November 7, 2024
Property LawSemester 2

Quality Cut Pieces v. M. Laxmi and Co.AIR 1986 Bom 359

V.V. VAZE, J. – Summer of 42. The city of Bombay was slowly recovering from the erosion of war

economy. Serpentine queues for essential commodities were seen everywhere. The mighty arch of

yellow basalt hautily thrusting its frame above the promontory lapped by the waters of Bay of

Bombay had witnessed the entry of many and Englishman – Administrators, Governors-General,

dashing blades or humble quill-drivers – coming to India to keep Pax Britannica. That very arch was

soon to serve as their exit.

2. A group of seven businessmen drawn from various fields like pharmaceuticals, textiles, tea,

banking and insurance got together and surveyed the Indian economic scene. They had a vision of a

possible co-operation of Indian and foreign entrepreneurs in the field of supply of essential

commodities for civilian consumption – something which was very much relegated to the background

by the more pressing need to keep the sinews of war flowing. They envisaged a free-flow of goods

and merchandise – once the sea routes became open; took note of the fact that manufacturers in

western countries had at their disposal large departmental chain stores to handle goods direct from the

factory to the consumer and managed country-wide distribution system. This group regretted the

absence of a similar large scale departmental store in India and decided to remedy the defect and build

up a coordinated contact between the producer and consumer. With this object in view, the group

incorporated a company “Departmental Service Stores Limited” (“DSS”).

3. The company could not function in view of the prohibition regarding the issue of shares under

R. 94A of the Defence of India Rules, without the sanction of the Examiner of Capital Issues. This

sanction was granted on 15th Nov. 1943 authorising the company to raise capital of the value of Rs.

1,62,000/- under certain conditions. The hurdle of the Defence of India Rule was crossed and capital

was raised. Having realised the capital by allotting shares to those who had applied before 17th May

1943, the company had money but no premises wherein to start the contemplated departmental stores.

The company was all dressed up but had nowhere to go. On 8th Sept. 1944 the company acquired the

house of Messrs. Dinshaw and Company, Colaba, Causeway, Bombay, from one Behram Rustom

Irani, after paying Rs. 47,000/- out of which Rs. 4,000/- were towards the goodwill and the remainder

towards the price of goods, electrical installations, type-writers etc. A store was started in the

premises of Dinshaw and Co., for the 10 months ending 30th June 1945, DSS made a modest profit of

Rs. 6,485-2-11 Ps.

4. The Examiner of Capital Issues permitted the company to issue further shares of capital of the

value of Rs. 8,30,000/-. The signatories to the Memorandum and Articles of Association, the

Directors, Managing Agents and their friends agreed to take a bulk of the new issue and remainder

was offered for public subscription. Messrs, Begman Traders Ltd. of 41, Bruce Street, Fort, Bombay,

were the Managing Agents of the company and Bagayatkar and Manjrekar of Bombay were ex-officio

Directors nominated by the Managing Agents. The Prospectus issued by the company inviting

subscription from the public, after taking a note of the possible increase in international trade on

account of the opening of free sea routes, announced that the DSS will inaugurate a new era of “Shop

as you please” under one roof and thereby obviate the necessity of standing in long queues and

hunting for different goods and shops situated in far flung localities. The ambitious prospectus

projected a picture of a store where a person can buy all his needs “from a pin to a piano” and that too

with home delivery facilities. Twelve Departments were enumerated as being the ones which would

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be immediately opened in the stores and it was indicated that the DSS would further diversify their

activities into thirty more Departments ranging from motor-cars, engineering goods, type writers,

jewellery to flowers. By way of a foot note DSS promised that departments of refreshments,

decoration and art gallery will follow after a while.

5. Regarding the mechanics of running the stores, the prospectus proclaimed that the DSS shall

bring together manufacturers under one roof and the concept being of cooperation, a selected group of

merchants dealing in various types of merchandise were to be provided with facilities and

accommodation in the store “for the display and sale of their goods, under the supervision and general

management of the company”. The promotors felt that this would save the merchants good deal of

overhead charges and exorbitant shop rents.

6. The projection of the Directors was that the income to the company from the Departments will

be “the commission ranging from 2.1/2% to 15% or more” according to the nature of the commodities

sold, and that many leading merchants in various lines had already expressed their willingness to avail

themselves of this facility. The promoters announced that the DSS enjoyed the confidence of leading

merchants “who had agreed to leave in their control their goods worth thousands of rupees for display

and sale on retail and wholesale basis”.

7. The permission granted by the Controller for issue of the balance of the originally issued share

capital of Rs. 10,00,000/- “created a problem of securing suitable premises at a suitable place, when

for love or money even small premises were not available in Bombay”. As the report for the year

ending 30th June, 1946 suggests, the Directors were “fortunate in securing an ideal structure and land

in an ideal locality at Dadar a most central place in Greater Bombay”.

46. The tests to be applied in order to find out whether a particular document operates as a lease

or a licence have been crystallised by the Supreme Court in Sohanlal Naraindas v. Laxmidas

Raghunath [1971 Mah LJ 604, 607]:

Intention of the parties to an instrument must be gathered from the terms of the

agreement examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The description given by

the parties may be evidence of the intention but is not decisive. Mere use of the words

appropriate to the creation of a lease will not preclude the agreement operating as a licence. A

recital that the agreement does not create a tenancy is also not decisive. The crucial test in

each case is whether the instrument is intended to create or not to create an interest in the

property the subject matter of the agreement. If it is in fact intended to create an interest in the

property it is a lease, if it does not, it is a licence. In determining whether the agreement

creates a lease or a licence the test of exclusive possession, though not decisive, is of

significance.

47. During the war and in the post-war period, the freedom of parties to enter into a lease and the

licencee’s rights to sublet the premises were seriously curtailed by the various Rent Control Acts. S.

15 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (“Rent Act”) puts an

embargo on the tenant to sublet, assign or transfer his interest in the premises let out to him. Hence,

the first question that arises for determination is whether the parties could “contract out” of the

provisions of the regulatory legislation pertaining to urban tenancies?

48. In Sheel-Max and B.P. Ltd. v. Manchester Garages Ltd. [(1971) 1 AII ER 841] the plaintiffs

were the owners of a petrol filling station. They allowed the defendants to go into occupation of the

premises by an agreement contained in a document called a licence. By the terms of the agreement, it

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was expressed to be solely for the purpose of selling the plaintiffs’ brands of motor fuel and the

defendants had agreed to promote the sale of the plaintiffs’ products. As differences arose between the

parties, the plaintiffs asked the defendants to leave when the agreement expired upon which the latter

claimed that the agreement gave them a tenancy and they are entitled to protection of the (U.K.)

Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. The defendants relied heavily on the fact that they were in exclusive

possession of the petrol filling station. Lord Denning dismissed this ground:

(C)ounsel for the defendants says that the defendants have exclusive possession, and that that

carries with it a tenancy. That is old law which is now gone. As I have said many times,

exclusive possession is no longer decisive. We have to look at the nature of the transaction to

see whether it is a personal privilege or not.

Next the Counsel argued that it would not be permissible for the parties to “get out” of the

Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. Repelling this argument, Lord Denning said (at p. 844):

It seems to me that when the parties are making arrangements for a filling station, they

can agree either on a licence or a tenancy. If they agree on a licence, it is easy enough for

their agreement to be put into writing, in which case the licensee has no protection under the

Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. But, if they agree on a tenancy, and so express it, he is

protected. I realise that this means that the parties can, by agreeing on a licence, get out of

the Act; but so be it; it may be no bad thing.

49. The stall-holders in the present batch appeals have branded the agreements with DSS etc. as

‘Sham and bogus’. Such an argument was advanced in Somma v. Hazelhurst [(1978) 2 All ER

1011] where it was urged that in a “Rent Act situation” any permission to occupy the premises

exclusively must be a tenancy and not a licence, unless it comes into the category of hotels, hostels,

family arrangements or service occupancy of a similar undefined special category. Dismissing the

contention, the Court observed (at p. 1020):

We can see no reason why an ordinary landlord not in any of these special categories

should not be able to grant a licence to occupy an ordinary house. If that is what both he and

the licensee intend and if they can frame any written agreement in such a way as to

demonstrate that it is not really an agreement for a lease masquerading as a licence, we can

see no reason in law or justice why they should be prevented from achieving that object. Nor

can we see why their common intentions should be categorised as bogus or unreal or as sham

merely on the grounds that the Court disapproves of the bargain.

The Court approved the observations of Backely LJ in Shell-Mex and B.P. Ltd. v. Manchester

Garages Ltd. case:

(A)nd it may be that this is a device which has been adopted by the plaintiffs to avoid

possible consequences of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, which would have affected the

transaction being one of landlord and tenant but in my judgment one cannot take that into

account in the process of construing such a document to find out what the true nature of the

transaction is. One has first to find out what is the true nature of the transaction and then see

how the Act operates on the state of affairs, if it at all. One should not approach the problem

with a tendency to attempt to find a tenancy because unless there is a tenancy the case will

escape the effects of the statute”.

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51. “Why so large cost, having so short a lease, Dost thou upon thy fading mansion spend”?

So asked Shakespeare in his early Sonnet 146.

52. DSS had taken the suit property from Ashar for a short lease of 10 years from 1-6-1946 to 31-

5-1956. It had only one option of renewal for a further period of 10 years. All the same, inspite of

dwindling finances, DSS constructed a building worth Rs. 1,51,585/-, furnished the same with

furniture and fittings costings Rs. 1,32,768/- and installed electrical fittings worth Rs. 22,641.-. The

property purchased by Ashar was an old godown of a mill; will a lessee of Ashar incur a ‘large cost’

of Rs. 2,00,000/- upon a ‘fading godown’ if he was only to sublet the same?

53. Exh. Z-196 dt. 20-6-1952 is a typical agreement which DSS used to enter into with the

merchants. The preamble states that the merchant “Soni Watch Co.” in this case, had applied to DSS

“to stock, display and sell his goods through DSS” and that the merchant shall sell the goods at ruling

market rates. DSS shall try to obtain licences and permits, if necessary, in its own name, but DSS will

be free to do business in the same or similar articles in the stores. The merchant had agreed to deposit

by way of guarantee a sum of Rs. 1,000/- for a stall admeasuring about 120 Sq. ft. which was to bear

interest at 3.50 per cent per annum. The merchant was to be provided by DSS with a stall complete

with fittings and furnitures, provide his own cash memo, maintain a stock book and submit to the DSS

monthly statement of accounts on or before the 5th of the following month. The ownership of the

goods was to remain with the merchant. DSS were entitled to receive a minimum “share remuneration

or commission” at the rate of Rs. 135/- per stall or Rs. 250/- for two stalls or to “the share,

remuneration or commission” at the rate of two per cent on the gross sale proceeds, exclusive of sales

tax, whichever is more. The agreement was to remain in force for one year from 13-5-1953, but power

was given to the Company to terminate the agreement for breach of the terms. Then follows clause

34: “The merchant shall have no right to assign the benefit of this agreement. The merchant is not a

tenant of the Company and on termination of this agreement, he shall have no right to continue in or

use of the premises of the Company”.

54. In short, the agreement not only clearly tells the merchant that he is not a tenant of the stall,

but obligates him to send a statement of accounts so that DSS could work out whether they are

entitled to a commission over and above the minimum agreed upon.

55. On 29-8-1952, some stall-holders wrote to the Collector of Bombay (Exh. Z-157) in

connection with the notices dt. 26-8-1952 issued by the Collector asking the merchants to pay the

dues. The merchants informed the Collector that with the exception of Dr. D.S. Patkar (who is not one

of the defendants), “all are charged commission on the gross sale with a certain minimum according

to the number of stalls or spaces required by the individual merchants for trading in the department

stores”. They referred to the fact that prior to 1-5-1952, DSS were providing all facilities, such as

service of the boys, delivery of the goods, collection of daily sales, maintenance of stock book and

accounts, supervision, electricity and all other incidental expenses for which the merchants were

paying higher rate of compensation. As one of the share-holders, the letter proceeds, has filed a

winding up petition as DSS have changed their management practices, reduced the amount of deposit

and the rate of commission. The merchants expressed fervent hope that the winding up petition will be

dismissed, but requested the Collector to see that essential services like watchmen, electricity, etc. are

maintained.

56. The earlier letter (Exh. 31) dt. 8-1-1951, by which the merchants had asked the Collector of

Bombay to hold DSS responsible for the sales tax, has already been discussed. Vide Exhibit ‘O’ dt.

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21st Oct. 1952, DSS told the Collector that except the case of Dr. Patkar, in whose favour they had

created tenancy and whose premises are distinctly separate, all other persons who are trading with the

DSS are not tenants. DSS charges the merchants certain fixed minimum on the gross daily sales by

way of Company’s commission. The letter goes on to say that the merchants, who attend the sales.

“do so more as the Salesmen of the Company and not in their capacities as the owners of the goods”.

None of the merchants have been allowed to put up sign-boards in his own name. DSS then referred

to the case of Mrs. Sarla Shetty, who was allowed to conduct a tailoring class on leave and licence

basis, but has picked up a quarrel and put up claim for tenancy rights. An attempt was made by DSS

to ask Chinubhai whether the stalls can be let out, so that more money could be realised and the debt

paid off more quickly (Exhibit “R” dt. 30th Oct. 1953). According to Chinubhai he tried to sell this

idea to the mortgagees but the mortgagees did not agree and hence the idea was dropped.

57. The intention of the parties can be gathered from the surrounding circumstances, and so far as

the present case is concerned, it is not one of a stray occupation by a stranger in a room in a

residential house which may give rise to questions as to whether he was only a lodger or a boarder or

a paying guest or a tenant. This is a case of no less than 47 people taking stalls and carrying on

business for a period of over 22 years. Resultantly the behavioral pattern appearing on a broad canvas

stretching over more than two decades has to be observed. It would make for a better appreciation of

this pattern if the evidence is grouped under various heads.

58. Admittedly, Laxmi lost possession as a result of Court Decree on 19th Nov. 1968 and it has

been urged by the stall-holders that the space that was allotted to them was in their exclusive

possession, inasmuch as, they had put flap doors and for that purpose certain photographs were

produced. The photographs did show an arrangement of a plywood shutter capable of being locked. It

was also canvassed that there were rolling shutters to some stalls which would enure for a better

locking system. But P. W. 6 Mahendra, who was commissioned to fix the rolling shutters, had

admitted that the shutters were fixed after 1968 and thus the fixation of rolling shutters loses its

relevance for the purposes of this appeal which deals with a period prior to 19-11-1958. It is now

more or less an established fact that none of the stalls had a locking arrangement, for, the space

allotted to each merchant was earmarked on two sides by show cases placed back to back forming the

walls and waist high counters placed in the front across which the merchants would attend to the

customers forming the third side.

59. As the plan of the building shows, the stores (with the exception of Stall No. 6 of Nathani who

is the Appellant in First Appeal No. 648 of 1972, and Stall No. 7 of Ramjivandas who is the Appellant

in First Appeal No. 664 of 1972, to whom I would advert later), was like a fort having a single

collapsible steel gate which controlled the ingress and egress. A second wooden gate was also

provided inside the steel collapsible steel gate for greater security, the space between the two acting as

a passage to the stores flanked by show windows on either sides. While handling over possession to

the mortgagee Shah Brothers, DSS, vide Exhibit ‘D’ dt. 25th Oct. 1953, talked of giving the keys of

the gates. That is to say, once the gate was locked, it was not possible for anyone to enter the stores.

60. Such was the control of the management, that the merchants had to request Ramniklal on 8th

July, 1954 (Exh. ‘Z-61’) that “the stores should be kept open continuously from 9.00 am to 8.00 p.m.

without the present break of 12 a.m. to 3 p.m. in order to improve the sales and remove the

inconvenience of finding some shelter between 12.00 a.m. (Sic noon) to 3.00 p.m.” The management

would close the stores at 12.00 noon, ask all the merchants to clear out, lock the gates and allow them

entry only at 3.00 p.m.

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61. The timings of the stores became the subject-matter of discussion amongst the merchants

and the management as would be apparent from the persual of the bunch of letters (Exh. ‘Z-61’

(Colly.). When the management conceded to the request of keeping the stores open non-stop without

lunch break, some merchants, on 23-7-1954, wrote to Ramniklal that they should revert to the old

timings as they did not get enough business to justify putting in extra work of three hours. Some

complained that as the stores caters to office-goers hardly any one comes between 12.00 noon to 3.00

p.m. while others felt that a good number of customers coming from far off places such as Virar,

Kalyan, would be disappointed to find the stores closed between 12.00 noon and 3.00 p.m. The

management had the final say in the matter and they decided on 11th Dec. 1954 that the old timings

should be restored. So complete was the control of Ramniklal over the timings of the stores that on 1st

Dec., 1954 he decided that in view of inauguration of the Stainless Steel Department at the hands of

Ashar the paramount landlord, the stores would be opened at 8.00 a.m. Similarly, Ramniklal closed

the stores at 10.00 p.m. on 26-10-1954 and asked all the merchants to bring in their account books for

a joint Pooja at 10.30 p.m.

62. If DSS, Ramniklal or Laxmi were only interested in acting as landlords, nothing would have

been easier than to open an account in the nearest bank and ask the merchants to credit the monthly

rent in that account. There would have been no need to appoint any staff whatsoever, not even a bill

collector.

But right from the beginning DSS maintained an office in the stores and had a number of

employees such as watchmen, accountants etc. As an exercise in business management, DSS, in the

year ending 30th June, 1948, had engaged extra highly qualified and experienced staff of accountants

and statisticians so that the contingency of accumulating large portion of dead stock did not occur.

63. It appears that Chinubhai used to incur expenditure of about Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 6,000/- per

annum in inserting advertisements of the stores as a whole. (Exh. ‘Z-60’) (‘Z-80’). Whenever the stall

holders desired that their names should be specifically mentioned in the advertisements, Ramniklal

used to comply, provided the particular stall-holder bore half the expenses. For instance, Soni Watch

Company (vide letter – Exh. ‘Z-73’) wrote on 11th Nov. 1955 informing Ramniklal that an expense of

Rs. 243-4-0 had been incurred by them in exhibiting cinema slides at ‘Chitra’, ‘Rivoli’ and

‘Broadway’ of Dadar, and claimed reimbursement of half the cost totalling to Rs. 121-10-0. Another

stall-holder Gujar and Company also desired to boost up the sale of Samson Dresses. They intended to

have an advertisement campaign which would cost him Rs. 60/- and requested Ramniklal to

contribute his share of Rs. 30/- Ramniklal was issuing calendars showing the name of the stores, but

one Karamshi Monshi, holder of stall No. 26, desired that 500 calendars should bear his name as well

and by a letter (Exh. ‘Z-70’) dated 3rd Sept. 1956, agreed to bear expenses for the same.

The Merchants’ Association by their Resolution dt. 12-1-1957 decided that the Executive

Committee of their Association should discuss with the management a successful campaign of

advertisement and that the façade of the stores should be given a face lift. The management, vide their

letter dt. 25th March, 1956 (Exh. ‘Z-60’) agreed to share 50% of the expenses and invited suggestions

and proposals for the construction of the front gate.

64. It appears that the management gifted a telephone locking device to the customers as a part of

their advertising campaign.

65. The acknowledged leader of the stall-holders Soni, had admitted that the management used to

decorate the stores on festive occasions.

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66. In order to promote sales, the management had announced a 6¼% rebate on 15th Aug.

1957 to customers and the same was shared by the management. Next year, the merchants again

requested the management on 18-7-1958 (Exh. ‘Z-60’) (Colly.) that a rebate of 6% should be allowed

to the customers and half the burden of 3% should be borne by the management.

67. It appears that in spite of advertisement compaign, and all other steps taken by the

management, the sales of the stalls did not pick up appreciably. A circular was issued by Ramniklal

(Exh. ‘Z-63’) on 3-12-1954 convening a meeting of the stall-holders with a view to giving rebate in

the minimum commission. Ramniklal made it clear that the rebate in the commission will be granted

only to those merchants who have no outstanding and who would give an undertaking “to remain in

the stores for the next six months”. Ultimately, a rebate of 10% was granted but the circulars issued

from time to time (Exh. “Z-63”) (Colly.) show that the merchants were in arrears not only in the

payment of their minimum commission, but also electric charges. The management also offered a

heavy reduction in the minimum commission when the stores was closed for about 10 days during the

agitation consequent upon the report of the States Re-organisation Commission.

68. The merchants used to submit sales statements from time to time (‘Exh. “Z-86 to “Z-107”)

and the recalcitrants amongst them were reminded to submit statements.

69. By a letter (Exh. “Z-64”) dt. 2nd Aug. 1956, Soni requested permission from Ramniklal to

change the merchandise in which they were dealing till that date, but the management advised him to

stock latest popular records of H.M.V. but did not permit him to deal in watches.

70. One of the tests proposed by Lord Denning M.R. in Marchant v. Charters [(1977) 3 All ER

918, 922] is “Was it intended that the occupier should have a stake in the room or did he have only

permission for himself personally to occupy the room, whether under a contract or not”? Right from

the beginning it was the management of the stores which had a stake not only in the various stalls

which they had furnished but also in the sales of stall-holders who were given permission to occupy

the same. Some of the stall-holders like Paradkar (Exh. “Z-74 dt. 4th Oct. 1956) who could not boost

their sales, surrendered their stalls because even the minimum commission was rather too heavy for

them to pay. The advertisement compaign was geared to increase the sales of the stall-holders so that

the management could augment their share of the commission on the gross sales figures. It was not

the stall-holders who had the stake in the stalls but the management who had a stake not only in the

stalls and the entire buildings, but also in the total sales so that they could claim higher commission.

The interest of the stall-holders was not assignable and every time a new stall-holder was inducted, he

was given a fresh permission by the management.

71. The sapling of a departmental stores nursed under the long shadows of Macy’s and Harrod’s

did not take roots let alone burgeoing in Dadar soil. The Dadar housewife was accustomed to visit a

row of shop-fronts displaying sarees when she wanted to buy a saree and was not mentally attuned to

visit a conglomeration of shops selling anything from a pin to a piano. (A white collared Dadarite

anyway preferred to do his Sunday morning riyaz squatting on the floor with his good old

harmonium!).

72. Most of the stall-holders did not do well with the result that the management had to content

itself with the minimum commission. But Century Mills, who had a stall, showed better performance

and paid the percentage of commission calculated on the basis of sales which was higher than the

minimum agreed upon. After their initial period was over, fresh negotiations were started with

Century and a fresh permission granted to them under different terms.

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73. All the licenced agreements with the stall-holders came to an end on 31-12-1965 and the

surprising feature of this case is that right from 1946 till this date, not a single assertion was made by

the stall-holders that they are tenants. On 1-1-1966, notices of revocation (Exh. “Z-168”) (Colly.)

were issued by Laxmi whereafter for the first time on 10-1-1966, the stall-holders claimed to be

tenants and thus filed the first salvo in this battle. Within a month, they filed suits on 9-2-1966 (Exh.

“Z-201”) in the Small Causes Court for obtaining a declaration that they are the tenants. This long

acquiescence of the stall holders lends credence to the case of the plaintiffs that the stall-holders were

merely licensees.

74. The surrounding circumstannces marshalled above like want of facility to independently lock

the stalls, the inability of the stall-holders to enter into the building or the stores at will, the

requirement of having to seek permission of the management to change the hours of business or effect

a change of merchandise, non-assignability of interest in stalls, repeated recognition of the agreements

to pay a fixed percentage of commission subject to a minimum with DSS, Ramniklal and Laxmi, the

sale promotion campaigns lodges by DSS, Ramniklal and Laxmi, the correspondence of the stallholders with the fiscal authorities reiterating the commission agreements, the deployment of staff like

watchmen; accountants, statisticians by the management to monitor the sales, want of a single protest

by the stall-holders till 10-1-1966 asserting rights of tenancy, submission of sales statements by the

stall-holders to the management and payment of commission on the turnover higher than the

minimum by Century Mills’ stall, unequivocally point out that all of them, with the exception of stall

No. 6 of Nathani and Stall No. 7 of Ramjeevandas were merely licensees for reward.

75. The cases of Nathani and Ramjeevandas stand on different footing. It is not the case of Laxmi

or their predecessors in interest that they have never given any premises in the stores on rent.

Admittedly, Dr. Patkar who runs a maternity home and others were tenants. Though exclusive

possession alone and by itself is not the acid test of determination whether the relationship between

the parties is that of tenancy or licence, it assumes importance in the case of Nathani and

Ramjeevandas. Both these stalls are facing the road and the stall-holders have not to enter the

collapsible gate at all to reach and open their stalls. Surely, these stalls facing the road could not be

kept open as was the practice with the stalls inside the main gate. The exclusive possession in their

case coupled with the fact that there are other persons who are recognised to be the tenants in the

building of the stores is a pointer to the fact Laxmi have failed to prove that Nathani and

Ramjeevandas are mere licensees.

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