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BHAGWATI, J. :-This is a writ petition brought by way of public interest litigation in order to
ensure observance of the provisions of various labour laws in relation to workmen employed in
the construction work of various projects connected with the Asian Games. The matter was
brought to the attention of the Court by the first petitioner which is an organisation formed for
the purpose of protecting democratic, rights by means of a letter addressed to one of us
(Bhagwati J.). The letter was based on a report made by a team of three social scientists who
were commissioned by the first petitioner for the purpose of investigating and inquiring into the
conditions under which the workmen engaged in the various Asiad Projects were working. Since
the letter addressed by Ist petitioner was based on the report made by three social scientists after
personal investigation and study, it was treated as a writ petition on the judicial side and notice
was issued upon it inter alia to the Union of India, Delhi Development Authority and Delhi
Administration which were arrayed as respondents to the writ petition. These respondents filed
their respective affidavits in reply to the allegations contained in the writ petition and an affidavit
was filed on behalf of the petitioner in rejoinder to the affidavits in reply and the writ petition
was argued before us on the basis of these pleadings.
- The Asian Games take place periodically is different parts of Asia and this time India is
hosting the Asian Games. It is a highly prestigious undertaking and in order to accomplish it
successfully according to international standard the Government, of India had to embark upon
various construction projects which included building of flyovers, stadia, swimming pool. hotels
and. Asian Games village complex. This construction work was farmed out by the Government
of India amongst various authorities such as the Delhi Administration he Delhi Development
Authority and the New Delhi Municipal, Committee. It is not necessary for the purpose of the
present writ petition to set out what particular project was entrusted to which authority because it
is not the purpose of this writ petition to find fault with any particular authority for not observing
in the labour laws in relation to the workmen employed in the projects which are being executed
by it, but to ensure that in future the labour laws are implemented and the rights of the workers
under the labour laws are not violated. These various authorities to whom. the execution of the
different projects was entrusted engaged contractors for the purpose of carrying out the
construction on work of the projects and they were registered as principal employers under
Section 7 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The contractors started
the construction work of the projects and for the purpose of carrying out the construction work.
they engaged workers through jamadars. The jamadars brought the workers from different parts
of India and particularly the States of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa and got them
employed by the contractors. The workers were entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per day,
that being the minimum wage fixed for workers employed on the construction of roads and in
building operations but the case of the petitioners was, that the workers were not paid this
minimum wage and they were exploited by the contractors and the jamaors. The Union of India
in the affidavit reply filed on its behalf by Madan Mohan Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour
asserted that the contractors and the minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per day but frankly admitted that
this minimum wage was aid to the jamadars through whom the workers were recruited and the
jamadars deducted rupee one per day per worker as their commission and paid only Rs. 8.25 by
way of wage to the workers. The result was that in fact the workers did not get the minimum
wage of Rs. 9.25 per day. The petitioners also alleged in the writ petition that the provisions of
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the Equal Remuneration Act 1976 were violated and women worker, were paid only Rs. 7 per
day and the balance of the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by the jamaridars. It
was also pointed out by the petitioners that there was iola ion of Art., 24 of the Constitution
situation and of the provisions of the Employment of Children Act 1938 inasmuch as children
below the age of 14 years were (employed by the contractors in the construction work of the
various projects. The petitioners also alleged violation of the provisions of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition ) Act 1970 and pointed out various breaches of those provisions by
the contractors which resulted in deprivation and exploitation of the workers employed in the
construction work of most of the projects. It was also the case of the petitioners that the workers
were denied proper living conditions and medical and other facilities to which they were entitled
under the provisions of the contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition 1970. The petitioners also
complained that the contractors were not implementing the provisions of the Inter– State
Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1979 though that
Act was brought in force in the Union Territory of Delhi an far back as 2nd October 1980. The
report of the team of three social scientists on which the writ petition was based set out various
instances of violations of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. 1948, the Equal
Remuneration Act 1976, Article 24 of the Constitution. The Employment of Children Act 1938
and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service)
Act 1979. - These averments made on behalf of the petitioners were denied in the affidavits in reply filed
on behalf of the Union of India the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority.
It was asserted by these authorities that so far as the Equal Remuneration Act 1976 and the
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 were concerned, the provisions of these
labour laws were being complied with by the contractors and whenever any violations of these
labour laws were brought to the attention of the authorities as a result of periodical inspections
carried out by them, action by way of prosecution was being taken against the contractors. The
provisions of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 were, according to the Delhi Development
Authority, being observed by the contractors and it was pointed out by the Delhi Development
Authority in its affidavit reply that. the construction work of the projects entrusted to it was
being carried out by the contractors under a written contract entered into with them and this
written contract incorporated “Model Rules for the protection of Health, and Sanitary
Arrangements for Workers employed by Delhi Development Authority or its Contractors” which
provided for various facilities to be given to the workers employed in the construction work and
also ensured to them payment of minimum wage. The Delhi Administration was not so
categorical as the Delhi Development Authority in regard to the observance of the provisions of
the Minimum Wages Act 1948 and in its affidavit in reply it conceded that the jamadars through
whom the workers were recruited might be deducting rupee one per day per worker from the
minimum wage payable to the workers. The Union of India was however more frank and it
clearly admitted in its affidavit in reply that the jamadars were deducting rupee one per day per
worker from the wage payable to the workers with the result that the workers did not get the
minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per day and there was violation of the provisions of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948. - We may conveniently at this stage before proceeding to examine the factual aspects of the
case, deal with two preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents against the
maintainability of the writ petition. The first preliminary objection was that the petitioners had
no locus standi to maintain the writ petition since, even on the averments made in the writ
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petition, the rights said to have been violated were those of the workers employed in the
construction work of the various Asiad Projects and not of the petitioners and the petitioners
could not therefore have any cause of action. The second preliminary objection urged on behalf
of the respondents was that in any event no writ petition could lie against the respondents,
because the workmen whose rights were said to have been violated were employees of the
contractors and not of the respondents and the cause of action of the workmen, if any, was
therefore against the contractors and not against the respondents. It was also contended as part of
this preliminary objection that no writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution could lie
against the respondents for the alleged violations of the rights of the workmen under the various
labour laws and the remedy, if any, was only under the provisions of those laws. These two
preliminary objections were pressed before us on behalf of the Union of India, the Delhi
Administration and the Delhi Development Authority with a view to shutting out an inquiry by
this Court into the violations of various labour laws alleged in the writ petition but we do not
think there is any substance in them and they must be rejected. Our reasons for saying so are as
follows : - The first preliminary objection raises the question of locus standi of the petitioners to maintain
the writ petition. It is true that the complaint of the petitioners in the writ petition is in regard to
the violations of the provisions of various labour laws designed for the welfare of workmen and
therefore from a strictly traditional point of view, it would be only the workmen whose legal
rights are violated who would be entitled to approach the court for judicial redress. But the
traditional rule of standing which confines access to the judicial process only to those to whom
legal injury is caused or legal wrong is done has now been jettisoned by this Court and the
narrow confines within which the rule of standing was imprisoned for long years as a result of
inheritance of the Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence have been broken and a new dimension
has been given to the doctrine of locus standi which has revolutionised the whole concept of
access to justice in a way not known before to the western system of jurisprudence. This Court
has taken the view that having regard to the peculiar socio-economic conditions prevailing in the
country where there is considerable poverty, illiteracy and ignorance obstructing and impeding
accessibility to the judicial process, it would result in closing the doors of justice to the poor and
deprived sections of the community if the traditional rule of standing evolved by Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence that only a person wronged can sue for judicial redress were to be blindly adhered
to and followed and it is therefore necessary to evolve a new strategy by relaxing this traditional
rule of standing in order that justice may become easily available to the lowly and the lost. It has
been held by this Court in its recent judgment in the Judges Appointment and Transfer case*in a
major break- through which in the years to come is likely to impart new significance and
relevance in the judicial system and to transform it into an instrument of socio-economic change,
that where a person or class of persons to whom legal injury is caused or legal wrong is done is
by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position not able to
approach the Court for judicial redress, any member of the public acting bona fide and not out of
any extraneous motivation may move the Court for judicial redress of the legal injury or wrong
suffered by such person or class of persons and the judicial process may be set in motion by any
public spirited individual or institution even by addressing a letter to the Court. Where judicial
redress is sought of a legal injury or legal wrong suffered by a person or class of persons who by
reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable to
approach the Court and the Court is moved for this purpose by a member of a public by
addressing a letter drawing the attention of the Court to such legal injury or legal wrong. Court
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would cast aside all technical rules of procedure and entertain the letter as a writ petition on the
judicial side and take action upon it. That is what has happened in the present case. Here the
workmen. whose rights are said to have been violated and to whom a life of basic human dignity
has been denied are poor, ignorant. illiterate humans who by reason of their poverty and social
and economic disability, are unable to approach the Courts for judicial redress and hence the
petitioners have under the liberalised rule of standing, locus standi to maintain the present writ
petition espousing the cause of the workmen. It is not the case of the respondents that the
petitioners; are acting mala fide or out of extraneous motivesand in fact the respondents cannot
so allege, since the first petitioner is admittedly an organisation dedicated to the protection and
enforcement of Fundamental Rights and making Directive Principles of State Policy enforceable
and justiciable. There can be no doubt that it is out of a sense of public service that the present
litigation has been brought by the petitioners and it is clearly maintainable.
10.We must then proceed to consider the first limb of the second preliminary objection. It is true
that the workmen whose cause has been championed by the petitioners are employees of the
contractors but the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development
Authority which have entrusted the construction work of Asiad Projects to the contractors cannot
escape their obligation for observance of the various labour laws by the contractors. So far as the
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 is concerned it is clear that under S. 20 if
any amenity required to be provided under Ss. 16. 17. 18 or 19 for the benefit of the workmen
employed in an establishment is not provided by the contractor,the obligation to provide such
amenity rests on the principal employer and therefore if in the construction work of the Asiad
Projects, the contractors do not carry out the obligations imposed upon them by any of these
sections, the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority as
principal employers would be liable and these obligations would be enforceable against them.
The same position obtains in regard to the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of
Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1979. In the case of this Act also, Ss. 17 and 18
make the principal employer liable to make payment of the wages to the migrant workmen
employed by the contractor as also to pay the allowances provided under Ss. 14 and 15 and to
provide the facilities specified in S. 16 to such migrant workmen. In case the contractor fails to
do so and these obligations are also therefore clearly enforceable against the Union of India, the
Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority as principal employers. So far as
Article 24 of the Constitution is concerned. it embodies a fundamental right which is plainly and
indubitably enforceable against every one and by reason of its compulsive mandate, no one can
employ a child below the age of 14 years in a hazardous employment and since, as pointed out
above construction work is a hazardous employment, no child below the age of 14 years can be
employed in construction work and. therefore, not only are the contractors under a constitutional
mandate not to employ any child below the age of 14 years, but it is also the duty of the Union of
India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority to ensure that this
constitutional obligation is obeyed by the contractors to whom they have entrusted the
construction work of the various Asiad Projects. The Union of India, the Delhi Administration
and the Delhi Development Authority cannot fold their hands in despair and become silent
spectators of the breach of a constitutional prohibition being committed by their own contractors.
So also with regard to the observance of the provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act 1976, the
Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority cannot avoid
their obligation to ensure that these provisions are complied with by the contractors. It is the
principle of equality embodied in Art. 14 of the Constitution which finds expression in the
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provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act 1976 and if the Union of India, the Delhi
Administration or the Delhi Development Authority at any time finds that the provisions of the
Equal Remuneration Act 1976 are not observed and the principles of equality before the law
enshrined in Art. 14 is violated by its own contractors, it cannot ignore such violation and sit
quiet by adopting a non-interfering attitude and taking shelter under the executive that the
violation is being committed by the contractors and not by it. If any particular contractor is
committing a breach of the provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act 1976 and thus denying
equality before the law to the workmen, the Union of India, the Delhi Administration or the
Delhi Development Authority as the case may be, would be under an obligation to ensure that
the contractor observes the provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act 1976 and does not breach
the equality clause enacted in Art. 14. The Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the
Delhi Development Authority must also ensure that the minimum wage is paid to the workmen
as provided under the Minimum Wages Act 1948. The contractors are, of course, liable to pay
the minimum wage to the workmen employed by them but the Union of India, the Delhi
Administration and the Delhi Development Authority who have entrusted the construction work
to the contractors would equally be responsible to ensure that the minimum wage is paid to the
workmen by their contractors. This obligation which even otherwise rests on the Union of India,
the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority is additionally reinforced by S.
17 of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service)
Act 1979 in so far as migrant workmen are concerned.It is obvious, therefore, that the Union of
India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority cannot escape their
obligation to the workmen to ensure observance of these labour laws by the contractors and if
these labour laws are not complied with by the contractors, the workmen would clearly have a
cause of action against the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development
Authority. - That takes us to a consideration of the other limb of the second preliminary objection. The
argument of the respondents under this head of preliminary objection was that a writ petition
under Art. 32 cannot be maintained unless it complains of a breach of some fundamental right or
the other and since what were alleged in the present writ petition were merely violations of the
labour laws enacted for the benefit of the workmen and not breaches of any fundamental rights,
the present writ petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. Now it is true that
the present writ petition cannot be maintained by the petitioners unless they can show some
violation of a fundamental right, for it is only for enforcement of a fundamental right that a writ
petition can be maintained in this Court under Art. 32.So far we agree with the contention of the
respondents but there our agreement ends. We cannot accept the plea of the respondents that the
present writ petition does not complain of any breach of a fundamental, right. The complaint of
violation of Art. 24 based on the averment that children below the age of 14 years are employed
in the construction work of the Asiad Projects is clearly a complaint of violation of a
fundamental right. So also when the petitioners allege non-observance of the provisions of the
Equal Remuneration Act 1976, it is in effect and substance a complaint of breach of the principle
of equality before the law enshrined in Art. 14 and it can hardly be disputed that such a
complaint can legitimately form the subject matter of a writ petition under Art. 32.Then there is
the complaint of non-observance of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and
Abolition) Act 1970 and the inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and
Conditions of Service) Act 1979 and this is also in our opinion a complaint relating to violation
of Art. 21. This Article has acquired a new dimension as a result of the decision of this Court in
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Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. (1978) 2 SCR 621 (663) : (AIR 1978 SC 597) and it has
received its most expansive interpretation in Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union
Territory of Delhi (1981) 2 SCR 516 : (AIR 1981 SC 746). Where it has been held by this Court
that the right of life guaranteed under this Article is not confined merely to physical existence or
to the use of any faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed or the soul communicates with
outside world but it also includes within its scope and ambit the right to live with basic human
dignity and the State cannot deprive any one of this precious and invaluable right because no
procedure by which such deprivation may be effected can ever be regarded as reasonable, fair
and just. Now the rights and benefits conferred on the workmen employed by a contractor under
the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and the Inter State
Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 are clearly
intended to ensure basic human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any
of these rights and benefits to which they are entitled under the provisions of these two pieces of
social welfare legislation, that would clearly be a violation of Art. 21 by the Union of India, the
Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority which, as principal employers, are
made statutorily responsible for securing such rights and benefits to the workmen. That leaves
for consideration the complaint in regard to non-payment of minimum wage to the workmen
under the Minimum Wages Act 1948.We are of the view that this complaint is also one relating
to breach of a fundamental right and for reasons which we shall presently state, it is the
fundamental right enshrined in Art. 23 which is violated by non-payment of minimum wage to
the workmen. - Art. 23 enacts a very important fundamental right in the following terms :
“Art. 23 : Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour –
(1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited
and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.
(2) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public
purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds
only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.
Now many of the fundamental rights enacted in Part III operate as limitations on the power of
the State and impose negative obligations on the State not to encroach on individual liberty and
they are enforceable only against the State. But there are certain fundamental rights conferred by
the Constitution which are enforceable against the whole world and they are to be found inter
alia in Articles 17, 23 and 24. We have already discussed the true scope and. ambit of Article 24
in an earlier portion of this judgment and hence we do not propose to say anything more about it.
So also we need not expatiate on the proper meaning and effect of the fundamental right
enshrined in Art. 17 since we are not concerned with that Article in the present writ petition.It is
Art. 23 with which we are concerned and that Article is clearly designed to protect the individual
not only against the State but also against other private citizens. Article 23 is not limited in its
application against the State but it prohibits “traffic in human beings and begar and other similar
forms of forced labour” practised by anyone else. The sweep of Article 23 is wide and unlimited
and it strikes at “traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour”
wherever they are found.The reason for enacting this provision in the chapter on fundamental
rights is to be found in the socio-economic condition of the people at the time when the
Constitution came to be enacted. The Constitution makers, when they set out to frame the
Constitution, found that they had the enormous task before them of changing the socio-economic
structure of the country and bringing about socio-economic regeneration with a view to reaching
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social and economic justice to the common man. Large masses of people, bled white by wellnigh two centuries of foreign rule, were living in abject poverty and destitution, with ignorance
and illiteracy accentuating their helplessness and despair. The society had degenerated into a
status-oriented hierarchical society with little respect for the dignity of the individual who was in
the lower rungs of the social ladder or in an economically impoverished condition. The political
revolution was completed and it had succeeded in bringing freedom to the country but freedom
was not an end in itself, it was only a means to an end, the end being the raising of the people to
higher levels of achievement and bringing about their total advancement and welfare. Political
freedom had no meaning unless it was accompanied by social and economic freedom and it was
therefore necessary to carry forward the social and economic revolution with a view to creating
socio-economic conditions in which every one would be able to enjoy basic human rights and
participate in the fruits of freedom and liberty in an egalitarian social and economic framework.
It was with this end in view that the Constitution makers enacted the Directive Principles of State
Policy in Part IV of the Constitution setting out the constitutional goal of a new socio-economic
order. Now there was one feature of our national life which was ugly and shameful and which
cried for urgent attention and that was the existence of bonded or forced labour in large parts of
the country. This evil was the relic of a feudal exploitative society and it was totally
incompatible with the new egalitarian socio-economic order which “We the people of India”
were determined to build and constituted a gross and most revolting denial of basic human
dignity, It was therefore necessary to eradicate this pernicious practice and wipe it out altogether
from the national scene and this had to be done immediately because with the advent of freedom,
such practice could not be allowed to continue to blight the national life any longer. Obviously, it
would not have been enough merely to include abolition of forced labour in the Directive
Principles of State Policy, because then the outlawing of this practice would not have been
legally enforceable and it would have continued to plague our national life in violation of the
basic constitutional norms and values until some appropriate legislation could be brought by the
legislature forbidding such practice, The Constitution, makers therefore, decided to give teeth to
their resolve to obliterate and wipe out this evil practice by enacting constitutional prohibition
against it in the chapter on fundamental rights, so that the abolition of such practice may become
enforceable and effective as soon as the Constitution came into force. This is the reason why the
provision enacted in Art, 23 was included in the chapter on fundamental rights.The prohibition
against “traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour” is clearly
intended to be a general prohibition, total in its effect and all pervasive in its range and it is
enforceable not only against the State but also against any other person indulging in any such
practice. - The question then is as to what is the true scope and meaning of the expression “traffic in
human beings” and begar and other similar forms of forced labour” in Art. 23? What are the
forms of ‘forced labour’ prohibited by that Article and what kind of labour provided by a person
can be regarded as ‘forced labour’ so as to fall within this prohibition? - When the Constitution makers enacted Art. 23 they had before them Art. 4 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights but they deliberately departed from its language and employed
words which would make the reach and content of Art. 23 much wider than that of Article 4 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They banned ‘traffic in human beings which is an
expression of much larger amplitude than ‘slave trade’ and they also interdicted “begar and other
similar forms of forced labour”. The question is what is the scope and ambit of the expression
‘begar and other similar forms of forced labour’? Is this expression wide enough to include every
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conceivable form of forced labour and what is the true scope, and meaning of the words “forced
labour?”The word ‘begar’ in this Article is not a word of common use in English language. It is a
word of Indian origin which like many other words has found its way in the English vocabulary.
It is very difficult to formulate a precise definition of the word ‘begar’, but there can be no doubt
that it is a form of forced labour under which a person is compelled to work without receiving
say remuneration.Molesworth describes ‘begar’ as “labour or service exacted by a government or
person in power without giving remuneration for it”. Wilson’s glossary of Judicial and Revenue
Terms givers the following meaning of the word ‘beger’ : “a forced labourer, one pressed to carry
burthens for individuals or the public. Under the old system, when pressed for public service, no
pay was given. The Begari, though still liable to be pressed for public objects, now receives pay.
Forced labour for private service is prohibited.” “Begar” may therefore be loosely described as
labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it. That
was the meaning of the word ‘begar’ accepted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in
S. Vasudevan v. S. D. Mital, AIR 1962 Bom 53. ‘Begar’ is thus clearly a film of forced labour.
Now it is not merely ‘begar’ which is unconstitutionally prohibited by Art. 23 but also all other
similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may
manifest itself, because it is violative of human diginity and is contrary to basic human values.
The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing with
human rights. It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights came into being. International Labour Organisation adopted
Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the International Labour Organisation
which ratifies this convention shall “suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its
forms” and this prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the International
Labour Organisation in 1957. The words “forced or compulsory labour” in Convention No. 29
had of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these
words given in Art. 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights
and Article 8 of the International Covenant an Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced or
compulsory labour. Art. 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a prohibition against forced labour
in whatever form it may be found. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
laid some emphasis on. the word ‘similar’ and contended that it is not every form of forced labour
which is prohibited by Art. 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to ‘begar’ and
since ‘begar’ means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any
remuneration for it, the interdict of Art. 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where
labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some
remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate,it would not fail within the words ‘other similar
forms of forced ‘labour’. This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition
against forced labour enacted in Art. 23 and is in our opinion not well founded.It does not accord
with the principle enunciated by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCR
621 : (AIR 1978 SC 597) (supra) that when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution
conferring fundamental rights, the attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit
of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their meaning and content.It is difficult, to
imagine that the Constitution makers should have intended to strike only at certain forms of
forced labour leaving it open to the socially or economically powerful sections of the community
to exploit the poor and weaker sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour.Could there
be any logic or reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or service to another
without receiving any remuneration at all, it should be regarded as a pernicious practice
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sufficient to attract the condemnation of Art. 23, but if some remuneration is paid for it, then it
should be outside the inhibition of that Article? If this were the true interpretation, Art. 23 would
be reduced to a mere rope of sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society
for a person belonging to a socially or economically dominant clan to exact labour or service
from a person belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section of the community by paying a
negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Article 23.We do not think it
would be right to place on the language of Art. 23 an interpretation which would emasculate its
beneficent provisions and defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are clear of the view that
Article 23 is intended to abolish every form of forced labour. The words “other similar forms of
forced labour” are used in Art. 23 not with a view to importing the particular characteristic of
‘begar’ that labour or service should be exacted without payment of any remuneration but with a
view to bringing within the scope and ambit of that Article all other forms of forced labour and
since ‘begar’ is one form of forced labour, the Constitution makers used the words “other similar
forms of forced labour”. If the requirement that labour or work should be exacted. without any
remuneration were imported in other forms of forced labour, they would straightway come
within the meaning of the word ‘begar’and in that event there would be no need to have the
additional words “other similar forms of forced labour”. These words would be rendered futile
and meaningless and it is a well recognised rule of interpretation that the court should avoid a
construction which has the effect of rendering any words used by the legislature superfluous or
redundant. The object of adding these words was clearly to expand the reach and content of Art.
23 by including, in addition to ‘begar’, other forms of forced labour within the prohibition of that
Article. Every form of forced labour, ‘begar’ or otherwise, is within the inhibition of Art. 23 and
it makes no difference whether the person who is forced to give his labour or service to another
is remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit by
this Article if it is forced labour, that is, labour supplied not willingly but as a result of force or
compulsion. Take for example a case where a person has entered into a contract of service with
another for a period of three years and he wishes to discontinue serving such other person before
the expiration of the period of three years. If a law were to provide that in such a case the
contract shall be specifically enforced and he shall be compelled to serve for the full period of
three years, it would clearly amount to forced labour and such a law would be void as offending
Art. 23. That is why specific performance of a contract of service cannot be enforced against an
employee and the employee cannot be forced by compulsion of law to continue to serve the
employer. Of course if there is a breach of the contract of service, the employee would be liable
to pay damages to the employer but he cannot be forced to continue to serve the employer
without breaching the injunction of Art. 23. This was precisely the view taken by the Supreme
Court of United State in Bailey v. Alabama, (1910) 219 US 219: 55 Law Ed 191 while dealing
with a similar provision in the Thirteenth Amendment. There a legislation enacted by the
Alabama State providing that when a person with intent to injure or defraud his employer enters
into a contract in writing for the purpose of any service and obtains money or other property
from the employer and without refunding the money or the property refuses or fails to perform
such service, he will be punished with a fine. The constitutional validity of this legislation was
challenged on the ground that it violated the Thirteenth Amendment which inter alia provides :
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude…………………..shall exist within the United States or
any place subject to their jurisdiction”. This challenge was upheld by a majority of the Court and
Mr. Justice Hughes delivering the majority opinion said :
“We cannot escape the conclusion that although the statute in terms, is to punish fraud, still its
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natural and inevitable effect is to expose to conviction for crime those who simply fail or refuse
to perform contracts for personal service in liquidation of a debt, and judging its purpose by its
effect that it seeks in this way to provide the means of compulsion though which performance of
such service may be secured. The question is whether such a statute is constitutional.” The
learned Judge proceeded to explain the scope and ambit of the expression ‘involuntary servitude’
in the following words :
“The plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all its badges and
incidents; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labour free by prohibiting that
control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit,
which is the essence of involuntary servitude.”
Then, dealing with the contention that the employee in that case hadvoluntarilycontracted to
perform the service which was sought to be compelled and there was therefore no violation of
the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, the learned Judge observed :
“The fact that the debtor contracted to perform the labour which is sought to be compelled does
not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the statute. The full intent of
the constitutional provision could be “defeated with obvious facility if through the guise of
contracts under which advances had been made, debtors could he held to compulsory service. It
is the compulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs, the condition of
servitude is created which would be not less involuntary because of the original agreement to
work out the indebtedness. The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to the
breach, but not to enforced labour. “
and proceeded to elaborate this thesis by pointing out :
“Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a
difference in the mode of origin, but none in the character of the servitude. The one exists where
the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the
debtor by some provision of law. But peonage however created, is compulsory service,
involuntary servitude. The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the
debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear distinction exists between peonage and the
voluntary performance of labour or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case
the debtor though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labour or service, and subject like any
other contractor to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to
break it, and no law or force compels performance or a continuance of the service.”
It is therefore clear that even if a person has contracted with another to perform service and there
is consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even remuneration, he
cannot be forced, by compulsion of law or otherwise, to continue to perform such service, as that
would be forced labour within the inhibition of Art. 23. This Article strikes at every form of
forced labour even if it has its origin in a contract voluntarily entered into by the person
obligated to provide labour or service vide Pollock v. Williams, (1943) 322 US 4 : 88 Law Ed - The reason is that it offends against human dignity to compel a person to provide labour or
service to another doe not wish to do so, even though it be in breach of the contract entered into
by him.There should be no serfdom or involuntary servitude in a free democratic India which
respects the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. Moreover, in a country
like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of
bargaining power, a contract of service may appear on its face volunt ary but it may, in reality,
be involuntary, because while entering into the contract, the employee, by reason of his
economically helpless condition, may have been faced with Hobson’s choice, either to starve or
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to submit to the exploitative terms dictated by the powerful employer. It would be a travesty of
justice to hold the employee in such a case to the terms of the contract and to compel him to
serve the employer even though he may not wish to do so. That would aggravate the inequality
and injustice from which the employee even otherwise suffers on account of his economically
disadvantaged position and lend the authority of law to the exploitation of the poor helpless
employee by the economically powerful employer. Article 23 therefore. says that no one shall be
forced to provide labour or service against his will, even though it be under a contract of service. - Now the next question that arises for consideration is whether there is any breach of Art. 23
when a person provides labour or service to the State or to any other person and is paid less than
the minimum wage for it. It is obvious that ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or
service to another for less than the minimum wage, when he knows that under the law he is
entitled to get minimum wage for the labour or service provided by him. It may therefore be
legitimately presumed that when a person provides labour or service. to another against receipt
of remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of some
compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is entitled under law to
receive.What Article 23 prohibits is ‘forced labour’ that is labour or service which a person is
forced to provide and ‘force’ which would make such labour or service ‘forced labour’ may arise;
in several ways. It may be physical force which may compel a person to provide labour or
service to another or it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for
imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be
compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which deprives a
person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may
properly be regarded as ‘force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such ‘force’, it
would be ‘forced labour’.Where a person is suffering. from hunger or starvation, when he has no
resources at all to fight disease or to feed his wife and children or even to hide their nakedness,
where utter grinding poverty has broken his back and reduced him to a state of helplessness and
despair and where no other employment is available to alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he
would have no choice but to accept any work that comes his way, even if the remuneration
offered to him is less than the minimum wage. He would be in no position to bargain with the
employer; he would have to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be acting
not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of economic
circumstances and the labour or service provided by him would be clearly. ‘forced labour’. There
is no reason why the word ‘forced’ should be read in. a narrow and restricted manner so as to be
confined only to physical or legal ‘force’ particularly when the national charter, its fundamental
document has promised to build a new socialist republic where there will be socio-economic
justice for all and everyone shall have the right to work, to education and to adequate means of
livelihood. The Constitution makers have given us one of the most remarkable documents in
history for ushering in a new socio-economic order and the Constitution which they have forged
for us has a social purpose and an economic mission and therefore every word or phrase in the
Constitution must be interpreted in a manner which would advance the socio-economic objective
of the Constitution. It is not unoften that in a capitalist society economic circumstances exert
much greater pressure on an individual in driving him to a particular course of action than
physical compulsion or force of legislative provision.The word ‘force’ must therefore be
construed to include not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion
of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in want and
compels him to provide labour or service even though the remuneration received for it is less
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than the minimum wage.Of course, if a person provides labour or service to another against
receipt of the minimum wage it would not be possible to say that the labour or service provided.
by him is ‘forced labour’ because he gets what he is entitled under law to receive. No inference
can reasonably be drawn in such a case that he is forced to provide labour or service for the
simple reason that he would be providing labour or service against receipt of what is, lawfully
payable to him just like any other person who is not under the force of any compulsion. We are
therefore of the view that where a person provides labour or service. to another for remuneration
which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within
the scope and ambit of the words “forced labour” under Art. 23. Such a person would be entitled
to come to the Court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Art. 23 by asking the Court
to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or service provided by him
ceases to be ‘forced labour’ and the breach of Art. 23 is remedied. It is therefore clear that when
the petitioners alleged that minimum wage was not paid to the workmen employed by the
contractors, the complaint was really in effect and substance a complaint against violation of the
fundamental right of the workmen under Art. 23. - Before leaving this subject, we may point out with all the emphasis at our command that
whenever any fundamental right which is enforceable against private. individuals such as, for
example, a fundamental right enacted in. Arts. 17 or 23, or 24 is being violated, it is the
constitutional obligation of the State to take the necessary steps for the purpose of interdicting
such violation and ensuring observance of the fundamental right by the private individual who is
transgressing the same.Of course, the person whose fundamental right is violated can always
approach the court for the purpose of enforcement of his fundamental right, but that cannot
absolve the State from its constitutional obligation to see that there is no violation of the
fundamental right of such person, particularly when be belongs to the weaker. section of
humanity and is unable to wage a legal battle against a strong and powerful opponent who is
exploiting him. The Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development
Authority must therefore be held to be under an obligation to ensure observance of these various
labour laws by the contractors and if the provisions of any of these labour laws are violated by
the contractors the petitioners vindicating the cause of the workmen are entitled to enforce this
obligation against the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development
Authority by filing the present writ petition. The preliminary objections urged on behalf of the
respondents must accordingly be rejected. - Having disposed of these preliminary objections. we may turn to consider whether there was
any violation of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act 1948, Art. 24 of the Constitution, the
Equal Remuneration Act 1976, the Contract ‘Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and
the Inter – State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act
1979 by the contractors. The Union of India in its affidavit in reply admitted that there were
certain violations committed by the contractors but hastened to add that for these violations
prosecutions were initiated against the errant contractors and no violation of any of the labour
laws was allowed to go unpunished.The Union of India also conceded in its affidavit in reply that
Re. 1/- per worker per day was deducted by the jamadars from the wage payable to the workers
with the result that the workers did not get the minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per daybut stated that
proceedings had been taken for the purpose of recovering the amount of the shortfall in the
minimum wage from the contractors. No particulars were however given of such proceedings
adopted by the Union of India or the Delhi Administration or the Delhi. Development Authority.
It was for this reason that we directed by our Order dated 11th May 1982 that whatever is the
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minimum wage for the time being or if the wage payable is higher than such wage. shall be paid
by the contractors to the workmen directly without the intervention of the jamadars and that the
jamadars shall not be entitled to deduct or recover any amount from the minimum wage payable
to the workmen as and by way of commission or otherwise. We would also direct in addition that
if the Union of India or the Delhi Administration or the Delhi Development Authority finds and
for this purpose it may hold such inquiry as is possible in the circumstances that any of the
workmen has not received the minimum wage payable to him, it shall take the necessary legal
action against the contractors whether by way of prosecution or by way of recovery of the
amount of the shortfall. We would also suggest that hereafter whenever any contracts are given
by the government or any other governmental authority including a public sector corporation, it
should be ensured by introducing a suitable provision in the contracts that wage shall be paid by
the contractors to the workmen directly without the intervention of any jamadars or thekadars
and that the contractors shall ensure that no amount by way of commission or otherwise is
deducted or recovered by the jamadars from wage of the workmen. So far as observance of the
other labour laws by the contractors is concerned, the Union of India, the Delhi Administration
and the Delhi Development Authority disputed the claim of the petitioners that the provisions of
these labour laws were not being implemented by the contractors save in a few instances where
prosecutions had been launched against the contractors. Since it would not be possible for this
Court to take evidence for the purpose of deciding this factual dispute between the parties and we
also wanted to ensure that in any event the provisions of these various laws enacted for the
benefit of the workmen were strictly observed and implemented by the contractors, we by our
order dated 11th May. 1982 appointed three Ombudsmen and requested them to make periodical
inspections of the sites of the construction work for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
provisions of these labour laws were being carried out and the workers were receiving the
benefits and amenities provided for them under these beneficent statutes or whether there were
any violations of these provisions being committed by the contractors so that on the basis of the
reports of the three Ombudsmen, this Court could give further direction in the matter if found
necessary. We may add that whenever any construction work is being carried out either
departmentally or through contractors, the government or any other governmental authority
including a public sector corporation which is carrying out such work must take great care to see
that the provisions of the labour laws are being strictly observed and they should not wait for any
complaint to be received from the workmen in regard to non-observance of any such provisions
before proceeding to take action against the erring officers or contractors but they should
institute an effective system of periodic inspections coupled with occasional surprise inspections
by the higher officers in order to ensure that there are no violations of the provisions of labour
lawsand the workmen are not denied the rights and benefits to which they are entitled under such
provisions and if any such violations are found, immediate action should be taken against
defaulting officers or contractors. That is the least which a government or a governmental
authority or a public sector corporation is expected to do in a social welfare State. - These are the reasons for which we made our order dated 11th May. 1982.
Order accordingly.
