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S.B. SINHA, J. – Whether direction to pay back wages consequent upon a declaration that a
workman has been retrenched in violation of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (equivalent to Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947)
as a rule is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 6.2.2004
passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 23890 of 1992 dismissing the appeal preferred by the Appellant herein arising
out of a judgment and order dated 8th July, 1992.
The Appellant is an undertaking of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Respondent
herein was appointed on 23rd July, 1984 in a project known as Project Peetal Basti by the
Appellant for looking after the construction of building, cement loading and unloading. He
worked in the said project from 23.7.1984 till 8.1.1987. He was thereafter appointed in NonFerrous Rolling Mill. By an order dated 12/13.2.1987, the competent authority of the NonFerrous Mill of the Appellant passed the following order:
“Following two persons are hereby accorded approval for appointment in NonFerrous Rolling Mill on minimum daily wages for the period w.e.f. date indicated against
their name till 31-3-1987.
Sl No. Name Date
- Sh. Hori Lal 7-1-1987
- Sh. Uday Narain Pandey 8-1-1987″
The services of the Respondent were terminated on the expiry of his tenure. An
industrial dispute having been raised, the appropriate government by an order dated 14.9.1998
referred the following dispute for adjudication by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Uttar
Pradesh:
Whether the employer’s decision to terminate the Workman Sh. Uday Narain son
of Pateshwari Pandey w.e.f. 1-4-87 was illegal and improper? If yes whether the
concerned workman is entitled to the benefit of retrenchment and other benefit?
The Project Officer of the Appellant-Corporation appears to have granted a certificate
showing the number of days on which the Respondent performed his duties.
The Labour Court in its award dated 31.10.1991 came to the finding that the
Respondent worked for more than 240 days in each year of 1985-1986. It was directed:
Therefore, I reached to the decision that the employer should reinstate the
concerned workman Uday Narain Pandey son of Sh. Pateshwari Pandey w.e.f. the
date of retrenchment i.e. 1-4-87 and he should be paid entire backwage with any
other allowances w.e.f. same date within 30 days from the date of this order together
with Rs. 50/- towards cost of litigation to Sh. Uday Narain Pandey. I decide
accordingly in this Industrial Dispute.
192
The Appellant herein filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court in May, 1992
which was marked as Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23890 of 1992 inter alia contending that
as the Respondent had not rendered service continuously for a period of 240 days during the
period of 12 calendar months immediately before his retrenchment uninterruptedly, he was
not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. It was
further contended that the appointment of the Respondent was on contractual basis for a fixed
tenure which came to an end automatically as stipulated in the aforementioned order dated
12/13.2.1987.
An application was filed by the Respondent herein under the Payment of Wages Act
wherein an award was passed. The said order was also questioned by the Appellant by filing
a writ application before the High Court and by an order dated 12.8.1993, the High Court
directed it to pay a sum of rupees ten thousand to the Respondent. Pursuant to or in
furtherance of the said order, the Respondent is said to have been paid wages upto February, - By reason of the impugned order dated 6.2.2004, the writ petition was dismissed
holding:
Having heard the learned counsel for the Petitioners and having perused the
record, I am of the opinion that the aforesaid findings recorded by the Labour Court
cannot be said to be perverse. The learned senior counsel then contended that the
Petitioner No. 1 i.e. U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. has been closed down. Be
that as it may, the position of the Respondent workman would be the same as that all
the similar employees and this cannot be a ground to set aside the award of the
Labour Court.
Ms. Rachana Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant would
bring to our notice that the Appellant’s industries have been lying closed since 26.3.1993 and
in that view of the matter, the Labour Court as also the High Court committed a serious error
in passing the impugned judgment. The appointment of the Respondent, the learned counsel
would contend, being a contractual one for a fixed period, Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act would have no application.
Relying on or on the basis of the principle of ‘no work no pay’, it was urged that for the
period the Respondent did not work, he was not entitled to any wages and as such the grant of
back wages by the Labour Court as also by the High Court is wholly illegal, particularly, in
view of the fact that no statement was made in his written statement filed before the Labour
Court that he was not employed with any other concern. In any event, the Respondent was
also not interested in a job. In support of the aforementioned contention, reliance has been
placed on Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. S.C. Sharma [(2005) 2 SCC 363] and
Allahabad Jal Sansthan v. Daya Shankar Rai [(2005) 5 SCC 124].
Mr. Bharat Sangal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, on the other
hand, would submit that Section 2 (oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 applies to the
workmen working in the State of Uttar Pradesh as there does not exist any such provision in
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. It was conceded that in view of the fact that establishment
of the Appellant was sold out on 26.3.1993, the Respondent may not be entitled to an order of
reinstatement with full back wages but having regard to the fact that his services were
193
wrongly terminated with effect from 1.4.1987, he would be entitled to back wages for the
entire period from 1.4.1987 till 26.3.1993 besides the amount of compensation as envisaged
under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
Payment of back wages, Mr. Sangal would urge, is automatic consequent upon a
declaration that the order of termination is unsustainable for any reason whatsoever and in
particular when it is found to be in violation of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act.
It is not in dispute that the Respondent was appointed on daily wages. He on his own
showing was appointed in a project work to look after the construction of building.
The construction of the building, the learned Labour Court noticed, came to an end in the
year 1988. The reference by the appropriate government pursuant to an industrial dispute
raised by the Respondent was made in the year 1990.
A decision had been taken to close down the establishment of the Appellant as far back
on 17.11.1990 wherefor a Government Order, GO No. 395/18 Niryat-3151/90 dated
17.11.1990 was issued. In its rejoinder affidavit filed before the High Court, it was contended
that the said GO was implemented substantially and all the employees including the regular
employees save and except some skeleton staff for winding up were retrenched. The Non
Ferrous Mill of the Appellant was sold on 26.3.1993.
The Labour Court in its impugned award has not arrived at any finding that the order of
appointment dated 8.1.1987 whereby the Respondent was appointed afresh in the Non
Ferrous Rolling Mill was by way of unfair labour practice. It is, however, true that the
Appellant relying on or on the basis of the aforementioned order dated 12/13.2.1987 in terms
whereof the Respondent’s services were approved for appointment in the said mill on
minimum daily wages for the period 8.1.1987 till 31.3.1987 terminated his services without
giving any notice or paying salary of one month in lieu thereof. No compensation in terms of
Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was also paid.
Before adverting to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties, we
may observe that although direction to pay full back wages on a declaration that the order of
termination was invalid used to be the usual result but now, with the passage of time, a
pragmatic view of the matter is being taken by the court realizing that an industry may not be
compelled to pay to the workman for the period during which he apparently contributed little
or nothing at all to it and/ or for a period that was spent unproductively as a result whereof the
employer would be compelled to go back to a situation which prevailed many years ago,
namely, when the workman was retrenched.
It is not disputed that the Respondent did not plead that he after his purported
retrenchment was wholly unemployed.
Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act provides for service of one month notice
as also payment of compensation to be computed in the manner laid down therein. Proviso to
clause (a) of the said provision, however, excludes the requirement of giving such notice in
the event the appointment was for a fixed tenure.
194
Section 25B(2)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act raises a legal fiction that if a workman
has actually worked under the employer continuously for a period of more than 240 days
during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which
calculation is to be made, although he is not in continuous service, he shall be deemed to be in
continuous service under an employer for a period of one year.
The Labour Court although passed its award relying on or on the basis of the certificate
issued by the Appellant, it did not hold that during the preceding 12 months, namely, for the
period 1st April, 1986 to 31st March, 1987 the workman had completed 240 days of service.
Unfortunately, neither the Labour Court nor the High Court considered this aspect of the
matter in right perspective.
No precise formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances payment of entire
back wages should be allowed. Indisputably, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. It would, however, not be correct to contend that it is automatic. It should not be
granted mechanically only because on technical grounds or otherwise an order of termination
is found to be in contravention of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act.
Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Central Act as inserted by Industrial Disputes Amendment Act,
1984 is as under:
“2. Definitions- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context,
(oo) ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a
workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way
of disciplinary action, but does not include
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of
the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its
expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf
contained therein;”
However, a similar provision has not been enacted in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
The contention of the Appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, was that the Respondent having
been appointed for a fixed period was not entitled to any compensation under the provisions
of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. But, in this connection our attention has
been drawn to a 2-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Uttar Pradesh State Sugar
Corporation Ltd. v. Om Prakash Upadhyay [2002 (1) LLJ 241: (2002) 10 SCC 89] wherein
it was held that in view of Section 31(1) of Industrial Disputes (Amendment and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Central
Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicable. In that view of the matter, although no
notice was required to be service in view of the proviso to Clause (a) of Section 6-N of the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, compensation therefor as provided for in Clause (b) was
payable. But, it is not necessary for us to go into the correctness or otherwise of the said
decision as it is not disputed that before the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act can be invoked, the concerned workman must work at least for 240 days during
195
a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is
to be made.
However, as the question as regard termination of service of the Respondent by the
Appellant is not in issue, we would proceed on the basis that the services of the Respondent
were terminated in violation of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The primary
question, as noticed by us herein before, is as to whether even in such a situation the
Respondent would be entitled to the entire back wages.
Before adverting to the said question in a bit more detail, let us consider the decisions
relied upon by Mr. Sangal.
In Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd.
[(1979) 1 SCR 563], this court merely held that the relief of reinstatement with continuity of
service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It, therefore, does
not lay down a law in absolute terms to the effect that right to claim back wages must
necessarily follow an order declaring that the termination of service is invalid in law.
In Hindustan Tin Works notice for retrenchment was issued inter alia for nonavailability of raw material to utilize the full installed capacity, power shedding limiting the
working of the unit to 5 days a week and the mounting loss which were found to be factually
incorrect. The real reason for issuing such a notice was held to be “the annoyance felt by the
management consequent upon the refusal of the workmen to agree to the terms of settlement
contained in the draft dated 5th April, 1974″.
Laws proverbial delay, it was urged therein, is a matter which should be kept in view
having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case and the conduct of the parties. Such
a contention was raised on the ground that the company was suffering losses. The court
analysed factual matrix obtaining therein to the effect that a sum of Rs. 2,80,000/- was
required to be paid by way of back wages and an offer was made by way of settlement to pay
50% of the back wages observing:
“Now, undoubtedly the appellant appears to have turned the corner. The
industrial unit is looking up. It has started making profits. The workmen have already
been reinstated and, therefore, they have started earning their wages. It may,
however, be recalled that the appellant has still not cleared its accumulated loss.
Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of this case it would be appropriate
to award 75% of the back wages to the workmen to be paid in two equal
instalments.”
It will, therefore, be seen that this Court itself, having regard to the factual matrix
obtaining in the said case, directed payment of 75% of the back wages and that too in two
equal instalments.
In Management of Panitole Tea Estate v. The Workmen [(1971) 3 SCR 774], a twojudge bench of this Court while considering the question as regard grant of relief or
reinstatement, observed:
The general rule of reinstatement in the absence of special circumstances was
also recognised in the case of Workmen of Assam Match Co. Ltd. v. Presiding
196
Officer, Labour Court, Assam and has again been affirmed recently in Tulsidas Paul
v. Second Labour Court, W.B. In Tulsidas Paul it has been emphasised that no hard
and fast rule as to which circumstances would establish an exception to the general
rule could be laid down and the Tribunal must in each case decide the question in a
spirit of fairness and justice in keeping with the objectives of industrial adjudication.
In Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cumLabour Court, New Delhi [(1981) 1 SCR 789], this Court refused to go into the question as to
whether termination of services of a workman in violation of the provisions of Section 25F is
void ab initio or merely invalid or inoperative on the premise that semantic luxuries are
misplaced in the interpretation of ‘bread and butter’ statutes. In that context, Chinnappa
Reddy, J. observed:
Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services
of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen.
It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too.
But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly
inequitable vis-`-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back
wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe
financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other
employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion
left in the court to make appropriate consequential orders. The court may deny the
relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has
closed down. The court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that
would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional
cases the court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be
reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special
impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional
hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than
not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the
relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted.
Yet again, no law in absolute terms had been laid down therein. The court proceeded on
the basis that there may be situations where grant of full back wages would be inequitable. In
the fact situation obtaining therein, the court, however was of the opinion that there was no
impediment in the way of awarding the relief. It is interesting to note that Pathak, J., as His
Lordship then was, however was of the view:
“Ordinarily, a workman who has been retrenched in contravention of the law is
entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and that principle yields only where the
justice of the case in the light of the particular facts indicates the desirability of a
different relief.”
The expression ‘ordinarily’ must be understood given its due meaning. A useful reference
in this behalf may be made to a 4-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Jasbhai Motibhai
Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed [(1976) 1 SCC 671] wherein it has been held:
197 - The expression “ordinarily” indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is
flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially
affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or
even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a
stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but
has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be
covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above,
are not inconsistent with it.
In J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India [(1998) 9 SCC 559] again no law has been laid
down in the fact situation obtaining therein. The court held that the workmen had all along
been ready and willing to work, the plea of ‘no work no pay’ as prayed for should not be
applied.
We may notice that in M.D., U.P. Warehousing Corpn. v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee
[(1980) 3 SCC 459] and Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd.
although an observation had been made to the effect that in a case where a breach of the
provisions of Section 25-F has taken place, the workmen cannot be denied back wages to any
extent, no law, which may be considered to be binding precedent has been laid down therein.
In P.G.I. of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh v. Raj Kumar [(2001) 2 SCC
54], Banerjee, J., on the other hand, was of the opinion:
The learned counsel appearing for the respondents, however, placed strong
reliance on a later decision of this Court in PGI of M.E. & Research Chandigarh v.
Vinod Krishan Sharma wherein this Court directed payment of balance of 60% of
the back wages to the respondent within a specified period of time. It may well be
noted that the decision in Soma case has been noticed by this Court in Vinod Sharma
case wherein this Court apropos the decision in Soma case observed: “A mere look at
the said judgment shows that it was rendered in the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the case. It is, therefore, obvious that the said decision which centred round its
own facts cannot be a precedent in the present case which is based on its own facts.”
We also record our concurrence with the observations made therein. Payment of back
wages having a discretionary element involved in it has to be dealt with, in the facts
and circumstances of each case and no straight-jacket formula can be evolved,
though, however, there is statutory sanction to direct payment of back wages in its
entirety. As regards the decision of this Court in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. be it
noted that though broad guidelines, as regards payment of back wages, have been laid
down by this Court but having regard to the peculiar facts of the matter, this Court
directed payment of 75% back wages only.
The decisions of this Court strongly relied upon by Mr. Sangal, therefore, do not speak in
one voice that the industrial court or for that matter the High Court or this Court would not
have any discretionary role to play in the matter of moulding the relief. If a judgment is
rendered merely having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein, the same, in our opinion,
could not be a declaration of law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of
India.
198
It is one thing to say that the court interprets a provision of a statute and lays down a law,
but it is another thing to say that the courts although exercise plenary jurisdiction will have no
discretionary power at all in the matter of moulding the relief or otherwise give any such
reliefs, as the parties may be found to be entitled to in equity and justice. If that be so, the
court’s function as court of justice would be totally impaired. Discretionary jurisdiction in a
court need not be conferred always by a statute.
Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers power upon the court to mould
relief in a given situation. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the
proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act
empowers the Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal to give appropriate relief in case
of discharge or dismissal of workmen.
The meaning of the word ‘discharge’ is somewhat vague. In this case, we have noticed
that one of the contentions of the Appellant was that the services of the Respondent had been
terminated in terms of its order dated 12/13.2.1987 whereby and whereunder the services of
the Respondent herein was approved till 31.3.1987.
The Industrial Disputes Act was principally established for the purpose of pre-empting
industrial tensions, providing the mechanics of dispute-resolutions and setting up the
necessary infrastructure so that the energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in
counter-productive battles and assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of
goodwill. [See LIC v. D.J. Bahadur (1981) 1 SCC 315]
Industrial Courts while adjudicating on disputes between the management and the
workmen, therefore, must take such decisions which would be in consonance with the
purpose the law seeks to achieve. When justice is the buzzword in the matter of adjudication
under the Industrial Disputes Act, it would be wholly improper on the part of the superior
courts to make them apply the cold letter of the statutes to act mechanically. Rendition of
justice would bring within its purview giving a person what is due to him and not what can be
given to him in law.
A person is not entitled to get something only because it would be lawful to do so. If that
principle is applied, the functions of an industrial court shall lose much of its significance.
The changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this Court probably having
regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the government in the wake of prevailing
market economy, globalization, privatization and outsourcing is evident.
In Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharya [(2002) 6 SCC 41], this Court
noticed Raj Kumar and Hindustan Tin Works but held:
As already noted, there was no application of mind to the question of back wages
by the Labour Court. There was no pleading or evidence whatsoever on the aspect
whether the respondent was employed elsewhere during this long interregnum.
Instead of remitting the matter to the Labour Court or the High Court for fresh
consideration at this distance of time, we feel that the issue relating to payment of
back wages should be settled finally. On consideration of the entire matter in the light
of the observations referred to supra in the matter of awarding back wages, we are of
199
the view that in the context of the facts of this particular case including the
vicissitudes of long-drawn litigation, it will serve the ends of justice if the respondent
is paid 50% of the back wages till the date of reinstatement…
The Court, therefore, emphasized that while granting relief application of mind on the
part of the industrial court is imperative. Payment of full back wages, therefore, cannot be the
natural consequence.
The said decisions were, however, distinguished in Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s.
Bharat Electronics Ltd. [(1981) 3 SCC 225]. Desai, J. was of the opinion: - But there is a catena of decisions which rule that where the termination is
illegal especially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither
termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workman
concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. No case is made
out for departure from this normally accepted approach of the courts in the field of
social justice and we do not propose to depart in this case.
In Allahabad Jal Sansthan v. Daya Shankar Rai [(2005) 5 SCC 124], in which one of
us was a party, this Court had taken into consideration most of the decisions relied upon by
Mr. Sangal and observed:
A law in absolute terms cannot be laid down as to in which cases, and under what
circumstances, full back wages can be granted or denied. The Labour Court and/or
Industrial Tribunal before which industrial dispute has been raised, would be entitled
to grant the relief having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. For the
said purpose, several factors are required to be taken into consideration. It is not in
dispute that Respondent 1 herein was appointed on an ad hoc basis; his services were
terminated on the ground of a policy decision, as far back as on 24-1-1987.
Respondent 1 had filed a written statement wherein he had not raised any plea that he
had been sitting idle or had not obtained any other employment in the interregnum.
The learned counsel for the appellant, in our opinion, is correct in submitting that a
pleading to that effect in the written statement by the workman was necessary. Not
only no such pleading was raised, even in his evidence, the workman did not say that
he continued to remain unemployed. In the instant case, the respondent herein had
been reinstated from 27-2-2001.
It was further stated: - We have referred to certain decisions of this Court to highlight that earlier in
the event of an order of dismissal being set aside, reinstatement with full back wages
was the usual result. But now with the passage of time, it has come to be realised that
industry is being compelled to pay the workman for a period during which he
apparently contributed little or nothing at all, for a period that was spent
unproductively, while the workman is being compelled to go back to a situation
which prevailed many years ago when he was dismissed. It is necessary for us to
develop a pragmatic approach to problems dogging industrial relations. However, no
just solution can be offered but the golden mean may be arrived at.
200
Yet again in General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh [JT 2005 (6) SC
137 : (2005) 5 SCC 591], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in a case where the workman had
worked for a short period which was less than a year and having regard to his educational
qualification, etc. denied back wages although the termination of service was held to have
been made in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stating:
A host of factors like the manner and method of selection and appointment i.e.
whether after proper advertisement of the vacancy or inviting applications from the
employment exchange, nature of appointment, namely, whether ad hoc, short term,
daily wage, temporary or permanent in character, any special qualification required
for the job and the like should be weighed and balanced in taking a decision regarding
award of back wages. One of the important factors, which has to be taken into
consideration, is the length of service, which the workman had rendered with the
employer. If the workman has rendered a considerable period of service and his
services are wrongfully terminated, he may be awarded full or partial back wages
keeping in view the fact that at his age and the qualification possessed by him he may
not be in a position to get another employment. However, where the total length of
service rendered by a workman is very small, the award of back wages for the
complete period i.e. from the date of termination till the date of the award, which our
experience shows is often quite large, would be wholly inappropriate. Another
important factor, which requires to be taken into consideration is the nature of
employment. A regular service of permanent character cannot be compared to short
or intermittent daily-wage employment though it may be for 240 days in a calendar
year.
The only question is whether the Respondent would be entitled to back wages from the
date of his termination of service till the aforementioned date. The decision to close down the
establishment by the State of Uttar Pradesh like other public sector organizations had been
taken as far back on 17.11.1990 where for a GO had been issued. It had further been averred,
which has been noticed hereinbefore, that the said GO has substantially been implemented. In
this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be subserved if the
back wages payable to the Respondent for the period 1.4.1987 to 26.3.1993 is confined to
25% of the total back wages payable during the said period.
The judgments and orders of the Labour Court and the High Court are set aside and it is
directed that the Respondent herein shall be entitled to 25% back wages of the total back
wages payable during the aforesaid period and compensation payable in terms of Section 6-N
of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. If, however, any sum has been paid by the Appellant
herein, the same shall be adjusted from the amount payable in terms of this judgment.
For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned
hereinbefore. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
