Parvathi Kollur & And v. State by Directorate of Enforcement

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Dinesh Maheshwari and Krishna Murari, JJ.
The appellants herein have questioned the judgment and order dated 17.12.2020 as
passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Revision Petition
No. 590 of 2019 whereby, the High Court allowed the revision petition filed by the
respondent and set aside the discharge order passed by the III Additional District and
Sessions Judge, D.K., Mangaluru (Karnataka) for the offence under Section 3 of the
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as „the Act of
2002‟).
The appellants herein are wife and son of the accused No. 1 against whom the
allegations had been that during his tenure as Deputy Revenue Officer, he amassed
assets disproportionate to his known source of income to an extent of Rs.42,25,859/-.
For this, the Lokayukta Police registered a case under Section 13(1)(e) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as
„the Act of 1988‟). During the pendency of trial, the Directorate of Enforcement
registered a case against the accused No. 1 and the appellants under the Act of 2002
and filed a complaint on 08.06.2016 before the Special Court for trial of the offence
under Section 3 thereof.
In the meantime, the Special Judge (Lokayukta) acquitted the accused No. 1 of the
offences aforesaid under the Act of 1988 while observing that the evidence produced
by the prosecution was insufficient to hold him guilty. Then, the accused No. 1 as also
the present appellants moved an application under Section 277 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking discharge in the case pertaining to the Act of 2002.
Before the said application was considered and decided, the accused No. 1 expired on
08.05.2018.
Thereafter, the Trial Court, by its judgment and order dated 04.01.2019, allowed the
application and discharged the appellants from the offences pertaining to the Act of
2002 while observing that occurrence of a scheduled offences was the basic condition
for giving rise to “proceeds of crime”; and commission of scheduled offence was a
pre-condition for proceeding under the Act of 2002.
Aggrieved by the said discharge order, the Directorate preferred a revision petition
before the High Court. The High Court proceeded to set aside the discharge order
while observing that the allegations made in the complaint and the material produced,
prima facie, made out sufficient ground for proceeding against the appellants for
offences under the Act of 2002.
Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the issue as involved in this
matter is no more res integra, particularly for the view taken by a 3-Judge Bench of
this Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union Of India & Ors.
decided on 27.07.2022 where, the consequence of failure of prosecution for the
scheduled offence has been clearly provided in the following terms:
“187. …….(d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent
on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a
scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with
such property, which constitutes the offence of money-laundering. The
Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional
basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed,
unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending
enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent
forum. If the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled
offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of
competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money- laundering
against him or any one claiming such property being the property linked
to stated scheduled offence through him.”
Learned ASG appearing for the respondent, in all fairness, does not dispute the above
position of law declared by this Court.
The result of the discussion aforesaid is that the view as taken by the Trial Court in
this matter had been a justified view of the matter and the High Court was not right in
setting aside the discharge order despite the fact that the accused No. 1 had already
been acquitted in relation to the scheduled offence and the present appellants were not
accused of any scheduled offence.
In view of the above, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment
and order dated 17.12.2020 is set aside and the order dated 04.01.2019 as passed by
the Trial Court, allowing discharge application of the appellants, is restored.
All pending applications stand disposed of.