Case Summary
| Citation | Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University AIR 1990 SC 1075 |
| Keywords | sec 115 IEA, estoppel, university, LL.B, admission, admit card |
| Facts | After passing his M.A. examination securing more than 40 percent marks (364 out of 900), the appellant secured admission in 1983 to three-years law course in Ganjam Law College. Along with his form seeking admission he had submitted the mark-sheet with his M.A. degree certificate. The appellant completed his first-year & second year course and admitted in 3rd year, but his results were not declared on the ground that in view of the Regulations of the University, he was not qualified to be admitted to the law course. His admission being improper, he was not eligible to sit at the examinations aforesaid. Qualification of admission in LL.B. Course, there were two conditions: I. He should have on the aggregate more than 39.5 per cent marks in Master’s Degree Examination. II. In each paper he must secure 25 percent marks. |
| Issues | Whether the appellant eligible to be admitted to Law Course? Whether the University estopped from declaring the admission of the appellant as void when initially the University itself admitted him and allowed him to take the semester exams? |
| Contentions | |
| Law Points | Supreme Court held that these two qualifications are applicable for under graduate course. A person who had passed Master Exam for those it is not applicable. Sanatan Gauda submitted his marks-sheet along with the application for admission. The Law College had admitted him. He had pursued his studies for two years. He was also admitted to the Final year of the course. It is only at the stage of the declaration of his results of the first year and second year examinations that the University raised the objection to his so-called ineligibility to be admitted to the Law course. The University is, therefore, clearly estopped from refusing to declare the results of the appellant’s examination or from preventing him from pursuing his final year course. |
| Judgement | The appeal, along these lines, succeeds. The respondent-University is coordinated to declare the said results just as the consequence of the Final examination if the appellant has shown up for the equivalent. The appeal is permitted as needs be. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
SAWANT, J.- This is an appeal by special leave against the order dated 30th July, 1987 of
the High Court of Orissa.
2. The appellant passed his M.A. examination in July 1981 securing in the aggregate 364
marks out of 900 marks, i.e., more than 40 per cent of the total marks. In 1983, he secured
admission in Ganjam Law College for three-year Law Course. There is no dispute that at the
time he took admission, he had submitted his marks-sheet along with his M.A.degree
certificate. The appellant completed his first year course known as the “Pre-Law Course” and
in 1984 was promoted to the second year course known as the “Intermediate Law Course”. In
1985, he appeared for the Pre-Law and Inter-Law examinations held by the Berhampur
University to which the Ganjam Law College is affiliated. He gave the said examination and
in the same year he was admitted to the Final Law course in the same College.
3. It appears that although he was admitted to the Final Law classes, his results for the
Pre-Law and Inter-Law examinations were not declared. The appellant made represen- tations
to the Bar Council 275 of India and the Administrator of the Berhampur University, on
February 12, 1986. On October 30, 1986, the University replied that since the appellant had
secured less than 39.5 per cent marks in his M.A. degree examination, he was not eligible for
admission to the Law Course. On November 11, 1986, the appellant made a representation
pointing out that he had secured more than 40 per cent marks in the said examination and,
therefore, he was entitled to be admitted to the Law course. On November 14, 1986, the
Chairman of the Board of Studies also wrote to the Deputy Registrar of the University
pointing out that the Board of Studies in its meeting held on October 29, 1986 had
recommended that those students who had passed their M.A. examination and had secured
more than 40 per cent of the total marks should be considered eligible for admission to the
Law course even though they had secured less than 20 per cent marks in any one of the papers
in the said examinations.
4. In spite of this, the University did not take any step to announce the appellant’s results.
Hence, the appellant approached the Orissa High Court by a writ petition on May 11, 1987
challenging the non-declaration of his results and the University’s refusal to permit the
appellant to appear in the Final Law examination. The writ petition was dismissed by the
High Court by the impugned order of July 30, 1987. Against the said decision the resent
appeal was filed. By an interim order of March 15, 1988, the appellant was permitted to
continue his Final Law course and to appear in the examination of the said course. It was also
directed that the results of the examinations in which the appellant had appeared should be
declared in due course.
5. On these facts, the question that falls for consideration is whether the appellant was
eligible to be admitted to the Law course. The University has objected to the appellant’s
admission on the ground that the University Regulation 1 in Chapter VIII relating to the
Bachelor of Laws Examination (Three-Year Course) read with Regulation 10 in Chapter V of
the University Regulations relating to the Master’s Degree Examination requires that if the
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student has secured less than 25 per cent marks in any of the papers for M.A. examination, he
should have on the aggregate more than 39.5 per cent marks in the said examination.
Admittedly, the appellant has obtained in the aggregate 364 marks out of 900 marks, i.e.,
more than 40 per cent marks, but in one paper in Group-II, he has secured only 13 marks out
of 100 which were less than 25 per cent. It is, therefore, the University’s contention that in
view of the said Regulations, he was not qualified to be admitted to the Law course and since
he was admitted wrongly, he 276 was not entitled to appear for the examination and, therefore, for the declaration of his results in the said examination.
6. Regulation 1 of Chapter VIII which lays down qualification for admission to the Law
course is as follows:
“1. Any registered candidate may be admitted to the degree of Bachelor of Laws,
if (a) he passes the examination for the degree of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of
Science, Bache- lor of Commerce, Bachelor of Oriental Learning, Bachelor of
Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery, Bachelor of Science (Engineering), Bachelor of
Science (Agriculture), Bachelor of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandary, B.
Pharma or any other examination recognised by the Bar Council of India and the
Academic Council as equivalent thereto securing 40% or more than 39.5% of marks
in the aggregate of such examination or any other higher degree examination passed
after graduation.
Provided that relaxation to the extent of 5% of marks in the qualifying
examination be allowed to the Sched- uled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates.
Provided further that in case of physically orthopaedically handicapped
candidates, relaxation upto 5% of marks in the qualifying examination may be given
on production of a certificate of disability from any Government Medical Officer to
the satisfaction of the authority concerned……”
The first paragraph of Regulation 1 on which reliance is placed by the University shows
that the requirement of 40 per cent or more than 39.5 per cent marks in the aggregate, is
meant only for graduates such as of Bachelors of Arts etc. That requirement does not apply to
those candidates who pass any higher degree examination after graduation. Therefore, on a
plain reading of the said paragraph, a postgraduate student like the appellant who has passed
his M.A.examination is not required to satisfy further that in the said post-graduate
examination he has secured 40 per cent or more than 39.5 per cent marks in the aggregate. It
is enough if he has passed his post-graduate examination.
7. What is further, Regulation 10 in Chapter V of the Regulations which prescribes marks
for passing M.A., M.Com.and M.Sc. examinations states that the minimum marks re- quired
for a student to pass the said examinations is 36 per cent in the aggregate of all the theory
papers taken together in case of M.A. and M.Com. examinations, and in the case of M.Sc.
examination, 36 per cent in the aggregate of all the theory papers taken together and 40
percent in the aggregate of all the practical papers taken together. I am not concerned here
with the marks of M.Sc. examination. The proviso to the said Regulation 10, further states
that no minimum pass marks shall be required in any paper. But if in any paper a candidate
obtains less than 25 per cent of marks, those marks shall not be included in the aggregate.
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In other words, in the case of the appellant, who has obtained 364 marks out of 900 on the
aggregate, his 13 marks in one of the papers being less than 25 per cent have to be excluded.
His aggregate marks, therefore, come to 35 1 out of 900 marks according to this Regulation.
They are admittedly more than 36 per cent as required by the said Regulation for passing the
M.A. examination. I may reproduce the said Regulation here:
10. The minimum marks that a candidate shall obtain to have passed shall be
thirty six per cent in the aggregate of all the theory papers taken together in the case
of M.A./ M.Com.and in the case of M.Sc. thirty six per cent in the aggregate of all
the theory papers taken together and forty per cent in the aggregate of all the practical
papers taken together.
Provided further that no minimum pass marks shall be required in any paper but
if in any paper a candidate obtains less than twenty five per cent of marks then these
shall not be included in the aggregate.
8. Even though, therefore, for admission to the Law course there is no requirement of any
particular marks for post-graduate students like the appellant, and the appellant is entitled to
be admitted under Regulation 1 in Chapter VIII of the said Regulations quoted earlier, the
appellant satisfies the other qualification as well, viz., he has passed the M.A. examination
with 36 per cent in the aggregate deducting 13 marks in one of the papers and is, there- fore,
duly qualified to be admitted to the Law course.
9. Mr. Misra appearing for the respondents, however, contended firstly that the qualifying
marks for admission as per Regulation 1 of Chapter VIII even for post-graduate students was
40 per cent or more than 39.5 per cent and since the appellant admittedly did not secure more
than 39.5 per cent marks after deducting from the aggregate 13 marks secured in one of the
papers, he was not eligible for being admitted to the Law course. I have pointed out herein
after that the plain reading of the said Regulation shows that the qualifying marks laid down
there do not apply to the post-graduates. They apply only to graduates. As far as the postgraduates are concerned, it is enough that they have passed their examination. Secondly, he
has also obtained the marks as required by the said Regulation 10 of Chapter V which is
applicable to the appellant, viz., 39 per cent when the minimum marks laid down by the said
Regulation is only 36 per cent. Mr. Misra then relied upon the prospectus of the Ganjam Law
College which had laid down as follows:
“1……………………
2……………………
3. Eligibility for admission.
(1) Pre-law class.
(a) An aggregate of 40 per cent and above, in the B .A., B.Sc, B.Com, or any
other university Degree of Higher University examination recognized by Berhampur
University.”
and contended that even if a candidate has a higher degree than B .A., B.Sc., B.Com., he has
to have an aggregate of 40 per cent minimum marks. As I read the said prospectus, I find that
it is on par with the qualification for admission given in University Regulation 1 in Chapter
VIII quoted above. The aggregate of 40 per cent and above marks is required only for
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graduates and there is no requirement of any percentage of marks prescribed for the postgraduates.
Resolution No. 123/1984 of the Bar Council of India passed on October 30, 1984 and
which is Annexure ‘K’ to the respondent-University’s counter affidavit also shows that for
admission to three-year Law course the qualification of minimum of 39.5 per cent marks is
meant only for graduates.
That Resolution does not speak of the requirement of marks for examination at postgraduate level. I am also of the view that this distinction between graduates and postgraduates made in the 279 matter of the qualifying marks is as it ought to be, since graduates
and post-graduates cannot be treated equally. A post-graduate student has a minimum of two
years more of academic pursuit to his credit than the graduate before he seeks admission to
the Law course. Obviously, therefore, they cannot be treated equally, and that is what the
University and the Bar Council of India have rightly done. It is the interpretation placed by
the University on its own Regulations and the Resolution of the Bar Council of India which is
at fault and not the Regulations or the Resolution.
10. This is apart from the fact that I find that in the present case the appellant while
securing his admission in the Law College had admittedly submitted his marks-sheet along
with the application for admission. The Law College had admitted him. He had pursued his
studies for two years.
The University had also granted him the admission card for the Pre-Law and Intermediate
Law examinations. He was permitted to appear in the said examinations. He was also
admitted to the Final year of the course. It is only at the stage of the declaration of his results
of the Pre-Law and Inter-Law examinations that the University raised the objection to his socalled ineligibility to be admitted to the Law course. The University is, therefore, clearly
estopped from refusing to declare the results of the appellant’s examination or from
preventing him from pursuing his final year course.
11. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the University is not justified in refusing to
declare the appellant’s results of the Pre-Law and Intermediate Law examinations. The appeal,
therefore, succeeds. The respondent-University is directed to declare the said results as well
as the result of the Final examination if the appellant has appeared for the same. The appeal is
allowed accordingly.
SHARMA, J. – I agree that the appeal should be allowed as indicated by my learned
Brother.
13. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent University having
issued the admit card and permitted the appellant to appear at parts I and II of Law
Examination, should not have later refused to publish his result. If there was any irregularity
in the admission of the appellant for the Law course, the University authorities ought to have
scrutinized the position before permitting 280 him to take the examination. It was pointed out
that in identical circumstances the same High Court had earlier in the same year allowed the
case of another candidate in O.J.C. No. 2619 of 1986 by a judgment, which also was by a
Division Bench.
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14. Mr. P.N. Misra, the learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the University
had informed the Colleges about the necessary condition for admission to the Law course
which, it appears, was not respected by the College. When the applications by the candidates
for sitting at the examination were forwarded by the College, the University asked the
Principal to send the marks of the candidates for the purpose of verification. but the Principal
did not comply. The letters Annexures ‘F’ and ‘G’ to the counter affidavit have been relied
upon for the purpose. The learned counsel pointed out that instead, the Principal sent a letter
Annexure ‘1’ stating that the marks-list would be sent in a few days for “your kind reference
and verification” which was never sent. The Principal wrongly assured the University
authorities that he had verified the position and that all the candidates were eligible. In these
circum- stances, the argument is that the appellant cannot take advantage of the fact that the
University allowed him to appear at the examination. I am afraid, the stand of the respondent
cannot be accepted as correct. From the letters of the University it is clear that it was not
depending upon the opinion of the Principal and had decided to verify the situation for itself.
In that situation it cannot punish the student for the negligence of the Principal or the
University authorities. It is important to appreciate that the appellant cannot be accused of
making any false statement or suppressing any relevant fact before anybody. He had produced
his marks-sheet before the College authority with his application for admission, and cannot be
accused of any fraud or misrepresentation. The interpretation of the rule on the basis of which
the University asserts that the appellant was not eligible for admission is challenged by the
appellant and is not accepted by the College and my learned Brother accepts the construction
suggested by him as correct. In such a situation even assuming the construction of the rule as
attempted by the University as correct, the Principal cannot be condemned for recommending
the candidature of the appellant for the examination in question. It was the bounden duty of
the University to have scrutinized the matter thoroughly before permitting the appellant to
appear at the examination and not having done so it cannot refuse to publish his results.
15. Before parting I would like to impress upon the University authorities to frame the
rules in such clear terms that it may not require great skill for understanding them. It is a
serious matter if a student who acts upon one interpretation of a rule and spends a
considerable period of his youth, is later threatened by a possible alternative construction,
which may cost him several years of his life. In order to achieve clarity, it does not matter, if
the rule, instead of being concise, is elaborate and lengthy.
Appeal allowed.
