December 23, 2024
DU LLBFamily law 2Semester 2

Bhagat Ram v. Teja Singh(2002) 1 SCC 210 : AIR 2002 SC 1

Case Summary

CitationBhagat Ram v. Teja Singh(2002) 1 SCC 210 : AIR 2002 SC 1
Keywordsfemale interstate, sec 15 HSA
FactsOne Kehar Singh owned a land measuring 280 kanals and 18 marlas in Village Antowali (now inPakistan). Smt Kirpo, widow of Kehar Singh, was allotted a different land in exchange for the land leftbehind in Pakistan.
Two sisters inherited the property from their mother. On the death of one, who died as an issueless widow, the other sister took the property as her ‘father’s heir’ and entered into an agreement to sell the same to a person X. The deceased sister’s husband’s brother challenged the validity of this sale and claimed the property as her heir under s. 15(1)(b).
Issueswhether sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the HinduSuccession Act, 1956 applies to the facts and circumstances of this case?
Contentions
Law Points The basis of inheritance of a female Hindu’s property who dies intestate would thus be the source from which such female Hindu came into possession of the property and the manner of inheritance which would decide the manner of devolution.

The Supreme Court held that since both the conditions were fulfilled, viz., she had inherited the property from one of her parents (mother) and had died issueless, the property would revert to her father’s heirs i.e., the sister in this case and the brother of her deceased husband would not be entitled to succeed.

Section 15(2) provides: Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein but upon the heirs of her father.

So, the property ‘inherited’ by a female from her parents, in absence of her issue or their children, will revert to her father’s heirs.
JudgementHence, court held that,we have no hesitation to hold that on the facts of this case, the property would devolve after death of Santi not on the heirs of her pre-deceased husband but would devolve oh Indro. This legal principle has wrongly been decided by all the courts below including the High Court.
Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority

Full Case Details

K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. – One Kehar Singh was the owner of the land admeasuring 280

kanals and 18 marlas in Village Antowali (now in Pakistan). He died prior to partition of India.

His widow, SmtKirpo and two daughters Smt Santi and Smt Indro migrated to India. In lieu of

the property owned by Kehar Singh in Pakistan, his widow, Kirpo was allotted some land in

India. Kirpo died on 25-12-1951 leaving behind her two daughters, Smt Santi and SmtIndro.

They inherited the property equally. Smt Santi died in 1960. The property left by her was

thereafter mutated in the name of her surviving sister, Smt Indro. The original appellant, Bhagat

Ram (deceased) who had entered into an agreement with Smt Indro on 12-3-1963, filed a suit for

specific performance, which was decreed in his favour. The original respondent in the appeal,

Shri Teja Singh (deceased) is the brother of Smt Santi’s predeceased husband. He filed a suit

alleging that, on the death of Smt Santi in 1960, the property in question devolved on him by

virtue of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The trial

court decreed the suit filed by Teja Singh. The appeal filed against the said decree was dismissed.

Bhagat Ram (deceased) then preferred the second appeal before the High Court, which was also

dismissed. The High Court held that the property held by Smt Santi on her death devolved on

Teja Singh who was the brother of the predeceased husband of Smt Santi. However, on appeal,

this Court by its judgment dated 31-3-1999 held that the property held by Smt Santi was the

property inherited by her from her mother; therefore, clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 is

the relevant provision which governed the succession and Teja Singh had no right in the property

left by Smt Santi and that it would only devolve on her sister Smt Indro.

7. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents Mr Jaspal Singh contended that Smt Santi

acquired property from her motherSmtKirpo who died on 25-12-1951 and at that time Smt Santi

had only a limited right over this property, but by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession

Act, she became the full owner of the property and, therefore, on her death, the property held by

her would be inherited by her legal heirs as per the rule set out in Section 15(1) of the Act. The

learned Senior Counsel further contended that prior to the Hindu Succession Act, Smt Santi had

only a limited right but for Section 14(1) of the Act, it would have reverted to the reversioners

and such a limited right became a full right and, therefore, the property is to be treated as her own

property. He also contended that Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act will have only

prospective operation and, therefore, the words used in Section 15(2)(a) viz. “any property

inherited by a female Hindu” are to be construed as property inherited by a female Hindu after the

commencement of the Act.

8. We do not find any merit in the contention raised by the counsel for the respondents.

Admittedly, Smt Santi inherited the property in question from her mother. If the property held by

a female was inherited from her father or mother, in the absence of any son or daughter of the

deceased including the children of any predeceased son or daughter, it would only devolve upon

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the heirs of the father and, in this case, her sister Smt Indro was the only legal heir of her father.

The deceased Smt Santi admittedly inherited the property in question from her mother. It is not

necessary that such inheritance should have been after the commencement of the Act. The intent

of the legislature is clear that the property, if originally belonged to the parents of the deceased

female, should go to the legal heirs of the father. So also under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of

Section 15, the property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or her father-in-law, shall

also under similar circumstances, devolve upon the heirs of the husband. It is the source from

which the property was inherited by the female, which is more important for the purpose of

devolution of her property. We do not think that the fact that a female Hindu originally had a

limited right and later, acquired the full right, in any way, would alter the rules of succession

given in sub-section (2) of Section 15.

9. A question of similar nature was considered by this Court in Bajaya v. Gopikabai[AIR

1978 SC 793]. In that case, the suit land originally belonged to G, son of D. G died before the

settlement of 1918 and thereafter, his land was held by his son, P who died in the year 1936. On

P’s death, the holding devolved on P’s widow, S. S died on 6-11-1956, and thereupon dispute

about the inheritance to the land left behind by S arose between the parties. The plaintiff claimed

that she being the daughter of T, a sister of the last male holder, P was an heir under Section 15

read with the Schedule referred to in Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, whereas the

defendants claimed as “sapindas” of the last male holder under Mitakshara law. Speaking for the

Bench, Hon’ble R.S. Sarkaria, J. held that the case would fall under clause (b) of sub-section (2)

of Section 15 because S died issueless and intestate and the interest in the suit property was

inherited by her from her husband and the property would go to the heirs of the husband.

10. In State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh [AIR 1991 SC 2301], also, a question of similar

nature was considered. In that case, the female Hindu inherited the property from her husband

prior to the Hindu Succession Act and she died after the Act. On being informed that there was no

heir entitled to succeed to her property, the Revenue Authorities effected mutation in favour of

the State. There was no heir from her husband’s side entitled to succeed to the property. The

plaintiff, who was the grandson of the brother of the female Hindu claimed right over the

property of the deceased. The High Court held that the property inherited by the female Hindu

from her husband became her absolute property in view of Section 14 and the property would

devolve upon the heirs specified under Section 15(1). The above view was held to be faulty and

this Court did not accept that. It was held that it is important to remember that female Hindu

being the full owner of the property becomes a fresh stock of descent. If she leaves behind any

heir either under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2) of Section 15, her property cannot be

escheated.

11. In Amar Kaur v. Raman Kumari [AIR 1985 P & H 86], a contra-view was taken by the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana. In this case, a widow inherited property from her husband in

1956. She had two daughters and the widow gifted the entire property in favour of her two

daughters. One of the daughters named Shankari died without leaving husband or descendant in

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1972. Her property was mutated in favour of her other sister. At the time of death of Shankari, her

husband had already died leaving behind another wife and a son. They claimed right over the

property left by the deceased female Hindu. In para 4 of the said judgment, it was held as under:

“… SmtShankari succeeded to life estate, which stood enlarged in her full ownership

under Section 14(1) of the Act. Since smaller estate merged into larger one, the lesser

estate ceases to exist and a new estate of full ownership by fiction of law came to be held

for the first time by SmtShankari. The estate, which she held under Section 14(1) of the

Act, cannot be considered to be by virtue of inheritance from her mother or father. In law

it would be deemed that she became full owner of this property by virtue of the Act. On

these facts it is to be seen whether Section 15(1) of the Act will apply or Section 15(2) of

the Act will apply. Section 15(2) of the Act will apply only when inheritance is to the

estate left by father or mother, in the absence of which, Section 15(1) of the Act would

apply.”

12. We do not think that the law laid down by the learned Single Judge in the abovesaid

decision is correct. Even if the female Hindu who is having a limited ownership becomes full

owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, the rules of succession given under sub-section (2) of

Section 15 can be applied. In fact, the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954 as originally introduced in the

Rajya Sabha did not contain any clause corresponding to sub-section (2) of Section 15. It came to

be incorporated on the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament.

The reason given by the Joint Committee is found in clause 17 of the Bill, which reads as follows:

“While revising the order of succession among the heirs to a Hindu female, the Joint

Committee have provided that, properties inherited by her from her father reverts to the

family of the father in the absence of issue and similarly property inherited from her

husband or father-in-law reverts to the heirs of the husband in the absence of issue. In the

opinion of the Joint Committee such a provision would prevent properties passing into

the hands of persons to whom justice would demand they should not pass.”

13. The source from which she inherits the property is always important and that would

govern the situation. Otherwise persons who are not even remotely related to the person who

originally held the property would acquire rights to inherit that property. That would defeat the

intent and purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 15, which gives a special pattern of succession.

14. This Court in its judgment dated 31-3-1999 held that clause (a) of sub-section (2) of

Section 15 is the appropriate rule to be applied for succession of the property left by the deceased

Smt Santi and we find no reasons to take a different view. Thus, the appeal is allowed.

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