December 3, 2024
DU LLBPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAWSemester 2

Corfu Channel CaseICJ Reports 1949, p.4

Case Summary

CitationCorfu Channel CaseICJ Reports 1949, p.4
Keywordslaws of the sea, state responsibility
FactsOn May 15th 1946 the British naval warships went across the Corfu Channel without the permission of the Albanian government and were fired upon by Albanian coastal batteries. Afterwards, on October 22nd, 1946, a fleet of British warships (two cruisers and two destroyers), left the port of Corfu and advanced northward through a channel previously swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait. Both destroyers were struck by a mine and were heavily damaged. This occurrence resulted in many human deaths and severe injuries. The two ships were mined in Albanian territorial waters in a previously swept and check-swept channel.After the mining accident of 22nd October, the United Kingdom Government sent a note to the Albanian Government. The note asserted the UK government’s intention to sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. Concurrently, at the United Kingdom Government’s request, the International Central Mine Clearance Board decided, in a resolution of November 1st, 1946, that there should be a further sweep of the Channel, subject to Albania’s consent. London received the reply of the note from the Albanian government on 31st October. It expressed that the Albanian Government would not give its consent to mine sweeping unless the operation in question took place outside Albanian territorial waters. The Albanian government directly expressed that any minesweeping carried on without the permission of the Albanian Government inside Albanian territorial waters will be regarded as a deliberate violation of Albanian sovereignty and territory. On 12th and 13th November of 1946 the British Royal Navy launched ‘Operation Retail’ and carried out the minesweeping against the wishes of the Albanian Government. This case was brought before the Court on May 22nd, 1947, by an Application filed by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland instituting proceedings against the Government of the People’s Republic of Albania.
IssuesWhether Albania is responsible under international law for the mine explosions which occurred on the 22nd October, 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage of machinery and loss of human lives which resulted due to it?
Whether the United Kingdom has violated the sovereignty of Albania by reason of minesweeping operation without consent of the Albanian Government?
Whether the United Kingdom is entitled to compensation for the loss suffered?
Contentions
Law PointsAlbania as a state has a responsibility not to breach international law. This responsibility originates from well-recognized principles of humanity which were even more onerous in time of peace than in war, from the principle of freedom of maritime communication, and from the obligation of all states not to knowingly allow their territory to be used contrary to the rights of other states. The Albanian Government had full knowledge about the mines and it had state responsibility to inform other states about the existence of the minefields. The Albanian government had the duty under international law to inform the ships approaching about the danger.The North Corfu Channel must be viewed as belonging to the ‘class of international highways’ across which an innocent passage does not need special permission and cannot be restricted by a coastal State in time of peace. But Albania was at war with Greece at that time which means that the coastal state was not in time of peace. But the UK violated the territorial sovereignty of Albania by launching Operation Retail without its consent.
JudgementThe Court held that Albania was responsible under international law for the mine explosions in Corfu channel that had taken place in Albanian territorial waters and for the damage and loss of life which had occurred.
Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority

Full Case Details

(State responsibility- modes of reparation-use of circumstantial evidence-right of innocent

passage- passage of warships through territorial waters-self help)

By the first part of the Special Agreement, the following question is submitted to the

Court:

“(1) 1s Albania responsible under international law for the explosions which

occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss

of human life which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay compensation?”

On October 22nd, 1946, a squadron of British warships, the cruisers Mauritius and

Leander and the destroyers Saumarez and Volage, left the port of Corfu and proceeded

northward through a channel previously swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait. The cruiser

Mauritius was leading, followed by the destroyer Saumarez; at a certain distance thereafter

came the cruiser Leander followed by the destroyer Volage. Outside the Bay of Saranda,

Saumarez struck a mine and was heavily damaged. Volage was ordered to give her assistance

and to take her in tow. Whilst towing the damaged ship, Volage struck a mine and was much

damaged. Nevertheless, she succeeded in towing the other ship back to Corfu.

Three weeks later, on November 13th, the North Corfu Channel was swept by British

minesweepers and twenty-two moored mines were cut.

In October, 1944, the North Corfu Channel was swept by the British Navy and no mines

were found in the channel thus swept, whereupon -the existence of a safe route through the

Channel was announced in November 1944. In January and February, 1945, the Channel was

check-swept by the British Navy with negative results. That the British Admiralty must have

considered the Channel to be a safe route for navigation is shown by the fact that on May

15th, 1946, it sent two British cruisers and on October 22nd a squadron through the Channel

without any special measures of precaution against danger from moored mines. It was in this

swept channel that the minefield was discovered on November 13th, 1946.

The Court consequently finds that the following facts are established. The two ships were

mined in Albanian territorial waters in a previously swept and check-swept channel just at the

place where a newly laid minefield consisting of moored contact German GY mines was

discovered three weeks later. The damage sustained by the ships was inconsistent with

damage which could have been caused by floating mines, magnetic ground mines, magnetic

moored mines, or German GR mines, but its nature and extent were such as would be caused

by mines of the type found in the minefield. In such circumstances the Court arrives at the

conclusion that the explosions were due to mines belonging to that minefield.

In the light of the information now available to the Court, the authors of the mine laying

remain unknown. In any case, the task of the Court, as defined by the Special Agreement, is

to decide whether Albania is responsible, under international law, for the explosions which

occurred on October 22nd, 1946, and to give judgment as to the compensation, if any.

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It is clear that knowledge of the mine laying cannot be imputed to the Albanian

Government by reason merely of the fact that a minefield discovered in Albanian territorial

waters caused the explosions of which the British warships were the victims. It is true, as

international practice shows, that a State on whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary

to international law has occurred, may be called upon to give an explanation. It is also true

that that State cannot evade such a request by limiting itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the

circumstances of the act and of its authors. The State may, up to a certain point, be bound to

supply particulars of the use made by it of the means of information and inquiry at its

disposal. But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State

over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any

unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the

authors. This fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neither involves prima facie

responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.

On the other hand, the fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within

its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of

that State as to such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim of a

breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to

responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact

and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its

use is recognized by international decisions. It must be regarded as of special weight when it

is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single conclusion.

The Court must examine therefore whether it has been established by means of indirect

evidence that Albania has knowledge of mine laying in her territorial waters independently of

any connivance on her part in this operation. The proof may be drawn from inferences of fact,

provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt. The elements of fact on which these

inferences can be based may differ from those which are relevant to the question of

connivance.

In the present case, two series of facts, which corroborate one another, have to be

considered : the first relates to Albania’s attitude before and after the disaster of October 22nd,

1946 ; the other concerns the feasibility of observing mine laying from the Albanian coast.

It is clearly established that the Albanian Government constantly kept a close watch over

the waters of the North Corfu Channel, at any rate after May 1946. This vigilance is proved

by the declaration of the Albanian Delegate in the Security Council on February 19th, 1947

(Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 16, p. 328), and especially by the

diplomatic notes of the Albanian Government concerning the passage of foreign ships

through its territorial waters.

The Albanian Government’s notes are all evidence of its intention to keep a jealous watch

on its territorial waters. The note verbale addressed to the United Kingdom on May 21st, 1946,

reveals the existence of a “General Order”, in execution of which the Coastal Commander

gave the order to fire in the direction of the British cruisers. This same note formulates a

demand that “permission” shall be given, by the Albanian authorities, for passage through

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territorial waters. The insistence on “formalities” and “permission” by Albania is repeated in

the Albanian note of June 19th.

As the Parties agree that the minefield had been recently laid, it must be concluded that

the operation was carried out during the period of close watch by the Albanian authorities in

this sector. This conclusion renders the Albanian Government’s assertion of ignorance a

priori somewhat improbable.

The telegrams sent by the Albanian Government on November 13th and November 27th,

1946, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at a time when that Government was

fully aware of the discovery of the minefield in Albanian territorial waters, are especially

significant of the measures taken by the Albanian Government. In the first telegram, that

Government raised the strongest protest against the movements and activity of British naval

units in its territorial waters on November 12th and 13th, 1946, without even mentioning the

existence of a minefield in these waters. In the second, it repeats its accusations against the

United Kingdom, without in any way protesting against the laying of this minefield which, if

effected without Albania’s consent, constituted a very serious violation of her sovereignty.

Another indication of the Albanian Government’s knowledge consists in the fact that that

Government did not notify the presence of mines in its waters, at the moment when it must

have known this, at the latest after the sweep on November 13th, and further, whereas the

Greek Government immediately appointed a Commission to inquire into the events of

October 22nd, the Albanian Government took no decision of such a nature, nor did it proceed

to the judicial investigation incumbent, in such a case, on the territorial sovereign.

This attitude does not seem reconcilable with the alleged ignorance of the Albanian

authorities that the minefield had been laid in Albanian territorial waters. It could be

explained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the mine laying, desired the

circumstances of the operation to remain secret.

2. As regards the possibility of observing mine laying from the Albanian coast, the Court

regards the following facts, relating to the technical conditions of a secret mine laying and to

the Albanian surveillance, as particularly important.

The Bay of Saranda and the channel used by shipping through the Strait are, from their

geographical configuration, easily watched; the entrance of the bay is dominated by heights

offering excellent observation points, both over the bay and over the Strait; whilst the channel

throughout is close to the Albanian coast. The laying of a minefield in these waters could

hardly fail to have been observed by the Albanian coastal defences.

On this subject, it must first be said that the mine laying operation itself must have

required a certain time. The method adopted required, according to the Experts of the Court,

the methodical and well thought-out laying of two rows of mines that had clearly a combined

offensive and defensive purpose: offensive, to prevent the passage, through the Channel, of

vessels drawing ten feet of water or more; defensive, to prevent vessels of the same draught

from entering the Bay of Saranda. The report of the Experts reckons the time that the

minelayers would have been in the waters, between Cape Kiephali and St. George’s

Monastery, at between two and two and a half hours. This is sufficient time to attract the

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attention of the observation posts, placed, as the Albanian Government stated, at Cape

Kiephali and St. George’s Monastery. The facilities for observation from the coast are

confirmed by the two following circumstances: the distance of the nearest mine from the

coast was only 500 metres; the minelayers must have passed at not more than about 500

metres from the coast between Denta Point and St. George’s Monastery.

The Court cannot fail to give great weight to the opinion of the Experts who examined the

locality in a manner giving every guarantee of correct and impartial information. Apart from

the existence of a look-out post at Cape Denta, which has not been proved, the Court, basing

itself on the declarations of the Albanian Government that look-out posts were stationed at

Cape Kiephali and St. George’s Monastery, refers to the following conclusions in the Experts’

Report: (1) that in the case of mine laying from the North towards the South, the minelayers

would have been seen from Cape Kiephali ; (2) in the case of mine laying from the South, the

minelayers would have been seen from Cape Kiephali and St. George’s Monastery.

From all the facts and observations mentioned above, the Court draws the conclusion that

the laying of the minefield which caused the explosions on October 22nd, 1946, could not

have been accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian Government.

The obligations resulting for Albania from this knowledge are not disputed between the

Parties. The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for

the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters

and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the

minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907,

No. VTII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-recognized

principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than

in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every State’s obligation

not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.

In fact, Albania neither notified the existence of the minefield, nor warned the British

warships of the danger they were approaching.

But Albania’s obligation to notify shipping of the existence of mines in her waters

depends on her having obtained knowledge of that fact in sufficient time before October 22nd

; and the duty of the Albanian coastal authorities to warn the British ships depends on the time

that elapsed between the moment that these ships were reported and the moment of the first

explosion.

On this subject, the Court makes the following observations. As has already been stated,

the Parties agree that the mines were recently laid. It must be concluded that the mine laying,

whatever may have been its exact date, was done at a time when there was a close Albanian

surveillance over the Strait. If it be supposed that it took place at the last possible moment,

i.e., in the night of October 21st-22nd, the only conclusion to be drawn would be that a

general notification to the shipping of all States before the time of the explosions would have

been difficult, perhaps even impossible. But this would certainly not have prevented the

Albanian authorities from taking, as they should have done, all necessary steps immediately

to warn ships near the danger zone, more especially those that were approaching that zone.

When on October 22nd about 13.00 hours the British warships were reported by the look-out

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post at St. George’s Monastery to the Commander of the Coastal Defences as approaching

‘Cape Long, it was perfectly possible for the Albanian authorities to use the interval of almost

two hours that elapsed before the explosion affecting Saumarez (14.53 hours or 14.55 hours)

to warn the vessels of the danger into which they were running.

In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. These

grave omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania.

The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that Albania is responsible under international

law for the explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the

damage and loss of human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty upon

Albania to pay compensation to the United Kingdom.

In the final submissions contained in its oral reply, the United Kingdom Government

asked the Court to give judgment that, as a result of the breach by the Albanian Government

of its obligations under international law, it had sustained damages amounting to £87 5,000.

The Albanian Government has not disputed the competence of the Court to decide what

kind of satisfaction is due under this part of the Agreement. The case was argued on behalf of

both Parties on the basis that this question should be decided by the Court.

As has been said above, the Security Council, in its Resolution of April 9th, 1947,

undoubtedly intended that the whole dispute should be decided by the Court. If, however, the

Court should limit itself to saying that there is a duty to pay compensation without deciding

what amount of compensation is due, the dispute would not be finally decided. An important

part of it would remain unsettled. As both Parties have repeatedly declared that they accept

the Resolution of the Security Council, such a result would not conform with their

declarations. It would not give full effect to the Resolution, but would leave open the

possibility of a further dispute.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that it has jurisdiction

to assess the amount of the compensation. This cannot, however, be done in the present

Judgment. The Albanian Government has not yet stated which items, if any, of the various

sums claimed it contests, and the United Kingdom Government has not submitted its evidence

with regard to them.

The Court therefore considers that further proceedings on this subject are necessary; the

order and time-limits of these proceedings will be fixed by the Order of this date.

In the second part of the Special Agreement, the following question is submitted to the

Court :

“(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the sovereignty of the

Albanian People’s Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the

22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946 and is there any duty to give

satisfaction?”

The Court will first consider whether the sovereignty of Albania was violated by reason

of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October 22nd, 1946.

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On May 15th, 1946, the British cruisers Orion and Superb, while passing southward

through the North Corfu Channel, were fired at by an Albanian battery in the vicinity of

Saranda. It appears from the report of the commanding naval officer dated May 29th, 1946,

that the firing started when the ships had already passed the battery and were moving away

from it ; that from 12 to 20 rounds were fired ; that the firing lasted 12 minutes and ceased

only when the ships were out of range ; but that the ships were not hit although there were a

number of “shorts” and of “overs”. An Albanian note of May 21st states that the Coastal

Commander ordered a few shots to be fired in the direction of the ships “in accordance with a

General Order founded on international law”.

The Court will now consider the Albanian contention that the United Kingdom

Government violated Albanian sovereignty by sending the warships through this Strait

without the previous authorization of the Albanian Government.

It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with

international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through

straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the

previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless

otherwise prescribed in an international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to

prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace.

The Albanian Government does not dispute that the North Corfu Channel is a strait in the

geographical sense; but it denies that this Channel belongs to the class of international

highways through which a right of passage exists, on the grounds that it is only of secondary

importance and not even a necessary route between two parts of the high seas, and that it is

used almost exclusively for local traffic to and from the ports of Corfu and Saranda.

It may be asked whether the test is to be found in the volume of traffic passing through

the Strait or in its greater or lesser importance for international navigation. But in the opinion

of the Court the decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as connecting two parts

of the high seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation. Nor can it be

decisive that this Strait is not a necessary route between two parts of the high seas, but only an

alternative passage between the Aegean and the Adriatic Seas. It has nevertheless been a

useful route for international maritime traffic.

One fact of particular importance is that the North Corfu Channel constitutes a frontier

between Albania and Greece, that a part of it is wholly within the territorial waters of these

States, and that the Strait is of special importance to Greece by reason of the traffic to and

from the port of Corfu.

Having regard to these various considerations, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that

the North Corfu Channel should be considered as belonging to the class of international

highways through which passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in time of peace.

On the other hand, it is a fact that the two coastal States did not maintain normal relations,

that Greece had made territorial claims precisely with regard to a part of Albanian territory

bordering on the Channel, that Greece had declared that she considered herself technically in

a state of war with Albania, and that Albania, invoking the danger of Greek incursions, had

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considered it necessary to take certain measures of vigilance in this region. The Court is of

opinion that Albania, in view of these exceptional circumstances, would have been justified in

issuing regulations in respect of the passage of warships through the Strait, but not in

prohibiting such passage or in subjecting it to the requirement of special authorization.

For these reasons the Court is unable to accept the Albanian contention that the

Government of the United Kingdom has violated Albanian sovereignty by sending the

warships through the Strait without having obtained the previous authorization of the

Albanian Government.

The Albanian Government has further contended that the sovereignty of Albania was

violated because the passage of the British warships on October 22nd, 1946, was not an

innocent passage.

The legality of this measure taken-by the Government of the United Kingdom cannot be

disputed, provided that it was carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of

international law. The “mission” was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly

denied. The Government of the United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from exercising its

right of passage, which the Albanian Government had illegally denied.

It remains, therefore, to consider whether the manner in which the passage was carried

out was consistent with the principle of innocent passage and to examine the various

contentions of the Albanian Government in so far as they appear to be relevant.

In the above-mentioned telegram of October 26th, the Commander- in-Chief reported that

the passage “was made with ships at action stations in order that they might be able to

retaliate quickly if fired upon again”. In view of the firing from the Albanian battery on May

15th, this measure of precaution cannot, in itself, he regarded as unreasonable. But four

warships-two cruisers and two destroyers-passed in this manner, with crews at action stations,

ready to retaliate quickly if fired upon. They passed one after another through this narrow

channel, close to the Albanian Coast, at a time of political tension in this region. The intention

must have been, not only to test Albania’s attitude, but at the same time to demonstrate such

force that she would abstain from firing again on passing ships. Having regard, however, to

all the circumstances of the case, as described above, the Court is unable to characterize these

measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a violation of Albania’s sovereignty.

Having thus examined the various contentions of the Albanian Government in so far as

they appear to be relevant, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the United Kingdom

did not violate the sovereignty of Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in

Albanian waters on October 22nd, 1946.

After the explosions of October 22nd, the United Kingdom Government sent a note to

the Albanian Government, in which it announced its intention to sweep the Corfu Channel

shortly. The Albanian reply, which was received in London on October 31st, stated that the

Albanian Government would not give its consent to this unless the operation in question took

place outside Albanian territorial waters. Meanwhile, at the United Kingdom Government’s

request, the International Central Mine Clearance Board decided, in a resolution of November

1st, 1946, that there should be a further sweep of the Channel, subject to Albania’s consent.

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The United Kingdom Government having informed the Albanian Government, in a

communication of November 10th, that the proposed sweep would take place on November

12th the Albanian Government replied on 11th, protesting against this “unilateral decision of

His Majesty’s Government”. It said it did not consider it inconvenient that the British fleet

should undertake the sweeping of the channel of navigation, but added that, before sweeping

was carried out, it considered it indispensable to decide what area of the sea should be

deemed to constitute this channel, and proposed the establishment of a Mixed Commission

for the purpose. It ended by saying that any sweeping undertaken without the consent of the

Albanian Government outside the channel thus constituted, i.e., inside Albanian territorial

waters where foreign warships have no reason to sail, could only be considered as a deliberate

violation of Albanian territory and sovereignty.

After this exchange of notes, “Operation Retail” took place on November 12th and 13th.

Commander Mestre, of the French Navy, was asked to attend as observer, and was present at

the sweep on November 13th. The operation was carried out under the protection of an

important covering force composed of an aircraft carrier, cruisers and other war vessels. This

covering force remained throughout the operation at a certain distance to the west of the

Channel, except for the frigate St. Bride’s Bay, which was stationed in the Channel south-east

of Cape Kiephali. The sweep began in the morning of November 13th, at about 9 o’clock, and

ended in the afternoon near nightfall. The area swept was in Albanian territorial waters,

and within the limits of the channel previously swept.

The United Kingdom Government does not dispute that “Operation Retail” was carried

out against the clearly expressed wish of the Albanian Government. It recognizes that the

operation had not the consent of the international mine clearance organizations, that it could

not be justified as the exercise of a right of innocent passage, and lastly that, in principle,

international law does not allow a State to assemble a large number of warships in the

territorial waters of another State and to carry out minesweeping in those waters. The United

Kingdom Government states that the operation was one of extreme urgency, and that it

considered itself entitled to carry it out without anybody’s consent.

The Court does not consider this argument convincing.

Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation

of international relations. The Court recognizes that the Albanian Government’s complete

failure to carry out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic

notes, are extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But

to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the

action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty. This declaration is

in accordance with the request made by Albania through her Counsel, and is in itself

appropriate satisfaction.

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