M.Y. Eqbal, J.: This appeal by special leave is directed against order dated 21.9.2006 passed by
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, who allowed the appeal preferred by
Defendant no.1 and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court in the original suit
preferred by the appellant.
2. The only question that needs consideration in this appeal is as to whether the High Court is
correct in law in interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for
short ‘the Act’) in arriving at a conclusion that the widow of the deceased P. Venkata Subba Rao
acquired an absolute interest in the property by the operation of Section 14 of the Act.
3. The undisputed facts are that the said suit property originally belonged to one P. Venkata
Subba Rao, who had three wives. Only the second wife was blessed with two sons and one
daughter, including defendant-Narasimha Rao. Veeraraghavamma was the third wife of the said
P. Venkata Subba Rao but she did not have any issues. P. Venkata Subba Rao executed a Will in
the year 1920(Exh.A2) in favour of his 3rd wife Veeraghavamma who in turn executed a Will
dated 14.7.1971 (Exh.B1) in favour of defendant-PentapatiSubba Rao, and thereafter, she died in
1976. The case of the defendant is that the said P. Narasimha Rao has no right to transfer the suit
properties in favour of the plaintiff.
4. The plaintiff’s-appellant’s case is that he purchased the suit property from one P. Narasimha
Roa who was having a vested remainder in respect of the said suit property on the
expiry of life estate of testator’s wife Veeraghavamma. According to the plaintiff-appellant,
during the life time of Veeraghavamma she enjoyed the properties and after her death the
property devolved upon the vendors of the plaintiff.
5. The trial court noted the undisputed case of both the parties that Will (Exh.A2) was executed
by late P. Venkata Subba Rao in favour of Veeraghavamma but she had limitedinterest to enjoy
the property during her life time and thereafter the remainder vested with P. Narasimha Rao to
enjoy the said property as absolute owner after the death of Veeraghavamma. However, the trial
court held that life estate of Veeraghavamma under the Will did not become enlarged into
absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act and thevested remainder in favour of P. Narasimha
Rao did not get extinguished in respect of the scheduled properties.
Accordingly, the suit was decreed.
6. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court defendant no.1 – P. Subba Rao preferred an appeal
before the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree
of the trial court holding that Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner of the suit property by
virtue of Section 14(1) and she had every right to bequeath the said property in favour of P.
Subba Rao, the first defendant under Exhibits B1 and B2.
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7. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal
before the High Court, first defendant died and his legal representatives were brought on record
and are arrayed in the present appeal as respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent no. 4 is defendant
no.3, and Legal representatives of Respondent no.5, who was defendant no.4, were brought on
record after his death during pendency of this appeal. Rest respondents were brought on record as
legal representatives of second defendant, who died during pendency of the suit. Since respondent
no.4 has vacated the suit shop and delivered possession to the plaintiff on 6.7.2006, appellant has
moved before us an application for deletion of respondent no.4 from the array of parties. It is
ordered accordingly.
8. Before we decide the question involved in this appeal we would like to reproduce the contents
of the Will (Exh.A1) which is as under:-
“I,Pularvathi Venkata Subba Rao, S/o late PularvathyVenkamma Vysya, Business, R/o
Rajahmundhry, have executed the Will dt. 24.08.1920 with good consciousness and wisdom.
I am now approximately 53 years. Now I have less physical strength and consequently I may not
survive for longer period, hence I have proposed to give all my properties both movable and
immovable mentioned in the schedule below by way of this Will. My first wife died issueless. My
second wife got two sons by name Manikyaro and Narasimha Rao and a daughter by name
Nagarathnamma. My 2nd wife also died. Thereafter I married Veeraghavamma my third wife and
she is alive. She has not begotten any children. I have house property bearing Municipal
D.No.6/875, another house bearing D.No.6/876 and also 5 shop rooms abutting to them with
vacant house site covered by D.No.6/870 in Innespeta, Rajahmundry Village, Rajahmundry Sub
Registry, E.G. Dist.I have wet land of extent ac15.17 cents in Rustumbada village Naraspuram
Sub Registry, Naraspuram Taluk. The said landed property was in the name of my 2nd wife and
after her life time my two sons mentioned above got the same mutated it in their names. I have a
policy bearing No. 23232 in Oriental Life Insurance Company and I have to receive monies from
the said policy and also silver, gold, brass articles house hold utensils Beeruva, Furniture, iron
safe etc., I have made the following dispositions which are to take place after my life time.
My third wife Veeraghavamma shall enjoy for life the tiled house with site and compound wall
and with half right in the well covered by municipal D.No.6/875, Rajahmundry and after life time
of my wife my 2nd son Narasimha Rao shall have the property with absolute rights such as gift,
sale etc. My second son Narasimha Rao shall have absolute rights such as gift and sale in respect
of the tiled house bearing D/no.6/876 and the 5 shop rooms covered byD.No.6/870 and the sit
abutting the above two properties with Chavidi and one Big latrine out of the two and that my
wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for life the small latrine covered by D.No.6/870 and after her
life time my son Narasimha Rao shall have the property with absolute right.
The said Veeraraghavammais entitled to fetch water from the well situated in back yard of house
bearing D.No.6/870. My eldest so Maniyarao shall have absolute rights such as gift and sale etc.,
in respect of ac 15.17 cents of Zeroyiti wet land of Rustumbada Village Narasapuram Taluk and
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my eldest son Maniyarao shall pay Rs.650/- which I am liable to pay to her and thus either
Nagarathnamma or any one has got no right in the said property.
The amount receivable from the Insurance Company referred above shall be recovered and my
two sons, daughter and my wife, all the four shall share the same equally and that the ornaments
lying with them shall take the same absolutely and that one shall not claim or
demand for any oweties against another. (Emphasis given)
This Will I have executed with full and good consciousness and the same shall come into force
after my life time. The properties mentioned in this Will are all myself acquired properties and I
did not get any ancestral properties.
I reserve my right to change the contents of the Will during my life time.
Signed Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao Attesting Witnesses ModaliSubbarayudu Yendi Surayya
Scribed by Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao With his own handwriting The contents of the said will
shall come into force after my life time. Signed by Pularvati Venkata Subbarao”
9. The trial court although noticed the decision of this Court in the case of V. Tulasamma and
others vs. Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs. (AIR 1977 SC 1944) but held that in that case on the basis
of compromise the Hindu widow was allotted immoveable properties expressly in lieu of her
maintenance, and hence, Section 14(1) of the Act was readily applicable to that case.
Whereas, the trial court held that the decision of this Court in the case of MstKarmi vs.
Amru&Ors., (AIR 1971 SC 745), is applicable because in that case the Hindu widow succeeded
the properties of her husband on the strength of Will where under she was given life estate in the
properties. For better appreciation paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the trial court’s judgment are
quoted thus:-
10. On the basis of the ratio decided by this Court in the decision quoted hereinabove and also
other decisions of the High Court, the trial court held that the life estate of Veeraghavamma under
Exhibit A-2 will not become enlarge into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act and did not extinguish vested remainders interest of Narasimha Rao in the suit
property.
11. In appeal, the High Court, after discussing the ratio decided by this Court in the decisions
noted by the trial court and also other decisions of this Court, reversed the finding of the trial
court and held that the case falls under Section 14(1) of the Act and Veeraghavamma became the
absolute owner of the suit property and she had every right to bequeath the said property in
favour of the first defendant P. Subba Rao under Exhibits B-1 and B-2. The High Court held
that:-
12. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate appearing for the appellant, confined his
argument to the question of law as to whether the High Court erred in law in holding that
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Section 14(1) of the Act will be attracted and the widow Veeraghavamma have acquired absolute
interest in the properties. Learned counsel made the following submissions:-
“(i) Section 14(1) cannot be interpreted to mean that each and every Will granting a limited/life
interest in a property to a widow is deemed/assumed to be in lieu of her maintenance. If the
testator in his Will specifically provides that he is granting only life interest in the property to his
widow, his right to limit his widow’s right in the property is recognized by Section 14(2) of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Further, the testator’s right to dispose off his property by will or other testamentary disposition is
recognized by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Therefore, Section 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders Section 14(2) and
Section 30 of the same Act otiose.
(ii) In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru&Ors. (1972)4 SCC 86), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held to the
effect that a widow who succeeded to the property of her deceased husband on the strength of his
will cannot claim any rights in the property other than those conferred by the will.. “The life
estate given to her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate
under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act” (iii) In V. Tulsamma vs. Sesha Reddy (1977)
3 SCC 99, this Court clarified the difference between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14,
thereby restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life interest in a property to his wife.
Learned counsel referred para 62 of the judgment in Tulsamma case.
(iv) V. Tulsamma’scase involved a compromise decree arising out of decree for maintenance
obtained by the widow against her husband’s brother in a case of intestate succession. It did not
deal with situations of testamentary succession. Therefore, strictly on
facts, it may not be applicable to cases of testamentary succession. However, in terms of law
declared therein, a doubt may arise whether Section 14(1) may apply to every instance of a Will
granting a limited/life interest in a property to the widow on the ground that the widow has a preexisting right of maintenance. (v) This doubt was resolved by the Supreme Court
in Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8 SCC 75, where it was held at paras 13
and 14 that the right under section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be rendered
otiose by a wide interpretation of Section 14(1) and that these two provisions have to be balanced.
(vi) The above view has been subsequently affirmed by this Court. In Sharad Subramanayan
vs. Soumi Mazumdar &Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 91 (at para 20), this Court upheld the contention of
the learned counsel for the respondents therein that there was no proposition of law that all
dispositions of property made to a female Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her right to
maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu law or under the statutory law.
(vii) Learned counsel referred para 14 in the case of Shivdev Kaur vs. R.S. Grewal.
(viii) The position of law as recorded in Sadhu Singh’s case and followed subsequently,
therefore, appears to be that the question as to whether Section 14(1) applies to a Will granting
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life interest to a widow hinges on the finding by the Court that the grant was in lieu of
maintenance. This leads to the second arguments.”
13. Mr. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel. submitted the fact that the life interest in property
granted to the widow by way of a Will was actually in lieu of her maintenance needs to be
specifically pleaded, proved and decided by the Court based on examination of evidence and
material on record.
14. Further, referring paragraph nos. 17, 22 and 24 of the decision in G. Rama vs. TG Seshagiri
Rao, (2008) 12 SCC 392, learned counsel submitted that issues are required to be
framed and evidence has to be led to specifically show that the Will granted interest in property in
lieu of maintenance.
15. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband has got a personal obligation to
maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his wife is entitled to a right to be
maintained out of such properties. It is equally well settled that the claim of Hindu widow to be
maintained is not a mere formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession, grace or
gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right. From the judicial pronouncement, the right of a
widow to be maintained, although does not create a charge on the property of her husband but
certainly the widow can enforce her right by moving the Court and for passing a decree for
maintenance by creating a charge.
16. The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate, Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 was
enacted giving statutory recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be no doubt that the
right to maintenance is a pre-existing right.
17. In V. Tulsamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy, AIR 1977 SC 1944, three Judges Bench of this
Court has elaborately considered the right of a Hindu woman to maintenance which is a preexisting right. My Lord Justice Fazal Ali writing the judgment firstly observed:-
“Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the
Shastric Hindu law on the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidents
and characteristics of a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance:
(1) that a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is
concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has
property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property
and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the
widow;
(2) though the widow’s right to maintenance is not a right, to property but it is undoubtedly a
pre-existing right in property i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the
widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement
or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;
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(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the
joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow’s right to maintenance, the
purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance;
(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu
law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing
right;
(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the
husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of
her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and(6) that where a Hindu
widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in
lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is
in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance.”
18. Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, their Lordships
observed: – “In the light of the above decisions of this Court the following principles appear to be
clear: “(1) that the provisions of Section 14 of the 1956 Act must be liberally construed in order
to advance the object of the Act which is to enlarge the limited interest possessed by a Hindu
widow which was in consonance with the changing temper of the times;
(2) it is manifestly clear that sub-section (2) of Section 14 does not refer to any transfer which
merely recognises a pre-existing right without creating or conferring a new title on the widow.
This was clearly held by this Court in Badri Pershad case.
(3) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary and far-reaching changes in the Hindu
society and every attempt should be made to carry out the spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly
supplied a long felt need and tried to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu
male and female in matters of intestate succession;
(4) that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is merely a proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and has
to be interpreted as a proviso and not in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main
provision.” 19. Lastly, His Lordship after elaborate consideration of the law and different
authorities came to the following conclusions:- “We would now like to summarise the
legalconclusions which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities
mentioned above on the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of Sections
14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated thus: “(1) The Hindu female’s
right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of
grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric
Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlierHindu jurists starting from
Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property
and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has
property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the
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maintenance of a female, the said right becomes alegally enforceable one. At any rate, even
without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer
declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or
confirms the pre-existing rights.
(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and
must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act
and promote the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation. (3)
Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without
interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in
a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section
14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. (4) Sub-section (2)
of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and
new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument
concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such
cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not
operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a preexisting right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled,
the sub-section has absolutely no application and the female’s limited interest would
automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions
placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored.
Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at
partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by
Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (5) The use of
express terms like ‘property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition’, ‘or in lieu of
maintenance’, ‘or arrears of maintenance’, etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes
sub-section
(2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of
sub-section (2). (6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the Legislature in Section 14(1) are of the
widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the
owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the
property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but
had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be
possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It
is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of
a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank
trespasser without any right or title. (7) That the words ‘restricted estate’ used in Section 14(2)
are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only limited
interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”
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20. Mr. Vishwanathan put heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Mst. Karmi
vs. Amru(1972 Vol. 4 SCC 86). In our considered opinion, the ratio decided in that
case will not apply in the facts of the present case. In Mst. Karmi case (Supra), one Jaimal, who
was the owner of the property, had executed a Will directing that on his death, his
entire estate would devolve upon his widow Nihali during her life and thereafter, the same would
devolve upon his collaterals on the death of Jaimal. The properties were mutated in the name of
Nihali who eventually died in 1960. On her death, the collaterals claimed the properties on the
basis of Will, but the appellant claimed the properties as their sole legatee from Nihali under her
Will of 1958. On these facts, it was held that Nihali having succeeded to the properties of Jaimal
on the strength of Will cannot claim any right in those properties over and above that was given
to her under the Will. The Court observed that the life estate given to her under the Will cannot
become an absolute estate under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
21. The facts in Karmi’scase (supra) and that of the present case are fully distinguishable. In the
instant case, the Will was executed in 1920 in which Subba Rao has mentioned that
his first wife died, the second wife got two sons and one daughter. Thereafter, second wife also
died. He, then, married to Veeraraghavamma as a third wife, who is alive. The executant of the
Will have also mentioned the description of the properties owned by him. He, very specifically
mentioned in the Will that his third wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy forlife one tiled house
situated in the compound wall. For that enjoyment, it was also mentioned in the Will that the
widow Veeraraghavamma shall also be entitled to fetch water fromthe well situated in the
backyard of a different house. In other words, the executant of the Will made arrangements for
his third wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit scheduleproperty till her life. The intention of
the executant is therefore clear that he gave the suit schedule property to his third wife
Veeraraghavamma in order to hold and enjoy the suit property for her maintenance during her
lifetime. It is not a case like Karmi case that by executing a Will, the executants directed that his
entire estate will devolve upon his widowVeeraraghavamma.
22. A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of R.B. S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S.
Rajkumar & Others, AIR 1962 SC 1493, while interpreting the provisions of Section 14(1) of the
Act observed:-
“16. By Section 14(1) the legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which under
the Sastric Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest into an absolute interest and
by the Explanation thereto gave to the expression “property” the widest connotation. The
expression includes property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance ordevise, or at a
partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether
a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or
by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. By Section 14(1) manifestly it is intended to
convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property however restricted the nature of that
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interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate. Pratapmull case undoubtedly
laid down that till actual division of the share declared in her favour by a preliminary decree for
partition of the joint family estate a Hindu wife or mother, was not recognised as owner, but that
rule cannot in our judgment applyafter the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act is a
codifying enactment, and has made far reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of
inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance, and
sweeps away the traditional limitations on her powers of dispositions which were regarded under
the Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She is under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent
in respect of property possessed by her at the time of her death. It is true that under the Sastric
Hindu law, the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was
in lieu other right to maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition. But the Legislature by
enacting the Hindu Womens’ Right to Property Act, 1937 made a significantdeparture in that
branch of the law; the Act gave a Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her
husband had at the time of his death, and if the estate was partitioned she became owner in
severalty of her share, subject of course to the restrictions on disposition and the peculiar rule of
extinction of the estate on death actual or civil. It cannot be assumedhaving regard to this
development that in enacting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the legislature merely
intended to declare the rule enunciated by the Privy Council in PratapmuIl case. Section 4 of the
Act gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act.”
23. Reference may also be made to a three Judges Bench decision of this Court in the case of
Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628. In that case, by a registered document of
partition, the related right was given to the widow – the user of the land with the condition that
she will have no right to alienate in any manner. This Court holding that the case falls under
Section 14(1) of the Act held as under:-
“6. If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her husband’s properties then the suit properties must
be held to have been allotted to her in accordance with law. As the law then stood she had only a
life interest in the properties taken by her. Therefore the recital in the deed in question that she
would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share ismerely recording the true
legal position. Hence it is not possible to conclude that the properties in question were given to
her subject to the condition of her enjoying it for a life time. Therefore the trial court as well as
the first appellate court were right in holding that the facts of the case do not fall within Section
14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. ConsequentlySubhrai Bai must be held to have had an
absolute right in the suit properties, in view of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.”
24. In the case of Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC 312, life estate
was granted to a Hindu women by a Will as a limited owner and the grant was in recognition of
pre-existing right. Following the ratio decided in Tulasamma’scase, their Lordships held that the
decision in Mst. Karmicannot be considered as an authority on theambit of Section 14(1) and (2)
of the Act. The Court held:- “9. It was clearly held in the above case that Section 14(2) of the Act
is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Section 14(1) and comes into operation only if
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acquisition in any of the methods indicatedtherein is made for the first time without there being
any pre-existing right in the female Hindu to the property. The Bench consisted of Hon. J.C.
Shah, V. Ramaswamy and A.N. Grover, JJ.
10. The case of MstKarmiv. Amruon which a reliance has now been placed by learned counsel for
the appellant and petitioners was also decided by a bench of three Judges Hon. J.C. Shah, K.S.
Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ. It may be noted that two Hon’ble Judges, namely, J.C. Shah and A.N.
Grover were common to both the cases. In MstKarmiv. Amru, one Jaimal died in 1938 leaving his
wife Nihali. His son Ditta pre-deceased him. Appellant in the above case was the daughter of
Ditta and the respondents were collaterals of Jaimal. Jaimal first executed a will dated December
18, 1935 and by a subsequent will dated November 13, 1937 revoked the first will. By the second
will a life estate was given to Nihali and thereafter the property was made to devolve on Bhagtu
and Amru collaterals. On the death of Jaimal in 1938, properties were mutated in the name of
Nihali. Nihali died in 1960/61.
The appellant MstKarmi claimed right on the basis of a will dated April 25, 1958 executed by
Nihali in her favour. It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her
husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act.
Thereafter, the appellant cannot claim title to the properties on the basis of the will executedby
the widow Nihali in her favour. It is a short judgment without adverting to any provisions of
Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither makes any mention of any argument
raised in this regard nor there is any mention of the earlier decision in Badri Pershadv. SmtKanso
Devi. The decision in MstKarmicannot be considered as an authority on the ambit and scope of
Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act.”
25. Reference may also be made to the decision of three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of
Shakuntala Devi vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 390, where a Hindu wife was bequeathed
life interest for maintenance by Will with the condition that she would not have power to alienate
the same in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife, the property was to revert back
to his daughter as an absolute owner. On this fact their Lordships following the ratio decided in
Tulasamma’scase (supra) held that by virtue of Section 14(1) a limited right given to the wife
under the Will got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property.
26. Mr. K.Ramamurty, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, also relied upon the
decision in the case of Santosh and Others vs. Saraswathibai and Another, (2008) 1 SCC 465,
Subhan Rao and Others vs. Parvathi Bai and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 235 and Sri Ramakrishna
Mutt vs. M. Maheswaran and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 68.
27. In Santosh’s case (supra), this Court followed the decision given in Nazar Singh’s case,
(1996) 1 SCC 35, and held that the pre-existing right of wife was crystallized and her limited
interest became an absolute interest in the property possessed by her in lieu of maintenance.
28. A similar question arose for consideration before this Court in Subhan Rao case (supra),
where a portion of suit property was given to the plaintiff-wife for her maintenance subject to
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restriction that she will not alienate the land which was given to her maintenance. The question
arose as to whether by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act she became the owner of the suit
property. Considering all the earlier decisions of this Court, their Lordships held that by virtue of
Section 14(1) of the Act, the pre-existing right in lieu of her right to maintenance transformed
into absolute estate.
29. In the case of Nazar Singh and Others vs. Jagjit Kaur and Others, (1996) 1 SCC 35, this
Court following the decision in Tulasamma’scase held as under:-
“9. Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1) and (2) has been the
subject-matter of a number of decisions of this Court, the most important of which is the decision
in V. Tulasammav. Sesha Reddy. The principles enunciated in this decision have been reiterated
in a number of decisions later but have never been departed from. According to this decision, subsection (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as
a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the
terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It has also been held that where the
property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of right of maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a
pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section
(2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her prescribes a
restricted estate in the property. Applying this principle, it must be held that the suit lands, which
were given to Harmel Kaur by Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were held by Harmel
Kaur as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive
covenants accompany-ing the grant. [Also see the recent decision of this Court in Mangat Mal v.
Punni Devi where a right to residence in a house property was held to attract sub-section (1) of
Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly conferred only a limited estate upon
her.] According to sub-section (1), where any property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of her
maintenance before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such property becomes the
absolute property of such female Hindu on the commencement of the Act provided thesaid
property was ‘possessed’ by her. Where, however, the property is given to a female Hindu
towards her maintenance after the commencement of the Act, shebecomes the absolute owner
thereof the moment she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is
already in possession) notwithstanding the limitations and restrictions contained in
theinstrument, grant or award whereunder the property is given to her. This proposition follows
from the words in sub-section (1), which insofar as is relevant read: “Any property possessed by a
female Hindu … after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as fullowner and not as
a limited owner.” In other words, though the instrument, grant, award or deed creates a limited
estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate
provided such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is placed in her
possession. So far as the expression ‘possessed’ is concerned, it too has been the subject-matter of
interpretation by several decisions of this Court to which it is not necessary to refer for the
purpose of this case.”
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30. In Sadhu Singh’s case, (2006) 8 SCC 75, the facts of thecase were quite different to that of
the present case. In Sadhu Singh’s case, this Court proceeded on the basis that the widow had no
pre-existing right in the property, and therefore, the life estate given to her in the Will cannot get
enlarged into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act.
31. Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellant’s last contention was that in the
absence of any pleading and proof from the side of the appellant to substantiate the plea that
Veeraraghavamma was occupying the property in lieu of maintenance, Section 14 will not be
automatically attracted. We do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned
counsel. Indisputably, Exhibit A-2 is a document which very categorically providedthat the
property in question was given to Veeraraghavamma to enjoy the same till her life. Neither the
genuineness of the said Exhibit A-2 was disputed nor it was disputed that Veeraraghavamma was
enjoying the property by way of maintenance. In our considered opinion, unless the factum of
bequeathing the property in favour of the wife and her continuous possession are disputed, the
question of pleading and proof does not arise. In other words, no one disputed the arrangement
made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said property in lieu of
maintenance.
Hence, the ratio decided in G. Rama’s case (supra) does not apply.
32. Further, indisputably, Mr. P. Venkata Subba Rao, the original owner of the property, realized
the fact that his wife Veeraraghavamma was issueless and she has a pre-existing
right to be maintained out of his property. He further realized that physically he was weak and
may not survive for long period. He therefore, decided to give his properties to his family
members. For the maintenance of his third wife Veeraraghavamma, he gave the tiled house with
site and compound wall with the stipulation that she shall enjoy the property for life in lieu of
maintenance. She will also be entitled to fetch water from the well and use other facilities.
Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma continued
to enjoy the said property. In view of the admitted position, we have no doubt to hold that by
virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, her limited right became absolute right to the suit property.
33. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has elaborately discussed the facts of the case and
the law applicable thereto and came to the conclusion that the trial court committed serious error
of law in holding that by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Act, her limited right has not become
absolute.
34. Though no specific word has been mentioned in Exhibit A-2 that in lieu of maintenance life
interest has been created in favour of Veeraraghavamma, in our opinion in whatever form a
limited interest is created in her favour who was having a pre-existing right of maintenance, the
same has become an absolute right by the operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
Act.
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35. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter and the judicial pronouncements of this
Court in a series of decisions, we hold that the impugned judgment of the High Court is perfectly
in accordance with law and needs no interference by this Court.
36. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal has no merit and dismissed. However, there shall be no
order as to costs.
