Case Summary
| Citation | Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar(1966) 1 SCR 134 : AIR 1966 SC 119 |
| Keywords | Evidence Act sec. 27,24,25,26. Confession given to police, discovery of facts. |
| Facts | There was a quarrel between the accused (Aghnoo) and his aunt, Ratni, related to property which she gave to her daughter and son-in-law. The accused claimed that the property belongs to him, so he planned the murder of these 4 people (aunt, her daughter and son-in-law, their son). Then the accused surrendered himself to the police officer and filed an FIR in which he stated that he murdered them, where he hid the dead bodies, and which weapon was used to kill them (tangi). The trial court convicted him under Section 302 of IPC, but the High Court upheld the conviction because the confession made to the police officer under Section 25 of IEA is not provable, yet the evidence obtained from it. This case is now appealed before the SC on special leave. |
| Issues | Whether the entire portion of confession to police officer is admissible u/s 25 IEA. Whether confession be treated as exception u/s 27 IEA |
| Contentions | |
| Law Points | SC claimed that under section 25 of the law, no confession made to a police officer is admissible as evidence against the accused; instead, it should be made before a magistrate. It was stated that when a confession is deemed inadmissible, the entire portion of it should be considered void. The Supreme Court held that the discovery of facts (such as dead bodies and weapons) mentioned in an FIR alone is not sufficient to prove guilt. In the absence of other independent evidence to prove the accused guilty and with no direct eyewitnesses, only the prosecution witness who claimed to have seen the accused coming out of the forest was present. Section 27 is an exception to Sections 24, 25, and 26. The entirety of a confession should be viewed as a whole, not in parts. |
| Judgement | Ahnoo was acquitted because there was no independent evidence showing he was guilty. The confession was the only proof of guilt, but Section 25 states that a confession made to the police is not admissible as evidence against the accused. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
BACHAWAT, J. – The appellant was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
for murdering his aunt, Ratni, her daughter, Chamin, her son-in-law, Somra and Dilu, son of
Somra. He was convicted and sentenced to death by the Judicial Commissioner of
Chotanagpur. The High Court of Patna accepted the death reference, confirmed the conviction
and sentence and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. The appellant now appeals
to this Court by special leave.
2. The prosecution case is that on August 11, 1963 between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. the
appellant murdered Somra in a forest known as Dungijharan Hills and later Chamin in Kesari
Garha field and then Ratni and Dilu in the house of Ratni at Village Jamtoli.
3. The first information of the offences was lodged by the appellant himself at Police
Station Palkot on August 11, 1963 at 3.15 p.m. The information was reduced to writing by the
officer-in-charge, Sub-Inspector H.P. Choudhury, and the appellant affixed his left thumbimpression on the report. The Sub-Inspector immediately took cognisance of the offence, and
arrested the appellant. The next day, the Sub-Inspector in the company of the appellant went
to the house of Ratni, where the appellant pointed out the dead bodies of Ratni and Dilu and
also a place in the orchard of Ratni covered with bushes and grass, where he had concealed a
tangi. The appellant then took the Sub-Inspector and witnesses to Kasiari garha khet and
pointed out the dead body of Chamin lying in a ditch covered with Ghunghu. The appellant
then took the Sub-Inspector and the witnesses to Dungijharan Hills, where he pointed out the
dead body of Somra lying in the slope of the hills to the north. The Sub-Inspector also
recovered from the appellant’s house a chadar stained with human blood. The evidence of
PW 6 shows that the appellant had gone to the forest on the morning of August 11, 1963.
4. The medical evidence discloses incised wounds on all the dead bodies. The injuries
were caused by a sharp-cutting weapon such as a tangi. All the four persons were brutally
murdered.
5. There is no eyewitness to the murders. The principal evidence against the appellant
consists of the first information report, which contains a full confession of guilt by the
appellant. If this report is excluded, the other evidence on the record is insufficient to convict
the appellant. The principal question in the appeal is whether the statement or any portion of it
is admissible in evidence.
6. The first information report reads as follows:
“My name is Aghnu Nagesia. (1) My father’s name is Lodhi Nagesia. I am a
resident of Lotwa, Tola Jamtoli, Thana Palkot, District Ranchi. Today, Sunday, date
not known, at about 3 p.m. I having come to the P.S. make statement before you the
S.I. of Police (2) that on account of my Barima (aunt) Mussammat having given
away her property to her daughter and son-in-law quarrels and troubles have been
occurring among us. My Barima has no son and she is a widow. Hence on her death
we shall be owners of her lands and properties and daughter and son-in-law of
Barima shall have no right to them. She lives separate from us, and lives in her house
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with her daughter and son-in-law and I live with my brother separately in my house.
Our lands are separate from the time of our father. (3) Today in the morning at about
7-8 a.m. I had gone with a tangi to Duni Jharan Pahar to cut shrubs for fencing. I
found Somra sitting alone there who was grazing cattle there. (4) Seeing him I got
enraged and dealt him a tangi blow on the filli (calf) of right leg, whereby he toppled
down on the ground. Thereupon I dealt him several Chheo (blows) on the head and
the face, with the result that he became speechless and died. At that time there was
none near about on that Pahar. (5) Thereafter I came to the Kesari Garu field where
Somra’s wife Chamin was weeding out grass in the field. (6) I struck her also all of a
sudden on the head with the said tangi whereby she dropped down on the ground and
died then and there. (7) Thereafter I dragged her to an adjoining field and laid her in a
ditch to the north of it and covered her body with Gongu (Pala ke Chhata) so that
people might not see her. There was no person then at that place also. (8) Thereafter I
armed with that tangi went to the house of my Barima to kill her. When I reached
there, I found that she was sitting near the hearth which was burning. (9) Reaching
there all of a sudden I began to strike her on the head with tangi whereupon she
dropped down dead at that very place. (10) Near her was Somra’s son aged about 3-4
years. (11) I also struck him with the tangi. He also fell down and died. (12) I
finished the line of my Barima so that no one could take share in her properties. (13)
I hid the tangi in the jhari of my Barima’s house. (14) Later on I narrated the
occurrence to my chacha (father’s brother) Lerha that I killed the aforesaid four
persons with tangi. After sometime (15) I started for the P.S. to lodge information
and reaching the P.S. I make this statement before you. (16) My Barima had all along
been quarrelling like a Murukh (foolish woman) and being vexed, I did so. (17) All
the dead bodies and the tangi would be lying in those places. I can point them out.
(18) This is my statement. I got it read over to me and finding it correct, I affixed my
left thumb-impression.”
7. We have divided the statement into 18 parts. Parts 1, 15 and 18 show that the appellant
went to the police station to make the report. Parts 2 and 16 show his motive for the murders.
Parts 3, 5, 8 and 10 disclose the movements and opportunities of the appellant before the
murders. Part 8 also discloses his intention. Parts 4, 6, 9 and 11 disclose that the appellant
killed the four persons. Part 12 disclose the killing and the motive. Parts 7, 13 and 17 disclose
concealment of a dead body and a tangi and his ability to point out places where the dead
bodies and the tangi were lying. Part 14 discloses the previous confession by the appellant.
Broadly speaking, the High Court admitted in evidence parts 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17
and 18.
8. On behalf of the appellant, it is contended that the entire statement is a confession
made to a police officer and is not provable against the appellant, having regard to Section 25
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. On behalf of the respondent, it is contended that Section 25
protects only those portions of the statement which disclose the killings by the appellant and
the rest of the statement is not protected by Section 25.
9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions
made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in Sections 24 to
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30 of the Evidence Act and Sections 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading “Admissions”.
Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in Sections 24 to 30. A confession or
an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some
provision of law. Section 24 excludes confessions caused by certain inducements, threats and
promises. Section 25 provides: “No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as
against a person accused of an offence.” The terms of Section 25 are imperative. A confession
made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the
accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a
confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression “accused of any
offence” covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of
the offence when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a
confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate
presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by Section 26 relates to a confession made
to a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed
by Section 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso,
and partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 24, 25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is
deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of
any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any statement made
by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation for any purpose at any
enquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso
and in cases falling under sub-section (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it shall
be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of Section
162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an
investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be
recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the
safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, a confession by an accused to a police officer is absolutely protected under Section 25 of
the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an investigation, it is also protected by
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other person made by
him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by Section 26, unless it is made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed upon the view that
confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody
of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They
are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them.
10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the recording of the first
information. The information report as such is not substantive evidence. It may be used to
corroborate the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under
Section 145 of the Act, if the informant is called as a witness. If the first information is given
by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as
evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a nonconfessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under Section 21
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of the Evidence Act and is relevant. But a confessional first information report to a police
officer cannot be used against the accused in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.
11. The Indian Evidence Act does not define “confession”. For a long time, the courts in
India adopted the definition of “confession” given in Article 22 of Stephen’s Digest of the
Law of Evidence. According to that definition, a confession is an admission made at any time
by a person charged with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that
crime. This definition was discarded by the Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayanaswami v.
King-Emperor [(1939) LR 66 IA 66, 81]. Lord Atkin observed:
“(N)o statement that contains self exculpatory matter can amount to confession,
if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence
alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms the
offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An
admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is
not of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the accused is the owner of and was
in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no
explanation of any other man’s possession.”
These observations received the approval of this Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of
Punjab [(1953) SCR 94]. In State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [(1961) 1 SCR 14], Shah,
J. referred to a confession as a statement made by a person stating or suggesting the inference
that he has committed a crime.
12. Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an admission of the offence by a person
charged with the offence. A statement which contains self-exculpatory matter cannot amount
to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative the
offence alleged to be confessed. If an admission of an accused is to be used against him. the
whole of it should be tendered in evidence, and if part of the admission is exculpatory and
part inculpatory, the prosecution is not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part only.
The accused is entitled to insist that the entire admission including the exculpatory part must
be tendered in evidence. But this principle is of no assistance to the accused where no part of
his statement is self-exculpatory, and the prosecution intends to use the whole of the
statement against the accused.
13. Now, a confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual
commission of the crime but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the
provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon and the
subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession is tainted, the taint attaches to each part
of it. It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to admit it in evidence as a nonconfessional statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact which by
itself or along with other admitted or proved facts suggests the inference that the accused
committed the crime, and though each part taken singly may not amount to a confession, each
of them being part of a confessional statement partakes of the character of a confession. If a
statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission but also every other
admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of the confession.
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14. If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision of law such as Section 24,
Section 25 and Section 26 of the Evidence Act, the entire confessional statement in all its
parts including the admissions of minor incriminating facts must also be excluded, unless
proof of it is permitted by some other section such as Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Little
substance and content would be left in Sections 24, 25 and 26 if proof of admissions of
incriminating facts in a confessional statement is permitted.
15. Sometimes, a single sentence in a statement may not amount to a confession at all.
Take a case of a person charged under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and a
statement made by him to a police officer that “I was drunk; I was driving a car at a speed of
80 miles per hour; I could see A on the road at a distance of 80 yards; I did not blow the horn;
1 made no attempt to stop the car; the car knocked down A.” No single sentence in this
statement amounts to a confession, but the statement read as a whole amounts to a confession
of an offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, and it would not be permissible
to admit in evidence each sentence separately as a non-confessional statement. Again, take a
case where a single sentence in a statement amounts to an admission of an offence. ‘A’ states
“I struck ‘B’ with a tangi and hurt him.” In consequence of the injury ‘B’ died. ‘A’ committed
an offence and is chargeable under various sections of the Indian Penal Code. Unless he
brings his case within one of the recognised exceptions, his statement amounts to an
admission of an offence, but the other parts of the statement such as the motive, the
preparation, the absence of provocation, concealment of the weapon and the subsequent
conduct, all throw light upon the gravity of the offence and the intention and knowledge of
the accused, and negatives the right of private defence, accident and other possible defences.
Each and every admission of an incriminating fact contained in the confessional statement is
part of the confession.
16. If the confession is caused by an inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by
Section 24 of the Evidence Act, the whole of the confession is excluded by Section 24. Proof
of not only the admission of the offence but also the admission of every other incriminating
fact such as the motive, the preparation and the subsequent conduct is excluded by Section 24.
To hold that the proof of the admission of other incriminating facts is not barred by Section
24 is to rob the section of its practical utility and content. It may be suggested that the bar of
Section 24 does not apply to the other admissions, but though receivable in evidence, they are
of no weight, as they were caused by inducement, threat or promise. According to this
suggestion, the other admissions are relevant, but are of no value. But we think that on a plain
construction of Section 24, proof of all the admissions of incriminating facts contained in a
confessional statement is excluded by the section. Similarly, Sections 25 and 26 bar not only
proof of admissions of an offence by an accused to a police officer or made by him while in
the custody of a police officer but also admissions contained in the confessional statement of
all incriminating facts related to the offence.
17. A little reflection will show that the expression “confession” in Sections 24 to 30
refers to the confessional statement as a whole including not only the admissions of the
offence but also all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence. Section 27
partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 24, 25 and 26 in respect of so much of the
information whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact
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discovered in consequence of the information, if the other conditions of the section are
satisfied. Section 27 distinctly contemplates that an information leading to a discovery may be
a part of the confession of the accused and thus fall within the purview of Sections 24, 25 and
26. Section 27 thus shows that a confessional statement admitting the offence may contain
additional information as part of the confession. Again, Section 30 permits the Court to take
into consideration against a co-accused a confession of another accused affecting not only
himself but the other co-accused. Section 30 thus shows that matters affecting other persons
may form part of the confession.
18. If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts
to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25. The
confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of
incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of
the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of
Section 25 is lifted by Section 27.
19. Our attention is not drawn to any decision of this Court or of the Privy Council on the
question whether apart from Section 27, a confessional first information report given by an
accused is receivable in evidence against him. Decisions of the High Courts on this point are
hopelessly conflicting. They contain all shades of opinion ranging from total exclusion of the
confession to total inclusion of all admissions of incriminating facts except the actual
commission of the crime.
20. We think, therefore, that save and except Parts 1, 15 and 18 identifying the appellant
as the maker of the first information report and save and except the portions coming within
the purview of Section 27, the entire first information report must be excluded from evidence.
21. Section 27 applies only to information received from a person accused of an offence
in the custody of a police officer. Now, the Sub-Inspector stated he arrested the appellant after
he gave the first information report leading to the discovery. Prima facie therefore, the
appellant was not in the custody of a police officer when he gave the report, unless it can be
said that he was then in constructive custody. On the question whether a person directly
giving to police officer information which may be used as evidence against him may be
deemed to have submitted himself to the custody of the police officer within the meaning of
Section 27, there is conflict of opinion. For the purposes of the case, we shall assume that the
appellant was constructively in police custody and therefore the information contained in the
first information report leading to the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi is admissible
in evidence. The entire evidence against the appellant then consists of the fact that the
appellant gave information as to the place where the dead bodies were lying and as to the
place where he concealed the tangi, the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi in
consequence of the information, the discovery of a blood-stained chadar from the appellant’s
house and the fact that he had gone to Dungi Jharan Hills on the morning of August 11, 1963.
This evidence is not sufficient to convict the appellant of the offences under Section 302 of
the Indian Penal Code. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence
passed by the Courts below are set aside, and the appellant is directed to be set at liberty
forthwith.
