Ejusdem Generis

Statute interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of a law passed by a legislative body. It is the process by which courts interpret and apply statutes. The goal of statute interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature in enacting the law, and to apply that intent to the facts of a particular case.

What is Ejusdem Generis?

‘Ejusdem Generis’ is a Latin term and the meaning of it is “of the same kind and nature”. The Ejusdem Generis rule states that when a list of two or more specific words or phrases is followed by general words, those general words should be interpreted to include only things of the same kind, class, or nature as the specific items listed.

The rationale behind this rule is that if the legislature (or the parties drafting the document) had intended the general words to have their widest possible meaning, they would not have included the specific examples. The inclusion of specific items suggests that the general words that follow are intended to cover other items within the same category or genus as the specific ones.

Need for Application:

The need for interpretation of statute by the doctrine of Ejusdem Generis arises when:
– There is ambiguity in the language of the provisions of statutes, or
– When in the provision, there is a possibility of two views, or
– The meaning which the provision of a statute gives, defeats the purpose of the statute.

Conditions for Application

1. Enumeration of Specific Words: The statute (or document) must contain a list of two or more specific words or phrases. A single specific word followed by general words is usually not sufficient for the rule to apply.
2. Specific Words Constitute a Class or Category (Genus): The specific words in the list must share a common characteristic, forming a recognizable class, category, or genus. They should not be a random assortment of unrelated items.
3. The Class is Not Exhausted by the Enumeration: There must be other items that fall within the same class or category as the specific words listed. If the specific words already cover the entire possible class, then the general words might be intended to have a broader meaning.
4. General Words Follow the Enumeration: The specific list must be followed by general words that are broad enough to potentially encompass things outside the class defined by the specific words.
5. No Indication of Contrary Legislative Intent: The context of the statute or other indications within it should not suggest that the legislature intended the general words to have a broader meaning beyond the class established by the specific words.

How it Works (with Examples):

Imagine a statute that says: “No vehicles, including cars, trucks, motorcycles, and other motor-powered vehicles, are allowed in the park.”

• Specific Words: cars, trucks, motorcycles
• General Words: other motor-powered vehicles
• Common Class: Land-based, motor-powered transportation.

Applying Ejusdem Generis, the phrase “other motor-powered vehicles” would likely be interpreted to include similar types of land-based transportation like scooters or ATVs. It would probably not include airplanes or boats, as those do not belong to the same class as cars, trucks, and motorcycles.

Purpose And Importance

1. Gives Meaning to Specific Words: The rule ensures that the specific examples provided by the legislature are not rendered superfluous.
2. Narrows Broad Language: It helps to limit the potentially wide scope of general words, preventing unintended applications of the law.
3. Ascertaining Legislative Intent: It serves as a tool to help courts understand what the lawmakers likely intended to cover by looking at the specific examples they provided.
4. Promoting Consistency: It helps in ensuring that similar items are treated similarly under the law.

Limitations

1. Difficulty in Identifying the Genus: Sometimes, it can be challenging to determine the precise common characteristic or class shared by the specific words.
2. Risk of Narrowing Too Much: Applying the rule too strictly could defeat the broader purpose of the legislation if the legislature genuinely intended the general words to have a wider scope.
3. Context is Crucial: The rule should always be applied in the context of the entire statute and with a view to discerning the overall legislative intent.

Case Laws

Calcutta Municipal Corpn. v. East India Hotels Ltd.

Facts: East India Hotels Ltd. owned and operated the Oberoi Grand hotel in Calcutta, which featured three restaurants: the Moghul Room, Polynesia, and Princes. These restaurants offered entertainment such as music (piped, vocal, and instrumental) and had dance floors for guests to enjoy dancing. Cabaret shows were also occasionally performed.
Before a dispute arose, the hotel had been obtaining licenses for these restaurants under Section 443 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. This section mandates licenses for “theatre, circus, cinema houses, dancing halls, or other similar places of public resort, recreation, or amusement.” Initially, the license fee was Rs. 250 per annum for each restaurant, but this fee was later increased.
The Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC) revised the license fees for such establishments, substantially increasing the fee for “hotels with dancing floors/restaurants (with or without bars) that provide music and amusements” to Rs. 15,000 per annum.
In response, the hotel challenged the applicability of Section 443 and the increased license fee, arguing that the restaurants did not qualify as “similar places” to those specifically listed in the section.
High Court’s decision:
The court ruled that Section 443 pertains to venues such as theaters, circuses, cinema houses, dance halls, or other similar places of public entertainment that require a license fee to operate. However, a restaurant that occasionally provides these types of amusements does not fall under the definition outlined in Section 443, and therefore, it is not required to pay a license fee. The court based its decision on the ejusdem generis rule.
Now, the appeal before the supreme court.
Issue: Whether the restaurants within the hotel, providing music and dancing facilities, fall within the ambit of “other similar place of public resort, recreation or amusement” under Section 443 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, thus requiring a license?
Whether the increased license fee levied by the CMC was valid?
Judgement: The Supreme Court ruled that restaurants within hotels, by offering music and dancing facilities, indeed fall under the definition of “other similar places of public resort, recreation, or amusement” as stated in Section 443 of the Act.
The court reasoned that the availability of dancing floors and live music for entertainment made these restaurants comparable to a “dancing hall,” which is explicitly mentioned in the section. The court emphasized that the provision of recreation alongside dining did not differentiate these establishments from a “dancing hall,” where food and drinks are also typically available.
The court determined that the High Court made an error by applying the principle of ejusdem generis, which restricted the interpretation of “other similar places.” The Supreme Court stated that the specific references in the section do not serve as a category that excludes the restaurants in question.
According to the court, a dancing hall is commonly understood to be a venue equipped with a dancing floor and live music to entertain guests who wish to dance. There is no substantial difference between a dancing hall and a restaurant that provides a proper dancing floor; thus, the inclusion of dancing as a form of recreation alongside fine dining does not make the establishments dissimilar.
While the main focus of the ruling was on the applicability of the section, the Supreme Court implicitly upheld the Corporation’s authority to impose the increased license fee under Section 443 by directing the hotel to adhere to the licensing requirements.
The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and held in favor of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation.

Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. CCE

Facts: Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. manufactured toilet soaps (bathing soaps) and claimed that their product should be classified under Item 15(1) of the Central Excise Tariff, which includes “Soap, household and laundry” and attracts a lower rate of excise duty. However, the Central Excise authorities classified their product under Item 15(2), which pertains to “Soap, other sorts,” thus imposing a higher rate of duty. Initially, the Assistant Collector categorized the product as “other sorts,” but the Collector (Appeals) determined it to be “household” soap. The Tribunal later overturned the Collector’s order, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether “toilet soap” (bathing soap) should be classified under “Soap, household and laundry” (Item 15(1)) or “Soap, other sorts” (Item 15(2)) for the purpose of excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as amended in 1964?
Judgement: The Court reiterated the principle that when interpreting a statutory provision, nothing should be added or deleted; the intention of the legislature must be discerned from the language employed. There is no place for assumptions or presumptions in a taxing statute.
Before the 1964 amendment, “toilet soap” was categorized separately with its own tariff rate. The amendment removed this distinct category, grouping soaps instead into “household and laundry” and “other sorts.” The Court emphasized the importance of understanding terms in their common and commercial usage. It argued that “toilet soap” is primarily used by households for bathing. When someone goes to the market and requests toilet soap, they are typically looking for soap intended for personal bathing.
The Court concluded that the term “household” in Item 15(1) should be interpreted broadly to encompass soaps used for personal bathing within a household. While household soaps may also be used for cleaning utensils or laundry, toilet soap specifically serves the family’s bathing needs.
The Court dismissed the argument that “household” soap should be limited to soaps used solely for cleaning items and laundry. It noted that the elimination of the separate category for toilet soap, along with its omission from “other sorts,” indicated that it should be classified under the broader category of “household” in commercial terms.
Although the Court recognized the legislative history in which toilet soap had been treated as a separate category, it focused on interpreting the amended provision based on the language used and its common understanding.
In the context of the amended Item 15 of the Central Excises and Salt Act of 1944, “toilet soap” (bathing soap), based on its common and commercial understanding, falls under the category of “Soap, household and laundry” (Item 15(1)). Therefore, it is subject to the lower rate of excise duty applicable to that category. The term “household” is to be understood broadly, including soaps used for personal bathing within a household. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by Oswal Agro Mills and held that “toilet soap” should be classified under “Soap, household and laundry” (Item 15(1)).