Case Summary
| Citation | Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192 |
| Keywords | |
| Facts | Shamsher challenged the legality of the Punjab Government’s action. He said that these actions were executed without the advice of the council of ministers which was mandated under the constitution. |
| Issues | Whether Government acted independently? Whether these actions constitutionally valid? |
| Contentions | |
| Law Points | The court clarified that the term “satisfaction” refers to satisfaction derived from the aid and advice of the council of ministers. It ruled that any action undertaken by the President or Governor without the counsel of the ministers is constitutionally valid. |
| Judgement | The Supreme Court held that both the President and the Governor are required to act on the advice of the council of ministers as outlined in Articles 74(1) and 163(1) of the Constitution. However, it clarified that “satisfaction” refers specifically to the satisfaction derived from this ministerial advice. As such, any actions taken by the President or Governor without the counsel of the ministers are considered constitutionally valid. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
(A.N.Ray, C.J. and D.G.Palekar, K.K.Mathew, Y.V.Chandrachud, A.Alagiriswami, P.N.Bhagwati and
V.R.Krishna Iyer, JJ.)
[The appellants had joined the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). Both of them were
on probation. By an order dated April 27, 1967, the services of the appellant Samsher Singh
were terminated by the following order:
“The Governor of Punjab is pleased to terminate the services of Shri Samsher Singh,
Subordinate Judge, on probation under Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment
and Appeal) Rules, 1952 with immediate effect. It is requested that these orders may please
be conveyed to the officer concerned under intimation to the Government.”
By an order dated December 15, 1969 the services of the appellant Ishwar Chand Agarwal were
terminated by the following order:
“On the recommendation of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the Governor of
Punjab is pleased to dispense with the services of Shri Ishwar Chand Agarwal, P.C.S.
(Judicial Branch), with immediate effect, under Rule 7(3) in Part ‘D’ of the Punjab Civil
Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951, as amended from time to time.”
A.N. RAY, C.J. (for himself, Palekar, Mathew, Chandrachud and Alagiriswami, JJ.) –
- The appellants contend that the Governor as the constitutional or the formal head of the
State can exercise powers and functions of appointment and removal of members of the
Subordinate Judicial Service only personally. The State contends that the Governor
exercises powers of appointment and removal conferred on him by or under the
Constitution like executive powers of the State Government only on the aid and advice of
his Council of Ministers and not personally. - The appellants rely on the decision of this Court in Sardari Lal v. Union of India [(1971)
3 SCR 461] where it has been held that where the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, if satisfied, makes an order under Article 311(2) proviso (c) that in the interestof the
security of the State it is not expedient to hold an enquiry for dismissal or removal or reduction
in rank of an officer, the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is his personalsatisfaction.
The appellants on the authority of this ruling contend that under Article 234 ofthe Constitution
the appointment as well as the termination of services of Subordinate Judges is to be made by
the Governor personally. - These two appeals were placed before a larger Bench to consider whether the decision
in Sardari Lal case correctly lays down the law that where the President or the Governor is to
be satisfied it is his personal satisfaction. - The appellants contend that the power of the Governor under Article 234 of the
Constitution is to be exercised by him personally for these reasons. - First, there are several constitutional functions, powers and duties of the Governor.
These are conferred on him eo nomine the Governor. The Governor, is, by and under the
Constitution, required to act in his discretion in several matters. These constitutional functions
and powers of the Governor eo nomine as well as these in the discretion of the Governor are
not executive powers of the State within the meaning of Article 154 read with Article 162.
- Second, the Governor under Article 163 of the Constitution can take aid and advice of
his Council of Ministers when he is exercising executive power of the State. The Governor
can exercise powers and functions without the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers
when he is required by or under the Constitution to act in his discretion, where he is required to
exercise his constitutional functions conferred on him eo nomine as the Governor. - Third, the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 163 is different from
the allocation of business of the government of the State by the Governor to the Council of
Ministers under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. The allocation of business of government
under Article 166(3) is an instance of exercise of executive power by the Governor through his
Council by allocating or delegating his functions. The aid and advice is a constitutional
restriction on the exercise of executive powers of the State by the Governor. The Governor will
not be constitutionally competent to exercise these executive powers of theState without the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers. - Fourth, the executive powers of the State are vested in the Governor under Article
154(1). The powers of appointment and removal of Subordinate Judges under Article 234
have not been allocated to the Ministers under the Rules of Business of the State of Punjab.
Rule 18 of the Rules of Business states that except as otherwise provided by any other rule
cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister-in-charge who
may, by means of Standing Orders, give such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases
in his department. Rule 7(2) in Part D of the Punjab Civil Service Rules which states that the
Governor of Punjab may on the recommendation of the High Court remove from service
without assigning any cause any Subordinate Judge or revert him to his substantive post during
the period of probation is incapable of allocation to a Minister. Rule 18 of the Rules of Business
is subject to exceptions and Rule 7(2) of the Service Rules is such an exception. Therefore, the
appellants contend that the power of the Governor to removeSubordinate Judges under Article
234 read with the aforesaid Rule 7(2) of the Service Rules cannot be allocated to a Minister. - The Attorney General for the Union, the Additional Solicitor General for the State of
Punjab and counsel for the State of Haryana contended that the President is the constitutional
head of the Union and the Governor is the constitutional head of the State and the President as
well as the Governor exercises all powers and functions conferred on them by or under the
Constitution on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. - In all the Articles which speak of powers and functions of the President, the
expressions used in relation thereto are ‘is satisfied’, ‘is of opinion’, ‘as he thinks fit’ and ‘if it
appears to’. In the case of Governor, the expressions used in respect of his powers and functions
are ‘is satisfied’, ‘if of opinion’ and ‘as he thinks fit’. - Article 163(1) states that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister
at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as
he is by or under this Constitution, required to exercise his functions or any of them in his
discretion. Article 163 (2) states that if any question arises whether any matter is or is not a
matter as respects which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his
discretion, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final and the validity of
anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or
ought not to have acted in his discretion. Extracting the words “in his discretion” in relation to
exercise of functions, the appellants contend that the Council of Ministers may aid and advise
the Governor in executive functions but the Governor individually and personally in his
discretion will exercise the constitutional functions of appointment and removal of officers in
State Judicial Service and other State Services.
- It is noticeable that though in Article 74 it is stated that there shall be a Council of
Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of
his functions, there is no provision in Article 74 comparable to Article 163 that the aid and
advice is except in so far as he is required to exercise his functions or any of them in his
discretion. - It is necessary to find out as to why the words ‘in his discretion’ are used in relation to
some powers of the Governor and not in the case of the President. - Articles where the expression “acts in his discretion” is used in relation to the
powers and functions of the Governor are those which speak of special responsibilities of
the Governor. These Aticles are 371A(1)(b), 371A(l)(d), 371A(2)(b) and 371A(2)(f). There
are two paragraphs in the Sixth Schedule, namely 9(2) and 18(3) where the words “in his
discretion” are used in relation to certain powers of the Governor. Paragraph9(2) is in
relation to determination of amount of royalties payable by licensees or lessees
prospecting for, or extracting minerals, to the District Council. Paragraph 18(3) has been
omitted with effect from January 21, 1972. - The executive power of the Union is vested in the President under Article 53(1). The
executive power of the State is vested in the Governor under Article 154(1). The expressions
“Union” and “State” occur in Articles 53(1) and 154(1) respectively to bring about the federal
principles embodied in the Constitution. Any action taken in the exercise of the executive power
of the Union vested in the President under Article 53(1) is taken by the Government of India in
the name of the President as will appear in Article 77(1). Similarly, any action taken in the
exercise of the executive power of the State vested in the Governor under Article154(1)
is taken by the Government of the State in the name of the Governor as will appear in Article
166(1). - There are two significant features in regard to the executive action taken in the name of
the President or in the name of the Governor. Neither the President nor the Governor may sue
or be sued for any executive action of the State. First, Article 300 states that the Government
of India may sue or be sued in the name of the Union and the Governor may sue or be sued in
the name of the State. Second, Article 361 states that proceedings may be brought against the
Government of India and the Government of the State but not against the President or the
Governor. Articles 300 and 361 indicate that neither the President nor the Governor can be sued
for executive actions of the Government. The reason is that neither the President nor the
Governor exercises the executive functions individually or personally.
Executive action taken in the name of the President is the action of the Union. Executive action
taken in the name of the Governor is the executive action of the State.
- Our Constitution embodies generally the Parliamentary or Cabinet system of
Government of the British model both for the Union and the States. Under this system the
President is the constitutional or formal head of the Union and he exercises his powers and
functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of
Ministers. Article 103 is an exception to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers because
it specifically provides that the President acts only according to the opinion of the Election
Commission. This is when any question arises as to whether a Member of either House of
Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause
(1) of Article 102. - Under the Cabinet system of Government as embodied in our Constitution the
Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State and he exercises all his powers and
functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of
Ministers save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to
exercise his functions in his discretion. - The executive power is generally described as the residue which does not fall within
the legislative or judicial power. But executive power may also partake of legislative or judicial
actions. All powers and functions of the President except his legislative powers as for example
in Article 123, viz., ordinance making power and all powers and functions of the Governor
except his legislative power as for example in Article 213 being ordinance making powers are
executive powers of the Union vested in the President under Article 53(1) in one case and are
executive powers of the State vested in the Governor under Article 154(1) in the other case.
Clause (2) or clause f3) of Article 77 is not limited in its operation to the executiveaction of the
Government of India under clause (1) of Article 77. Similarly, clause (2) or clause (3) of Article
166 is not limited in its operation to the executive action of the Government of the State under
clause (1) of Article 166. The expression “Business of the Government of India” in clause (3)
of Article 77, and the expression “Business of theGovernment of the State” in clause (3) of
Article 166 includes all executive business. - In all cases in which the President or the Governor exercises his functions conferred on
him by or under the Constitution with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers he does so
by making rules for convenient transaction of the business of the Government of Indiaor the
Government of the State respectively or by allocation among his Ministers of the said business,
in accordance with Articles 77(3) and 166(3) respectively. Wherever the Constitution requires
the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise of any power or function by
the President or the Governor, as the case may be, as for example in Articles 123, 213, 311(2)
proviso (c), 317, 352(1), 356 and 360 the satisfaction required bythe Constitution is not the
personal satisfaction of the President or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of the President
or of the Governor in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet system of Government. The
reasons are these. It is the satisfaction of the Council of Ministerson whose aid and advice the
President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. Neither Article
77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of power. BothArticles 77(3) and 166(3)
provide that the President under Article 77(3) and the Governor
under Article 166(3) shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the
Government and the allocation of business among the Ministers of the said business. The Rules
of Business and the allocation among the Ministers of the said business all indicate that the
decision of any Minister or officer under the Rules of Business made under these two articles
viz. Article 77(3) in the case of the President and Article 166(3) in the case of the Governor of
the State is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively.
- Further the Rules of Business and allocation of business among the Ministers are
relatable to the provisions contained in Article 53 in the case of the President and Article 154
in the case of the Governor, that the executive power shall be exercised by the President or the
Governor directly or through the officers subordinate. The provisions contained in Article 74
in the case of the President and Article 163 in the case of the Governor that there shall be a
Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President or the Governor, as the case may be, are
sources of the Rules of Business. These provisions are for the discharge of the executive powers
and functions of the Government in the name of the President or the Governor. Wherefunctions
entrusted to a Minister are performed by an official employed in the Minister’s department there
is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the
Minister. The official is merely the machinery for the discharge of the functions entrusted to a
Minister. - It is a fundamental principle of English Constitutional law that Ministers must accept
responsibility for every executive act. In England the Sovereign never acts on his own
responsibility. The power of the Sovereign is conditioned by the practical rule that the Crown
must find advisers to bear responsibility for his action. Those advisers must have the confidence
of the House of Commons. This rule of English Constitutional law is incorporated in our
Constitution. The Indian Constitution envisages a Parliamentary and responsible form of
Government at the Centre and in the States and not a Presidential form of Government. The
powers of the Governor as the constitutional head are not different. - This Court has consistently taken the view that the powers of the President and the
powers of the Governor are similar to the powers of the Crown under the British Parliamentary
system. - This Court in Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan case [AIR 1964 SC 648] held that Article
258 enables the President to do by notification what the Legislature could do by legislation,
namely, to entrust functions relating to matters to which executive power of the Union extends,
to officers named in the notification. The notification issued by the President was held to have
the force of law. This Court held that Article 258(1) empowers the President to entrust to the
State the functions which are vested in the Union, and which are exercisable by the President
on behalf of the Union and further went on to say that Article 258 does not authorise the
President to entrust such powers as are expressly vested in the President by the Constitution
and do not fall within the ambit of Article 258(1). This Court illustrated that observation by
stating that the power of the President to promulgate ordinances under Articles268 to 279 during
an emergency, to declare failure of constitutional machinery in States underArticle 356, to
declare a financial emergency under Article 360, to make rules regulating the recruitment and
conditions of service of persons appointed to posts and services, in connection with the affairs
of the Union under Article 309, are not powers of the Union
Government but are vested in the President by the Constitution and are incapable of being
delegated or entrusted to any other body or authority under Article 258(1).
- The ratio in Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan case is confined to the powers of the
President which can be conferred on States under Article 258. The effect of Article 258 is to
make a blanket provision enabling the President to exercise the power which the Legislature
could exercise by legislation, to entrust functions to the officers to be specified in that behalf
by the President and subject to the conditions prescribed thereby. The result of the notification
by the President under Article 258 is that wherever the expression “appropriate Government”
occurs in the Act in relation to provisions for acquisition of land for the purposes of the
Union, the words “Appropriate Government or the Commissioner of the Division having
territorial jurisdiction over the area in which the land is situate” were deemed to be substituted. - The distinction made by this Court between the executive functions of the Union and
the executive functions of the President does not lead to any conclusion that the President is not
the constitutional head of Government. Article 74(1) provides for the Council of Ministersto
aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. Article 163(1) makes similar
provision for a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor. Therefore, whether the
functions exercised by the President are functions of the Union or the functions of the President
they have equally to be exercised with the aid and advice of the Council ofMinisters, and the
same is true of the functions of the Governor except those which he has to exercise in his
discretion. - In Sardari Lal case an order was made by the President under sub-clause (c) to clause
(2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. The order was:
The President is satisfied that you are unfit to be retained in the public service and ought
to be dismissed from service. The President is further satisfied under sub-clause (c) of proviso
to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution that in the interest of the security of the State it
is not expedient to hold an inquiry.
The order was challenged on the ground that the order was signed by the Joint Secretary
and was an order in the name, of the President of India and that the Joint Secretary could not
exercise the authority on behalf of the President. - This Court in Sardari Lal case relied on two decisions of this Court. One is Moti Ram
Deka v. General Manager, N. E. F. Railway, Maligaon, Pandu [AIR 1964 SC 600] and the
other is Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan case. Moti Ram Deka case was relied on in support of
the proposition that the power to dismiss a Government servant at pleasure is outside the
scope of Articles 53 and 154 of the Constitution and cannot be delegated by the President or
the Governor to a subordinate officer and can be exercised only by the President or the Governor
in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. Clause (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2) was
held by this Court in Sardari Lal case to mean that the functions of the President under that
provision cannot be delegated to anyone else in the case of a civil servant of the Union and the
President has to be satisfied personally that in the interest of the security of the State it is not
expedient to hold an inquiry prescribed by Article 311(2). In support of thisview this Court
relied on the observation in Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan case that the powers
of the President under Article 311(2) cannot be delegated. This Court also stated in Sardari Lal
case that the general consensus of the decisions is that the executive functions of the nature
entrusted by certain articles in which the President has to be satisfied himself about the
existence of certain facts or state of affairs cannot be delegated by him to anyone else.
- The decision in Sardari Lal case that the President has to be satisfied personally in
exercise of executive power or function and that the functions of the President cannot be
delegated is with respect not the correct statement of law and is against the established and
uniform view of this Court as embodied in several decisions to which reference has already
been made. These decisions are from the year 1955 up to the year 1971. These decisions are
Rai Saheb Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras
and U.N.R. Rao v. Smt Indira Gandhi. These decisions were neither referred to nor considered
in Sardari Lal case. - The President as well as the Governor is the Constitutional or formal head. The
President as well as the Governor exercises his powers and functions conferred on him by or
under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres
where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his
discretion. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor
for the exercise by the President or the Governor of any power or function, the satisfaction
required by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or Governor but the
satisfaction of the President or Governor in the constitutional sense in the Cabinet system of
Government, that is, satisfaction of his Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the
President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions.The decision of
any Minister or officer under Rules of Business made under any of these two Articles 77(3) and
166(3) is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively. These articles did not
provide for any delegation. Therefore, the decision of a Minister or officer under the Rules of
Business is the decision of the President or the Governor. - In Moti Rain Deka case, the question for decision was whether Rules 148(3) and 149(3)
which provided for termination of the service of a permanent Government servant by a
stipulated notice violated Article 311. The majority opinion in Moti Ram Deka case was that
Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were invalid inasmuch as they are inconsistent with the provisions of
Article 311(2). The decision in Moti Ram Deka case is not an authority for the proposition that
the power to dismiss a servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Article 154 and cannot be
delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer. - This Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [AIR 1961 SC 751] held that the
power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure, subject to the provisions of Article 311, is not
an executive power under Article 154 but a constitutional power and is not capable of being
delegated to officers subordinate to him. The effect of the judgment in Babu Ram Upadhya
case was that the Governor could not delegate his pleasure to any officer nor could any law
provide for the exercise of that pleasure by an officer with the result that statutory rules
governing dismissal were binding on every officer though they were subject to the overriding
pleasure of the Governor. This would mean that the officer was bound by the rules but the
Governor was not.
- In Babu Ram Upadhya case, the majority view stated v seven propositions at p. 701 of
the report. Proposition No. 2 is that the power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure is outside
the scope of Article 154 and therefore cannot be delegated by the Governor to a subordinate
officer and can be exercised by him only in the manner prescribed by theConstitution.
Propositions Nos. 3 and 4 are these. The tenure of a public servant is subject to the limitations
or qualifications mentioned in Article 311 of the Constitution. The Parliament or the
Legislatures of States cannot make a law abrogating or modifying this tenure so as to impinge
upon the overriding power conferred upon the President or the Governor under Article 310 as
qualified by Article 311. Proposition No. 5 is that the Parliament or the Legislatures of States
can make a law regulating the conditions of service of such a member which includes
proceedings by way of disciplinary action, without affecting the powers of the President or the
Governor under Article 310 of the Constitution read with Article 311.Proposition No. 6 is that
the Parliament and the Legislatures also can make a law laying downand regulating the scope
and content of the doctrine of “reasonable opportunity” embodied in Article 311, but the said
law would be subject to judicial review. - All these propositions were reviewed by the majority opinion of this Court in Moti Ram
Deka case and this Court restated that proposition No. 2 must be read along with the subsequent
propositions specified as propositions Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6. The ruling in Moti Ram Deka case is
that a law can be framed prescribing the procedure by which and the authorityby whom the
said pleasure can be exercised. The pleasure of the President or the Governor to dismiss can
therefore not only be delegated but is also subject to Article 311. The true position as laid down
in Moti Ram Deka case is that Articles 310 and 311 must no doubt be read together but once
the true scope and effect of Article 311 is determined the scope of Article 310(1) must be limited
in the sense that in regard to cases falling under Article 311(2) the pleasure mentioned in Article
310(2) must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of Article 311. - The majority view in Babu Ram Upadhya case is no longer good law after the decision
in Moti Ram Deka case. The theory that only the President or the Governor is personally to
exercise the pleasure or dismissing or removing a public servant is repelled by express words
in Article 311 that no person who is a member of the civil service or holds a civil post under
the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by authority subordinateto that by which
he was appointed. The words “dismissed or removed by an authoritysubordinate to that by
which he was appointed” indicate that the pleasure of the President or the Governor is exercised
by such officers on whom the President or the Governor confers or delegates power. - The provisions of the Constitution which expressly require the Governor to exercise his
powers in his discretion are contained in articles to which reference has been made. To illustrate,
Article 239(2) states that where a Governor is appointed an administrator of an adjoining Union
territory he shall exercise his functions as such administrator independentlyof his Council of
Ministers. The other articles which speak of the discretion of the Governor are paragraphs 9(2)
and 18(3) of the Sixth Schedule and Articles 371A(1)(b), 37lA(1)(d) and 371A(2)(b) and
371A(2)(f). The discretion conferred on the Governor means that as the constitutional or formal
head of the State the power is vested in him. In this connection,
reference may be made to Article356 which states that the Governor can send a report to the
President that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on
in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. Again Article 200 requires the Governor
to reserve for consideration any Bill which in his opinion if it became law, would soderogate
from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which the High Court is designed
to ml under the Constitution.
- In making a report under Article 356 the Governor will be justified in exercising his
discretion even against the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. The reason is that the
failure of the constitutional machinery may be because of the conduct of the Council of
Ministers. This discretionary power is given to the Governor to enable him to report to the
President who, however, must act on the advice of his Council of Ministers in all matters. In
this context Article 163(2) is explicable that the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall
be final and the validity shall not be called in question. The action taken by the Presidenton
such a report is a different matter. The President acts on the advice of his Council of Ministers.
In all other matters where the Governor acts in his discretion he will act inharmony with his
Council of Ministers. The Constitution does not aim at providing a parallel administration
within the State by allowing the Governor to go against the advice of the Council of Ministers. - Similarly Article 200 indicates another instance where the Governor may act
irrespective of any advice from the Council of Ministers. In such matters where the Governor
is to exercise his discretion he must discharge his duties to the best of his judgment. The
Governor is required to pursue such courses which are not detrimental to the State. - For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President or the Governor acts on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head in the case of the
Union and the Chief Minister at the head in the case of State in all matters which vests in the
Executive whether those functions are executive or legislative in character. Neither the
President nor the Governor is to exercise the executive functions personally. The present
appeals concern the appointment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Services
of the State which is to be made by the Governor as contemplated in Article 234 of the
Constitution after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
Appointment or dismissal or removal of persons belonging to the Judicial Service of the State
is not a personal function but is an executive function of the Governor exercised in accordance
with the rules in that behalf under the Constitution. - In the present appeals the two rules which deal with termination of services of
probationers in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) are Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Service
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and Rule 7(3) in Part D of the Punjab Civil Service
(Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951 hereinafter referred to as Rule 9 and Rule 7. The services of the
appellant Samsher Singh were terminated under Rule 9. The services of IshwarChand Agarwal
were terminated under Rule 7(3). - Rule 9 providesthat where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer,
whether during or at the end of the period of probation, for any specific fault or on account of
the unsatisfactory record or unfavourable reports implying the unsuitability for
the service, the probationer shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal, and given an
opportunity to show cause against it, before orders are passed by the authority competent to
terminate the appointment.
- Rule 7(3) aforesaid provides that on the completion of the period of probation of any
member of the service, the Governor may, on the recommendation of the High Court, confirm
him in his appointment if he is working against a permanent vacancy or, if his work or conduct
is reported by the High Court to be unsatisfactory, dispense with his services orrevert him
to his former substantive post, if any, or extend his period of probation and thereafter pass such
orders as he could have passed on the expiry of the first period of probation. - Rule 9 of the Punishment and Appeal Rules contemplates an inquiry into grounds of
proposal of termination of the employment of the probationer. Rule 7 on the other hand confers
power on the Governor on the recommendation of the High Court to confirm or to dispense
with the services or to revert him or to extend his period of probation. - The position of a probationer was considered by this Court in Purshottam LalDhingra
v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 36]. Das, C.J. speaking for the Court said that where a person
is appointed to a permanent post in Government service on probation the termination of his
service during or at the end of the period of probation will not ordinarilyand by itself be a
punishment because the Government servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such
a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to do
so. Such a termination does not operate as a forfeiture of any rightof a servant to hold the post,
for he has no such right. Obviously such a termination cannot be a dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank by way of punishment. There are, however, two important observations of
Das, C.J. in Dhingra case. One is that if a right exists under a contract or Service Rules to
terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant.
The other is that if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and violates Article 311 of the
Constitution. The reasoning why motive is said to be irrelevant is that it inheres in the state of
mind which is not discernible. On the other hand, if termination is founded on misconduct it is
objective and is manifest.
66. If the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the substance of the order is
that the termination is by way of punishment then a probationer is entitled to attract Article.
The substance of the order and not the form would be decisive K.H. Phadnis v. State of
Maharashtra [(1971) 1 SCC 790].
67. An order terminating the services of a temporary servant or probationer under the Rules
of Employment and without anything more will not attract Article 311. Where a departmental
enquiry is contemplated and if an enquiry is not in fact proceeded with, Article 311 will not be
attracted unless it can be shown that the order though unexceptionable in formis made following
a report based on misconduct State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra [(1970) 2 SCC 871].
68. The appellant Ishwar Chand Agarwal contended that he completed his initial period of
two years’ probation on November 11, 1967 and the maximum period of three years
probation on November 11, 1968 and by reason of the fact that he continued in service after the
expiry of the maximum period of probation he became confirmed. The appellant also contended
that he had a right to be confirmed and there was a permanent vacancy in the cadre of the service
on September 17, 1969 and the same should have been allotted to him.
- Rule 7(1) states that every Subordinate Judge, in the first instance, be appointed on
probation for two years but this period may be extended from time to time expressly or
impliedly so that the total period of probation including extension, if any, does not exceed three
years. The explanation to Rule 7(1) is that the period of probation shall be deemed to have been
extended if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of his period of probation.
72. In this context reference may be made to the proviso to Rule 7(3). The proviso to the
rule states that the completion of the maximum period of three years’ probation would not
confer on him the right to be confirmed till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. Rule 7(3)
states that an express order of confirmation is necessary. The proviso to Rule 7(3) is inthe
negative form that the completion of the maximum period of three years would not confer a
right of confirmation till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. The period of probation is
therefore extended by implication until the proceedings commenced against a probationer like
the appellant are concluded to enable the Government to decide whether a probationer should
be confirmed or his services should be terminated. No confirmation by implication canarise in
the present case in the facts and circumstances as also by the meaning and operationof Rules
7(1) and 7(3) as aforesaid.
73. It is necessary at this stage to refer to the second proviso to Rule 7(3) which came into
existence on November 19, 1970. That proviso of course does not apply to the facts of the
present case. That proviso states that if the report of the High Court regarding the unsatisfactory
work or conduct of the probationer is made to the Governor before the expiryof the maximum
period of probation, further proceedings in the matter may be taken and orders passed by the
Governor of Punjab dispensing with his services or reverting him to his substantive post even
after the expiry of the maximum period of probation. The second proviso makes explicit which
is implicit in Rule 7(1) and Rule 7(3) that the period ofprobation gets extended till the
proceedings commenced by the notice come to an end either by confirmation or discharge of
the probationer.
74. In the present case, no confirmation by implication can arise by reason of the notice to
show cause given on October 4, 1968 the enquiry by the Director of Vigilance to enquire into
allegations and the operation of Rule 7 of the Service Rules that the probation shall be extended
impliedly if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed before the expiry of the period of probation.
Inasmuch as Ishwar Chand Agarwal was not confirmed at the end of the period of probation
confirmation by implication is nullified.
75. The second contention on behalf of Ishwar Chand Agarwal was that the termination is
by way of punishment. It was said to be an order removing the appellant from service on the
basis of charges of gross misconduct by ex-parte enquiry conducted by the Vigilance
Department. The enquiry was said to be in breach of Article 311 as also in violation of rules
of natural justice. The appellant relied on Rule 9 to show that he was not only entitled to
know the grounds but also to an opportunity to represent as a condition precedent to any such
termination. The appellant put in the forefront that the termination of his services was based on
the findings of the Vigilance Department which went into 15 allegations of misconduct
contained in about 8 complaints and these were never communicated to him.
- The High Court under Article 235 is vested with the control of subordinate judiciary.
The High Court according to the appellant failed to act in terms of the provisions of the
Constitution and abdicated the control by not having an inquiry through Judicial Officers
subordinate to the control of the High Court but asking the Government to enquire through the
Vigilance Department.
78. The High Court for reasons which are not stated requested the Government to depute
the Director of Vigilance to hold an enquiry. It is indeed strange that the High Court which
had control over the subordinate judiciary asked the Government to hold an enquiry through
the Vigilance Department. The members of the subordinate judiciary are not only under the
control of the High Court but are also under the care and custody of the High Court. The High
Court failed to discharge the duty of preserving its control. The request by the High Court to
have the enquiry through the Director of Vigilance was an act of self abnegation. The contention
of the State that the High Court wanted the Government to be satisfied makes matters worse.
The Governor will act on the recommendation of the High Court. That is the broad basis of
Article 235. The High Court should have conducted the enquiry preferably through District
Judges. The members of the subordinate judiciary look up to the High Court not only for
discipline but also for dignity. The High Court acted in total disregard of Article 235 by asking
the Government to enquire through the Director of Vigilance.
79. The Enquiry Officer nominated by the Director of Vigilance recorded the statements of
the witnesses behind the back of the appellant. The enquiry was to ascertain the truth of
allegations of misconduct. Neither the report nor the statements recorded by the Enquiry Officer
reached the appellant. The Enquiry Officer gave his findings on allegations of misconduct. The
High Court accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and wrote to the Government on June
25, 1969 that in the light of the report the appellant was not a suitable person to be retained in
service. The order of termination was because of the recommendations in the report.
80. The order of termination of the services of Ishwar Chand Agarwal is clearly by way of
punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court not only denied Ishwar
Chand Agarwal the protection under Article 311 but also denied itself the dignified control over
the subordinate judiciary. The form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by
way of punishment. Even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the facts
and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave
character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of
Article 311. In such a case the simplicity of the form of the order will not give any sanctity.
That is exactly what has happened in the case of Ishwar Chand Agarwal. The order of
termination is illegal and must be set aside.
81. The appellant Samsher Singh was appointed on May 1, 1964 as Subordinate Judge.
He was on probation. On March 22, 1967 the Chief Secretary issued a notice to him
substantially repeating the same charges which had been communicated by the Registrar on
December 15, 1966 and asked the appellant to show cause as to why his services should not
be terminated as he was found unsuitable for the job. The appellant gave an answer. On April
29, 1967 the services of the appellant were terminated.
- The appellant Samsher Singh in the context of the Rules of Business contended that the
removal of a Subordinate Judge from service is a personal power of the Governor and is
incapable of being delegated or dealt with under the Rules of Business. We have already held
that the Governor can allocate the business of the Government to the Ministers and such
allocation is no delegation and it is an exercise of executive power by the Governor through the
Council or officers under the Rules of Business. The contention of the appellant that the order
was passed by the Chief Minister without the formal approval of the Governor is, therefore,
untenable. The order is the order of the Governor. - The appellant was asked to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated.
There were four grounds. One was that the appellant’s behaviour towards the Bar and the
litigant public was highly objectionable, derogatory, non-cooperative and unbecomingof a
judicial officer. The second was that the appellant would leave his office early. The third was
the complaint of Om Prakash, Agriculture Inspector that the appellant abused his positionby
proclaiming that he would get Om Prakash involved in a case if he did not co-operate with
Mangal Singh, a friend of the appellant and Block Development Officer, Sultanpur. The fourth
was the complaint of Prem Sagar that the appellant did not give full opportunity toPrem Sagar
to lead evidence. Prem Sagar also complained that the decree-holder made an application for
execution of the decree against Prem Sagar and the appellant without obtaining office report
incorporated some additions in the original judgment and warrant of possession. - The appellant showed cause. The appellant said that he was not provided with an
opportunity to work under the same superior officer for at least six months so that independent
opinion could be formed about his knowledge, work and conduct. On April 29, 1967 the
appellant received a letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government addressedto the
Registrar, Punjab and Haryana High Court that the services of the appellant had been
terminated. - It appears that a mountain has been made out of a mole hill. The allegation against the
appellant is that he helped the opponent of Prem Sagar. The case against Prem Sagar was heard
on April 17, 1965. Judgment was pronounced the same day. The application forexecution of
the decree was entertained on the same day by the appellant. In the warrant the appellant wrote
with his own hands the words “Trees, well, crops and other rights attached to the land”. This
correction was made by the appellant in order that the warrant might be in conformity with the
plaint and the decree. There is nothing wrong in correcting the warrant to make it consistent
with the decree. It appears that with regard to the complaint of leaving office early and the
complaint of Om Prakash, Agriculture Inspector the appellant was in fact punished and a
punishment of warning was inflicted on him. - The appellant claimed protection of Rule 9. Rule 9 makes it incumbent on theauthority
that the services of a probationer can be terminated on specific fault or on account of
unsatisfactory record implying unsuitability. In the facts and circumstances of this case it is
clear that the order of termination of the appellant Samsher Singh was one of punishment. The
authorities were to find out the suitability of the appellant. They however concerned themselves
with matters which were really trifle. The appellant rightly corrected the recordsin the case of
Prem Sagar. The appellant did so with his own hand. The order of termination isin infraction of
Rule 9. The order of termination is therefore set aside.
- The appellant Samsher Singh is now employed in the Ministry of Law. No useful
purpose will be served by asking for reconsideration as to the suitability of the appellant
Samsher Singh for confirmation. - For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President as well as the Governor acts on the
aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in executive action and is not required by the
Constitution to act personally without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers or
against the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Where the Governor has any discretion
the Governor acts on his own judgment. The Governor exercises his discretion in harmony with
his Council of Ministers. The appointment as well as removal of the members of the
Subordinate Judicial Service is an executive action of the Governor to be exercised on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Appointments and removals of persons are made by the President and the Governor as the
constitutional head of the Executive on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. That is
why any action by any servant of the Union or the State in regard to appointment or dismissal
is brought against the Union or the State and not against the President or the Governor. - The orders of termination of the services of the appellants are set aside. The appellant
Ishwar Chand Agarwal is declared to be a member of the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial
Branch). The appellant Samsher Singh succeeds in so far as the order of termination is set aside.
In view of the fact that Samsher Singh is already employed in the Ministry of Law no relief
excepting salary or other monetary benefits which accrued to him upto the time he obtained
employment in the Ministry of Law is given.
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