Case Summary
| Citation | Vellikannu v. R. Singaperumal(2005) 6 SCC 622 |
| Keywords | Murderer disqualification, sec 6,25,27 of HSA |
| Facts | The son murdered his father and was convicted by the court. As he was disqualified from inheriting the property of the deceased, his wife claimed the same on the ground that since the murderer would be deemed to be dead, she would be regarded as the widow of the predeceased son and eligible to inherit the property as the intestate’s class-I heir. |
| Issues | Whether the heir of murderer entitled to get property? |
| Contentions | The point of contention in the case arose when the appellant filed a complaint at the District-Munsif Court, claiming that it entitled her to Ramasami Konar’s property before her second marriage.She further claimed that it had disqualified the respondent as a legal successor under Section 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and that only she had the right to claim the estates.The appellant-wife maintained that the respondent-husband must be regarded as having died before the inheritance issue arose and that she, as the only legal successor living, would be entitled to the deceased’s whole assets. The appellant had requested a declaration of relief based on the same. |
| Law Points | It was held that neither the son nor his wife was eligible to claim inheritance. The son cannot inherit any property of his father on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience as he has murdered him and the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist in that case. Once the son is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e., the wife and the son. The son himself is totally disqualified by virtue of sections section 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of the deceased. |
| Judgement | Consequently, it reasoned that if the son cannot inherit, then the wife, who inherits through her husband, cannot claim the deceased father-in-law’s property either. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority | Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, when a son cannot inherit, his whole stock, including his wife, is disinherited according to the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.As a result, the wife has no claim to the property because her husband, through whom she may have claimed, was disinherited. |
Full Case Details
A.K. MATHUR, J. – This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of
Judicature at Madras whereby the learned Single Judge by his order dated 6-3-1997 has allowed
Second Appeal No. 773 of 1983 filed by the respondent-first defendant herein.
2. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are: That an Original Suit No. 87
of 1978 was filed in the Court of the District Munsif, Melur by the plaintiff-appellant (herein).
The schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of the late RamasamiKonar and the first
defendant was the only son of RamasamiKonar and the plaintiff is the wife of the first defendant.
Wife of RamasamiKonar was already divorced and married with some other person and was
residing separately. It is alleged that the first defendant in the suit married the plaintiff-appellant
and both were residing as husband and wife. On 10-10-1972 the first defendant murdered his
father RamasamiKonar and was convicted under Section 302 IPC for life imprisonment. The
conviction of the first defendant was confirmed by the High Court but the High Court
recommended the Government to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. The first
defendant was released in July 1975. Since the first defendant murdered his father, he was not
entitled to succeed to the estate of his deceased father and as such the claim of the plaintiff was
that she alone was entitled to all the properties left by the deceased RamasamiKonar. According
to the plaintiff, the first defendant must be deemed to have predeceased as provided under Section
25 read with Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act. She claimed to be the widow of the first
defendant and claimed to be the owner of all the properties left by RamasamiKonar as
coparcener. After the release of the first defendant from the prison, the first defendant lived with
the plaintiff for some time but after some time she was driven out of the house. The second
defendant is already impleaded in the suit as tenant claiming under the first defendant. The
plaintiff, therefore, prayed that she may be granted the relief of declaration as she is entitled to
inherit the entire estate of the deceased RamasamiKonar. As against this it was contended by the
first defendant that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff is not the legal heir of
RamasamiKonar. It was alleged that all the properties acquired by Ramasami, were joint family
properties and the first defendant has acquired the same by survivorship. The trial court by order
dated 31-3-1980 held that all the properties are joint family properties of the deceased
RamasamiKonar and the first defendant. The second defendant is a cultivating tenant. The first
defendant having murdered his father is not entitled to claim any right under Section 6 read with
Sections 25 and 27 of the Act but as per proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act the
plaintiff is entitled to a decree for half share and accordingly it was granted to the plaintiff. This
matter was taken up in appeal by Defendant 1. The lower appellate court also confirmed the
finding of the trial court but modified the decree that it may be treated as preliminary decree. The
lower court also held that the first defendant must be treated as non-existent. The plaintiff became
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a Class I heir under Schedule 1 of the Hindu Succession Act and she was entitled to a share in the
property. The appeal was dismissed.
3. Aggrieved against this, the first defendant preferred a second appeal before the High Court.
4. The High Court at the time of admission of the second appeal, framed the following
substantial questions of law:
1. Whether Ext. A-2 judgment in the criminal case is conclusive on the question of
exclusion from inheritance in the present proceedings? and
2. Whether the exclusion from inheritance would cover enlargement of interest by
survivorship, in the light of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act?
So far as Question 1 is concerned, the High Court held that the judgment of the criminal court
can be taken into consideration. But the main question which was addressed by the High Court
was whether the plaintiff can inherit the properties from the estate of her deceased father-in-law
RamasamiKonar and what is the effect of Section 25, Section 27 read with Section 6 and Section
8 of the Hindu Succession Act.
5. It was not disputed that the properties of RamasamiKonar were joint family properties in
which Defendant 1 was also one of the members and the parties are governed by the Mitakshara
school of Hindu law.
7. Learned Single Judge allowed the appeal of Defendant 1-Respondent 1 (herein) and
judgment and decree of the courts below were set aside. The suit was dismissed. Hence the
present appeal.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to persuade us that the appellant being the sole
female survivor of the joint Hindu property as her husband stands disqualified, she under proviso
to Section 6 of the Act, is entitled to the whole of the estate as a sole surviving member of the
coparcenary property read with Section 8 of the Act as a Class I heir. As against this, learned
counsel for the respondent-defendant has submitted that this disqualification which was attached
to the son equally applies in the case of the wife as she is claiming the estate because of her
marriage with the respondent and if he is disqualified, then she is also equally disqualified to
claim any property being a coparcener from the estate of her deceased father-in-law.
9. In order to appreciate the rival contention, it would be relevant to reproduce provisions of
the Hindu Succession Act, Sections 6, 8, 25 and 27 of the Act.
10. As per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, if a male Hindu dies after commencement
of this Act, his interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by survivorship upon
the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with the Act. At the same time
there is proviso to the section which qualifies the main section that if the deceased left a surviving
female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who
claims through such female, the interest of the deceased in Mitakshara coparcenary property shall
devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be and not by survivorship. So
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far as the present case is concerned, the concurrent finding of the fact is that the deceased
RamasamiKonar was governed by Mitakshara law and the property was the coparcenary
property. But he died intestate. Therefore, as per Section 6, the property shall devolve by
survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not by Section 6 of the Act.
11. So far as the property in question is concerned, there is a finding of the courts below that
the property is a coparcenary property and if that being so, if Defendant 1 had not murdered his
father then perhaps things would have taken a different shape. But what is the effect on the
succession of the property of the deceased father when the son has murdered him? If he had not
murdered his father he would have along with his wife succeeded in the matter. So far as the
rights of coparceners in the Mitakshara law are concerned, the son acquires by birth or adoption a
vested interest in all coparcenary property whether ancestral or not and whether acquired before
or after his birth or adoption, as the case may be, as a member of a joint family. This is the view
which has been accepted by all the authors of the Hindu law. In the famous MullasPrinciples of
Hindu Law [15th Edn. (1982) at pp. 284 and 285], the learned author has stated thus:
The essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara law is unity of ownership. The
ownership of the coparcenary property is in the whole body of coparceners. According to
the true notion of an undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law, no individual
member of that family, whilst it remains undivided, can predicate, of the joint and
undivided property, that he, that particular member, has a definite share, one-third or
one-fourth. His interest is a fluctuating interest, capable of being enlarged by deaths in
the family, and liable to be diminished by births in the family. It is only on a partition
that he becomes entitled to a definite share. The most appropriate term to describe the
interest of a coparcener in coparcenary property is ‘undivided coparcenary interest’. The
nature and extent of that interest is defined in Section 235. The rights of each coparcener
until a partition takes place consist in a common possession and common enjoyment of
the coparcenary property. As observed by the Privy Council in Katama Natchiarv.
Rajah of Shivagunga[(1863) 9 MIA 543)], ‘there is community of interest and unity of
possession between all the members of the family, and upon the death of any one of them
the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had during the deceased’s
lifetime a common interest and a common possession.
12.Likewise, S.V. Gupte, author of Hindu Law, [Vol. 1, 3rd Edn. (1981) at p.162] where the
learned author deals with the rights of a coparcener. He says thus:
Until partition a coparcener is entitled to –
(1) joint possession and enjoyment of joint family property,
(2) the right to take the joint family property by survivorship, and
(3) the right to demand partition of the joint family property.
At p. 164, the learned author deals with the right of survivorship. He says:
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While the family remains joint, its property continues to devolve upon the
coparceners for the time being by survivorship and not by succession. Consequently, on
the death of a coparcener the surviving coparceners take his undivided interest in the
joint family property by survivorship. There is community of interest and unity of
possession between all the members of the family, and upon the death of any one of
them, the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had during the
deceased’s lifetime a common interest and a common possession.
The learned author further says:
A coparcener who is disqualified by reason of a disability (such as insanity) from
taking a share on partition may nevertheless take the whole property by survivorship.
At p. 165, the learned author has further said thus:
By survivorship a coparcener does not obtain the share of a deceased coparcener as
his representative; strictly speaking it does not pass to him; the effect is merely to enlarge
his share in what he already owns in the aggregate. Surviving coparceners are not
therefore the legal representatives of a deceased coparcener.
13. In N.R. Raghavachariar’sHindu Law – Principles and Precedents [8th Edn. (1987)] at p.
230] under the heading “Rights of Coparceners” it is said thus:
The following are the rights of a coparcener.- (1) Right by birth, (2) Right of
survivorship, (3) Right to partition, (4) Right to joint possession and enjoyment, (5)
Right to restrain unauthorised acts, (6) Right of alienation, (7) Right to accounts, and (8)
Right to make self-acquisition.
While dealing with “Right by Birth” learned author says thus:
Every coparcener gets an interest by birth in the coparcenary property. This right by
birth relates back to the date of conception. This, however, must not be held to negative
the position that coparcenary property may itself come into existence after the birth of
the coparcener concerned.
While dealing with right of survivorship, it is said thus:
The system of a joint family with its incident of succession by survivorship is a
peculiarity of the Hindu law. In such a family no member has any definite share and his
death or somehow ceasing to be a member of the family causes no change in the joint
status of the family. Where a coparcener dies without male issue his interest in the joint
family property passes to the other coparceners by survivorship and not by succession to
his own heir. Even where a coparcener becomes afflicted with lunacy subsequent to his
birth, he does not lose his status as a coparcener which he has acquired by his birth, and
although his lunacy may under the Hindu law disqualify him from demanding a share in
a partition in his family, yet where all the other coparceners die and he becomes the sole
surviving member of the coparcenary, he takes the whole joint family property by
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survivorship, and becomes a fresh stock of descent to the exclusion of the daughter of the
last predeceased coparcener. The beneficial interest of each coparcener is liable to
fluctuation, increasing by the death of another coparcener and decreasing by the birth of
a new coparcener.
Therefore, it is now settled that a member of a coparcenary acquires a right in the property by
birth. His share may fluctuate from time to time but his right by way of survivorship in
coparcenary property in Mitakshara law is a settled proposition.
14.In this connection, a reference may be made to the case of State Bank of India v.
GhamandiRam[AIR 1969 SC 1330] in which it was held thus:
5 . According to the Mitakshara school of Hindu law all the property of a Hindu joint
family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in quasi-corporate capacity.
The textual authority of the Mitakshara lays down in express terms that the joint family
property is held in trust for the joint family members then living and thereafter to be born
(see Mitakshara, Ch. I, 1-27). The incidents of coparcenership under the Mitakshara law
are: first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on
birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person; secondly, that such
descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till
partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property, conjointly
with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and
enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property is
possible unless it be for necessity, without the co ncurrence of the coparceners, and
sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. A
coparcenary under the Mitakshara school is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of
parties except insofar that on adoption the adopted son becomes a coparcener with his
adoptive father as regards the ancestral properties of the latter.
15.The concept of coparcener as given in the Mitakshara school of Hindu law as already
mentioned above, is that of a joint family property wherein all the members of the coparcenary
share equally. In this connection a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case
of State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh [(1985) 2 SCC 321] in which
Their Lordships have held as follows:
8. A Hindu coparcenary is, however, a narrower body than the joint family. Only
males who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property can be
members of the coparcenary or coparceners. A male member of a joint family and his
sons, grandsons and great-grandsons constitute a coparcenary. A coparcener acquires
right in the coparcenary property by birth but his right can be definitely ascertained only
when a partition takes place. When the family is joint, the extent of the share of a
coparcener cannot be definitely predicated since it is always capable of fluctuating.
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16. Therefore, in view of various decisions of this Court it appears that Defendant 1 and the
plaintiff who was married to Defendant 1 were members of joint Hindu family. If the defendantrespondent had not incurred the disqualification, then they would have inherited the property as
per Mitakshara school of Hindu law. But the question is that when the sole male survivor had
incurred the disqualification can he still claim the property by virtue of Mitakshara school of
Hindu law? If he cannot get the property by way of survivorship, then the question is whether his
wife who succeeds through the husband can succeed to the property? Our answer to this question
is in the negative. In fact, prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, sections like
Sections 25 and 27 were not there but the murderer of his own father was disqualified on the
principle of justice, equity and good conscience and as a measure of public policy. This position
of law was enunciated by the Privy Council way back in 1924 in the case of
KenchavaKomSanyellappaHosmaniv. GirimallappaChannappaSamasagar [AIR 1924 PC 209]
wherein Their Lordships have held as follows:
In Their Lordships’ view it was rightly held by the two courts below that the
murderer was disqualified; and with regard to the question whether he is disqualified
wholly or only as to the beneficial interest which the Subordinate Judge discussed,
founding upon the distinction between the beneficial and legal estate which was made by
the Subordinate Judge and by the High Court of Madras in the case of
VedanayagaMudaliarv. Vedammal[ILR (1904)27 Mad 591], Their Lordships reject, as
did the High Court here, any such distinction. The theory of legal and equitable estates is
no part of Hindu law, and should not be introduced into discussion. The second question
to be decided is whether title can be claimed through the murderer. If this were so, the
defendants as the murderer’s sisters, would take precedence of the plaintiff, his cousin. In
this matter also, Their Lordships are of opinion that the courts below were right. The
murderer should be treated as non-existent and not as one who forms the stock for a fresh
line of descent. It may be pointed out that this view was also taken in the Madras case
just cited.
Their Lordships also explained the decision in the case of Ganguv. Chandrabhagaba[ILR (1908)
32 Bom 275] and held as follows:
It was contended that a different ruling was to be extracted from the decision of the
Bombay High Court in Ganguv.Chandrabhagaba. This is not so. In that case, the wife
of a murderer was held entitled to succeed to the estate of the murdered man but that was
not because the wife deduced title through her husband, but because of the principle of
Hindu family law that a wife becomes a member of her husband’s gotra, an actual
relation of her husband’s relations in her own right, as it is called in Hindu law a gotrajasapinda. The decision therefore has no bearing on the present case.
Therefore, the principle which has been enunciated by Their Lordships in no uncertain terms
totally disinherits the son who has murdered his father. Their Lordships have observed as follows:
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A murderer must for the purpose of the inheritance, be treated as if he was dead
when the inheritance opened and as not being a fresh stock of descent; the exclusion
extends to the legal as well as beneficial estate, so that neither he can himself succeed nor
can the succession be claimed through him.
This Privy Council decision made reference to the decisions of the High Courts of Madras and
Bombay and Their Lordships have approved the ratio contained in those decisions that a murderer
should be totally disinherited because of the felony committed by him. This decision of the Privy
Council was subsequently followed in the following cases:
( i) K. Stanumurthiayyav. K. Ramappa[AIR 1942 Mad 277]
( ii ) Nakchhed Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh[AIR 1953 All 759]
( iii ) Mata Badal Singh v. Bijay Bahadur Singh [AIR 1956 All 707]
( iv ) Minotiv. Sushil Mohansingh Malik [AIR 1982 Bom 68]
17.This position of law was incorporated by way of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956, which clearly enunciates that a person who commits murder or abets the commission of
murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other
property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission
of the murder. In fact, the objects and reasons also makes a reference to the Privy Council
judgment. The objects and reasons for enacting Section 25 read as under:
A murderer, even if not disqualified under Hindu law from succeeding to the estate
of the person whom he has murdered, is so disqualified upon principles of justice, equity
and good conscience. The murderer is not to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of
descent but should be regarded as non-existent when the succession opens.
18.Therefore, once it is held that a person has murdered his father or a person from whom he
wants to inherit, he stands totally disqualified. Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act makes it
further clear that if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall
be deemed as if such person had died before the intestate. That shows that a person who has
murdered a person through whom he wants to inherit the property stands disqualified on that
account. That means he will be deemed to have predeceased him. The effect of Section 25 read
with Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is totally disqualified to
succeed to the estate of the deceased. The framers of the Act in the objects and reasons have
made a reference to the decision of the Privy Council that the murderer is not to be regarded as
the stock of a fresh line of descent but should be regarded as non-existent. That means that a
person who is guilty of committing the murder cannot be treated to have any relationship
whatsoever with the deceased’s estate.
19. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, the effect of Sections 25 and 27 is that
Respondent 1 cannot inherit any property of his father on the principle of justice, equity and good
conscience as he has murdered him and the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist in
that case. Once the son is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e. wife or
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son. The defendant-Respondent 1 son himself is totally disqualified by virtue of Sections 25 and
27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of
the deceased RamasamiKonar.
20. Therefore, as a result of our above discussion, we are of opinion that the view taken by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras is correct that the plaintiff is not entitled to
inherit the estate of the deceased RamasamiKonar and the learned Single Judge has rightly set
aside the orders of the two courts below. Since we cannot decide this appeal without deciding the
right of Respondent 1 as the right of the appellant flows therefrom as his wife i.e. the plaintiff,
therefore, it was necessary for us to first decide whether Respondent 1 could succeed or inherit
the estate of his deceased father. When the son cannot succeed then the wife who succeeds to the
property through the husband cannot also lay a claim to the property of her father-in-law. The
appeal is thus dismissed. No order as to costs.
