M/S Umesh Goel v Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.(2016) 11 SCC 313

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ISSUE:
An interesting but very important legal question arises for consideration in this appeal relating to
interpretation of Section 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act with reference to its applicability to
Arbitral proceedings.
FACTS:
The respondent which is a Cooperative Group Housing Society invited tenders for construction of
102 dwelling units with basement at Plot No. 21 Sector 5, Dwarka New Delhi. The tenders were
invited in May 1998. The appellant, an unregistered partnership firm submitted its bid in response
to the said tender on 06.05.1998. The appellant was the successful bidder and the contract was
awarded to the appellant at an estimated cost of Rs.9.80 crores. The appellant was issued a letter
of intent. On 09.08.1998 the appellant submitted its first bill for the construction of the compound
wall etc. The agreement for the construction of 102 dwelling units with basement was entered
into between the appellant and the respondent on 02.02.1999. It is stated that there was some
delay in getting the plan sanctioned, which according to the appellant, he was not responsible for
the delay. A dispute arose as between the appellant and the respondent which necessitated the
appellant to move the High Court of Delhi by way of an application under Section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (for short 1996 Act) to restrain the respondent from
dispossessing the appellant from the worksite till the work executed by the appellant is
measured by the Commissioner to be appointed by the Court. It was filed on 22.05.2005. A
Commissioner was also appointed by the High Court. The appellant filed another application
under Section 9 of the 1996 Act to restrain the respondent from operating its bank accounts and
from dispossessing the appellant on 29.01.2003.
With reference to the dispute which arose as between the appellant and the respondent an
arbitrator/an advocate by name Smt. Sangeeta Tomar was appointed by the respondent to
adjudicate the dispute between them. As the appointment came to be made on 17.03.2003 by the
respondent, though, the appellant earlier moved the High Court by way of an Arbitration
Application No.145 of 2003 on 09.07.2003 under Section 11(5) of the 1996 Act for appointment
of an independent arbitrator, the same was subsequently withdrawn. The appellant participated in
the arbitration proceedings before the arbitrator appointed by the respondent. Claims and counter
claims were made by the appellant as well as the respondent before the arbitrator. The arbitrator
passed the award on 05.05.2005 wherein the claim of the appellant was allowed to the extent of

Rs. 1,36,24,886.08 along with interest at the rate of 12% from 01.06.2002 till the date of the
award and further interest from the date of award till its payment at the rate of 18% per annum.
While resisting the claim of the appellant, the respondent did not specifically raise any plea under
Section 69 of the Partnership Act.
The respondent challenged the award dated 05.05.2005 under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before
the Delhi High Court which was registered as A.A. No.188 of 2005. The said application was
filed on 02.08.2005. The respondents application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by
an order dated 01.09.2005. The respondent filed Review Application No.26 of 2005 which was
also dismissed by the learned Single Judge by an order dated 03.10.2005. As against the orders
dated 01.09.2005 and 03.10.2005, the respondent preferred appeals in FAO (OS) No.376 of 2005
on 14.11.2005. Pending disposal of the appeals, an interim order was passed on 21.07.2006
directing the respondent to deposit 50% of the decretal amount within six weeks and by
subsequent order dated 18.08.2006 the time was extended by another four weeks. By the
impugned order dated 20.11.2007 the Division Bench having allowed the FAO(OS) No.376 of
2005, the appellant is before us.
We heard Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Mr.Amarendra Saran,
learned Senior Counsel for the respondent. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel in his
submissions after drawing our attention to Section 69 and in particular Section 69(3) of the
Partnership Act contended that when sub sections (1) and (2) are read in to sub section (3) of
Section 69, the expression other proceedings mentioned in the said sub section (3) should be with
reference to other proceedings connected with a suit in a Court and cannot be read in isolation.
The learned Senior Counsel contented that if it is read in that sense the expression other
proceedings in sub section (3) can have no relevance nor referable to Arbitral proceedings in
isolation. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that going by the plain reading of the
Statute and if the golden rule of construction is applied, an arbitrator by himself is not a court for
the purpose of Section 69 of the Statute. The learned Senior Counsel then submitted that there is a
vast difference between an arbitrator and the Court, that though an arbitrator may exercise
judicial powers, he does not derive such powers from the State but by the agreement of the parties
under a contract and, therefore, he cannot be held to be a Court for the purpose of Section 69 of
the Partnership Act. While referring to Section 36 of the 1996 Act, the learned Senior Counsel
submitted that it is only a statutory fiction by which for the purpose of enforcement, the award is
deemed to be a decree and it cannot be enlarged to an extent to mean that by virtue of the said
award to be deemed as a decree, the arbitrator can be held to be a Court. Lastly, it was contended
by him that in order to invoke Section 69(3), three mandatory conditions are required to be
fulfilled, namely, that (a) there should be a suit and the other proceedings should be intrinsically
connected to the suit, (b) such suit should have been laid to enforce a right arising from the
contract and (c) such a suit should have been filed in a Court of law.
As against the above submissions Mr. Saran, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submitted

that the expression other proceedings will include arbitral proceedings and that the foundation for
it must only be based on a right in a contract. In support of the said submission, learned senior
counsel contended that this Court has held while interpreting Section 14 of the Limitation Act
that arbitral proceedings are to be treated on par with civil proceedings. The learned Senior
Counsel also submitted that under Section 2(a) of the Interest Act, arbitral proceedings have been
equated to regular suits and, therefore, the expression other proceedings in Section 69(3) of the
Partnership Act should be held to include an Arbitral Proceeding on par with a suit. The learned
counsel, therefore, contented that the arbitrator should be held to be a Court and the proceedings
pending before it are to be treated as a suit and consequently other proceedings. By referring to
Sections 35 and 36 of the 1996 Act where an award of the arbitrator has been equated to a decree
of the Court and applicability of Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of execution has been
prescribed, the learned Senior Counsel contended that the arbitral proceedings should be held to
be civil proceedings before a Court.
Having heard learned counsel for the appellant as well the respondent and having bestowed our
serious consideration to the respective submissions, the various decisions relied upon and the
provisions contained in the Partnership Act, the Interest Act, Civil Procedure Code and
Arbitration Act, we are of the view that the submissions of Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant merit acceptance.
To appreciate the respective submissions and in support of our conclusion, at the very outset
Section 69 requires to be noted. Though, some of the decisions which were cited before us dealt
with Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act, in the instance we wish to analyze the said sub-section
along with the other components of the said Section 69. When we read sub-section (3) of Section
69 carefully, we find that as rightly contended by Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant, the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) have been impliedly incorporated in subsection (3). When the opening set of expression in sub-section (3) states that the provisions of
sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply, there is no difficulty in accepting the said submission of
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the entirety of the said two sub-sections should be
held to be bodily lifted and incorporated in sub-section (3). It is difficult to state that any one part
of sub-sections (1) and (2) alone should be held to be incorporated for the purpose of sub-section
(3). Therefore, we are convinced that when we read sub-section (3) it is imperative that all the
ingredients contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) should be read into sub-section (3) and thereafter
apply the said sub- section when such application is called for in any matter.
Once we steer clear of the said position it will be necessary to note what are the specific
ingredients contained in sub-sections (1) and (2). When we read sub-section (1) of Section 69 the
said sub-section primarily imposes a ban on any person as a partner of a firm from filing any suit
to enforce a right arising from a contract or a right conferred under the Partnership Act in any
Court by or on behalf of an unregistered firm or a person suing as a partner of a firm against the
said firm or against any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in that firm. To put it in

nut-shell the ban imposed under sub-section (1) of Section 69 is on any person in his capacity as
the Partner of an unregistered firm against the said firm or any of its partners, in the matter of
filing a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by the provisions of the
Partnership Act. In effect, the ban is in respect of filing a suit against that unregistered firm itself
or any of its partners by way of a suit under a contract or under the Partnership Act. Under subsection (2) the very same ban is imposed on an unregistered firm or on its behalf by any of its
partners against any third party by way of a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract in any
Court. A close reading of sub-Sections (1) and (2) therefore shows that while under sub-section
(1) the ban is as against filing a suit in a Court by any person as a partner of an unregistered firm
against the firm itself or any of its partner, under sub- section (2) such a ban in the same form of a
suit in the Court will also operate against any third party at the instance of such an unregistered
firm. The common feature in both the sub-sections are filing of a suit, in a Court for the
enforcement of a right arising from a contract or conferred by the Partnership Act either on behalf
of an unregistered firm or by the firm itself or by anyone representing as partners of such an
unregistered firm. While under sub-section (1) the ban imposed would operate against the firm
itself or any of its partners, under sub-section (2) the ban would operate against any third party.
The question for our consideration is by virtue of sub-section (3) whether the expression other
proceedings contained therein will include Arbitral proceedings and can be equated to a suit filed
in a Court and thereby the ban imposed against an unregistered firm can operate in the matter of
arbitral proceedings. If sub-sections (1) and (2) are virtually lifted whole hog and incorporated in
sub-section (3), it must be stated that it is not the mere ban that is imposed in sub-sections (1) and
that alone is contemplated for the application of sub-section (3). In other words, when the whole
of the ingredients contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) are wholly incorporated in sub-section (3),
the resultant position would be that the ban can operate in respect of an unregistered firm even
relating to a set off or other proceedings only when such claim of set off or other proceedings are
intrinsically connected with the suit that is pending in a Court. To put it differently, in order to
invoke sub-section (3) of Section 69 and for the ban to operate either the firm should be an
unregistered one or the person who wants to sue should be a partner of an unregistered firm, that
its/ his endeavour should be to file a suit in a Court, in which event even if it pertains to a claim
of set off or in respect of other proceedings connected with any right arising from a contract or
conferred by the Partnership Act which is sought to be enforced through a Court by way of a suit
then and then alone the said sub-section can operate to its full extent.
As far as the construction of the said sub-section (3) of Section 69 is concerned, we are able to
discern the above legal position without any scope of ambiguity. To be more precise, the
condition precedent for the operation of ban under sub-section (3) is that the launching of a suit in
a Court of law should be present and it should be by an unregistered firm or by a person claiming
to be partner of an unregistered firm either to a claim for set off in the said suit or any other
proceedings intrinsically connected with the said suit.

In the event of the above ingredients set out under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) being fulfilled
then and then alone the ban prescribed against an unregistered firm under Section 69(1), (2) and
(3) would operate and not otherwise.
Keeping the above outcome of the legal position that can be derived from a reading of subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 69 in mind we can draw further conclusions by making
specific reference to sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) as well as the exceptions set out in
sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) as well. When under sub-section (3) which also relates
to a ban concerning other proceedings, the law makers wanted to specifically exclude from such
ban such of those proceedings which also likely to arise in a suit, but yet the imposition of ban of
an unregistered firm need not be imposed. Keeping the said intent of the law makers in mind,
when we read sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3), it can be understood that even though
such other proceedings may be for the enforcement of any right to sue but yet if it is for the
dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm or any right or power to realize the
property of a dissolved firm, the same can be worked out by way of a suit in a Court or by way of
other proceedings in that suit and the same will not be affected by the ban imposed under subsection (3). Similarly, any steps initiated at the instance of an official assignee, a receiver or Court
under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act of 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act
of 1920 (5 of 1920) to realize the property of an insolvent partner in a pending suit of a Court also
stand excluded from the ban imposed under sub-section (3). The specific exclusions contained in
clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) therefore makes the position clear to the effect that even
though such proceedings may fall under the expression other proceedings and may be
intrinsically connected with a suit in a Court, yet the ban would not operate against such
proceedings.
When we read sub-section (4), the ban imposed under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) will have no
application to any of those proceedings set out in sub- clauses (a) and (b) of the said sub-section
(4). A specific reference to sub-clause (b) of sub-section (4) disclose that in the last part of the
said sub-clause it is specifically provided that other proceedings incidental to or arising from any
suit or claim of set off not exceeding Rs.100 in value under those specific statute referred to in the
said sub- clause can also be launched without any ban being operated as provided under subsections (1), (2) and (3). The said part of sub-clause (b) of sub- section (4) thus gives a vivid
picture as to the position that the other proceeding specified in the said sub-section can only relate
to a pending suit in a Court and not to any other different proceeding which can be categorized as
other proceedings.
We are thus able to arrive at a definite conclusion as to the scope and ambit of Section 69 in
particular about Section 69(3). Having thus analyzed the provision in such minute details and its
implication, we can now apply the said provision to the case on hand and find out whether
Section 69(3) is attracted to the Arbitral Proceedings and the ultimate award passed therein by
construing the same as falling under the expression other proceedings.

In the case on hand, the contract between the parties contained an Arbitration Clause. The
respondent invoked the said clause and an Arbitrator came to be appointed. After the respondent
filed its statement of claim, the appellant filed its reply and also its counter claim dated
30.08.2003. Before the Arbitrator, in the course of oral arguments, a faint attempt was made
contending that, the appellant-firm being an unregistered one, by virtue of Section 69 of the
Partnership Act, the proceedings insofar as the counter claim was concerned, the same was not
maintainable and should be rejected. The Arbitrator took the correct view that Section 69 has no
application to the proceedings of the Arbitrator and held that the objection of the respondent was
not sustainable. The Arbitrator allowed the counter claim to the extent of Rs.1,36,24,886/-
(Rupees One crore thirty six lacs twenty four thousand eight hundred eighty six only). When the
award of the Arbitrator was challenged by the respondent under Section 34 of the Act, the very
same objection was raised as a ground of attack. The learned Single Judge of the High Court also
found no merit in the said contention and upheld the award of counter claim.
By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench in the appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act
took a contrary view and held that the counter claim in an Arbitral Proceedings is covered by the
expression other proceedings contained in Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act and the appellant
being an unregistered firm at the relevant point of time was hit by the embargo contained therein
and consequently the award of counter claim in the award as confirmed by the learned Judge was
reversed as not justiciable by virtue of Section 69 of the Partnership Act.
Based on the close analysis of Section 69 in its different parts, we are able to discern and hold
that in order to attract the said Section, first and foremost the pending proceeding must be a suit
instituted in a Court and in that suit a claim of set off or other proceedings will also be barred by
virtue of the provision set out in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 as specifically stipulated in
sub-section (3) of the said Section. Having regard to the manner in which the expressions are
couched in sub-section (3), a claim of set off or other proceedings cannot have independent
existence. In other words, the foundation for the application of the said sub-section should be the
initiation of a suit in which a claim of set off or other proceedings which intrinsically connected
with the suit arise and not otherwise.
Under the Partnership Act, the expression Court is not defined. In Section 2(e) of the said Act
though it is stated that the expressions used but not defined, the definition in the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 can be applied, in the Contract Act also there is no specific definition set out for the
expression Court. However, we find a definition of the Court in Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act,
which reads as under:

2. Definitions.-(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,-

S.2 (e) Court means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the
High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the
questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of
a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any
Court of Small Causes;
Mr. Amrender Saran, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in his submissions contended
that under Section 36 of the 1996 Act since it has been provided that the award of an Arbitrator
can be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were a decree of
the Court, it should be held that the role played by the Arbitrator should also be deemed to be that
of a Court and on that footing hold that Arbitral Proceedings are also akin to Court proceedings
before the Court by equating the Arbitral Tribunal as a Court.
Having thus noted the facts involved in the case on hand and before dealing with the contentions
of Mr. Saran, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent on the interpretation of Section 69(3), we
wish to note the earliest decision on this very question dealt with in Jagdish Chander Gupta v.
Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. 1964 (8) SCR 50,Justice Hidayatullah, speaking for the Bench has
made a critical analysis of this very provision, namely, Section 69(3) and has stated as under in
paragraphs 7 and 9:

7. Mr. Justice Naik asked the question that if all proceedings were to be excluded why was it not
   considered sufficient to speak of proceedings along with suits in sub-Sections (1) and (2) instead
   of framing a separate sub- section about proceedings and coupling other proceeding with a claim
   of set-off? The question is a proper one to ask but the search for the answer in the scheme of the
   section itself gives the clue. The section things in terms of (a) suits and (b) claims of set-off
   which are in a sense of the nature of suits and (c) suits and other proceedings. The section first
   provides for exclusion of suits in sub-sections (1) and (2). Then it says that the same ban applies
   to a claim of set-off and other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract. Next it
   excludes the ban in respect of the right to sue (a) for the dissolution of a firm, (b) for accounts of
   a dissolved firm and (c) for the realization of the property of a dissolved firm. The emphasis in
   each case is on dissolution of the firm. Then follows a general exclusion of the section. The
   fourth sub-section says that the section as a whole, is not to apply to firms or to partners and firms
   which have no place of business in the territories of India or whose places of business are situated
   in the territories of India but in areas to which Chapter VII is not to apply and to suits or claims of
   set- off not exceeding Rs.100 in value. Here there is no insistence on the dissolution of the firm. It
   is significant that in the latter part of clause (b) of that section the words are or to any proceeding
   in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim and this

clearly shows that the word proceeding is not limited to a proceeding in the nature of a suit or a
claim of set-off. Sub-section (4) combines suits and a claim of set-off and then speaks of any
proceeding in execution and other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim
as being outside the ban of the main section. It would hardly have been necessary to be so explicit
if the words other proceeding in the main section had a meaning as restricted as is suggested by
the respondent. It is possible that the draftsman wishing to make exceptions of different kinds in
respect of suits, claims of set-off and other proceedings grouped suits in sub-sections (1) and (2),
set-off and other proceedings in sub-section
made some special exceptions in respect of them in sub-section (3) in respect of dissolved firms
and then viewed them all together in sub-section (4) providing for a complete exclusion of the
section in respect of suits of particular classes. For convenience of drafting this scheme was
probably followed and nothing can be spelled out from the manner in which the section is subdivided.

9. In our judgment, the words other proceeding in sub-section (3) must receive their full meaning
   untrammeled by the words a claim of set-off. The latter words neither intend nor can be construed
   to cut down the generality of the words other proceeding. The sub-section provides for the
   application of the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) to claims of set-off and also to other
   proceedings of any kind which can properly be said to be for enforcement of any right arising
   from contract except those expressly mentioned as exceptions in sub-section (3) and sub-section
   (4). (Underlining is ours) In the first blush, when we read paragraph 7, one is likely to gain an
   impression as though the expression other proceedings is disjunctive of a suit as specifically
   prescribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69. But on a deeper scrutiny of the judgment, we
   find that in the light of the special features involved in the said case, it was laid down that other
   proceedings would be referable to Arbitration as well. We will right now note and state as to
   those intricate factors which weighed with the learned Judges to state the law in such terms. First
   and foremost, it will have to be noted that in the said case, the Arbitral proceedings arose under
   the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 and in particular in relation to a proceeding which emanated
   under Section 8 of the said Act. Under Section 8 of the 1940 Act, the power of Court to appoint
   Arbitrator or umpire is specified. Sub-sections (1)(a) to (c) and (2) of Section 8 details the
   situations under which the said power of appointment of Arbitrator or umpire can be made. Under
   Section 2(c), the expression Court is defined to mean a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide
   the questions framing the subject matter of a suit excluding a Small Causes Court. Under the said
   definition, an exception is carved out even for a Small Causes Court to fall under the definition of
   Court when the said Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction in situations, which are set
   out in Section 21 of the Act.
   The definition of Court under Section 2(c) read along with Sections 8 and 21 of the 1940 Act,

therefore, indicates that the proceedings initiated under the said Sections are virtually in the
nature of a suit in a Civil Court having jurisdiction, though such proceedings are relating to
initiation as well as superintendence of Arbitration proceedings such as appointment of an
Arbitrator or umpire or inaction or neglect on the part of Arbitrator or umpire or the incapacity of
the Arbitrator or umpire, death of an Arbitrator or umpire or even in situations where the
agreement has not provided for or not intended to supply the vacancy or the parties or the
Arbitrator fail to supply the vacancy or the parties or the Arbitrator who are required to appoint
an umpire and they fail to carry out their obligation. Under Section 21 of the 1940 Act even in the
absence of an agreement providing for Arbitration, by consent of all parties to any suit can seek
for a reference to Arbitration before the judgment is pronounced. Equally a reference to Sections
11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24,
25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43 and 47 of 1940 Act disclose that the
whole
scheme of the Act in effect invested the Civil Court and under certain specified situations even
with the Small Causes Court to exercise all the powers that a Civil Court having jurisdiction in a
civil suit mutatis mutandis in relation to an Arbitration apply, unlike the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act of 1996 (hereinafter called the 1996 Act).
The scope and ambit of the power and jurisdiction of Court defined under Section 2(e) of the
1996 Act is circumscribed to certain specified extent as set out in Sections 8, 9, 14, 27, 34, 36, 37,
39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 56, 58 and 59. A comparative consideration of the 1940 Act and 1996
Act disclose the extent of control and operation of a Court under the former Act was far more
intensive and elaborate than the latter Act. The more significant distinction as between the 1940
Act and the 1996 Act is clear to the position that the former Act does not merely stop with the
initiation and enforcement of an Arbitration and its award, but effectively provides for
intervention at every stage of the Arbitral proceedings upto its final consideration and
enforcement as if it were a regular civil suit, whereas under the 1996 Act, the scope of
intervention is not that of a Civil Court as it could do in the matter of a suit. Such clear distinction
could be discerned from the reading of the various provisions of both the Acts. Therefore, in the
light of such distinctive features that prevail in respect of an Arbitral proceeding which emanated
under the 1940 Act, this Court held in Jagdish Chander case (supra) to the effect that an Arbitral
proceedings governed by 1940 Act would squarely fall under the category of other proceedings as
specified in Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act. To be more precise, in Jagdish Chander case
(supra), in as much the initiation of the proceedings were under Section 8 of the 1940 Act before
a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of suit and the
respondent therein being an unregistered Partnership Firm, the ingredients set out in Section 69(1)
to (3) of the Partnership Act applied in all force and consequently held that the prohibition set out
in the said Section squarely applied.

We only wish to add that though in the said decision, this Court did not specifically mention as to
the requirement of pendency of a proceeding in the nature of a suit in a Civil Court as the basic
ingredient to be satisfied as stipulated in sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 69 in order to extend
the specific prohibition even to other proceedings under sub- section (3), this Court was fully
aware of the fulfillment of those mandatory requirement having regard to the nature of
proceedings that existed under the provisions of the 1940 Act. Therefore, our conclusion based on
the interpretation of Section 69 on the whole as set out in paragraphs 12 to 17 are fully supported
by the above decision. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the ratio laid down in Jagdish
Chander case does not in anyway conflict with the view which we have taken herein, having
regard to the advent of the 1996 Act, under which the nature of Arbitration Proceedings
underwent a sea change as compared to the 1940 Act, what is stated in Jagdish Chander case can
have application in the special facts of that case and that it can have no application to a
proceedings which emanated under the 1996 Act, for which the interpretation to be placed on
Section 69(3) will have to be made independently with specific reference to the provisions of the
1996 Act, where the role of the Court is limited as noted earlier to the extent as specified in
Sections 8, 9 etc. Having thus noted the distinctive features in Jagdish Chander case ,we wish to
refer to the subsequent decision of this Court reported in Kamal Pushp Enterprises v.D.R.
Construction Co. (2000) 6 SCC 659. The judgment and the ratio in Jagdish Chander was sought
to be applied in all force in Kamal Pushp Enterprises ,but having noted the distinctive feature of
Jagdish Chander , this Court has explained the said
judgment and held that it will have no application to a post Award situation. Some of the relevant
portions of the judgment in Kamal Pushp Enterprises can be quoted to appreciate the ultimate
conclusion which fully supports our view. The question posed for consideration has been noted as
under:
Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the Courts below ought to
have sustained the objection of the appellant based upon Section 69 of the Partnership Act
holding the proceedings to be barred on account of the respondent being an unregistered firm.
Strong reliance was placed in this regard upon the decision of this Court reported in Jagdish
Chander Gupta Vs. Kajaria Traders (India) ltd. [AIR 1964 SC 1882]; .. in addition to placing
reliance upon some other decisions of the High Courts, to substantiate his claim.
This Court ultimately construed the words other proceedings in sub- section (3) of Section 69
giving them their full meaning untrammeled by the words a claim of set off, and held that the
generality of the words other proceedings are not to be cut down by the latter words. The said
case, being one concerning an application before Court under Section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act,
1940 in the light of the arbitration agreement, this Court finally held that since the arbitration
clause formed part of the agreement constituting the partnership the proceeding under Section
8(2) was in fact to enforce a right which arose from a contract/agreement of parties.

9. The prohibition contained in Section 69 is in respect of instituting a proceeding to enforce a
   right arising from a contract in any Court by an unregistered firm, and it had no application to the
   proceedings before an Arbitrator and that too when the reference to the Arbitrator was at the
   instance of the appellant itself. If the said bar engrafted in Section 69 is absolute in its terms and
   is destructive of any and every right arising under the contract itself and not confined merely to
   enforcement of a right arising from a contract by an unregistered firm by instituting a suit or other
   proceedings in Court only, it would become a jurisdictional issue in respect of the Arbitrators
   power, authority and competency itself, undermining thereby the legal efficacy of the very award,
   and consequently furnish a ground by itself to challenge the award when it is sought to be made a
   rule of Court.. The Award in this case cannot either rightly or legitimately said to be vitiated on
   account of the prohibition contained in Section 69 of the partnership Act, 1932 since the same has
   no application to proceedings before an Arbitrator. At the stage of enforcement of the award by
   passing a decree in terms thereof what is enforced is the award itself which crystallise the rights
   of parties under the Indian Contract Act and the general law to be paid for the work executed and
   not any right arising only from the objectionable contract.. Consequently, the post award
   proceedings cannot be considered by any means, to be a suit or other proceedings to enforce any
   rights arising under a contract. All the more so when, as in this case, at all stages the respondent
   was only on the defence and has not itself instituted any proceedings to enforce any rights of the
   nature prohibited under Section 69 of the Partnership Act, before any Court as such. (Emphasis
   added) The above passages extracted from the case of Kamal Pushp Enterprises (supra), apart
   from explaining the principles laid down in Jagdish Chander case (supra), has thus held in
   categorical terms as to how Section 69 prohibition will have no application to the post award
   proceedings as they do not fall under the expression other proceedings of the said section. This
   Court thus having already understood and explained Jagdish Chander case (supra) and reiterated
   the legal position on the application of Section 69(3) to the post award proceedings, which fully
   supports our conclusion in the case on hand, we need not dilate much on this issue.
   Having reached the above definite conclusion on the application of Section 69(3) to the post
   award proceedings, when we consider the submissions of Mr. Amrender Saran, learned senior
   counsel for the respondent, the learned counsel, in the first place, contended that for the
   application of Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act to Arbitral proceedings, the foundation must
   be only based on a right in a contract. As far as the said contention is concerned, the same has
   already been dealt with by this Court in Kamal Pushp Enterprises (supra) wherein it is held as
   under:
   The Award in this case cannot either rightly or legitimately said to be vitiated on account of the
   prohibition contained in Section 69 of the partnership Act, 1932 since the same has no application
   to proceedings before an Arbitrator. At the stage of enforcement of the award by passing a decree
   in terms thereof what is enforced is the award itself which crystallise the rights of parties under
   the Indian Contract Act and the general law to be paid for the work executed and not any right

arising only from the objectionable contract.. (Emphasis added) Therefore, the said contention of
the learned senior counsel for the respondent has no force.
The learned senior counsel then contended that while interpreting Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, it was held that Arbitration Proceedings are to be treated on par with civil proceedings.
Though, in the first blush, the submission looks more attractive, on a deeper scrutiny it must be
held that it is always well settled that a judgment can be a binding precedent on a question of law,
which was canvassed before it and decided. Keeping the said principle in mind when we consider
the said submission, we have clearly held as to how a reading of Section 69 as a whole does not
permit of any interpretation that would cover Arbitral proceedings, de hors, filing of a suit in a
Court and that too in respect of a right under a contract governed by the provisions of the Indian
Partnership Act, especially after the coming into force of the 1996 Act and the proceedings
governed by the special features contained in the said Act. Therefore, any interpretation made
under the Limitation Act while construing Section 14 to treat Arbitral proceedings on par with
civil proceedings cannot be applied to the case on hand. Further, the decision of this Court in
Kamal Pushp having considered the application to Section 69(3) itself to Arbitral Proceedings
and held that the same will not apply to a Post Award Proceedings, we do not find any merit in
the said submission. Therefore, we are not able to apply the principles laid down in the decision
reported in M/s. Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (supra) and P. Sarathy (supra) relied upon by the
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
The next submission of Mr. Saran, learned Senior Counsel was again by relying upon Section
2(a) of the Interest Act. Under the said definition section, Court has been defined to include a
Tribunal and an Arbitrator. The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that Arbitral
Proceedings should be equated to a Court and consequently make Section 69(3), applicable to it
as falling under the expression other proceedings. If such a specific provision has been
incorporated in the Partnership Act, there can be no difficulty in accepting the argument of the
learned senior counsel for the respondent. In the absence of such a specific provision, it will not
be appropriate to import the definition clause under Section 2(a) of the Interest Act to the
Partnership Act in order to apply Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act. Therefore, we do not find
any scope to countenance such a submission of the learned senior counsel for the respondent.
Lastly, it was contended by Mr. Saran, learned Senior Counsel that under Section 36 of the 1996
Act, an Award of the Arbitrator has been equated to decree of the Court for the purpose of
execution. Under Section 35 of the 1996 Act, an Arbitral Award will be final and binding on the
parties and persons claiming under them subject to the other provisions prescribed in the said part
of the Act. Under Section 36 it is provided that where the time for making an application to set
aside the arbitral award under Section 34 expired, or such application having been made and
referred, the award can be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it
were a decree of the Court. When we consider the submission of the learned senior counsel for
the respondent, at the very outset, it must be held that by referring to Sections 35 and 36, it is

difficult to draw an inference that based on the deeming provision specifically meant for the
enforcement and execution of an Award, the Arbitral Proceedings can be equated to a Civil Court
proceedings. As rightly contended by Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel for the appellant,
Section 36 only creates a statutory fiction which is limited for the purpose of enforcement of the
Award. The deeming fiction is specifically restricted to treat the Award as a decree of a Court,
exclusively for the purpose of execution, though as a matter of fact, it is only an Award of
Arbitral proceeding. It is a settled proposition, that a statutory provision will have to be construed
from the words that are expressly used and it is not for the Court to add or substitute any word to
it. Therefore, going by Sections 35 and 36 it cannot be held that the entire Arbitral proceeding is a
Civil Court proceedings for the purpose of applicability of Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act.
In this context, we draw support from the decision of this Court reported in Sadan K. Bormal
(supra), paragraph 25 is relevant for our purpose which reads as under:

25. So far as interpretation of a provision creating a legal fiction is concerned, it is trite that the
    Court must ascertain the purpose for which the fiction is created and having done so must assume
    all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect
    to the fiction. In construing a fiction it must not be extended beyond the purpose for which it is
    created or beyond the language of the Section by which it is created. It cannot be extended by
    importing another fiction. These principles are well settled and it is not necessary for us to refer to
    the authorities on this subject. The principle has been succinctly stated by Lord Asquith in East
    End Dwelling Co. Ltd. V. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 ALL ER 587, when he observed
    :-
    “If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited
    from doing so, also imagine as real the consequence and incidents which, if the putative state of
    affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it-. The statute says
    that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must
    cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that
    state of affairs”. We also draw support from the decision of this Court reported in Paramjeet
    Singh Patheja Vs. ICDS Ltd. – (2006) 13 SCC 322, paragraph 42 is relevant, which reads as
    under:
    
    42. The words as if demonstrate that award and decree or order are two different things. The legal
    fiction created is for the limited purpose of enforcement as a decree. The fiction is not intended to
    make it a decree for all purposes under all statutes, whether State or Central. Though the learned
    senior counsel for the appellant and the respondent referred to certain other decisions in support
    of their respective submissions, as we are fortified by our conclusion, based on the interpretation
    of Section 69 of the Partnership Act vis-à-vis the 1996 Act and the 1940 Act as well as supported
    by the decision in Jagdish Chander (supra) and Kamal Pushp Enterprises (supra), we do not find
    any necessity to refer to those decisions in detail. Having regard to our conclusion that Arbitral
    Proceedings will not come under the expression other proceedings of Section 69(3) of the

Partnership Act, the ban imposed under the said Section 69 can have no application to Arbitral
proceedings as well as the Arbitration Award. Therefore, the appeal stands allowed, the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the judgment of the learned Single Judge stands
restored. No costs.