmost latitude in making the
classification and it is only when there is a palpable abuse of power and the differences made
have no rational relation to the objectives of the legislation, that necessity of judicial
interference arises. - Section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance so far as it is material for our present purpose
lays down that a Special Court shall try “such offences or classes of offences…or classes of
cases as the State Government may…direct”. This part of the section undoubtedly
contemplates a classification to be made of offences and cases but no classification appears
on the terms of the statute itself which merely gives an authority to the State Government to
determine what classes of cases or offences are to be tried by the Special Tribunal. The
question arises at the outset as to whether such statute is not on the face of it discriminatory as
it commits to the discretion of an administrative body or officials the duty of making selection
or classification for purposes of the legislation; and there is a still further question, namely, by
what tests, if any, is the propriety of the administrative action to be adjudged and what would
be the remedy of the aggrieved person if the classification made by the administrative body is
arbitrary or capricious? - As has been stated already, Section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance is worded in
exactly the same manner as Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act; and that part
of it, with which we are here concerned, authorises the State Government to direct any classes
of offences or cases to be tried by the Special Tribunal. The State Government, therefore, has
got to make a classification of cases or offences before it issues its directions to the Special
Court. The question is, on what basis is the classification to be made? If it depends entirely
upon the pleasure of the State Government to make any classification it likes, without any
guiding principle at all, it cannot certainly be a proper classification, which requires that a
reasonable relation must exist between the classification and the objective that the legislation
has in view. On the other hand, if the legislature indicates a definite objective and the
discretion has been vested in the State Government as a means of achieving that object, the
law itself, as I have said above, cannot be held to be discriminatory, though the action of the
State Government may be condemned if it offends against the equal protection clause, by
making an arbitrary selection. Now, the earlier ordinance, to which the present one is a
subsequent addition by way of amendment, was passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on
2nd April, 1948. It is described as an ordinance to provide for the security of the State,
maintenance of public order and maintenance of supplies and services essential to the
community in the State of Saurashtra. The preamble to the ordinance sets out the objective of
the ordinance in identical terms. It is to be noted that the integration of several States in
Kathiawar which now form the State of Saurashtra, was completed some time in February, - It appears from the affidavit of an officer of the Home Government of the Saurashtra
State that soon after the integration took place, an alarming state of lawlessness prevailed in
some of the districts within the State. There were gangs of dacoits operating at different
places and their number began to increase gradually. As ordinary law was deemed insufficient
to cope with the nefarious activities of those criminal gangs, the Saurashtra Public Safety
86
Measures Ordinance was promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 2nd April, 1948. The ordinance,
as stated already, provided principally for preventive detention and imposition of collective
fines; and it was hoped that armed with these extraordinary powers the State Government
would be able to bring the situation under control. These hopes, however, were belied, and
the affidavit gives a long list of offences in which murder and nose-cutting figure
conspicuously in addition to looting and dacoity, which were committed by the dacoits during
the years 1948 and 1949.
In view of this ugly situation in the State, the new Ordinance was passed on 11th of
November, 1949, and this ordinance provides inter alia for the establishment of Special
Courts which are to try offenders under a special procedure. Acting under Section 11 of the
Ordinance, the Government issued a notification on 9/11th February, 1950, which constituted
a Special Court for areas specified in the schedule, and here again the affidavit shows that all
these areas are included in the districts of Gohilwad, Madhya Saurashtra and Sorath, where
the tribe of marauders principally flourished. The object of passing this new ordinance is
identically the same for which the earlier Ordinance was passed, and the preamble to the
latter, taken along with the surrounding circumstances, discloses a definite legislative policy
which has been sought to be effectuated by the different provisions contained in the
enactment. If Special Courts were considered necessary to cope with an abnormal situation, it
cannot be said that the vesting of authority in the State Government to select offences for trial
by such courts is in any way unreasonable. - In the light of the principles stated already, I am unable to hold that Section 11 of the
Ordinance insofar as it authorises the State Government to direct classes of offences or cases
to be tried by the Special Court offends against the provision of the equal protection clause in
our Constitution. If the notification that has been issued by the State Government proceeds on
any arbitrary or unreasonable basis, obviously that could be challenged as unconstitutional. It
is necessary, therefore, to examine the terms of the notification and the list of offences it has
prescribed. - The notification, as said above, constitutes a Special Court for the areas mentioned in
the Schedule and appoints Mr P.P. Anand as a Special Judge to preside over the Special
Court. The offences triable by the Special Court are then set out with reference to the specific
sections of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Chibber attacks the classification of offences made in
this list primarily on the ground that while it mentions offences of a particular character, it
excludes at the same time other offences of a cognate character in reference to which no
difference in treatment is justifiable. It is pointed out that while Section 183 of the Indian
Penal Code is mentioned in the list, Sections 184, 186 and 188 which deal with similar
offences are excluded. Similarly the list does not mention Section 308 of the Indian Penal
Code, though it mentions Section 307. The learned counsel relies in this connection upon the
decision of the Supreme Court of America in Skinner v. Oklahoma [316 US 535]. In that
case the question for consideration related to the constitutionality of a certain statute of
Oklahoma which provided for sterilization of certain habitual criminals who were convicted
two or more times in any State of felony involving moral turpitude. The statute applied to
persons guilty of larceny, which was a felony, but not to embezzlement, and it was held that
the legislation violated the equal protection clause. It is undoubtedly a sound and reasonable
proposition that when the nature of two offences is intrinsically the same and they are
punishable in the same manner, a person accused of one should not be treated differently from
87
a person accused of the other, because it is an essential principle underlying the equal
protection clause that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. At the same time it is to be noted as Douglas, J.,
observed in the very case that in determining the reach and scope of particular legislation it is
not necessary for the legislature to provide abstract symmetry. “It may mark and set apart the
classes and types of problems according to the needs and as dictated or suggested by
experience.”
A too rigid instance therefore on a thing like scientific classification is neither practicable
nor desirable. It is true that the notification mentions Section 183 of the Indian Penal Code,
though it omits Section 184; but I am unable to hold that the two are identically of the same
nature. Section 183 deals with resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of
public servant; while Section 184 relates to obstructing sale of property offered for sale by
authority of public servant. Section 186 on the other hand does not relate to the taking of
property at all, but is concerned with obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his
public duties. Then again I am not sure that it was incumbent upon the State Government to
include Section 308 of the Indian Penal Code in the list simply because they included Section - It is true that culpable homicide as well as attempt to murder are specified in the list; but
an attempt to commit culpable homicide is certainly a less heinous offence and the State
Government might think it proper, having regard to all the facts known to them, that an
offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide does not require a special treatment. - Be that as it may, I do not think that a meticulous examination of the various offences
specified in the list with regard to their nature and punishment is necessary for purposes of
this case. The appellant before us was accused of murder punishable under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code. There is no other offence, I believe, described in the Indian Penal Code,
which can be placed on an identical footing as murder. Even culpable homicide not
amounting to murder is something less heinous than murder, although it finds a place in the
list. In my opinion, the appellant can have no right to complain if he has not been aggrieved in
any way by any unjust or arbitrary classification. As he is accused of murder and dacoity and
no offences of a similar nature are excluded from the list, I do not think that it is open to him
to complain of any violation of equal protection clause in the notification. There are quite a
number of offences specified in the notification and they are capable of being grouped under
various heads. Simply because certain offences which could have been mentioned along with
similar other in a particular group have been omitted therefrom, it cannot be said that the
whole list is bad. The question of inequality on the ground of such omission can be raised
only by the person who is directed to be tried under the special procedure for a certain
offence, whereas for commission of a similar offence not mentioned in the list another person
has still the advantages of the ordinary procedure open to him. In my opinion, therefore, the
first point raised on behalf of the appellant cannot succeed.
