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P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.
- The first point which calls for our decision in this appeal is whether the Tribunal was right in
holding that the facts proved against Raghavan did not attract the provisions of Standing Order 22(viii) of
the certified standing orders of the appellant. The said standing order provides that without prejudice to
the general meaning of the term “misconduct”, it shall be deemed to mean and include, inter alia,
drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour within or without the factory. It is
common ground that the alleged assault took place outside the factory, and, in fact, at a considerable
distance from it. The Tribunal has held that the assault in question can be treated as a purely private
matter between Raghavan and Augustine with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result of
which Standing Order 22(viii) cannot be invoked against Raghavan. Mr Menon who has appeared for the
respondent before us, has contended that in construing standing orders of this character, we must take care
to see that disputes of a purely private or individual type are not brought within their scope. He argues
that on many occasions, individual employees may have to deal with private disputes and sometimes, as a
result of these private disputes, assault may be committed. Such an assault may attract the relevant
provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but it does not fall under Standing Order 22(viii). In our opinion, this
contention is well-founded. It would, we think, be unreasonable to include within Standing Order 22(viii)
any riotous behaviour without the factory which was the result of purely private and individual dispute,
and in course of which tempers of both the contestants became hot. In order that Standing Order 22(viii)
may be attracted, the appellant should be able to show that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some
rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim.
- This appeal by special leave raises a short question about the
validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil
Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K.K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the 14th
of November, 1955. The appellant is a public limited concern engaged in the industry of soaps and toilet
articles. It owns three factories in addition to 12 sales offices. One of these factories is located at
Tatapuram, Ernakulam, in the State of Kerala. Mr Raghavan was working with the appellant at its factory
at Tatapuram. It was reported to the appellant that on 12th November, 1955, Mr Raghavan and another
employee of the appellant, Mr Mathews by name, waylaid Mr C.A. Augustine, the Chargeman of the
Soap Plant of the company’s factory at Tatapuram while he was returning home after his duty in the
second shift and assaulted him. That is why charge-sheets were issued against both Messrs Raghavan and
Mathews on 14th November, 1955. Pursuant to the service of the charge-sheets, two officers were
appointed by the appellant to hold an enquiry; but the respondent Union represented to the appellant that
justice would not be done to Raghavan and Mathews unless somebody outside Tatapuram was invited to
hold the enquiry. Thereupon, the General Manager of the appellant appointed Mr Y.D. Joshi, who is a
Law Officer of the appellant in the Head Office, to hold the enquiry. Mr Joshi held the enquiry from 27th
to 30th December, 1955, and subsequently, he made his report to the General Manager of the appellant on
7th January, 1956. At that time, an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and its
employees, and so, the appellant applied to the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the dismissal of Messrs
Raghavan and Mathews. The Tribunal approved of the dismissal of Raghavan, but did not accord its
approval of the dismissal of Mathews. Acting in pursuance of the approval accorded by the Tribunal, the
appellant dismissed Raghavan with effect from 14th November, 1955. Not satisfied with the order of
dismissal, the respondent raised an industrial dispute in regard to the propriety and validity of the said
dismissal of Raghavan and that has become the subject-matter of the present reference which was ordered
on the 3rd of December, 1958. It is on this reference that the Industrial Tribunal has held that the
appellant was not justified in dismissing Raghavan, and so, has ordered his reinstatement. This is the
order which has given rise to the present appeal by special leave.
- In the present case, however, it is quite clear that the assault committed by Raghavan on Augustine
was not a purely private or individual matter. What the occasion for this assault was and what motive
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actuated it, have been considered by the domestic Tribunal and the findings of the domestic Tribunal on
these points must be accepted in the present proceedings, unless they are shown to be based on no
evidence or are otherwise perverse. Now, when we look at the report of the Enquiry Officer, it is clear
that on the evidence given by Mr M.M. Augustine and K.T. Joseph it appeared that the assault was
committed by Raghavan on C.A. Augustine, because he was in favour of the introduction of the Incentive
Bonus Scheme. It appears that the introduction of this incentive bonus scheme was approved by one set of
workmen and was opposed by another, with the result that the two rival unions belonging to these two
sets respectively were arrayed against each other on that question. The evidence of the two witnesses to
whom we have just referred clearly shows that when Raghavan assaulted C.A. Augustine, he expressly
stated that Augustine was a black-leg (Karinkali) who was interested in increased production in the
company with a view to obtain bonus; and the report further shows that the Enquiry Officer believed this
evidence and came to the conclusion that the assault was motivated by this hostility between Raghavan
and C.A. Augustine. In fact, the charge framed clearly suggested that the assault was made for that
motive. It was alleged in the charge that Augustine was assaulted to terrorise the workmen who had been
responsible for giving increased production under the incentives bonus scheme. According to the charge
such acts were highly subversive of discipline. The Enquiry Officer has held that in the light of the
evidence given by M.M. Augustine and K.T. Joseph, the charge as framed had been proved. This finding
clearly means that the assault was not the result of a purely individual or private quarrel between the
assailant and his victim, but it was referable to the difference of opinion between the two in regard to the
introduction of the incentive bonus scheme on which the two unions were sharply divided. Therefore, if
Raghavan assaulted Augustine solely for the reason that Augustine was supporting the plea for more
production, that cannot be said to be outside the purview of Standing Order 22(viii). - The next point which needs to be considered arises out of a plea which has been strenuously urged
before us by Mr Menon that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct
the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and so, the Tribunal was entitled to go
into the evidence itself and decide whether Raghavan’s dismissal was justified or not. The legal position
in this matter is not in doubt. If it appears that the domestic enquiry was not conducted in accordance with
the principles of natural justice and a reasonable opportunity was not, for instance, given to Raghavan to
lead evidence in support of his defence, that would be a valid ground on which the Tribunal can discard
the finding of the domestic enquiry and consider the matter on the merits uninfluenced by the said
finding. Unfortunately for the respondent, however, on the material on record it is very difficult to sustain
the finding of the Tribunal that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. - The whole of this contention is based on the fact that Raghavan wanted to examine two witnesses,
Messrs M.P. Menon and Chalakudi. It appears that Raghavan told the Enquiry Officer that he wanted to
examine these two witnesses and he requested him to invite the said two witnesses to give evidence. The
Enquiry Officer told Raghavan that it was really not a part of his duty to call the said two witnesses and
that Raghavan should in fact have kept them ready himself. Even so, in order to assist Raghavan, the
Enquiry Officer wrote letters to the two witnesses. Mr Menon replied expressing his inability to be
present before the Enquiry Officer, and the Enquiry Officer communicated this reply to Raghavan, so that
for Raghavan’s failure to examine Menon no blame can be attributed to the enquiry officer at all. In
regard to Chalakudi, it appears that he sent one letter addressed to the Enquiry Officer and it reached him
on the 31st December, 1955, the day on which he was leaving for Bombay. This letter was not signed,
and so, the Enquiry Officer took no action on it and gave no time to Chalakudi to appear three or four
days later as had been suggested in that unsigned letter. The Tribunal thought that this attitude on the part
of the Enquiry Officer was unsympathetic and that introduced an element of unfairness in the enquiry
itself. We are unable to appreciate how such a conclusion can follow on facts which are admitted. We do
not think the Enquiry Officer was called upon to accept an unsigned letter and act upon it. Besides, the
Enquiry Officer had gone to Ernakulam from Bombay for holding this enquiry, because the respondent
Union itself wanted that the enquiry should be held by some other officer outside the local station and it
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was known that the Bombay Officer would go back as soon as the enquiry was over. In such a case, if
Raghavan did not take steps to produce his witnesses before the Enquiry Officer, how can it be said that
the Enquiry Officer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice? Mr
Menon has suggested that the Enquiry Officer should have taken steps to get the witnesses M.P. Menon
and Chalakudi brought before him for giving evidence. This suggestion is clearly untenable. In a domestic
enquiry, the officer holding the enquiry can take no valid or effective steps to compel the attendance of
any witness; just as the appellant produced its witnesses before the officer, Raghavan should have taken
steps to produce his witnesses. His witness Menon probably took the view that it was beneath his dignity
to appear in a domestic enquiry, and Chalakudi was content to send an unsigned letter and that to so as to
reach the Enquiry Officer on the day when he was leaving Ernakulam for Bombay. It would be
unreasonable to suggest that in a domestic enquiry, it is the right of the charge-sheeted employee to ask
for as many adjournments as he likes. It is true that if it appears that by refusing to adjourn the hearing at
the instance of the charge-sheeted workman the Enquiry Officer failed to give the said workman a
reasonable opportunity to lead evidence that may in a proper case be considered to introduce an element
of infirmity in the enquiry; but in the circumstances of this case we do not think it would be possible to
draw such an inference.
The record shows that the Enquiry Officer went out of his way to assist Raghavan; and if the
witnesses did not turn up to give evidence in time it was not his fault. We must accordingly hold that the
Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry suffered from the infirmity that it was
conducted contrary to the principles of natural justice. - Let us then consider whether the dismissal of Raghavan is actuated by mala fides or amounts to
victimisation. In regard to the plea of victimisation, the Tribunal has definitely found against the
respondent. “I do not for a moment believe”, says the Tribunal, “that the management foisted a case
against the ex-worker. Regarding the allegation of victimisation, there is no sufficient evidence in the case
that the management or its Manager Mr John was motivated with victimisation or unfair labour practice”.
This finding is quite clearly in favour of the appellant. The Tribunal, however, thought that because the
Enquiry Officer did not give an adjournment to Raghavan to examine his witnesses, that introduced an
element of mala fides. It has also observed that since the case against Raghavan did not fall within the
purview of Standing Order 22(viii) and yet, the appellant framed a charge against Raghavan under that
standing order, that introduced another element of mala fides. It is on these grounds that the conclusion as
to mala fides recorded by the Tribunal seems to rest. - In regard to the first ground, we have already held that the Tribunal was not justified in blaming the
Enquiry Officer for not adjourning the case beyond 31st December, 1955. In regard to the second ground,
we are surprised that the Tribunal should have taken the view that since in its opinion, Standing Order
22(viii) did not apply to the facts of this case, the framing of the charge under the said standing order and
the finding of the domestic Tribunal in favour of the appellant on that ground showed mala fides. It seems
to us that the Tribunal has completely overlooked an elementary principle of judicial approach that even if
a judge or tribunal may reach an erroneous conclusion either of fact or of law, the mere error of the
conclusion does not make the conclusion mala fide. Besides, as we have just indicated, on the merits we
are satisfied that the Tribunal was in error in holding that Standing Order 22(viii) did not apply.
Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that the dismissal of Raghavan was mala fide, cannot possibly be
sustained. - There is one more point which has been pressed before us by Mr Menon. In Phulbari Tea Estate
v. Workmen [(1960) 1 SCR 32], this Court has held that even if a domestic enquiry is found to be
defective, the employer may seek to justify the dismissal of his employee by leading evidence before the
Tribunal to which an industrial dispute arising out of the impugned dismissal has been referred for
adjudication. Mr Menon contends that by parity of reasoning, in cases where the employee is unable to
lead his evidence before the domestic Tribunal for no fault of his own, a similar opportunity should be
given to him to prove his case in proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. In our opinion, this
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contention is not well-founded. The decision in the case of Phulbari Tea Estate proceeds on the basis
which is of basic importance in industrial adjudication that findings properly recorded in domestic
enquiries which are conducted, fairly, cannot be re-examined by industrial adjudication unless the said
findings are either perverse, or are not supported by any evidence, or some other valid reason of that
character. In such a case, the fact that the finding is not accepted by the Industrial Tribunal would not
necessarily preclude the employer from justifying the dismissal of his employee on the merits, provided,
of course, he leads evidence before the Industrial Tribunal and persuades the Tribunal to accept his case.
That, however, is very different from a case like the present. In the case before us, the enquiry has been
fair; the Enquiry Officer gave Raghavan ample opportunity to lead his evidence. If a reasonable
opportunity had been denied to the employee, that would have made the enquiry itself bad and then the
employer would have been required to prove his case before the Industrial Tribunal, and in dealing with
the dispute the Industrial Tribunal would have been justified in completely ignoring in the findings of the
domestic enquiry. But if the enquiry has been fairly conducted, it means that all reasonable opportunity
has been given to the employee to prove his case by leading evidence. In such a case, how can the court
hold that merely because the witnesses did not appear to give evidence in support of the employee’s case,
he should be allowed to lead such evidence before the Industrial Tribunal. If this plea is upheld, no
domestic enquiry would be effective and in every case, the matter would have to be tried afresh by the
Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are not prepared to accede to Mr Menon’s argument that the Tribunal
was justified in considering the merits of the dispute for itself in the present reference proceedings. Since
the enquiry has been fairly conducted, and the findings recorded therein are based on evidence which is
believed, there would be no justification for the Industrial Tribunal to consider the same facts for itself.
Findings properly recorded at such enquiries are binding on the parties, unless, of course, it is known that
the said findings are perverse, or are not based on any evidence. - There is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have
taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry
should have been stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal proceedings. As this Court has
held in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan [(1960) 3 SCR 227], it is desirable that if
the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a
criminal court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal
case. It would be particularly appropriate to adopt such a course where the charge against the workman is
of a grave character, because in such a case, it would be unfair to compel the workman to disclose the
defence which he may take before the criminal court. But to say that domestic enquiries may be stayed
pending criminal trial is very different from anything that if an employer proceeds with the domestic
enquiry in spite of the fact that the criminal trial is pending, the enquiry for that reason alone is vitiated
and the conclusion reached in such an enquiry is either bad in law or mala fide. In fairness, we ought to
add that Mr Menon did not seek to justify this extreme position. Therefore, we must hold that the
Industrial Tribunal was in error when it characterised the result of the domestic enquiry as mala fide
partly because the enquiry was not stayed pending the criminal proceedings against Raghavan. We
accordingly hold that the domestic enquiry in this case was properly held and fairly conducted and the
conclusions of fact reached by the Enquiry Officer are based on evidence which he accepted as true. That
being so, it was not open to the Industrial Tribunal to reconsider the same questions of fact and come to a
contrary conclusion. - The result is, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Industrial Tribunal is set aside and
the reference made to it is answered in favour of the appellant.
