On October 3rd, 1948, a military rebellion broke out in Peru. It was suppressed on the
same day and investigations were at once opened. On October 4th, the President of the
Republic issued a decree in the recitals of which a political party, the American People’s
Revolutionary Alliance, was charged with having organized and directed the rebellion. The
decree consequently enacted that this party had placed itself outside the law, that it would
henceforth not be permitted to exercise any kind of activity, and that its leaders would be
brought to justice in the national courts as instigators of the rebellion. Simultaneously, the
head of the Judicial Department of the Navy issued an order requiring the Examining
Magistrate to open at once an enquiry as to the facts constituting the crime of military
rebellion.
On October 5th, the Minister of the Interior addressed to the Minister for the Navy a “note
of denunciation” against the leader of the American People’s Revolutionary Alliance, Victor
Raul Haya de la Torre, and other members of the party as responsible for the rebellion. This
denunciation was approved on the same day by the Minister for the Navy and on October
10th by the Public Prosecutor, who stated that the subject-matter of the proceedings was the
crime of military rebellion.
On October 11th, the Examining Magistrate issued an order for the opening of judicial
proceedings against Haya de la Torre they are the page charged in the ‘denunciation’ “, and on
October 25th he ordered the arrest of the persons “denounced” who had not yet been detained.
On October 27th, a Military Junta made a coup d’état and seized the supreme power.
This Military Junta of the Government issued on November 4th a decree providing for
Courts-Martial for summary procedure in cases of rebellion, sedition and rioting, fixing short
time-limits and severe punishment without appeal.
This decree was not applied to the judicial proceedings against Haya de la Torre and
others. These proceedings continued under the same jurisdiction as theretofore. This is shown
by a note of November 8th from the Examining Magistrate requesting the production of
certain documents, by a note of November 13th from the Head of the Investigation and
Surveillance Service to the Examining Magistrate stating that Haya de la Torre and others
were not arrested as they could not be found, and by an Order by the Examining Magistrate of
the same date requiring the defaulters to be cited by public summons. On November 16th and
the two subsequent days, the summons was published in the officia1 gazette El Peruano,
requiring “the accused persons who are in default” – Haya de la Torre and others-to report to
the office of the Examining Magistrate to answer the accusation brought against them “for the
crime of military rebellion”. Haya de la Torre did not report, and the facts brought to the
knowledge of the Court do not show that any further measures were taken against him.
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On October 4th, the day after the military rebellion, a state of siege was declared,
suspending certain constitutional rights; it was renewed on November 2nd and December
2nd, 1948, and on January 2nd, 1949.
On January 3rd, 1949, Haya de la Torre sought asylum in the Colombian Embassy in
Lima. On the next day, the Colombian Ambassador sent the following note to the Peruvian
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Public Worship :
“1 have the honour to inform Your Excellency, in accordance with what is
provided in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention on Asylum signed by Our two
countries in the city of Havana in the year 1928, that Senor Victor Raul Haya de la
Torre has been given asylum at the seat of this mission as from 9 p.m. yesterday.
In view of the foregoing, and in view of the desire of this Embassy that Senor
Haya de la Torre should leave Peru as early as possible, 1 request Your Excellency to
be good enough to give orders for the requisite safe-conduct to be issued, so that
Senor Haya de la Torre may leave the country with the usual facilities attaching to the
right of diplomatic asylum.”
On January 14th, the Ambassador sent to the Minister a further note as follows :
“Pursuant to instructions received from the Chancellery of my country, 1 have the
honour to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Colombia, in accordance
with the right conferred upon it by Article 2 of the Convention on Political Asylum
signed by our two countries in the city of Montevideo on December 26th, 1933,has
qualified Senor Victor Raul Haya de la Torre as a political refugee.”
A diplomatic correspondence followed, leading up to the Act of Lima of August 31st,
1949, whereby the dispute which had arisen between the two Governments was referred to the
Court.
The Colombian Government has presented two submissions, of which the first asks the
Court to adjudge and declare
“That the Republic of Colombia, as the country granting asylum, is competent to
qualify the offence for the purpose of the said asylum, within the limits of the obligations
resulting in particular from the Bolivarian Agreement on Extradition of July 18th 1911,
and the Convention on asylum of February 20th, 1928, and of American international law
in general.”
The written and oral arguments submitted on behalf of that Government show that its
claim must be understood in the sense that Colombia, as the State granting asylum, is
competent to qualify the nature of the offence by a unilateral and definitive decision binding
on Peru. Colombia has based this submission partly on rules resulting from agreement, partly
on an alleged custom.
The Colombian Government has referred to the Bolivarian Agreement of 1911, Article
18, which is framed in the following terms:
15
“Aside from the stipulations of the present Agreement, the signatory States
recognize the institution of asylum in conformity with the principles of international
law.”
In recognizing “the institution of asylum”, this article merely refers to the principles of
international law. But the principles of international law do not recognize any rule of
unilateral and definitive qualification by the State granting diplomatic asylum.
The Colombian Government has also relied on Article 4 of this Agreement concerning
extradition of a criminal refugee from the territory of the State in which he has sought refuge.
The arguments submitted in this respect reveal a confusion between territorial asylum
(extradition), on the one hand, and diplomatic asylum, on the other. In the case of extradition,
the refugee is within the territory of the State of refuge.
A decision with regard to extradition implies only the normal exercise of the territorial
sovereignty. The refugee is outside the territory of the State where the offence was
committed, and a decision to grant him asylum in no way derogates from the sovereignty of
that State.
In the case of diplomatic asylum, the refugee is within the territory of the State where the
offence was committed. A decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from the
sovereignty of that State. It withdraws the offender from the jurisdiction of the territorial State
and constitutes an intervention in matters which are exclusively within the competence of that
State. Such a derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognized unless its legal
basis is established in each particular case.
For these reasons, it is not possible to deduce from the provisions of agreements
concerning extradition any conclusion which would apply to the question now under
consideration.
The Colombian Government further relies on the Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928.
This Convention lays down certain rules relating to diplomatic asylum, but does not contain
any provision conferring on the State granting asylum a unilateral competence to qualify the
offence with definitive and binding force for the territorial State. The Colombian Government
contends, however, that such a competence is implied in that Convention and is inherent in
the institution of asylum.
A competence of this kind is of an exceptional character. It involves a derogation from
the equal rights of qualification which, in the absence of any contrary rule, must be attributed
to each of the States concerned; it thus aggravates the derogation from territorial sovereignty
constituted by the exercise of asylum. Such a competence is not inherent in the institution of
diplomatic asylum. This institution would perhaps be more effective if a rule of unilateral and
definitive qualification were applied. But such a rule is not essential to the exercise of asylum.
These considerations show that the alleged right of unilateral and definitive qualification
cannot be regarded as recognized by implication in the Havana Convention. Moreover, this
Convention, in pursuance of the desire expressed in its preamble of “fixing the rules” which
the Governments of the States of America must observe for the granting of asylum, was
16
concluded with the manifest intention of preventing the abuses which had arisen in the
previous practice, by limiting the grant of asylum.
The Colombian Government has invoked Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Havana
Convention, which is framed in the following terms:
“Asylum granted to political offenders in legations, warships, military camps or military
aircraft, shall be respected to the extent in which allowed as a right or through humanitarian
toleration, by the usages, the conventions or the laws of the country in which granted and in
accordance with the following provisions:”
This provision has been interpreted by that Government in the sense that the usages,
conventions and laws of Colombia relating to the qualification of the offence can be invoked
against Peru. This interpretation, which would mean that the extent of the obligation of one of
the signatory States would depend upon any modifications which might occur in the law of
another, cannot be accepted. The provision must be regarded as a limitation of the extent to
which asylum shall be respected. What the provision says in effect is that the State of refuge
shall not exercise asylum to a larger extent than is warranted by its own usages, conventions
or laws and that the asylum granted must be respected by the territorial State only where such
asylum would be permitted according to the usages, conventions or laws of the State of
refuge. Nothing therefore can be deduced from this provision in so far as qualification is
concerned.
The Colombian Government has further referred to the Montevideo Convention on
Political Asylum of 1933. It is argued that, by Article 2 of that Convention, the Havana
Convention of 1928 is interpreted in the sense that the qualification of a political offence
appertains to the State granting asylum. The Montevideo Convention has not been ratified by
Peru, and cannot be invoked against that State.
The Colombian Government has finally invoked “American international law in general”.
In addition to the rules arising from agreements which have already been considered, it has
relied on an alleged regional or local custom peculiar to Latin-American States.
The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established
in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The Colombian Government
must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage
practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining
to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from
Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, which refers to international custom “as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law”.
In support of its contention concerning the existence of such a custom, the Colombian
Government has referred to a large number of extradition treaties which, as already explained,
can have no bearing on the question now under consideration. It has cited conventions and
agreements which do not contain any provision concerning the alleged rule of unilateral and
definitive qualification such as the Montevideo Convention of 1889 on international penal
law, the Bolivarian Agreement of 1911 and the Havana Convention of 1928. It has invoked
conventions which have not been ratified by Peru, such as the Montevideo Conventions of
17
1933 and 1939. The Convention of 1933 has, in fact, been ratified by not more than eleven
States and the Convention of 1939 by two States only.
It is particularly the Montevideo Convention of 1933 which Counsel for the Colombian
Government has also relied on in this connection. It is contended that this Convention has
merely codified principles which were already recognized by Latin-American custom, and
that it is valid against Peru as a proof of customary law. The limited number of States which
have ratified this Convention reveals the weakness of this argument, and furthermore, it is
invalidated by the preamble which states that this Convention modifies the Havana
Convention.
Finally, the Colombian Government has referred to a large number of particular cases in
which diplomatic asylum was in fact granted and respected. But it has not shown that the
alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification was invoked or-if in some cases it was in
fact invoked-that it was, apart from conventional stipulations, exercised by the States granting
asylum as a right appertaining to them and respected by the territorial States as a duty
incumbent on them and not merely for reasons of political expediency. The facts brought to
the knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much
fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the officia1 views
expressed on various occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession
of conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice has
been so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it
is not possible to discern in al1 this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with
regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence.
The Court cannot therefore find that the Colombian Government has proved the existence
of such a custom. But even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between certain
Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru which, far from having by
its attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the
Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939, which were the first to include a rule concerning
the qualification of the offence in matters of diplomatic asylum.
In the written Pleadings and during the oral proceedings, the Government of Colombia
relied upon officia1 communiqués published by the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
October 13th and 26th, 1948, and the Government of Peru relied upon a Report of the
Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia dated September 2nd,
1937; on the question of qualification, these documents state views which are contrary to
those now maintained by these Governments. The Court, whose duty it is to apply
international law in deciding the present case, cannot attach decisive importance to any of
these documents.
For these reasons, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that Colombia, as the State
granting asylum, is not competent to qualify the offence by a unilateral and definitive
decision, binding on Peru.
In its second submission, the Colombian Government asks the Court to adjudge and
declare:
18
“That the Republic of Peru, as the territorial State, is bound in the case now
before the Court, to give the guarantees necessary for the departure of M. Victor Raul
Haya de la Torre from the country, with due regard to the inviolability of his person.”
There exists undoubtedly a practice whereby the diplomatic representative who grants
asylum immediately requests a safe conduct without awaiting a request from the territorial
State for the departure of the refugee. This procedure meets certain requirements: the
diplomatic agent is naturally desirous that the presence of the refugee on his premises should
not be prolonged; and the government of the country, for its part, desires in a great number of
cases that its political opponent who has obtained asylum should depart. This concordance of
views suffices to explain the practice which has been noted in this connection, but this
practice does not and cannot mean that the State, to whom such a request for a safe-conduct
has been addressed, is legally bound to accede to it.
In the present case, the Peruvian Government has not requested that Haya de la Torre
should leave Peru. It has contested the legality of the asylum granted to him and has refused
to deliver a safe-conduct. In such circumstances the Colombian Government is not entitled to
claim that the Peruvian Government should give the guarantees necessary for the departure of
Haya de la Torre from the country, with due regard to the inviolability of his person.
The grant of asylum is not an instantaneous act which terminates with the admission, at a
given moment, of a refugee to an embassy or a legation. Any grant of asylum results in, and
in consequence logically implies, a state of protection; the asylum is granted as long as the
continued presence of the refugee in the embassy prolongs this protection. This view, which
results from the very nature of the institution of asylum, is further confirmed by the attitude of
the Parties during this case.
The Government of Peru has based its counter-claim on two different grounds which
correspond respectively to Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Havana
Convention.
Under Article 1, paragraph 1, “It is not permissible for States to grant asylum …. to
persons accused or condemned for common crimes….”.
…the Court considers that the Government of Peru has not proved that the acts of which
the refugee was accused before January 3rd/4th, 1949, constitute common crimes. …the
Government of Peru has not established that military rebellion in itself constitutes a common
crime. Article 248 of the Peruvian Code of Military Justice of 1939 even tends to prove the
contrary, for it makes a distinction between military rebellion and common crimes…
The Government of Peru relies, as a second basis for its counterclaim, upon the alleged
disregard of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Havana Convention, which provides as follows:
“Asylum may not be granted except in urgent cases and for the period of time
strictly indispensable for the person who has sought asylum to ensure in some other
way his safety.”
It has not been contended by the Government of Colombia that Haya de la Torre was in
such a situation at the time when he sought refuge in the Colombian Embassy at Lima. At that
time, three months had elapsed since the military rebellion. This long interval gives the
19
present case a very special character. During those three months, Haya de la Torre had
apparently been in hiding in the country, refusing to obey the summons to appear of the legal
authorities which was published on November 16th/18th, 1948, and refraining from seeking
asylum in the foreign embassies where several of his co-accused had found refuge before
these dates. It was only on January 3rd, 1949, that he sought refuge in the Colombian
Embassy. The Court considers that, prima facie, such circumstances make it difficult to speak
of urgency.
It is only in the written Reply that the Government of Colombia described in more
precise terms the nature of the danger against which the refugee intended to request the
protection of the Ambassador. It was then claimed that this danger resulted in particular from
the abnormal political situation existing in Peru…
In principle, it is inconceivable that the Havana Convention could have intended the term
“urgent cases” to include the danger of regular prosecution to which the citizens of any
country lay themselves open by attacking the institutions of that country; nor can it be
admitted that in referring to “the period of time strictly indispensable for the person who has
sought asylum to ensure in some other way his safety”, the Convention envisaged protection
from the operation of regular legal proceedings.
It is not possible to infer from that provision ( Article 1,Havana Convention) that, because
a person is accused of political offences and not of common crimes, he is, by that fact alone,
entitled to asylum. It is clear that such an inference would disregard the requirements laid
down by Article 2, paragraph 2, for the grant of asylum to political offenders.
In principle, therefore, asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of justice. An
exception to this rule can occur only if, in the guise of justice, arbitrary action is substituted
for the rule of law. Such would be the case if the administration of justice were corrupted by
measures clearly prompted by political aims. Asylum protects the political offender against
any measures of a manifestly extra-legal character which a government might take or attempt
to take against its political opponents. On the other hand, the safety which arises out of
asylum cannot be construed as a protection against the regular application of the laws and
against the jurisdiction of legally constituted tribunals. Protection thus understood would
authorize the diplomatic agent to obstruct the application of the laws of the country whereas it
is his duty to respect them; it would in fact become the equivalent of immunity, which was
evidently not within the intentions of the draftsmen of the Havana Convention.
It is true that successive decrees promulgated by the Government of Peru proclaimed and
prolonged a state of siege in that country; but it has not been shown that the existence of a
state of siege implied the subordination of justice to the executive authority, or that the
suspension of certain constitutional guarantees entailed the abolition of judicial guarantees.
As for the decree of November 4th, 1948, providing for Courts-Martial, it contained no
indication which might be taken to mean that the new provisions would apply retroactively to
offences committed prior to the publication of the said decree. In fact, this decree was not
applied to the legal proceedings against Haya de la Torre, as appears from the foregoing
recital of the facts.
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The Court cannot admit that the States signatory to the Havana Convention intended to
substitute for the practice of the Latin- American republics, in which considerations of
courtesy, good neighbourliness and political expediency have always held a prominent place,
a legal system which would guarantee to their own nationals accused of political offences the
privilege of evading national jurisdiction. Such a conception, moreover, would come into
conflict with one of the most firmly established traditions of Latin America, namely, nonintervention. It was at the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, during which the
Convention on Asylum was signed, that the States of Latin America declared their resolute
opposition to any foreign political intervention.
