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By an order dated August 5, 1991 in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of
India v. B. Karunakar [(1992) 1 SCC 709], a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
referred the matter to the Chief Justice for being placed before a larger Bench, for the Bench
found a conflict in the two decisions of this Court, viz., Kailash Chander Asthana v. State of
U.P. [(1988) 3 SCC 600] and Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan [(1991) 1 SCC 588],
both delivered by the Benches of three learned Judges. This group of matters was at the
instance of various parties, viz., Union of India, Public Sector Corporations, Public Sector
Banks, State Governments and two private parties.
P.B. SAWANT, J. – 2. The basic question of law which arises in these matters is whether the
report of the enquiry officer/authority who/which is appointed by the disciplinary authority to
hold an inquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee, is required to be furnished
to the employee to enable him to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority
before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the
employee and the punishment, if any, to be awarded to him. This question in turn gives rise to
the following incidental questions:
(i) Whether the report should be furnished to the employee even when the
statutory rules laying down the procedure for holding the disciplinary inquiry are
silent on the subject or are against it?
(ii) Whether the report of the enquiry officer is required to be furnished to the
delinquent employee even when the punishment imposed is other than the major
punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank?
(iii) Whether the obligation to furnish the report is only when the employee asks
for the same or whether it exists even otherwise?
(iv) Whether the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan Case will apply to all
establishments — Government and non-Government, public and private sector
undertakings?
(v) What is the effect of the non-furnishing of the report on the order of
punishment and what relief should be granted to the employee in such cases?
(vi) From what date the law requiring furnishing of the report, should come into
operation?
(vii) Since the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case has made the law laid down
there prospective in operation, i.e., applicable to the orders of punishment passed
after November 20, 1990 on which day they said decision was delivered, this
question in turn also raises another question, viz., what was the law prevailing prior
to November 20, 1990?
- In this country, the law on the subject has developed along two paths, viz., the statute
and the principles of natural justice.
246 - Since the Government of India Act, 1935 till the Forty-second Amendment of the
Constitution, the Government servant had always the right to receive the report of the enquiry
officer/authority and to represent against the findings recorded in it when the enquiry
officer/authority was not the disciplinary authority. This right was however, exercisable by
him at the second stage of the disciplinary proceedings viz., when he was served with a notice
to show cause against the proposed penalty. The issuance of the notice to show cause against
the penalty necessarily required the furnishing of a copy of the enquiry officer’s report since,
as held by the Courts, the right to show cause against the penalty also implied the right to
represent against the findings on the charges. This was considered to be an essential part of
the ‘reasonable opportunity’ incorporated earlier in Section 240(3) of the GOI Act and later in
Article 311(2) of the Constitution as originally enacted. The right to receive the enquiry
officer’s report and to show cause against the findings in the report was independent of the
right to show cause against the penalty proposed. The two rights came to be confused with
each other because as the law stood prior to the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution,
the two rights arose simultaneously only at the stage when a notice to show cause against the
proposed penalty was issued. If the disciplinary authority after considering the enquiry
officer’s report had dropped the proceedings or had decided to impose a penalty other than
that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, there was no occasion for issuance of the
notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. In that case, the employee had neither the
right to receive the report and represent against the finding of guilt nor the right to show cause
against the proposed penalty. The right to receive the report and to represent against the
findings recorded in it was thus inextricably connected with the acceptance of the report by
the disciplinary authority and the nature of the penalty proposed. Since the Forty-second
Amendment of the Constitution dispensed with the issuance of the notice to show cause
against the penalty proposed even if it was dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, some
courts took the view that the Government servant was deprived of his right to represent
against the findings of guilt as well. The error occurred on account of the failure to distinguish
the two rights which were independent of each other. - While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable
opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary
authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against
the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has
considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of
the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is
the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser
penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right
exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. - The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an
essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural
justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before
the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to
come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings
including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary
247
authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded
without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by
it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary
authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair
opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the
tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings
recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity
to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own
findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the
disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer
along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do
constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence
its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same
to the disciplinary authority that would not constitute any additional material before the
disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when
the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may
not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such
findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration
by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the
reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that
before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee
should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer’s findings. The disciplinary
authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the
representation of the employee against it. - It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary
authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the
disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer’s
report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it. The second stage begins when the
disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the
disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not
even reached. The employee’s right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable
opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him,
he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary
proceedings. - The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article
311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of the charges against him”. The findings on the charges given by a third person like
the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at
by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new
unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that
“where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty
may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be
necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty
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proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to
be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary
authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to
assist him), the employee’s reply to the enquiry officer’s report and consideration of such
reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second
stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show
cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding
upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the
penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry
officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the
Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the
second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the
disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and
the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second
Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of
the employee against the enquiry officer’s report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary
authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives
at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. - Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority;
the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer’s report before the
disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the
employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the
employee’s right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the
enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a
denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the
principles of natural justice. - Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows:
[i] Since the denial of the report of the enquiry officer is a denial of reasonable
opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory
rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural
justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a
copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or
are silent on the subject.
[ii] The relevant portion of Article 311(2) of the Constitution is as follows:
“(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against
him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those
charges.”
Thus the article makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The article, however, cannot be construed to
mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in
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awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee.
What is further, Article 311(2) applies only to members of the civil services of the Union
or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or to the holders of the civil posts under
the Union or a State. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and
others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules
contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded and when the enquiry officer is
not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the
enquiry officer’s report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment.
[iii] Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend himself
effectively and he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or
against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver
of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the report or not, the report has to
be furnished to him.
[iv] In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the
disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part
of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural
justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd.
Ramzan case should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or
non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules
governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the
furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of
punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the
punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of
the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges
levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly.
[v] The next question to be answered is what the effect on the order of punishment is
when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief
should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to
the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and
the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the nonfurnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have
made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct
reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of
justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of
natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to
vindicate his just rights. They are neither incantations to be invoked nor rites to be
performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the
employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the
report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice
to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It
amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of
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justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of
natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice. - Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer’s report is not furnished to the
delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause
the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured
it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his
or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties,
the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have
made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal
should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not
mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not
furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short
cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and
give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any
internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of
natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds
that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it
should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the
Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is
to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed
with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from
the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be
entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his
reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority
concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the
final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated,
the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from
the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the
benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the
inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of
holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such
fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law. - Questions (vi) and (vii) may be considered together. As has been discussed earlier,
although the furnishing of the enquiry officer’s report to the delinquent employee is a part of
the reasonable opportunity available to him to defend himself against the charges, before the
Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the stage at which the said opportunity became
available to the employee had stood deferred till the second notice requiring him to show
cause against the penalty, was issued to him. The right to prove his innocence to the
disciplinary authority was to be exercised by the employee along with his right to show cause
as to why no penalty or lesser penalty should be awarded. The proposition of law that the two
rights were independent of each other and in fact belonged to two different stages in the
inquiry came into sharp focus only after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution
which abolished the second stage of the inquiry, viz., the inquiry into the nature of
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punishment. As pointed out earlier, it was mooted but not decided in E. Bashyan case by the
two learned Judges of this Court who referred the question to the larger Bench. It has also
been pointed out that in K.C. Asthana case no such question was either raised or decided. It
was for the first time in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case that the question squarely fell for decision
before this Court. Hence till November 20, 1990, i.e., the day on which Mohd. Ramzan Khan
case was decided, the position of law on the subject was not settled by this Court. It is for the
first time in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case that this Court laid down the law. That decision made
the law laid down there prospective in operation, i.e., applicable to the orders of punishment
passed after November 20, 1990. The law laid down was not applicable to the orders of
punishment passed before that date notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings arising out
of the same were pending in courts after that date. The said proceedings had to be decided
according to the law prevalent prior to the said date which did not require the authority to
supply a copy of the enquiry officer’s report to the employee. The only exception to this was
where the service rules with regard to the disciplinary proceedings themselves made it
obligatory to supply a copy of the report to the employee. - However, it cannot be gainsaid that while Mohd. Ramzan Khan case made the law
laid down there prospective in operation, while disposing of the cases which were before the
Court; the Court through inadvertence gave relief to the employees concerned in those cases
by allowing their appeals and setting aside the disciplinary proceedings. The relief granted
was obviously per incuriam. The said relief has, therefore, to be confined only to the
employees concerned in those appeals. The law which is expressly made prospective in
operation there cannot be applied retrospectively on account of the said error. It is now well
settled that the courts can make the law laid down by them prospective in operation to prevent
unsettlement of the settled positions, to prevent administrative chaos and to meet the ends of
justice. In this connection, we may refer to some well-known decisions on the point. - The need to make the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case prospective in
operation requires no emphasis. As pointed out above, in view of the unsettled position of the
law on the subject, the authorities/managements all over the country had proceeded on the
basis that there was no need to furnish a copy of the report of the enquiry officer to the
delinquent employee and innumerable employees have been punished without giving them
the copies of the reports. In some of the cases, the orders of punishment have long since
become final while other cases are pending in courts at different stages. In many of the cases,
the misconduct has been grave and in others the denial on the part of the management to
furnish the report would ultimately prove to be no more than a technical mistake. To reopen
all the disciplinary proceedings now would result in grave prejudice to administration which
will far outweigh the benefit to the employees concerned. Both administrative reality and
public interests do not, therefore, require that the orders of punishment passed prior to the
decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case without furnishing the report of the enquiry officer
should be disturbed and the disciplinary proceedings which gave rise to the said orders should
be reopened on that account. Hence we hold as above.
