November 22, 2024
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SOVEREIGN, DIPLOMATIC & CONSULARIMMUNITY/PRIVILEGECASE CONCERNING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC ANDCONSULAR STAFF IN TEHRAN(United States of America v. Iran)ICJ Rep.1980

JUDGMENT

1. On 29 November 1979, United States of America instituted proceedings against the

Islarnic Republic of Iran in respect of a dispute concerning the seizure and holding as

hostages of members of the United States diplomatic and consular staff and certain other

United States nationals in Tehran.

5. After due notice to the Parties, 18 March 1980 was fixed as the date for the opening of

the oral proceedings ; on 18, 19 and 20 March 1980, public hearings were held, in the course

of which the Court heard the oral argument of the Agent and Counsel of the United States ;

the Government of Iran was not represented at the hearings.

6. Both the countries were parties to one or more of the following Conventions and

Protocols

(a) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 ;

(b) the Optional Protocol to that Convention concerning the Compulsory Settlement of

Disputes ;

(c) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 ;

(d) the Optional Protocol to that Convention concerning the Compulsory Settlement

of Disputes ;

(e) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally

Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973.

8. In the course of the written proceedings the following Submissions were presented on

behalf of the Government of the United States of America :

“The United States requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows

(a) That the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and

punish the conduct described in the preceding Statement of Facts, violated its international

legal obligations to the United States as provided by

– Articles 22,24,25,27,29,31,37 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations,

– Articles 28,31,33,34,36 and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,

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– Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against

Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, and

– Articles II (4), XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and

Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, and

– Articles 2 (3), 2 (4) and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations ;

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations, the Government of Iran

is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of al1 United States

nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in

Tehran and to assure that al1 such persons and al1 other United States nationals in Tehran are

allowed to leave Iran safely ;

(c) That the Government of Iran shall pay to the United States, in its own right and in the

exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, reparation for the foregoing

violations of Iran’s international legal obligations to the United States, in a sum to be

determined by the Court ; and

(d) That the Government of Iran submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of

prosecution those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff

of the United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates” ; in the Memorial :

“The Government of the United States respectfully requests that the Court adjudge and

declare as follows :

(a) that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in permitting, tolerating,

encouraging, adopting, and endeavoring to exploit, as well as in failing to prevent and punish,

the conduct described in the Statement of the Facts, violated its international legal obligations

to the United States as provided by :

– Articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 37, 44 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations

– Articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40 and 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular

Relations :

– Article II (4), XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and

Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran ; and

– Articles 2,4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes

against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents ;

(b) That, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations :

(i) The Governrnent of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall immediately ensure that the

premises at the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulates are restored to the

possession of the United States authorities under their exclusive control, and shall ensure their

inviolability and effective protection as provided for by the treaties in force between the two

States, and by general international law ;

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(ii) the Governrnent of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall ensure the immediate release,

without any exception, of al1 persons of United States nationality who are or have been held

in the Embassy of the United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

Tehran, or who are or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to al1

such persons, in accordance with the treaties in force between the two States, and with general

international law ;

(iii) the Governrnent of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall, as from that moment, afford

to al1 the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges

and immunities to which they are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States,

and under general international law, including immunity from any form of criminal

jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave the territory of Iran ;

(iv) the Governrnent of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall, in affording the diplomatic

and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges and immunities to

which they are entitled, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction, ensure

that no such personnel shall be obliged to appear on trial or as a witness, deponent, source of

information, or in any other role, at any proceedings, whether formal or informal, initiated by

or with the acquiescence of the Iranian Government, whether such proceedings be

denominated a ‘trial’, ‘grand jury’, ‘international commission’ or otherwise ;

v) the Governrnent of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall submit to its competent

authorities for the purpose of prosecution, or extradite to the United States, those persons

responsible for the crimes committed against the personnel and premises of the United States

Embassy and Consulates in Iran ;

(c) that the United States of America is entitled to the payment to it, in its own right and

in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals held hostage, of reparation

by the Islarnic Republic of Iran for the violations of the above international legal obligations

which it owes to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court at a subsequent

stage of the proceedings.”

17. At approximately 10.30 a.m. on 4 November 1979, during the course of a

demonstration of approximately 3,000 persons, the United States Embassy compound in

Tehran was overrun by a strong armed group of several hundred people. The Iranian security

personnel are reported to have simply disappeared from the scene ; at al1 events it is

established that they made no apparent effort to deter or prevent the demonstrators from

seizing the Embassy’s premises. The invading group (who subsequently described themselves

as “Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Policy”, and who will hereafter be referred to as

“the militants”) gained access by force to the compound and to the ground floor of the

Chancery building. Over two hours after the beginning of the attack, and after the militants

had attempted to set fire to the Chancery building and to cut through the upstairs steel doors

with a torch, they gained entry to the upper floor ; one hour later they gained control of the

main vault. The militants also seized the other buildings, including the various residences, on

the Embassy compound. In the course of the attack, al1 the diplomatic and consular personnel

and other persons present in the premises were seized as hostages, and detained in the

Embassy compound ; subsequently other United States personnel and one United States

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private citizen seized elsewhere in Tehran were brought to the compound and added to the

number of hostages.

18. During the three hours or more of the assault, repeated calls for help were made from

the Embassy to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and repeated efforts to secure help from the

Iranian authorities were also made through direct discussions by the United States Chargé

d’affaires, who was at the Foreign Ministry at the time, together with two other members of

the mission. From there he made contact with the Prime Minister’s Office and with Foreign

Ministry officials. A request was also made to the Iranian Chargé d’affaires in Washington for

assistance in putting an end to the seizure of the Embassy. Despite these repeated requests, no

Iranian forces were sent in time to provide relief and protection to the Embassy. In fact when

Revolutionary Guards ultimately arrived on the scene, despatched by the Government “to

prevent clashes”, they considered that their task was merely to “protect the safety of both the

hostages and the students”, according to statements subsequently made by the Iranian

Government’s spokesman, and by the operations commander of the Guards. No attempt was

made by the Iranian Government to clear the Embassy premises, to rescue the persons held

hostage, or to persuade the militants to terminate their action against the Embassy.

19. During the morning of 5 November, only hours after the seizure of the Embassy, the

United States Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz were also seized ; again the Iranian

Government took no protective action. The operation of these Consulates had been suspended

since the attack in February 1979 (paragraph 14 above), and therefore no United States

personnel were seized on these premises..

35. In its letter of 9 December 1979 the Government of Iran maintained that the Court

could not and should not take cognizance of the present case for another reason, namely, The

problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the

interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is

based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more

complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application

divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between

Iran and the United States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, inter alia, al1 the

crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular the coup d’état of 1953

stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr.

Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his régime which was under the control of

American interests, and al1 the social, economic, cultural and political consequences of the

direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations

of al1 international norms, committed by the United States in Iran.”

36. The Court, however, in its Order of 15 December 1979, made it clear that the seizure

of the United States Embassy and Consulates and the detention of internationally protected

persons as hostages cannot be considered as something “secondary” or “marginal”, having

regard to the importance of the legal principles involved. It also referred to a statement of the

Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to Security Council resolution 457 (1979), as

evidencing the importance attached by the international community as a whole to the

observance of those principles in the present case as well as its concern at the dangerous level

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of tension between Iran and the United States. The Court, at the same time, pointed out that

no provision of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline to take

cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however

important. It further underlined that, if the Iranian Government considered the alleged

activities of the United States in Iran legally to have a close connection with the subjectmatter of the United States’ Application, it was open to that Government to present its own

arguments regarding those activities to the Court either by way of defense in a CounterMemorial or by way of a counter-claim.

In the present case the principal claims of the United States relate essentially to alleged

violations by Iran of its obligations to the United States under the Vienna Conventions of

1961 on Diplomatic Relations and of 1963 on Consular Relations. With regard to these claims

the United States has invoked as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction Article 1 of the Optional

Protocols concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes which accompany these

Conventions. The United Nations publication Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the

Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions lists both Iran and the United States as

parties to the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, as also to their accompanying Protocols

concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, and in each case without any reservation

to the instrument in question. The Vienna Conventions, which codify the law of diplomatic

and consular relations, state principles and rules essential for the maintenance of peaceful

relations between States and accepted throughout the world by nations of al1 creeds, cultures

and political complexions. Moreover, the Iranian Government has not maintained in its

communications to the Court that the two Vienna Conventions and Protocols are not in force

as between Iran and the United States. Accordingly, as indicated in the Court’s Order of 15

December 1979, the Optional Protocols manifestly provide a possible basis for the Court’s

jurisdiction, with respect to the United States’ claims under the Vienna Conventions of 1961

and 1963. It only remains, therefore, to consider whether the present dispute in fact falls

within the scope of their provisions.

47. The occupation of the United States Embassy by militants on 4 November 1979 and

the detention of its personnel as hostages was an event of a kind to provoke an immediate

protest from any government, as it did from the United States Government, which dispatched

a special emissary to Iran to deliver a formal protest. Although the special emissary, denied

al1 contact with Iranian officials, never entered Iran, the Iranian Government was left in no

doubt as to the reaction of the United States to the taking over of its Embassy and detention of

its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. Indeed, the Court was informed that the United

States was meanwhile making its views known to the Iranian Government through its Charge

d’affaires, who has been kept since 4 November 1979 in the Iranian Foreign Ministry itself,

where he happened to be with two other members of his mission during the attack on the

Embassy. In any event, by a letter of 9 November 1979, the United States brought the

situation in regard to its Embassy before the Security Council. The Iranian Government did

not take any part in the debates on the matter in the Council, and it was still refusing to enter

into any discussions on the subject when, on 29 November 1979, the United States filed the

present Application submitting its claims to the Court. It is clear that on that date there existed

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a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Conventions and thus

one falling within the scope of Article 1 of the Protocols.

50. The United States also presents claims in respect of alleged violations by Iran of

Articles II, paragraph 4, XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,

and Consular Rights of 1955 between the United States and Iran, which entered into force on

16 June 1957.

54. No suggestion has been made by Iran that the 1955 Treaty was not in force on 4

November 1979 when the United States Embassy was overrun and its nationals taken hostage,

or on 29 November when the United States submitted the dispute to the Court. The very

purpose of a treaty of amity, and indeed of a treaty of establishment, is to promote friendly

relations between the two countries concerned, and between their two peoples, more

especially by mutual undertakings to ensure the protection and security of their nationals in

each other’s territory. It is precisely when difficulties arise that the treaty assumes its greatest

importance, and the whole object of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty was to

establish the means for arriving at a friendly settlement of such difficulties by the Court or by

other peaceful means. It would, therefore, be incompatible with the whole purpose of the

1955 Treaty if recourse to the Court under Article XXI, paragraph 2, were now to be found

not to be open to the parties precisely at the moment when such recourse was most needed.

Furthermore, although the machinery for the effective operation of the 1955 Treaty has, no

doubt, now been impaired by reason of diplomatic relations between the two countries having

been broken off by the United States, its provisions remain part of the corpus of law

applicable between the United States and Iran.

56. The principal facts material for the Court’s decision on the merits of The present case

have been set out earlier in this Judgment. Those facts have to be looked at by the Court from

two points of view. First, it must determine how far, legally, the acts in question may be

regarded as imputable to the Iranian State. Secondly, it must consider their compatibility or

incompatibility with the obligations of Iran under treaties in force or under any other rules of

international law that may be applicable.The events which are the subject of the United States’

claims fa11 into two phases which it will be convenient to examine separately.

57. The first of these phases covers the armed attack on the United States Embassy by

militants on 4 November 1979, the overmining of its premises, the seizure of its inmates as

hostages, the appropriation of its property and archives and the conduct of the Iranian

authorities in the face of those occurrences. The attack and the subsequent overrunning, bit by

bit, of the whole Embassy premises, was an operation which continued over a period of some

three hours without any body of police, any military unit or any Iranian official intervening to

try to stop or impede it from being carried through to its completion. The result of the attack

was considerable damage to the Embassy premises and property, the forcible opening and

seizure of its archives, the confiscation of the archives and other documents found in the

Embassy and, most grave of all, the seizure by force of its diplomatic and consular personnel

as hostages, together with two United States nationals.

58. No suggestion has been made that the militants, when they executed their attack on

the Embassy, had any form of official status as recognized “agents” or organs of the Iranian

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State. Their conduct in mounting the attack, overrunning the Embassy and seizing its inmates

as hostages cannot, therefore, be regarded as imputable to that State on that basis. Their

conduct might be considered as itself directly imputable to the Iranian State only if it were

established that, in fact. on the occasion in question the militants acted on behalf on the State,

having been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian State to carry out a specific

operation. The information before the Court does not, however, suffice to establish with the

requisite certainty the existence at that time of such a link between the militants and any

competent organ of the State.

59. Previously, it is true, the religious leader of the country, the Ayatollah Khomeini, had

made several public declarations inveighing against the United States as responsible for al1

his country’s problems. In so doing, it would appear, the Ayatollah Khomeini was giving

utterance to the general resentment felt by supporters of the revolution at the admission of the

former Shah to the United States. The information before the Court also indicates that a

spokesman for the militants, in explaining their action afterwards, did expressly refer to a

message issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini, on 1 November 1979. In that message the

Ayatollah Khomeini had declared that it was “up to the dear pupils, students and theological

students to expand with al1 their might their attacks against the United States and Israel, so

they may force the United States to return the deposed and criminal shah, and to condemn this

great plot” (that is, a plot to stir up between the main streams of Islamic thought). In the view

of the Court, however, it would be going too far to interpret such general declarations of the

Ayatollah Khomeini to the people or students of Iran as amounting to an authorization from

the State to undertake the specific operation of invading and seizing the United States

Embassy. To do so would, indeed, conflict with the assertions of the militants themselves who

are reported to have claimed credit for having devised and carried out the plan to occupy the

Embassy. Again, congratulations after the event, such as those reportedly telephoned to the

militants by the Ayatollah Khomeini on the actual evening of the attack, and other subsequent

statements of official approval, though highly significant in another context shortly to be

considered, do not alter the initially independent and unofficial character of the militants’

attack on the Embassy.

60. The first phase, here under examination, of the events complained of also includes

the attacks on the United States Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. Like the attack on the

Embassy, they appear to have been executed by militants not having an official character, and

successful because of lack of sufficient protection.

61. The conclusion just reached by the Court, that the initiation of the attack on the

United States Embassy on 4 November 1979, and of the attacks on the Consulates at Tabriz

and Shiraz the following day, cannot be considered as in itself imputable to the Iranian State

does not mean that Iran is, in consequence, free of any responsibility in regard to those attacks

; for its own conduct was in conflict with its international obligations. By a number of

provisions of the Vienna Conventions of 196 1 and 1963, Iran was placed under the most

categorical obligations, as a receiving State, to take appropriate steps to ensure the protection

of the United States Embassy and Consulates, their staffs, their archives, their means of

communication and the freedom of movement of the members of their staffs.

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62. Thus, after solemnly proclaiming the inviolability of the premises of a diplomatic

mission, Article 22 of the 1961 Convention continues in paragraph 2 :

“The receiving State is under a special duty to take al1 appropriate steps to protect the

premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of

the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.” (Emphasis added.) So, too, after

proclaiming that the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable, and that he shall not be

liable to any form of arrest or detention,

Article 29 provides :

“The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take al1 appropriate steps

to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity. ” (Emphasis added.)

The obligation of a receiving State to protect the inviolability of the archives and

documents of a diplomatic mission is laid down in Article 24, which specifically provides that

they are to be “inviolable at any time and wherever they may be. Under Article 25 it is

required to “accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the mission”, under

Article 26 to “ensure to al1 members of the mission freedom of movement and travel in its

territory”, and under Article 27 to “permit and protect free communication on the part of the

mission for al1 official purposes”.

Analogous provisions are to be found in the 1963 Convention regarding the privileges

and immunities of consular missions and their staffs (Art. 3 1, para. 3, Arts. 40,33,28,34 and

35). In the view of the Court, the obligations of the Iranian Government here in question are

not merely contractual obligations established by the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963,

but also obligations under general international law.

63. The facts set out in paragraphs 14 to 27 above establish to the satisfaction of the

Court that on 4 November 1979 the Iranian Government failed altogether to take any

“appropriate steps” to protect the premises, staff and archives of the United States’ mission

against attack by the militants, and to take any steps either to prevent this attack or to stop it

before it reached its completion. They also show that on 5 November 1979 the Iranian

Government similarly failed to take appropriate steps for the protection of the United States

Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. In addition they show, in the opinion of the Court, that the

failure of the Iranian Government to take such steps was due to more than mere negligence or

lack of appropriate means.

64. The total inaction of the Iranian authorities on that date in face of urgent and

repeated requests for help contrasts very sharply with its conduct on several other occasions

of a similar kind. Some eight months earlier, on 14 February 1979, the United States Embassy

in Tehran had itself been subjected to the armed attack mentioned above (paragraph 14), in

the course of which the attackers had taken the Ambassador and his staff prisoner. On that

occasion, however, a detachment of Revolutionary Guards, sent by the Government, had

arrived promptly, together with a Deputy Prime Minister, and had quickly succeeded in

freeing the Ambassador and his staff and restoring the Embassy to him. On 1 March 1979,

moreover, the Prime Minister of Iran had sent a letter expressing deep regret at the incident,

giving an assurance that appropriate arrangements had been made to prevent any repetition of

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such incidents, and indicating the willingness of his Government to indemnify the United

States for the damage. On 1 November 1979, only three days before the events which gave

rise to the present case, the Iranian police intervened quickly and effectively to protect the

United States Embassy when a large crowd of demonstrators spent several hours marching up

and down outside it.

Furthermore, on other occasions in November 1979 and January 1980, invasions or

attempted invasions of other foreign embassies in Tehran were frustrated or speedily

terminated.

65. A similar pattern of facts appears in relation to consulates. In February 1979, at

about the same time as the first attack on the United States Embassy, attacks were made by

demonstrators on its Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz ; but the Iranian authorities then took the

necessary steps to clear them of the demonstrators. On the other hand, the Iranian authorities

took no action to prevent the attack of 5 November 1979, or to restore the Consulates to the

possession of the United States. In contrast, when on the next day militants invaded the Iraqi

Consulate in Kermanshah, prompt steps were taken by the Iranian authorities to secure their

withdrawal from the Consulate. Thus in this case, the Iranian authorities and police took the

necessary steps to prevent and check the attempted invasion or return the premises to their

rightful owners.

66. As to the actual conduct of the Iranian authorities when faced with the events of 4

November 1979. the information before the Court establishes that, despite assurances

previously given by them to the United States Government and despite repeated and urgent

calls for help, they took no apparent steps either to prevent the militants from invading the

Embassy or to persuade or to compel them to withdraw. Furthermore, after the militants had

forced an entry into the premises of the Embassy, the Iranian authorities made no effort to

compel or even to persuade them to withdraw from the Embassy and to free the diplomatic

and consular staff whom they had made prisoner.

67. This inaction of the Iranian Government by itself constituted clear and serious

violation of Iran’s obligations to the United States under the provisions of Article 22,

paragraph 2, and Articles 24,25,26, 27 and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations, and Articles 5 and 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Similarly, with respect to the attacks on the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz, the inaction of

the Iranian authorities entailed clear and serious breaches of its obligations under the

provisions of several further articles of the 1963 Convention on Consular Relations. So far as

concerns the two private United States nationals seized as hostages by the invading militants,

that inaction entailed, albeit incidentally, a breach of its obligations under Article II,

paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights which,

in addition to the obligations of Iran existing under general international law, requires the

parties to ensure “the most constant protection and security” to each other’s nationals in their

respective territories.

68. The Court is therefore led inevitably to conclude, in regard to the first phase of the

events which has so far been considered, that on 4 November 1979 the Iranian authorities :

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(a) were fully aware of their obligations under the conventions in force to take

appropriate steps to protect the premises of the United States Embassy and its diplomatic and

consular staff from any attack and from any infringement of their inviolability, and to ensure

the security of such other persons as might be present on the said premises ;

(b) were fully aware, as a result of the appeals for help made by the United States

Embassy, of the urgent need for action on their part ;

(c) had the means at their disposal to perform their obligations ;

d) completely failed to comply with these obligations. Similarly, the Court is led to

conclude that the Iranian authorities were equally aware of their obligations to protect the

United States Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz, and of the need for action on their part, and

similarly failed to use the means which were at their disposal to comply with their

obligations.

69. The second phase of the events which are the subject of the United States’ claims

comprises the whole series of facts which occurred following the completion of the

occupation of the United States Embassy by the militants, and the seizure of the Consulates at

Tabriz and Shiraz. The occupation having taken place and the diplomatic and consular

personnel of the United States’ mission having been taken hostage, the action required of the

Iranian Government by the Vienna Conventions and by general international law was

manifest. Its plain duty was at once to make every effort, and to take every appropriate step,

to bring these flagrant infringements of the inviolability of the premises, archives and

diplomatic and consular staff of the United States Embassy to a speedy end, to restore the

Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz to United States control, and in general to re-establish the

status quo and to offer reparation for the damage.

70. No such step was, however, taken by the Iranian authorities. At a press conference

on 5 November the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yazdi, conceded that “according to international

regulations the Iranian Government is duty bound to safeguard the life and property of foreign

nationals”. But he made no mention of Iran’s obligation to safeguard the inviolability of

foreign embassies and diplomats ; and he ended by announcing that the action of the students

“enjoys the endorsement and support of the government, because America herself is

responsible for this incident”. As to the Prime Minister, Mr. Bazargan, he does not appear to

have made any statement on the matter before resigning his office on 5 November.

71. In any event expressions of approval of the take-over of the Embassy,.and indeed

also of the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. bv militants came immediately from numerous

Iranian authorities, including religious, judicial, executive, police and broadcasting

authorities. Above all, the Ayatollah Khomeini himself made crystal clear the endorsement by

the State both of the take-over of the Embassy and Consulates and of the detention of the

Embassy staff as hostages.

72. At any rate, thus fortified in their action, the militants at the Embassy at once went

one step farther. On 6 November they proclaimed that the Embassy, which they too referred

to as “the U.S. center of plots and espionage”, would remain under their occupation. and that

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they were watching “most closely” the members of the diplomatic staff taken hostage whom

they called “U.S. mercenaries and spies”.

73. The seal of official government approval was finally set on this situation by a decree

issued on 17 November 1979 by the Ayatollah Khomeini. His decree began with the assertion

that the American Embassy was “a center of espionage and conspiracy” and that “those

people who hatched plots against our Islamic movement in that place do not enjoy

international diplomatic respect”. He went on expressly to declare that the premises of the

Embassy and the hostages would remain as they were until the United States had handed over

the former Shah for trial and returned his property to Iran. This statement of policy the

Ayatollah qualified only to the extent of requesting the militants holding the hostages to

“hand over the blacks and the women, if it is proven that they did not spy, to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs so that they may be immediately expelled from Iran”. As to the rest of the

hostages, he made the Iranian Government’s intentions al1 too clear : “The noble Iranian

nation will not give permission for the release of the rest of them. Therefore, the rest of them

will be under arrest until the American Government acts according to the wish of the nation.”

74. The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining the

occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of

exerting pressure on the United States Government was complied with by other Iranian

authorities and endorsed by them repeatedly in statements made in various contexts. The

result of that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created

by the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as

hostages. The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of

the Iranian State, and the

decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and

detention of the hostages into acts of that State. The militants, authors of the invasion and

jailers of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for whose acts the State

itself was internationally responsible. On 6 May 1980, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.

Ghotbzadeh, is reported to have said in a television interview that the occupation of the

United States Embassy had been “done by Our nation”.

Moreover, in the prevailing circumstances the situation of the hostages was aggravated

by the fact that their detention by the militants did not even offer the normal guarantees which

might have been afforded by police and security forces subject to the discipline and the

control of official superiors.

75. During the six months which have elapsed since the situation just described was

created by the decree of the Ayatollah Khomeini, it has undergone no material change. The

Court’s Order of 15 December 1979 indicating provisional measures, which called for the

immediate restoration of the Embassy to the United States and the release of the hostages,

was publicly rejected by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following day and has been

ignored by al1 Iranian authorities. On two occasions, namely on 23 February and on 7 April

1980, the Ayatollah Khomeini laid it down that the hostages should remain at the United

States Embassy under the control of the militants until the new Iranian parliament should

have assembled and taken a decision as to their fate. His adherence to that policy also made it

200

impossible to obtain his consent to the transfer of the hostages from the control of the

militants to that of the Government or of the Council of the Revolution. In any event, while

highly desirable from the humanitarian and safety points of view, such a transfer would not

have resulted in any material change in the legal situation, for its sponsors themselves

emphasized that it must not be understood as signifying the release of the hostages.

76. The Iranian authorities’ decision to continue the subjection of the premises of the

United States Embassy to occupation by militants and of the Embassy staff to detention as

hostages, clearly gave rise to repeated and multiple breaches of the applicable provisions of

the Vienna Conventions even more serious than those which arose from their failure to take

any steps to prevent the attacks on the inviolability of these premises and staff.

77. In the first place, these facts constituted breaches additional to those already

committed of paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations which requires Iran to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or

damage and to prevent any disturbance of its peace or impairment of its dignity. Paragraphs 1

and 3 of that Article have also been infringed, and continue to be infringed, since they forbid

agents of a receiving State to enter the premises of a mission without consent or to undertake

any search, requisition, attachment or like measure on the premises. Secondly, they constitute

continuing breaches of Article 29 of the same Convention which forbids any arrest or

detention of a diplomatic agent and any attack on his person, freedom or dignity. Thirdly, the

Iranian authorities are without doubt in continuing breach of the provisions of Articles 25,26

and 27 of the 196 1 Vienna Convention and of pertinent provisions of the 1963 Vienna

Convention concerning facilities for the performance of functions, freedom of movement and

communications for diplomatic and consular staff, as well as of Article 24 of the former

Convention and Article 33 of the latter, which provide for the absolute inviolability of the

archives and documents of diplomatic missions and consulates. This particular violation has

been made manifest to the world by repeated statements by the militants occupying the

Embassy, who claim to be in possession of documents from the archives, and by various

government authorities, purporting to specify the contents thereof. Finally, the continued

detention as hostages of the two private individuals of United States nationality entails a

renewed breach of the obligations of Iran under Article II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of

Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights.

78. Inevitably, in considering the compatibility or otherwise of the conduct of the Iranian

authorities with the requirements of the Vienna Conventions, the Court has focussed its

attention primarily on the occupation of the Embassy and the treatment of the United States

diplomatic and consular personnel within the Embassy. It is however evident that the question

of the compatibility of their conduct with the Vienna Conventions also arises in connection

with the treatment of the United States Chargé d’affaires and two members of his staff in the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 November 1979 and since that date. The facts of this case

establish to the satisfaction of the Court that on 4 November 1979 and thereafter the Iranian

authorities have withheld from the Chargé d’affaires and the two members of his staff the

necessary protection and facilities to permit them to leave the Ministry in safety. Accordingly

it appears to the Court that with respect to these three members of the United States’ mission

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the Iranian authorities have committed a continuing breach of their obligations under Articles

26 and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It further appears to the

Court that the continuation of that situation over a long period has, in the circumstances,

amounted to detention in the Ministry 79.The judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic of

Iran and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have frequently voiced or associated themselves

with, a threat first announced by the militants, of having some of the hostages submitted to

trial before a court or some other body. These threats may at present merely be acts in

contemplation. But the Court considers it necessary here and now to stress that, if the

intention to submit the hostages to any form of criminal trial or investigation were to be put

into effect, that would constitute a grave breach by Iran of its obligations under Article 31,

paragraph 1, of the 196 1 Vienna Convention. This paragraph states in the most express terms

: “A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving

State.” Again, if there were an attempt to compel the hostages to bear witness, a suggestion

renewed at the time of the visit to Iran of the Secretary-General’s Commission, Iran would

without question be violating paragraph 2 of that same Article of the 1961 Vienna Convention

which provides that : “A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.”

80. The facts of the present case, viewed in the light of the applicable rules of law, thus

speak loudly and clearly of successive and still continuing breaches by Iran of its obligations

to the United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, as well as under the

Treaty of 1955. Before drawing from this finding the conclusions which flow from it, in terms

of the international responsibility of the Iranian State vis-à-vis the United States of America,

the Court considers that it should examine one further point. The Court cannot overlook the

fact that on the Iranian side, in often imprecise terms, the idea has been put forward that the

conduct of the Iranian Government, at the time of the events of 4 November 1979 and

subsequently, might be justified by the existence of special circumstances.

81. In his letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980, as previously recalled, Iran’s

Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the present case as only “a marginal and secondary

aspect of an overall problem”. This problem, he maintained, “involves, inter alia, more than

25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the

shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian

people, contrary to and in conflict with al1 international and humanitarian norms”. In the first

of the two letters he indeed singled out amongst the “crimes” which he attributed to the

United States an alleged complicity on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency in the coup

d’état of 1953 and in the restoration of the Shah to the throne of Iran. Invoking these alleged

crimes of the United States, the Iranian Foreign Minister took the position that the United

States’ Application could not be examined by the Court divorced from its proper context,

which he insisted was “the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the

United States over the last 25 years”.

82. The Court must however observe, first of all, that the matters alleged the Iranian

Foreign Minister’s letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980 are of a kind which, if

invoked in legal proceedings, must clearly be established to the satisfaction of the tribunal

with al1 the requisite proof. The Court, in its Order of 15 December 1979, pointed out that if

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the Iranian Government considered the alleged activities of the United States in Iran legally to

have a close connection with the subject-matter of the Application it was open to Iran to

present its own case regarding those activities to the Court by way of defence to the United

States’ claims. The Iranian Government, however, did not appear before the Court. Moreover,

even in his letter of 16 March 1980, transmitted to the Court some three months after the issue

of that Order, the Iranian Foreign Minister did not furnish the Court with any further

information regarding the alleged criminal activities of the United States in Iran, or explain on

what legal basis he considered these allegations to constitute a relevant answer to the United

States’ claims. The large body of information submitted by the United States itself to the

Court includes, it is true, some statements emanating from Iranian authorities or from the

militants in which reference is made to alleged espionage and interference in Iran by the

United States centered upon its Embassy in Tehran. These statements are, however, of the

same general character as the assertions of alleged criminal activities of the United States

contained in the Foreign Minister’s letters, and are unsupported by evidence furnished by Iran

before the Court. Hence they do not provide a basis on which the Court could form a judicial

opinion on the truth or otherwise of the matters there alleged.

83. In any case, even if the alleged criminal activities of the United States in Iran could

be considered as having been established, the question would remain whether they could be

regarded by the Court as constituting a justification of Iran’s conduct and thus a defence to the

United States’ claims in the present case. The Court, however, is unable to accept that they

can be so regarded. This is because diplomatic law itself provides the necessary means of

defence against, and sanction for, illicit activities by members of diplomatic or consular

missions.

84. The Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 contain express provisions to meet the

case when members of an embassy staff, under the cover of diplomatic privileges and

immunities, engage in such abuses of their functions as espionage or interference in the

internal affairs of the receiving State. It is precisely with the possibility of such abuses in

contemplation that Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations, and Article 55, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,

provide “Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of al1 persons

enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving

State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.” Paragraph 3

of Article 41 of the 1961 Convention further States : “The premises of the mission must not

be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the missions . . . “: an analogous

provision, with respect to consular premises is to be found in Article 55, paragraph 2, of the

1963 Convention.

85. Thus, it is for the very purpose of providing a remedy for such possible abuses of

diplomatic functions that Article 9 of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations stipulates

: “1. The receiving State rnay at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify

the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the

mission is persona non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not

acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person

203

concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person rnay be declared non grata or

not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State.

2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to carry out its

obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the receiving State rnay refuse to recognize the

person concerned as a member of the mission.” The 1963 Convention contains, in Article 23,

paragraphs 1 and 4, analogous provisions in respect of consular officers and consular staff.

Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the 1961 Convention, and paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the 1963

Convention, take account of the difficulty that may be experienced in practice of proving such

abuses in every case or, indeed, of determining exactly when exercise of the diplomatic

function, expressly recognized in Article 3 (1) (d) of the 196 1 Convention, of “ascertaining

by al1 lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State” maybe considered as

involving such acts as “espionage” or “interference in internal affairs”. The way in which

Article 9, paragraph 1, takes account of any such difficulty is by providing expressly in its

opening sentence that the receiving State rnay “at any time and without having to explain its

decision” notify the sending State that any particular member of its diplomatic mission is

‘)persona non grata” or “not acceptable” (and similarly Article 23, paragraph 4, of the 1963

Convention provides that “the receiving State is not obliged to give to the sending State

reasons for its decision”). Beyond that remedy for dealing with abuses of the diplomatic

function by individual members of a mission, a receiving State has in its hands a more radical

remedy if abuses of their functions by members of a mission reach serious proportions. This

is the power which every receiving State has, at its own discretion, to break off diplomatic

relations with a sending State and to cal1 for the immediate closure of the offending mission.

86. The rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained régime which, on

the one hand, lays down the receiving State’s obligations regarding the facilities, privileges

and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their

possible abuse by members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the

receiving State to counter any such abuse. These means are, by their nature, entirely

efficacious, for unless the sending State recalls the member of the mission objected to

forthwith, the prospect of the almost immediate loss of his privileges and immunities,

because of the withdrawal by the receiving State of his recognition as a member of the

mission, will in practice compel that

person, in his own interest, to depart at once. But the principle of the inviolability of the

persons of diplomatic agents and the premises of diplomatic missions is one of the very

foundations of this long-established régime, to the evolution of which the traditions of Islam

made a substantial contribution. The fundamental character of the principle of inviolability is,

moreover, strongly underlined by the provisions of Articles 44 and 45 of the Convention of

1961 (cf. also Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention of 1963). Even in the case of armed

conflict or in the case of a breach in diplomatic relations those provisions require that both the

inviolability of the members of a diplomatic mission and of the premises, property and

archives of the mission must be respected by the receiving State. Naturally, the observance of

this principle does not mean – and this the Applicant Government expressly acknowledges –

that a diplomatic agent caught in the act of committing an assault or other offence may not, on

204

occasion, be briefly arrested by the police of the receiving State in order to prevent the

commission of the particular crime. But such eventualities bear no relation at al1 to what

occurred in the present case.

87. In the present case, the Iranian Government did not break off diplomatic relations

with the United States ; and in response to a question put to him by a Member of the Court,

the United States Agent informed the Court that at no time before the events of 4 November

1979 had the Iranian Government declared, or indicated any intention to declare, any member

of the United States diplomatic or consular staff in Tehran persona non grata. The Iranian

Government did not, therefore, employ the remedies placed at its disposal by diplomatic law

specifically for dealing with activities of the kind of which it now complains. Instead, it

allowed a group of militants to attack and occupy the United States Embassy by force, and to

seize the diplomatic and consular staff as hostages ; instead, it has endorsed that action of

those militants and has deliberately maintained their occupation of the Embassy and detention

of its staff as a means of coercing the sending State. It has, at the same time, refused

altogether to discuss this situation with representatives of the United States. The Court,

therefore, can only conclude that Iran did not have recourse to the normal and efficacious

means at its disposal, but resorted to coercive action against the United States Embassy and

its staff.

88.Anything could hardly be considered as having provided a justification for the attack

on the United States Embassy and its diplomatic mission. Whatever extenuation of the

responsibility to be attached to the conduct of the Iranian authorities may be found in the

offense felt by them because of the admission of the Shah to the United States, that feeling of

offence could not affect the imperative character of the legal obligations incumbent upon the

Iranian Government which is not altered by a state of diplomatic tension between the two

countries. Still less could a mere refusal or failure on the part of the United States to extradite

the Shah to Iran be considered to modify the obligations of the Iranian authorities, quite apart

from any legal difficulties, in internal or international law, there might be in acceding to such

a request for extradition.

89. Accordingly the Court finds that no circumstances exist in the present case which

are capable of negativing the fundamentally unlawful character of the conduct pursued by the

Iranian State on 4 November 1979 and thereafter. This finding does not however exclude the

possibility that some of the circumstances alleged, if duly established, may later be found to

have some relevance in determining the consequences of the responsibility incurred by the

Iranian State with respect to that conduct, although they could not be considered to alter its

unlawful character.

90. On the basis of the foregoing detailed examination of the merits of the case, the

Court finds that Iran, by committing successive and continuing breaches of the obligations

laid upon it by the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular

Relations, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955, and the

applicable rules of general international law, has incurred responsibility towards the United

States. As to the consequences of this finding, it clearly entails an obligation on the part of the

Iranian State to make reparation for the injury thereby caused to the United States. Since

205

however Iran’s breaches of its obligations are still continuing, the form and amount of such

reparation cannot be determined at the present date.

91. At the same time the Court finds itself obliged to stress the cumulative effect of

Iran’s breaches of its obligations when taken together. A marked escalation of these breaches

can be seen to have occurred in the transition from the failure on the part of the Iranian

authorities to oppose the armed attack by the militants on 4 November 1979 and their seizure

of the Embassy premises and staff, to the almost immediate endorsement by those authorities

of the situation thus created, and then to their maintaining deliberately for many months the

occupation of the Embassy and detention of its staff by a group of armed militants acting on

behalf of the State for the purpose of forcing the United States to bow to certain demands.

Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical

constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of

the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But what has above al1 to be emphasized is the

extent and seriousness of the conflict between the conduct of the Iranian State and its

obligations under the whole corpus of the international rules of which diplomatic and consular

law is comprised, rules the fundamental character of which the Court must here again strongly

affirm. In its Order of 15 December 1979, the Court made a point of stressing that the

obligations laid on States by the two Vienna Conventions are of cardinal importance for the

maintenance of good relations between States in the interdependent world of today. “There is

no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States”, the

Court there said, “than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, so that

throughout history nations of al1 creeds and cultures have observed reciprocal obligations for

that purpose.” The institution of diplomacy, the Court continued, has proved to be “an

instrument essential for effective Co-operation in the international community, and for

enabling States, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems, to achieve

mutual understanding and to resolve their differences by peaceful means” (I. C.J. Reports

1979, p. 19).

92. It is a matter of deep regret that the situation which occasioned those observations

has not been rectified since they were made. Having regard to their importance the Court

considers it essential to reiterate them in the present Judgment. The frequency with which at

the present time the principles of international law governing diplomatic and consular

relations are set at naught by individuals or groups of individuals is already deplorable. But

this case is unique and of very particular gravity because here it is not only private individuals

or groups of individuals that have disregarded and set at naught the inviolability of a foreign

embassy, but the government of the receiving State itself. Therefore in recalling yet again

the extreme importance of the principles of law which it is called upon to apply in the present

case, the Court considers it to be its duty to draw the attention of the entire international

community, of which Iran itself has been a member since time immemorial, to the irreparable

harm that may be caused by events of the kind now before the Court. Such events cannot fail

to undermine the edifice of law carefully constructed by mankind over period of centuries, the

maintenance of which is vital for the security and well-being of the complex international

206

community of the present day, to which it is more essential than ever that the rules developed

to ensure the

ordered progress of relations between its members should be constantly and scrupulously

respected.

93. Before drawing the appropriate conclusions from its findings on the merits in this

case, the Court considers that it cannot let pass without comment the incursion into the

territory of Iran made by United States military units on 24-25 April 1980, an account of

which has been given earlier in ths Judgment (paragraph 32). No doubt the United States

Government may have had understandable preoccupations with respect to the well-being of

its nationals held hostage in its Embassy for over five months. No doubt also the United

States Government may have had understandable feelings of frustration at Iran’s longcontinued detention of the hostages, notwithstanding two resolutions of the Security Council

as well as the Court’s own Order of 15 December 1979 calling expressly for their immediate

release. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present proceedings, the Court cannot fail to

express its concern in regard to the United States’ incursion into Iran. When, as previously

recalled, this case had become ready for hearing on 19 February 1980, the United States

Agent requested the Court, owing to the delicate stage of certain negotiations, to defer setting

a date for the hearings. Subsequently, on 11 March, the Agent informed the Court of the

United States Government’s anxiety to obtain an early judgment on the merits of the case. The

hearings were accordingly held on 18, 19 and 20 March, and the Court was in course of

preparing the present judgment adjudicating upon the claims of the United States against Iran

when the operation of 24 April 1980 took place. The Court therefore feels bound to observe

that an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind

calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations ; and to

recall that in paragraph 47, 1 B, of its Order of 15 December 1979 the Court had indicated

that no action was to be taken by either party which might aggravate the tension between the

two countries.

94. At the same time, however, the Court must point out that neither the question of the

legality of the operation of 24 April1980, under the Charter of the United Nations and under

general international law, nor any possible question of responsibility flowing from it, is before

the Court. It must also point out that this question can have no bearing on the evaluation of

the conduct of the Iranian Government over six months earlier, on 4 November 1979, which

is the subject-matter of the United States’ Application. It follows that the findings reached by

the Court in this Judgment are not affected by that operation.

95. For these reasons, THE COURT,

1. By thirteen votes to two, Decides that the Islamic Republic of Iran, by the conduct

which the Court has set out in this Judgment, has violated in several respects, and is still

violating, obligations owed by it to the United States of America under international

conventions in force between the two countries, as well as under long-established rules of

general international law ;

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2. By thirteen votes to two, Decides that the violations of these obligations engage the

responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the United States of America under

international law ;

3. Unanimously, Decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must

immediately take al1 steps to redress the situation resulting from the events of 4 November

1979 and what followed from these events, and to that end :

(a) must immediately terminate the unlawful detention of the United States Chargé

d’affaires and other diplomatic and consular staff and other United States nationals now held

hostage in Iran, and must immediately release each and every one and entrust them to the

protecting Power (Article 45 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations) ;

(b) must ensure that al1 the said persons have the necessary means of leaving Iranian

territory, including means of transport ;

(c) must immediately place in the hands of the protecting Power the premises, property,

archives and documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran and of its Consulates in Iran

4. Unanimously, Decides that no member of the United States diplomatic or consular

staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any form of judicial proceedings or to participate

in them as a witness ;

5. By twelve votes to three, Decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

is under an obligation to make reparation to the Government of the United States of America

for the injury caused to the latter by the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from

these events ;

6. By fourteen votes to one, Decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing

agreement between the Parties, shall be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the

subsequent procedure in the case.

(Signed) Humphrey WALDOCK, President.

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