Case Summary
| Citation | Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Another AIR 2002 SC 177 |
| Keywords | |
| Facts | Rupa Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra case is known for matrimonial dissension, however when the subject of the legitimacy of a pronouncement of divorce arrived at the Honourable Supreme Court of India and the lady pulled out her consent that she concurred while surrendering to divorce through mutual consent, significant inquiries of law emerged. |
| Issues | whether an aggrieved person is qualified for any alleviation against a last judgment or request of the Supreme Court, after excusal of Review Petition, either under Article 32 or otherwise? |
| Contentions | |
| Law Points | Article 32 conjures the writ jurisdiction in the idea of Habeas Corpus, Quo Warranto, Mandamus, Prohibition, and Certiorari. As to writ jurisdiction, it is set essentially similar to the High Courts in India situated as the court of Kings Bench in England. It is a very much settled rule that details related to the right of writs in English law play no part to play under our constitutional plan. It is, notwithstanding, essential to note that a writ of certiorari to call for records and look at something very similar for passing a proper request is given by a better court than a sub-par court which ensures the record for assessment. On cautiously inspecting the chronicled foundation and the idea of writ jurisdiction, which is of a better sort over sub-par courts and councils, the court believed that a writ of certiorari can‘t be given to co-ordinate courts and even more so to predominant courts. However, the jurisdiction and orders of a High Court are at risk to be adjusted by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction under Articles 132[3], 133[4] and 134[5] just as under Article 136[6] of the Constitution, the High Courts are not established as substandard courts in our constitutional plan. Further, neither a more modest Bench of the Supreme Court nor a bigger one can give a writ under Article 32 to some other Bench of the Supreme Court. We might additionally notice that the prevalent courts of justice don‘t fall inside the ambit of ―state‖ or ―different specialists‖ under Article 12[7] of the Constitution. |
| Judgement | Therefore, the apex court would not give a writ under Article 32 to a High Court. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
Question before the Constitution Bench: “Whether the judgement of this Court dated
10-3-1997 in Civil Appeal No. 1843 of 1997 (Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bivin Zaveri, (1997) 4
SCC 226 can be regarded as a nullity and whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution can be maintained to question the validity of a judgement of this Court after the
petition for review of the said judgement has been dismissed are, in our opinion, questions
which need to be considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court.”
SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, J. – A perusal of the article, quote above,
shows it contains four clauses, Clause (1) guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court by
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III fundamental
rights. By clause (2) the Supreme Court is vested with the power to issue directions or oders
or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the right conferred
by Part III. Without prejudice to the powrs (powers) of the Supreme court in the
aforementioned clauses (1) and (2), Parliament is enabled, by clase (3), to empower by law
any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). The constitutional mandate embodied in
clause (4) is that Article 32 shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by the
Constitution.
- In fairness to the learned counsel for the parties, we record that all of them at the close
of the hearing of these cases conceded that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of
the Constitution cannot be invoked to challenge the validity of a final judgment/order passed
by this Court after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the Constitution read
with Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 1966. - However, all the learned counsel for the parties as also the learned Attorney-General
who appeared as amicus curiae, on the notice of this Court, adopted an unusual unanimous
approach to plead that even after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the
Constitution, an aggrieved person might be provided with an opportunity under inherent
powers of this Court to seek relief in cases of gross abuse of the process of the Court or gross
miscarriage of justice because against the order of this Court the affected party cannot have
recourse to any other forum.
These contentions pose the question, whether an order passed by this Court can be
corrected under its inherent powers after dismissal of the review petition on the ground that it
was passed either without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice or the
to unfair procedure giving scope for bias which resulted in abuse of the process of the court or
miscarriage of justice to an aggrieved person. - The law existing in other countries is aptly summarized by Aaron Barak in his treatise
thus:
“The authority to overrule exists in most countries, whether of civil law or common law
tradition. Even the House of Lords in the United Kingdom is not bound any more by its
precedents. The Supreme Court of the United States was never bound by its own decisions,
and neither are those of Canada, Australia, and Israel.”
281 - To what extent the principle of stare decisis binds this Court, was considered in the
case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd.(supra). The question before a Constitution Bench of Seven
learned Judges of this Court was: to what extent the principle of stare decisis could be pressed
into service where the power of this Court to overrule its earlier decisions was invoked. The
Court expressed its view thus:
“When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding
on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and
concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the
interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its
earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be
more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which
must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is
satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error;
but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be
satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view
is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay
down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the
question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions.” - In Maganlal Chhaganlal’s case (supra), a Bench of seven learned Judges of this
Court considered, inter alia, the question: whether a judgment of the Supreme Court in
Northern India Caterers’ case was required to be overruled. Khanna, J. observed:
“At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that certainty and continuity are essential
ingredients of rule of law. Certainty in law would be considerably eroded and suffer a serious
set back if the highest court of the land readily overrules the view expressed by it in earlier
cases, even though that view has held the field for a number of years. In quite a number of
cases which come up before this Court, two views are possible, and simply because the Court
considers that the view not taken by the Court in the earlier case was a better view of the
matter would not justify the overruling of the view. The law laid down by this Court is
binding upon all courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution, and numerous
cases all over the country are decided in accordance with the view taken by this Court. Many
people arrange their affairs and large number of transactions also take place on the faith of the
correctness of the view taken by this Court. It would create uncertainty, instability and
confusion if the law propounded by this Court on the basis of which numerous cases have
been decided and many transactions have taken place is held to be not the correct law.” - In the case of The Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. (supra), the question before a
Constitution Bench of five learned Judges was: when can this Court properly dissent from a
previous view? - In regard to the effect of an earlier order of this Court Sawant, J. speaking for the
Constitution Bench observed in Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal’s case (supra) as
follows:
“The decision of this Court on a question of law is binding on all courts and authorities.
Hence under the said clause the President can refer a question of law only when this court has
not decided it. Secondly, a decision given by this Court can be reviewed only under Article
137 read with Rule 1of Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and on the conditions
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mentioned therein. When, further, this Court overrules the view of law expressed by it in an
earlier case, it does not do so sitting in appeal and exercising an appellate jurisdiction over the
earlier decision. It does so in exercise of its inherent power and only in exceptional
circumstances such as when the earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in the absence
of relevant or material facts or if it is manifestly wrong and productive of public mischief.
[See, Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1955] 2 SCR 603]” - In the cases of Ramdeo Chauhan (supra) and Lily Thomas (supra), the question
before the Court was, the scope of the power of review of a judgment of this Court under
Article 137 of the Constitution read with Section 114, Order XLVII of the C.P.C. and Order
XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. - In the case of Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) (supra), on November 25, 1998 the
House of Lords by majority 3 : 2 restored warrant of arrest of Senator Pinochet who was the
Head of the State of Chile and was to stand trial in Spain for some alleged offences. It came
to be known later that one of the Law Lords (Lord Hoffmann), who heard the case, had links
with Amnesty International (A.I.) which had become a party to the case. This was not
disclosed by him at the time of the hearing of the case by the House. Pinochet Ugarte, on
coming to know of that fact, sought reconsideration of the said judgment of the House of
Lords on the ground of an appearance of bias not actual bias. On the principle of
disqualification of a judge to hear a matter on the ground of appearance of bias it was pointed
out, - “The principle that a judge was automatically disqualified from hearing a matter in his
own cause was not restricted to cases in which he had a pecuniary interest in the outcome, but
also applied to cases where the judge’s decision would lead to the promotion of a cause in
which the judge was involved together with one of the parties. That did not mean that judges
could not sit on cases concerning charities in whose work they were involved, and judges
would normally be concerned to reuse themselves or disclose the position to the parties only
where they had an active role as trustee or director of a charity which was closely allied to
and acting with a party to the litigation. In the instant case, the facts were exceptional in that
AI was a party to the appeal, it had been joined in order to argue for a particular result and the
Law Lord was a director of a charity closely allied to AI and sharing its objects. Accordingly,
he was automatically disqualified from hearing the appeal. The petition would therefore be
granted and the matter referred to another committee of the House for rehearing per curiam.” - On the point of jurisdiction of the House to correct any injustice in an earlier order, it
was observed:
“In principle it must be that your Lordships, as the ultimate court of appeal, have power to
correct any injustice caused by an earlier order of this House. There is no relevant statutory
limitation on the jurisdiction of the House in this regard and therefore its inherent jurisdiction
remains unfettered. In Cassell & Co. Ltd. V. Broome (No.2) 1972 (2) All ER 849 your
Lordships varied an order for costs already made by the House in circumstances where the
parties had not had a fair opportunity to address argument on the point.”
And it was held,
“An appeal to the House of Lords will only be reopened where a party through no fault of
its own, has been subjected to an unfair procedure. A decision of the House of Lords will not
be varied or rescinded merely because it is subsequently thought to be wrong.”
283 - The petitioners in these writ petitions seek re-consideration of the final judgments of
this Court after they have been unsuccessful in review petitions and in that these cases are
different from the cases referred to above. The provision of Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme
Court Rules bars further application for review in the same matter. The concern of the Court
now is whether any relief can be given to the petitioners who challenge the final judgment of
this Court, though after disposal of review petitions, complaining of the gross abuse of the
process of Court and remedial injustice. In a State like India, governed by rule of law,
certainty of law declared and the final decision rendered on merits in a lis between the parties
by the highest court in the country is of paramount importance. The principle of finality is
insisted upon not on the ground that a judgment given by the apex Court is impeccable but on
the maxim “Interest republicae ut sit finis lithium. - At one time adherence to the principle of stare decisis was so rigidly followed in the
courts governed by the English Jurisprudence that departing from an earlier precedent was
considered heresy. With the declaration of the practice statement by the House of Lords, the
highest court in England was enabled to depart from a previous decision when it appeared
right to do so. The next step forward by the highest court to do justice was to review its
judgment inter partie to correct injustice. So far as this Court is concerned, we have already
pointed out above that it has been conferred the power to review its own judgments under
Article 137 of the Constitution. The role of judiciary merely to interpret and declare the law
was the concept of bygone age. It is no more open to debate as it is fairly settled that the
courts can so mould and lay down the law formulating principles and guidelines as to adapt
and adjust to the changing conditions of the society, the ultimate objective being to dispense
justice. In the recent years there is a discernable shift in the approach of the final courts in
favour of rendering justice on the facts presented before them, without abrogating but bypassing the principle of finality of the judgment. In Union of India and Anr. etc. v.
Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc. etc. [1989]178ITR548(SC) : [1989] 178 ITR 548 (SC)
Pathak, CJ. speaking for the Constitution Bench aptly observed:
“But like all principles evolved by man for the regulation of the social order, the doctrine
of binding precedent is circumscribed in its governance by perceptible limitations, limitations
arising by reference to the need for re-adjustment in a changing society, a re-adjustment of
legal norms demanded by a changed social context. This need for adapting the law to new
urges in society brings home the truth of the Holmesian aphorism that “the life of the law has
not been logic it has been experience” (Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, p.5), and
again when he declared in another study (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Common Carriers and the
Common Law, 388) that, (1943) 9 CLT 387 “the law is forever adopting new principles from
life at one end”, and “sloughing off” old ones at the other. Explaining the conceptual import
of what Holmes had said, Julius Stone elaborated that it is by the introduction of new extralegal propositions emerging from experience to serve as premises, or by experience-guided
choice between competing legal propositions, rather than by the operation of logic upon
existing legal propositions, that the growth of law tends to be determined (Julius Stone, Legal
Systems & Lawyers Reasoning, pp.58-59)” - The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the
principle of finality of its judgment. We are faced with competing principles – ensuring
certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on
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reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the
principle of natural justice or apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in decision
making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or abuse of the process of the
court. Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of
uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice – a concept which is not
disputed but by a few. We are of the view that though Judges of the highest Court do their
best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise, in the
rarest of the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right
miscarriage of justice complained of. In such case it would not only be proper but also
obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. After giving our anxious consideration
to the question we are persuaded to hold that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases
shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in
public interest that a final judgment of the final court in the country should not be open to
challenge yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining to
reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience and cause perpetuation of
irremediable injustice. It may be useful to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of
United States in Ohio Power Company’s case (supra). In that case the Court of Claims
entered judgment for refund of tax, alleged to have been overpaid, in favour of the tax payer.
On the application of the Government a writ of certiorari against that judgment was declined
by the Supreme Court of United States in October 1955. The Government sought re-hearing
of the case by filing another application which was dismissed in December 1955. A second
petition for hearing was also rejected in May 1956. However, in June 1956 theorder passed in
December 1955 was set aside of its own motion and that case was ordered to be heard along
with two other pending cases in which the same question was presented. In those two cases
the Supreme Court held against the tax payer and, on the authority of that judgment, reversed
the judgment of the Court of Claims. Four learned members of the Court, in per curiam
opinion, rested the decision “on the ground of interest in finality of the decision must yield
where the interest of justice so required”. Three learned members dissented and held that
denial of certiorari had become final and ought not to be disturbed. Two learned members,
however, did not participate. - This Court in Harbans Singh’s case (supra), on an application under Article 32 of the
Constitution filed after the dismissal of special leave petition and the review, reconsidered its
judgment. In that case, among others, the petitioner and another person were convicted under
Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced to death. In the case of one of the remaining two convicts,
the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. While staying the
death sentence of the petitioner, A.N. Sen, J. in his concurring opinion, noticed the dismissal
of the petitioner’s special leave, review petitions and the petition for clemency by the
President and observed:
“Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due and proper administration
of justice. Apart from the jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Articles 32
and 136 of the Constitution, I am of the opinion that this Court retains and must retain an
inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any extraordinary situation in the larger
interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This
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power must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional circumstances for furthering the
ends of justice.” - In Supreme Court Bar Association’s case (supra), on an application filed under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner sought declaration that the Disciplinary
Committees of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone had exclusive
jurisdiction to inquire into and suspend or debar an advocate from practising law for
professional or other misconduct and that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction had no such jurisdiction, power or authority in that regard.
A Constitution Bench of this Court considered the correctness of the judgment of this Court in
Re Vinay Chandra Mishra, 1995 Cri LJ 3994. The question which fell for consideration of
this Court was: whether the punishment of debarring an advocate from practice and
suspending his licence for a specified period could be passed in exercise of power of this
Court under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India. There an errant
advocate was found guilty of criminal contempt and was awarded the punishment of simple
imprisonment for a period of six weeks and was also suspended from practice as an advocate
for a period of three years from the date of the judgment of this Court for contempt of the
High Court of Allahabad. As a result of that punishment all elective and nominated
offices/posts then held by him in his capacity as an advocate had to be vacated by him.
Elucidating the scope of the curative nature of power conferred on the Supreme Court under
Article 142, it was observed:
“The plenary powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are
inherent in the Court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred
on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also
exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These
powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers. This power
exists as as eparate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands
upon the foundation and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even
wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice
between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which the
Supreme Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in
particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between
the parties, while administering justice according to law. It is an indispensable adjunct to all
other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon
in the hands of the Supreme Court to prevent ‘clogging or obstruction of the stream of
justice’.” - In spite of the width of power conferred by Article 142, the Constitution Bench took
the view that suspending the advocate from practice and suspending his licence was not
within the sweep of the power under the said Article and overruled the judgment in Re V.C.
Mishra’s case (supra). - In M.S. Ahlwat’s case (supra), the petitioner, who was found guilty of forging
signatures and making false statements at different stages before this Court, was inflicted
punishment under Section 193 IPC in Afzal v. State of Haryana 1996 Cri LJ 1679. He filed
an application under Article 32 of the Constitution assailing the validity of that order. Taking
note of the complaint of miscarriage of justice by the Supreme Court in ordering his
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incarceration which ruined his career, acting without jurisdiction or without following the due
procedure, it was observed that to perpetuate an error was no virtue but to correct it was a
compulsion of judicial conscience. The correctness of the judgment was examined and the
error was rectified. - The upshot of the discussion in our view is that this Court, to prevent abuse of its
process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may re-consider its judgments in exercise
of its inherent power. - The next step is to specify the requirements to entertain such a curative petition under
the inherent power of this Court so that floodgates are not opened for filing a second review
petition as a matter of course in the guise of a curative petition under inherent power. It is
common ground that except when very strong reasons exist, the Court should not entertain an
application seeking reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become final on
dismissal of a review petition. It is neither advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds
on which such a petition may be entertained. - Nevertheless, we think that a petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he
establishes (1) violation of principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but
the judgment adversely affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served
with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice and (2) where in
the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or
the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the
petitioner. - The petitioner, in the curative petition, shall aver specifically that the grounds
mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition and that it was dismissed by
circulation. The curative petition shall contain a certification by a Senior Advocate with
regard to the fulfilment of the above requirements. - We are of the view that since the matter relates to re-examination of a final judgment
of this Court, though on limited ground, the curative petition has to be first circulated to a
Bench of the three senior-most Judges and the Judges who passed the judgment complained
of, if available. It is only when a majority of the learned Judges on this Bench conclude that
the matter needs hearing that it should be listed before the same Bench (as far as possible)
which may pass appropriate orders. It shall be open to the Bench at any stage of consideration
of the curative petition to ask a senior counsel to assist it as amicus curiae. In the event of the
Bench holding at any stage that the petition is without any merit and vexatious, it may impose
exemplary costs on the petitioner. - Insofar as the present writ petitions are concerned, the Registry shall process them,
notwithstanding that they do not contain the averment that the grounds urged were
specifically taken in the review petitions and the petitions were dismissed in circulation. - The point is accordingly answered.
