Case Summary
| Citation | R.S. Maddanappa v. Chandramma (1965) 3 SCR 283 |
| Keywords | sec 115 IEA , doctrine of estoppel |
| Facts | R.S. Maddanappa and Puttananjamma were married and having two daughters. Gowramma, the mother of Puttananjamma, having property which was disputed in this case. Gowramma had no other child except Puttananjamma. So, Puttananjamma was absolute owner of property. After her death her two daughters became owner of property. Although possession of property was in the hands of their father (R.S. Maddanappa). R.S. Maddanappa got another marriage. And he had kids too with his second wife. Initially second daughter from first wife was not interested in property. She had written some letters in favour of her father. Some notice was also issued against her, but she did not reply. But later, she claimed her share. Once she claimed her share, defendants demanded for application of doctrine of estoppel against her. High Court has given judgment in her favour. Matter has reached to Supreme Court through appeal. |
| Issues | Whether the first defendant was estopped by her conduct from claiming possession of her alleged half share of the properties? |
| Contentions | |
| Law Points | Supreme Court said that merely non-replying of suit and noncooperation with plaint are not sufficient for applying estoppel against respondent (Defendant -1- Chandramma). It does not mean that she impliedly admitted that she had no interest in the properties. Father knew the true legal position. That is to say, the father knew that these properties belonged to Puttananjamma, and that he had no authority to deal with these properties. There is nothing on the record to show that by reason of the conduct of the first defendant Maddanappa altered his position to his disadvantage. The object of estoppel is to prevent fraud and secure justice between the parties by promotion of honesty and good faith. Therefore, where one person makes a misrepresentation to the other about a fact he would not be shut out by the rule of estoppel, if that other person knows the true state of facts and must consequently not have been misled by the misrepresentation. The person claiming benefit of the doctrine must show that he has acted to his detriment on the faith of the representation made to him. In this case there was no detriment. Reason was that both parties aware about truth. Estoppel was not applied against Chandramma. The reason was that truth was known to both parties. |
| Judgement | Consequently, the first defendant is not estopped from claiming possession, and liability for improvement costs cannot be imposed. The SC upheld the decision given by the HC and dismissed the appeal with costs. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
MUDHOLKAR, J. – This is an appeal by Defendants 3 to 8 from a decision of the High
Court of Mysore passing a decree in favour of Respondent 1 who was Defendant 1 in the trial
court, for possession of half the property which was the subject-matter of the suit and also
allowing future mesne profits.
2. The relevant facts are briefly these: The plaintiff who is the elder sister of the first
defendant instituted a suit in the Court of the District Judge, Bangalore for a declaration that
she is the owner of half share in the properties described in the schedule to the plaint and for
partition and separate possession of half share and for mesne profits. According to her the suit
property was the absolute property of her mother Puttananjamma, and upon her death this
property devolved on her and the first defendant as her mother’s heirs. Since, according to
her, the first defendant did not want to join her as co-plaintiff in the suit, she was joined as a
defendant. It is common ground that the property was in the possession of the second
defendant R.S. Maddanappa, the father of the plaintiff and the first defendant and Gangavva,
the second wife of Maddanappa and her children Maddanappa died during the pendency of
the appeal before this Court and his legal representatives are the other defendants to the suit.
Briefly stated his defence, which is also the defence of the defendants other than Defendant 1
is that though the suit properties belonged to Gowramma, the mother of Puttananjamma, she
had settled them orally on the latter as well as on himself and that after the death of
Puttananjamma he has been in possession of those properties and enjoying them as full
owner. He further pleaded that it was the last wish of Puttananjamma that he should enjoy
these properties as absolute owner. The plaintiff and the first defendant had, according to him,
expressly and impliedly abandoned their right in these properties, that his possession over the
properties was adverse to them and as he was in adverse possession for over the statutory
period, the suit was barred. Finally he contended that he had spent more than Rs 46,000
towards improvement of the properties which was met partly from the income of his joint
ancestral property and partly from the assets of the third defendant. These improvements, he
alleged, were made by him bona fide in the belief that he had a right to the suit properties and
consequently he was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 51 of the Transfer of
Property Act.
3. The first defendant admitted the claim of the plaintiff and also claimed a decree against
the other defendants in respect of her half share in the suit properties. The other defendants,
however, resisted her claim and in addition to what the second defendant has alleged in his
written statement contended that she was estopped by her conduct from claiming any share in
the properties.
4. The trial court decreed the claim of the plaintiff but held that the first defendant was
estopped from claiming possession of her half share in the properties left by her mother. The
first defendant preferred an appeal before the High Court challenging the correctness of the
decision of the trial court. The other defendants also filed an appeal before the High Court
challenging the decision of the trial court in favour of the plaintiff. It would appear that the
plaintiff had also preferred some cross-objections. All the matters were heard together in the
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High Court, which dismissed the appeal preferred by Defendants 2 to 8 as well as the crossobjections lodged by the plaintiff but decreed the appeal preferred by the first defendant and
passed a decree in her favour for possession of her half share in the suit properties, and future
mesne profits against the remaining defendants. Defendants 2 to 8 applied for a certificate
from the High Court under Articles 133(1) (a) and 133(l) (c) in respect of the decree of the
High Court in the two appeals. The High Court granted the certificate to Defendants 2 to 8
insofar as Defendant 1 was concerned but refused certificate insofar as the plaintiff was
concerned. We are, therefore, concerned with a limited question and that is whether the High
Court was right in awarding a decree to the first defendant for possession of her half share and
mesne profits.
5. Mr Venkatarangaiengar, who appears for the appellants accepts the position that as the
certificate was refused to Defendants 2 to 8 insofar as the plaintiff is concerned, the only
points which they are entitled to urge are those which concern the first defendant alone and no
other. The points which the learned counsel formulated are as follows:
1. It is not open to a court to award future mesne profits to a party who did not claim
them in the suit;
2. No decree can be passed in favour of a defendant who has not asked for
transposition as plaintiff in the suit.
3. That the first defendant was estopped by her conduct from claiming possession of
her alleged half share of the properties.
6. We will consider the question of estoppel first. The conduct of the first defendant from
which the learned counsel wants us to draw the inference of estoppel consists of her attitude
when she was served with a notice by the plaintiff, her general attitude respecting Bangalore
properties as expressed in the letter dated 17th January, 1941, written by her to her stepmother
and the attestation by her and her husband on 3rd October, 1944, of the will executed on 25th
January, 1941 by Maddanappa. In the notice dated 26th January, 1948, by the plaintiff’s
lawyer to the first defendant it was stated that the plaintiff and the first defendant were joint
owners of the suit properties which were in the possession of their father and requested for the
cooperation of the first defendant in order to effect the division of the properties. A copy of
this notice was sent to Maddanappa and he sent a reply to it to the plaintiff’s lawyers. The
first defendant, however, sent no reply at all. We find it difficult to construe the conduct of the
first defendant in not replying to the notice and in not cooperating with the plaintiff in
instituting a suit for obtaining possession of the properties as justifying the inference of
estoppel. It does not mean that she impliedly admitted that she had no interest in the
properties, It is true that in Ex. 15, which is a letter sent by her on 17th January, 1941, to her
stepmother she has observed thus:
“I have no desire whatsoever in respect of the properties which are at Bangalore.
Everything belongs to my father. He has the sole authority to do anything…. We give
our consent to anything done by our father. We will not do anything.”
But even these statements cannot assist the appellants because admittedly the father knew
the true legal position. That is to say, the father knew that these properties belonged to
Puttananjamma and that he had no authority to deal with these properties. No doubt, in his
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written statement Maddanappa had set up a case that the properties belonged to him by virtue
of the declaration made by Puttananjamma at the time of her death, but that case has been
negatived by the courts below. The father’s possession must, therefore, be deemed to have
been, to his knowledge, on behalf of the plaintiff and the first defendant. There was thus no
possibility of an erroneous belief about his title being created in the mind of Maddanappa
because of what the first defendant had said in her letter to her stepmother.
7. Insofar as the attestation of the will is concerned, the appellants’ position is no better.
This “will” purports to make a disposition of the suit properties along with other properties by
Maddanappa in favour of Defendants 3 to 8. The attestation of the will by the first defendant
and her husband, would no doubt affix them with the knowledge of what Maddanappa was
doing, but it cannot operate as estoppel against them and in favour of Defendants 3 to 8 or
even in favour of Maddanappa. The will could take effect only upon the death of Maddanappa
and, therefore, no interest in the property had at all accrued to Defendants 3 to 8 even on the
date of the suit. So far as Maddanappa is concerned, he, as already stated, knew the true
position and therefore, could not say that an erroneous belief about his title to the properties
was created in his mind by reason of the conduct of the first defendant and her husband in
attesting the document. Apart from that there is nothing on the record to show that by reason
of the conduct of the first defendant Maddanappa altered his position to his disadvantage.
8. Mr Venkatarangaiengar, however, says that subsequent to the execution of the will he
had effected further improvements in the properties and for this purpose spent his own
moneys. According to him, he would not have done so in the absence of an assurance like the
one given by the first defendant and her husband to the effect that they had no objection to the
disposition of the suit properties by him in any way he chose to make it. The short answer to
this is that Maddanappa on his own allegations was not only in possession and enjoyment of
these properties ever since the death of Putananjamma but had made improvements in the
properties even before the execution of the will. In these circumstances, it is clear that the
provisions of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, which contain the law of estoppel by
representation do not help him.
9. Mr Venkatarangaiengar, however, wanted us to hold that the law of estoppel by
representation is not confined to the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, that apart
from the provisions of this section there is what is called “equitable estoppel” evolved by the
English Judges and that the present case would come within such “equitable estoppel”. In
some decisions of the High Courts reference has been made to “equitable estoppel” but we
doubt whether the court while determining whether the conduct of a particular party amounts
to an estoppel, could travel beyond the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act. As was
pointed out by Garth, C.J. in Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Saurjmull [ILR 5 Cal 669] the
provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act are in one sense a rule of evidence and are
founded upon the well known doctrine laid down in Pickard v. Sears [1832 A & E 469] in
which the rule was stated thus:
“Where one by his word of conduct wilfully causes another to believe for the
existence of a certain state of thing and induced him to act on that belief so as to alter
his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a
different state of things as existing at the first time.”
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The object of estoppel is to prevent fraud and secure justice between the parties by
promotion of honesty and good faith. Therefore, where one person makes a misrepresentation
to the other about a fact he would not be shut out by the rule of estoppel, if that other person
knew the true state of facts and must consequently not have been misled by the
misrepresentation.
10. The general principle of estoppel is stated thus by the Lord Chancellor in Cairneross
v. Lorimer [3 HLC 829]:
“The doctrine will apply, which is to be found, I believe, in the laws of all
civilized nations that if a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that he
consents to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it,
although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby
induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot
question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who
have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his
conduct…. I am of opinion that, generally speaking, if a party having an interest to
prevent an act being done has full notice of it being done, and acquiesces in it, so as
to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is
altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge the act
to their prejudice than he would have had if it had, been done by his previous
license.”
11. It may further be mentioned that in Carr v. London & N.W. Ry. Co. [LR 10 CP 307]
four propositions concerning an estoppel by conduct were laid down by Brett, J. the third of
which runs thus:
“If a man either in express terms or by conduct makes a representation to another
of the existence of a certain state of facts which he intends to be acted upon in a
certain way, and it be acted upon in the belief of the existence of such a state of facts,
to the damage of him who so believes and acts, the first is estopped from denying the
existence of such a state of facts.”
This also shows that the person claiming benefit of the doctrine must show that he has
acted to his detriment on the faith of the representation made to him.
12. This was quoted with approval in Sarad v. Gopal [19 IA 203]. It will thus be seen that
here also the person who sets up an estoppel against the other must show that: his position
was altered by reason of the representation or conduct of the latter and unless he does that
even the general principle of estoppel cannot be invoked by him. As already stated no
detriment resulted to any of the defendants as a result of what Defendant 1 had stated in her
letter to her stepmother or as a result of the attestation by her and her husband of the will of
Maddanappa.
14. Finally on this aspect of the case the learned counsel referred to the observations of
Lord Granworth in Ramsden v. Dyson [LR I HL App 129] which are as follows:
“If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own and I (the
real owner) perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him right, and leave aim to
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persevere in his error, a court of equity will not allow me afterwards to assert my title
to the land, on which he has expended money on the supposition, that the land was
his own. It considers that when I saw the mistake in which he had fallen, it was my
duty to be active and to state his adverse title; and that it would be dishonest in me to
remain wilfully passive on such an occasion in order afterwards to profit by the
mistake which I might have prevented.”
The doctrine of acquiescence cannot afford any help to the appellants for the simple
reason that Maddanappa who knew the true state of affairs could not say that any mistaken
belief was caused in his mind by reason of what the first defendant said or did. According to
the learned counsel, even if the first defendant’s claim to the half share in the suit property
cannot be denied to her she must at least be made to pay for the improvements effected by
Maddanappa, according to her proportionate share in the suit property. As already stated the
appellant was in enjoyment of these properties after his wife’s death and though fully aware
of the fact that they belonged to the daughters he dealt with them as he chose. When he spent
moneys on those properties he knew what he was doing and it is not open to him or to those
who claim under him to say that the real owners of the properties or either of them should be
made to pay for those improvements. No man who, knowing fully well that he has no title to
property spends money on improving it can be permitted to deprive the original owner of his
right to possession of the property except upon the payment for the improvements which were
not effected with the consent of that person. In our view, therefore, neither was Defendant 1
estopped from claiming possession of half share of the properties nor can she be made liable
to pay half the costs of improvements alleged to have been made by the second defendant.
15. Now regarding the second point, this objection is purely technical. The plaintiff sued
for partition of the suit properties upon the ground that they were inherited jointly by her and
by the first defendant and claimed possession of her share from the other defendants who
were wrongfully in possession of the properties. She also alleged that the first defendant did
not cooperate in the matter and so she had to institute the suit. The first defendant admitted
the plaintiffs title to half share in the properties and claimed a decree also in her own favour to
the extent of the remaining half share in the properties. She could also have prayed for her
transposition as a co-plaintiff and under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC the Court could have
transposed her as a co-plaintiff. The power under this provision is exercisable by the Court
even suo motu. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Bhupender v. Rajeshwar [581 A 228]
the power ought to be exercised by a court for doing complete justice between the parties.
Here both the plaintiff and the first defendant claim under the same title and though
Defendants 2 to 8 had urged special defences against the first defendant, they have been fully
considered and adjudicated upon by the High Court while allowing her appeal. Since the trial
court upheld the special defences urged by Defendants 3 to 8 and negatived the claim of the
first defendant it may have thought it unnecessary to order her transposition as plaintiff. But
the High Court could, while upholding her claim, well have done so. Apparently it either
over-looked the technical defect or felt that under Order 41 Rule 33 it had ample power to
decree her claim. However that, may be the provisions of Section 99 would be a bar to
interfere here with the High Court’s decree upon a ground such as this.
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16. The only other question for consideration is whether the High Court was justified in
awarding mesne profits to the first defendant even though she was not transposed as a
plaintiff. According to the learned counsel mesne profits cannot be awarded to a successful
party to a suit for possession unless a claim was made in respect of them. The learned counsel
is right insofar as mesne profits prior to the suit are concerned but insofar as mesne profits
subsequent to the date of the institution of the suit, that is, future mesne profits are concerned,
the position is governed by Order 20 Rule 12 CPC which is as follows:
“(1) Where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immovable property and for
rent or mesne profits, the court may pass a decree –
(a) for the possession of the property;
(b) for the rent or mesne profits which have accrued on the property during a
period prior to the institution of the suit or directing an inquiry as to such rent or
mesne profits;
(c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the
suit until:
(i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder,
(ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with
notice to the decree-holder through the court, or
(iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree,
whichever event first occurs.
(2) Where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or clause (c) a final decree in
respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of
such inquiry.”
17. The learned counsel, however, relied upon the decision of this Court in Mohd. Amin
v. Vakil Ahmed [1952 SCR 1133]. That was a suit for a declaration that a deed of settlement
was void and for possession of the property which was the subject-matter of the settlement
under that deed. The plaintiff’s had not claimed mesne profits, at all in their plaint but the
High Court had passed a decree in the plaintiffs favour not only for possession but also for
mesne profits. In the appeal before this Court against the decision of the High Court one of
the points taken was that in a case of this kind, the court has no power to award mesne profits.
While upholding this contention Bhagwati, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court has
observed thus:
“The learned Solicitor-General appearing for the plaintiffs conceded that there
was no demand for mesne profits as such but urged that the claim for mesne profits
would be included within the expression ‘awarding possession and occupation of the
property aforesaid together with all the rights appertaining thereto’. We are afraid
that the claim for mesne profits cannot be included within this expression and the
High-Court was in error in awarding to the plaintiffs mesne profits though they had
not been claimed in the plaint. The provision in regard to the mesne profits will
therefore have to be deleted from the decree.”
19. In the result therefore we uphold the decree of the High Court and dismiss the appeal
