RAMASWAMI, J. – This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Calcutta
High Court dated November 18, 1959 in First Appeal No. 104 of 1954 affirming the judgment and
decree dated February 27, 1954 of the Subordinate Judge, Fifth Court, at Alipore District 24 Parganas
in Title Suit No. 100 of 1952 decreeing the suit for pre-emption in favour of the plaintiffsRespondents 1 and 2.
2. Two brothers, Tulshidas Chatterjee and Kishorilal Chatterjee owned certain properties (land
and building) on Paharpur Road within Mouza Garden Reach, Khidderpore, in the suburbs of
Calcutta. In the year 1938 Kishorilal sued for partition of the properties and eventually the matter was
referred to arbitration. On December 16, 1940, the arbitrators filed their award on which a final decree
was passed on March 15, 1941 in the partition suit. Under the award, two of the four blocks, A, B, C
& D, into which the properties were divided by the arbitrators, namely, blocks A and C, were allotted
to Tulshidas and the remaining two blocks, B and D were allotted to Kishorilal. Two common
passages marked as X and Y and a common drain Z were kept joint between the parties for their use.
In the award there was a clause to the following effect:
“We further find and report with the consent of and approval of the parties that any party
in case of disposing or transferring any portion of his share, shall offer reference to the other
party, that is each party shall have the right of pre-emption between each other.”
3. Thereafter, on August 20, 1941 Tulshidas sold his A block to one Nagendra Nath Ghosh. This
was done after Kishorilal’s refusal to pre-empt the same in spite of Tulshidas’s offer to him in terms
of the pre-emption clause. On April 22, 1942, Kishorilal sold, by the Kobala (Ex. I), his two blocks, B
and D to Rati Raman Mukherjee and others. On June 21, 1946, the Mukherjees in their turn sold the
two blocks B & D to the plaintiffs by the Kobala [Ex. l(a)]. On September 20, 1952 Nagendra Nath
Ghose sold block A to Defendant 1 and on December 2, 1952, the present suit was filed by the
plaintiffs against the said purchaser – Defendant 1 for pre-empting his aforesaid purchase. On April 7,
1953 while the suit was pending in the trial court, Defendant 1 sold the disputed property (block A) to
Defendant 2. The plaintiffs thereafter made an application for amendment of the plaint praying for a
decree for pre-emption against Defendants 1 and 2 and calling upon them to execute a conveyance in
favour of the plaintiffs on payment of the actual consideration paid for the property in suit. On the
conclusion of the trial the Subordinate Judge held that the covenant of pre-emption was binding upon
the defendants who had notice of that clause and plaintiffs were entitled to enforce the right of preemption. He further held that the convenant of pre-emption was not hit by the rule against perpetuities
and was enforceable against the assignees of the original parties to the contract. Accordingly a decree
was granted to the plaintiffs asking them to deposit within one month a sum of Rs 14,000 for the
purpose of pre-empting the suit property and both the defendants were directed to execute and register
a Kobala in plaintiffs favour within 15 days of the deposit by the plaintiffs. The defendants took the
matter in appeal to the Calcutta High Court which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment
and decree of the Subordinate Judge.
4. On behalf of the appellant learned Counsel put forward the argument that the covenant for preemption was merely a personal covenant between the contracting parties and was not binding against
successors-in-interest or the assignees of the original parties to the contract. We are unable to accept
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this submission as correct. It is true that the pre-emption clause does not expressly state that it is
binding upon the assignees or successors-in-interest, but, having regard to the context and the
circumstances in which the award was made, it is manifest that the pre-emption clause must be
construed as binding upon the assignees or successors-in-interest of the original contracting parties.
5. Prima facie rights of the parties to a contract are assignable. Section 23(b) of the Specific Relief
Act states:
“23. Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the specific performance of a contract
may be obtained by –
(b) the representative in interest, or the principal, of any party thereto: provided that,
where the learning, skill, solvency or any personal quality of such party is a material
ingredient in the contract, or where the contract provides that his interest shall not be
assigned, his representative in interest or his principal shall not be entitled to specific
performance of the contract, unless where his part thereof has already been performed;”
Section 27(b) of the Act is to the following effect:
“27. Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may
be enforced against –
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract,
except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the
original contract;”
Reference should also be made to Sections 37 and 40 of the Indian Contract Act which are to the
following effect:
“37. The parties to a contract must either perform, or offer to perform, their respective
promises, unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of this
Act, or of any other law.
Promises bind the representatives of the promisors in case of the death of such promisors
before performance, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract.
40. If it appears from the nature of the case that it was the intention of the parties to any
contract that any promise contained in it should be performed by the promisor himself, such
promise must be performed by the promisor. In other cases, the promisor or his
representatives may employ a competent person to perform it.”
In substance these statutory provisions lay down that, subject to certain exceptions which are not
material in this case, a contract in the absence of a contrary intention express or implied will be
enforceable by and against the parties and their legal heirs and legal representatives including
assignees and transferees. In the present case, there is nothing in the language of the pre-emption
clause or the other clauses of the award to suggest that the parties had any contrary intention. On the
other hand a reference to the other clauses of the award shows that the parties intended that the
obligations and benefit of the contract should go to the assignees or successors-in-interest. The
following clauses of the award are important:
“We find and report that six feet wide common passage marked ‘X’ measuring 12 chapter
36 sq ft in the plan and coloured with Burnt sienna shall ever remain as such to all the blocks
the owners whereof shall have every right to take underground water pipes electric
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connections etc., and the parties shall have never any right either to obstruct or to close any
part of the same.
The parties shall be at liberty to fill up the tank portion allotted in their respective shares
at their own costs. The common walls and structures according to the above allotments shall
have to be maintained and kept in proper condition by both parties.
We further find and report that the partition line in the inner courtyard shall be drawn east
to west as shown in the plan just over the middle of the pit situated at the north-west corner of
the inner courtyard for the drainage of water. There must be an opening in the partition wall
that may be raised thereon over the mouth of the pit in order to have a free access for the
drainage of water of both parties through the said pit which shall have to be maintained as
such for ever.”
With the consent of the parties we find and award that the parties shall complete
construction of new structures or demolition of any existing structures, in terms of this award
within one year from this date, that is 16th day of December, 1940. During this period of one
year parties shall remain entitled to use and enjoy the entire property as allotted, but
immediately after the expiry of the said period of one year plaintiff shall have every right to
close or otherwise obstruct the defendant from enjoyment of that portion of the structure privy
or land exclusively allotted to him and the defendant shall have the same rights as against the
plaintiff in respect of his share of structures and land exclusively allotted to his share in terms
of the award.”
It is obvious-that in these clauses the expression “parties” cannot be restricted to the original
parties to the contract but must include the legal representatives and assignees of the original parties.
There is hence no reason why the same expression should be given a restricted meaning in the
preemption clause which is the subject-matter of interpretation in the present appeal. On behalf of the
respondents Mr N.C. Chatterji rightly argued that the pre-emption clause was based upon the ground
of vicinage and this circumstance would also suggest that the intention of the parties was that the preemption clause should be binding upon the heirs and successors-in-interest and the assignees of the
original parties to the contract. We accordingly hold that Mr Bishen Narain on behalf of the appellant
is unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the case.
6. We pass on to consider the next question which arises in this appeal, namely, whether the
covenant of pre-emption offends the rule against perpetuities and is therefore void and not enforceable
even against the original contracting parties.
7. “A perpetuity”, as defined by Lewis in his well-known book, on Perpetuities (p. 164), is a
“future limitation, whether executory or by way of remainder, and of either real or personal property
which is not to vest until after the expiration of, or will not necessarily vest within, the period fixed
and prescribed by law for the creation of future estates and interests”. The rule as formulated falls
within the branch of the law of property and its true object is to restrain the creation of future
conditional interest in property. The rule against perpetuities is not concerned with contracts as such
or with contractual rights and obligations as such. Thus a contract to pay money to a person, his heirs
or legal representatives upon a future contingency, which may happen beyond the period prescribed
would be perfectly valid (Walsh v. Secretary of State for India [(1863) 10 HLC 367 : 11 ER 1068]. It
is therefore well-established that the rule of perpetuity concerns rights of property only and does not
affect the making of contracts which do not create rights of property.
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8. The rule does not therefore apply to personal contracts which do not create interest in
property (See the decision of the court of appeal in South Eastern Railway Company v. Associated
Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd. [1910-1 Ch 12 ] even though the contract may have reference
to land. In Witham v. Vane [(1883) Challis’s Law of Real Property, 3rd Edn.]. William Harry, Earl of
Darlington sold in 1824 the manor of Hutton Henry and other hereditaments to George Silvertop. In
the conveyance there was a covenant that the said Earl, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns
would pay six pence for each chaldron of coal which would be wrought or gotten out of the lands so
sold and which would be shipped for sale, to George Silvertop, his heirs, executors, administrators or
assigns. The covenant was enforced in 1883 at the instance of an assignee from the legal
representatives of George Silvertop against the executors of the Earl. The Lord Chancellor (Earl of
Silborne) overruled the plea that the covenant offended the rule against perpetuities on the ground
that, though the covenant had relation to land, it did not amount to a reservation of any interest in
land.
9. In English law a contract for purchase of real property is regarded as creating an equitable
interest, and if, in the absence of a time-limit, it is possible that the option for repurchase might be
exercised beyond the prescribed period fixed by the perpetuity rule, the covenant is regarded as
altogether void. It has therefore been held that a covenant for pre-emption unlimited in point of time is
bad as being obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities. The point was settled by the court of Appeal in
London and South Western Railway Company v. Gomm [(1882) 20 ChD 562] which is the leading
English authority on the point. In that case, the plaintiff Company conveyed certain lands to Powell in
1865, and Powell covenanted with the company that he, his heirs, and assigns, would at any time, on
receipt of £ 100, reconvey the lands to the company. In 1879, the defendant Gomm purchased the land
from Powell’s heirs with notice of the above covenant, and in 1880 the company gave the defendant a
notice to reconvey the land, and on his refusal brought the suit for specific performance. Kay, J. gave
the plaintiff a decree, being of the opinion that, as the covenant did not create any estate or interest in
the land, it was not obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities. This decision was reversed by the court
of Appeal, and it was held that the option to purchase created an equitable interest in the land which
attracted the operation of the perpetuity rule. Sir George Jessel M.R. observed, in his judgment, that
the right to call for a conveyance of land was an equitable interest or equitable estate. There was no
doubt about it in an ordinary case of contract for purchase, and an option for repurchase did not stand
on a different footing. In the course of his judgment the learned Master of Rolls observed as follows:
“Whether the rule applies or not depends upon this as it appears to me, does or does not
the covenant give an interest in the land? If it is a bare or mere personal contract it is of
course not obnoxious to the rule, but in that case it is impossible to see how the present
appellant can be bound. He did not enter into the contract, but is only a purchaser from
Powell who did. If it is a mere personal contract it cannot be enforced against the assignee.
Therefore the company must admit that it somehow binds the land. The right to call for a
conveyance of the land is an equitable interest or equitable estate. In the ordinary case of a
contract for purchase there is no doubt about this, and an option of purchase is not different
in its nature. A person exercising the option has to do two things; he has to give notice of his
intention to purchase, and to pay the purchase money; but as far as the man who is liable to
convey is concerned, his estate or interest is taken away from him without his consent, and
the right to take it away being vested in another, the covenant giving the option must give the
other an interest in land.”
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10. In the case of an agreement for sale entered into prior to the passing of the Transfer of
Property Act, it was the accepted doctrine in India that the agreement created an interest in the land
itself in favour of the purchaser. For instance, in Fati Chand Sahu v. Lilambar Singh Das [(1871) 9
Beng LR 433 (PC)] a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale was dismissed on the ground
that the agreement, which was held to create an interest in the land, was not registered under Section
17 clause (2), of the Indian Registration Act of 1866. Following this principle, Markby, J. in Tripoota
Soonduree v. Juggur Nath Dutt [(1874) 24 Suth WR 321] expressed the opinion that a covenant for
pre-emption contained in a deed of partition, which was unlimited in point of time, was not
enforceable in law. The same view was taken by Baker, J. in Allibhai Mahomed Akuji v. Dada Alli
Isap [AIR 1931 Bom 578] where the option of purchase was contained in a contract entered into
before the passing of the Transfer of Property Act. The decision of the Judicial Committee in
Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. Bal Chand [AIR 1922 PC 165] was also a decision relating to a contract
of the year 1872. In that case, the proprietor of a hill entered into an agreement with a society of Jains
that, if the latter would require a site thereon for the erection of a temple, he and his heirs would grant
the site free of cost. The proprietor afterwards alienated the hill. The society, through their
representatives, sued the alienees for possession of a site defined by boundaries, alleging notice to the
proprietor requiring that site and that they had taken possession, but been dispossessed. It was held by
the Judicial Committee that the suit must fail. The Judicial Committee was of the opinion that the
agreement conferred on the society no present estate or interest in the site, and was unenforceable as a
covenant, since it did not run with the land, and infringed the rule against perpetuity.
11. The second paragraph of Section 40 taken with the illustration establishes two propositions:
(1) that a contract for sale does not create any interest in the land, but is annexed to the ownership of
the land and (2) that the obligation can be enforced against a subsequent gratuitous transferee from the
vendor or a transferee for value but with notice. Reading Section 14 along with Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act it is manifest that a mere contract for sale of immovable property does not
create any interest in the immovable property and it therefore follows that the rule of perpetuity
cannot be applied to a covenant of pre-emption even though there is no time-limit within which the
option has to be exercised. It is true that the second paragraph of Section 40 of the Transfer of
Property Act makes a substantial departure from the English law, for an obligation under a contract
which creates no interest in land but which concerns land is made enforceable against an assignee of
the land who takes from the promisor either gratuitously or takes for value but with notice. A contract
of this nature does not stand on the same footing as a mere personal contract, for it can be enforced
against an assignee with notice. There is a superficial kind of resemblance between the personal
obligation created by the contract of sale described under Section 40 of the Act which arises out of the
contract, and annexed to the ownership of immoveable property, but not amounting to an interest
therein or easement thereon and the equitable interest of the person purchasing under the English law,
in that both these rights are liable to be defeated by a purchaser for value without notice. But the
analogy cannot be carried further and the rule against perpetuity which applies to equitable estates in
English law cannot be applied to a covenant of pre-emption because Section 40 of the statute does not
make the covenant enforceable against the assignee on the footing that it creates an interest on the
land.
12. We are accordingly of the opinion that the covenant for pre-emption in this case does not
offend the rule against perpetuities and cannot be considered to be void in law. For the reasons
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expressed we hold that the decision of the High Court was correct and this appeal must be
dismissed with costs.
