Case Summary
| Citation | G. Basi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute (2003) 4 SC 225 |
| Keywords | state, article 12, authority, writ petition, constitutional rights, international organisation, article 14, equality |
| Facts | The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) is an international organisation which is co-founded by various international organisations under the Consultative Groups of International Agriculture Research (CGIAR). This organisation is made with a view to remove poverty in rural areas and hunger in environmentally sustainable ways involving 50 countries. The petitioner, in this case, is an employee of ICRISAT. He was terminated from the services on charges of proven misconduct based on the ICRISAT Personnel Policy Statement, set because of international employment policies. Petition was filed before Karnataka High Court and it was dismissed. Hence, now appeal before Supreme Court. |
| Issues | Does ICRISAT fall within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, within the meaning of “State”? What type ICRISAT is exactly? |
| Contentions | Petitioner contended that the agreement between the Indian government and CGAIR violated their constitutional rights under article 14, 21. ICRISAT only matters related to the functioning of the organization. It cannot be granted immunity. Respondent argued that petition filed under article 226 against ICRISAT is not maintainable because it was neither government not it is administered or control by the government. |
| Law Points | Court observed that a writ under article 226 is maintainable only when individual’s fundamental rights violated or infringed. In this case, petitioner’s right under article 14 and 21 violated is maintainable only when ICRISAT is state or authority within the meaning of article 12. The aim of ICRISAT was to help develop countries and ease rural poverty and hunger, but not something for the Union of India. It was not set up by Government of India but provide services to various countries including India. ICRISAT was neither being controlled by the Government nor was it accountable to the Government. It also found the financial contribution of India to be minimal- just around 0.3% to 2%, hence not financially dependent on the Indian government. The agreement between the India and CGAIR is mere contractual and hence, the court found that there is no infringement of constitutional rights. |
| Judgement | Court held that writ petition is not maintainable under article 226 because ICRISAT is not state as it is not a statutory body performing any public or statutory function. Appeal dismissed. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
RUMA PAL, J. – 1. The appellants were employees of the respondent no. 1 (ICRISAT). Their services were terminated. They filed writ petitions before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh against ICRISAT and the Union of India. The writ petitions were dismissed. The first writ petition so dismissed was W.P. No. 2730/1981 (K.S. Mathew v. ICRISAT). A second group of writ petitions was dismissed on 30th June 1988. The dismissals are the subject matter of these appeals. Both the Division Benches held that ICRISAT was an international organisation and was immune from being sued because of a notification issued in 1972 under the United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947 and that a writ under Article 226 could not be issued to ICRISAT.
2. What or who is ICRISAT? Was the High Court right in holding that it was not amena- ble to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226?
3. ICRISAT was proposed to be set up as a non-profit research and training centre by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The CGIAR is an informal association of about 50 government and non-governmental bodies and is co- sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, (FAO). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Bank. The members of the CGIAR at the relevant time were the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank; Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States, Ford Foundation, France, Germany, the Inter- American Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Research Centre, Japan, Kellogg Foundation, Netherlands, Norway, Rockefeller Foundation, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Nations Development Programme and the United States of America. In addition there were representatives from the five major developing regions of the world, namely, Africa, Asia and the Far East, Latin America, the Middle East, Southern and Eastern Europe.
4. The object of setting up ICRISAT was to help developing countries in semi-arid tropics to alleviate rural poverty and hunger in ways that are environmentally sustainable. The developing countries include India, parts of South Asian, sub-Saharan and South and Eastern Africa and parts of Latin America. The object was sought to be achieved by research and development of scientific technologies which could improve the quantity and quality of sorghum (bajra), pearl and finger millet, pigeon peas, chick peas and ground nut.
6. A memorandum of agreement was then entered into between the government of India and the Ford Foundation (acting on behalf of the Consultative Group) on 28th March 1972 (referred to as the March agreement) for the establishment of ICRISAT. The agreement provided that the principal headquarters of ICRISAT would be at Hyderabad, India. The agreement recorded that lCRISAT would, inter alia, serve, as a world centre for conducting research and training of scientists for the improvement of sorghum, millet, pigeon peas and chick peas.
19. On 23rd June 1983, in view of growing indiscipline in the institute the director-general issued a circular which inter alia stated:“A new set of disciplinary and appeal procedures for staff has been drafted and the staff management joint council will be consulted in this regard. Until these procedures are promulgated, procedures laid down in 1976 continue to apply. These provide for minor and major penalties according to the schedule in annexure I. Where the nature of the misconduct warrants a major penalty, an enquiry must be held before the penalty can be proposed and awarded.”
20. A show cause notice was issued to the appellant calling for an explanation for the acts of misconduct specified therein. The appellant gave an explanation on 25th July 1983. The explanation was not found satisfactory and an enquiry officer was appointed to enquire into the charges framed against the appellant. In August 1983, the appellant filed the writ application which resulted in the impugned order. The prayer in the writ petition was for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing ICRISAT to frame rules regarding the conditions of service which “nearly approximate to the accepted custom of India” and to direct the Union of India to take action for fulfillment of clause 6(a)(2) of the March agreement between the Union of India and CGIAR.
21. It is not clear whether any copy of the writ petition was served on the respondents at that stage. In any event, ICRISAT proceeded with the disciplinary enquiry against the appellant. An inquiry notice was issued on 13th September 1983. The appellant did not participate in the inquiry. Ultimately, the enquiry officer submitted a report to the personnel manager on 17th October 1983 finding the charges against the appellant proved. The order of termination was passed on 5th August 1983 by the principal administrator. In the order dismissing the appellant, it was stated that the appellant would stand relieved with effect from 5th December 1983 and that the appellant would be entitled to three months’ salary in lieu of notice consequent upon the cessation of his employment with ICRISAT. It does not appear that the appellant’s writ petition was amended to challenge the order of dismissal.
24. The appellant’s arguments that the Union of India could not have granted immunity from legal process to ICRISAT under the 1947 Act and that in any event the grant of such immunity could not serve to curtail the courts’ constitutional power under Article 226, proceeds on the basis that if it were not for such immunity, a writ could issue to ICRISAT. If a writ did otherwise lie against a body, it is a moot point whether judicial review of its actions could be excluded by grant of Immunity either by statute or by a statutory notification. Since, in our view, no writ would lie against ICRISAT, therefore, further questions whether it could or should have been granted immunity or whether the immunity debarred remedies under Article 226 do not arise.
26. The facts which have been narrated earlier clearly show that ICRISAT does not fulfill any of these tests. It was not set up by the government and, it gives its services voluntarily to a large number of countries besides India. It is not controlled by nor is it accountable to the government. The Indian government’s financial contribution to ICRISAT is minimal. Its participation in ICRISAT’s administration is limited to 3 out of 15 members. It cannot therefore be said that ICRISAT is a State or other authority as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution.
27. It is true that a writ under Article 226 also lies against a ‘person’ for “any other purpose”. The power of the High Court to issue such a writ to “any person” can only mean the power to issue such a writ to any person to whom, according to well-established
principles, a writ lies. That a writ may issue to an appropriate person for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III is clear enough from the language used. But the words “and for any other purpose” must mean “for any other purpose” for which any of the writs mentioned would according to well established principles issue.
28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a “person” if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty. ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the state in its sovereign capacity. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the institute, it certainly cannot be said that the ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities.
29. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the writ petition of the appellant was not maintainable against ICRISAT.
