December 23, 2024
DU LLBPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAWSemester 2

Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean(SOMALIA v. KENYA)I.C.J. Rep., 2021(Methods of Maritime Delimitation between Adjacent States)

In the claims presented by Somalia ICJ is asked to determine, on the basis of international

law, the complete course of the single maritime boundary dividing all the maritime areas

appertaining to Somalia and to Kenya in the Indian Ocean, including in the continental shelf

beyond 200 [nautical miles].

Procedural backdrop (paras. 1-28)

The Court begins by recalling that, on 28 August 2014, the Federal Republic of Somalia

(hereinafter “Somalia”) filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting

proceedings against the Republic of Kenya (hereinafter “Kenya”) concerning a dispute in

relation to “the establishment of the single maritime boundary between Somalia and Kenya in

the Indian Ocean delimiting the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone . . . and continental

shelf, including the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”. In its Application, Somalia

sought to found the jurisdiction of the Court on the declarations made, pursuant to Article 36,

paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, by Somalia on 11 April 1963 and by Kenya on 19

April 1965. On 7 October 2015, Kenya raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the

Court and to the admissibility of the Application. By its Judgment of 2 February 2017

(hereinafter the “2017 Judgment”), the Court rejected the preliminary objections raised by

Kenya, and found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by Somalia and that

the Application was admissible. Following the filing of the Parties’ written pleadings, public

hearings on the merits were held from 15 to 18 March 2021. Kenya did not participate in

those hearings.

I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (PARAS. 31-34)

The Court first recalls the Parties’ geographical situation, before noting the following facts.

On 15 July 1924, Italy and the United Kingdom concluded a treaty regulating certain

questions concerning the boundaries of their respective territories in East Africa, including

what Somalia describes as “the Italian colony of Jubaland”, located in present-day Somalia,

and the British colony of Kenya. By an Exchange of Notes dated 16 and 26 June 1925, the

boundary between the Italian and British colonial territories was redefined in its southernmost

section. Between 1925 and 1927, a joint British-Italian commission surveyed and demarcated

the boundary. Following the completion of this exercise, the commission recorded its

decisions in an Agreement signed on 17 December 1927 (hereinafter the “1927 Agreement”),

which was subsequently formally confirmed by an Exchange of Notes of 22 November 1933

between the British and Italian Governments (the 1927 Agreement and this Exchange of

Notes hereinafter collectively being referred to as the “1927/1933 treaty arrangement”).

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Somalia and Kenya gained their independence in 1960 and 1963, respectively. Both Parties

signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS” or the

“Convention”) on 10 December 1982. They ratified it on 2 March 1989 and 24 July 1989,

respectively, and the Convention entered into force for them on 16 November 1994.

Both Somalia and Kenya have filed submissions with the Commission on the Limits of the

Continental Shelf (hereinafter the “CLCS” or the “Commission”) in order to obtain its

recommendations on the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelves beyond

200 nautical miles, in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS. While they

previously objected to the consideration by the Commission of each other’s submissions,

these objections were subsequently withdrawn. As of the date of the Judgment, the

Commission has yet to issue its recommendations in respect of the Parties’ submissions.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES (PARA. 35)

The Court notes that the Parties have adopted fundamentally different approaches to the

delimitation of the maritime areas. Somalia argues that no maritime boundary exists between

the two States and asks the Court to plot a boundary line using the equidistance/special

circumstances method (for the delimitation of the territorial sea) and the equidistance/relevant

circumstances method (for the maritime areas beyond the territorial sea). In its view, an

unadjusted equidistance line throughout all maritime areas achieves the equitable result

required by international law. Kenya, for its part, contends that there is already an agreed

maritime boundary between the Parties, because Somalia has acquiesced to a boundary that

follows the parallel of latitude at 1° 39′ 43.2″ S (hereinafter “the parallel of latitude”). Kenya

further contends that the Parties have considered this to be an equitable delimitation, in light

of both the geographical context and regional practice. Kenya submits that, even if the Court

were to conclude that there is no maritime boundary in place, it should delimit the maritime

areas following the parallel of latitude, and that, even if the Court were to employ the

delimitation methodology suggested by Somalia, the outcome, following adjustment to reach

an equitable result, would be a delimitation that follows the parallel of latitude.

III. WHETHER SOMALIA HAS ACQUIESCED TO A MARITIME BOUNDARY

FOLLOWING THE PARALLEL OF LATITUDE (PARAS. 36-89)

The Court first ascertains whether there is an agreed maritime boundary between the Parties

on the basis of acquiescence by Somalia.

It recalls that both Kenya and Somalia are parties to UNCLOS. For the delimitation of the

territorial sea, Article 15 of the Convention provides for the use of a median line “failing

agreement between [the two States] to the contrary”, unless “it is necessary by reason of

historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a

[different] way”. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf is

governed by Article 74, paragraph 1, and Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Convention,

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respectively. They establish that delimitation “shall be effected by agreement on the basis of

international law”.

The Court reiterates that maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent

coasts must be effected by means of an agreement between them, and that, where such an

agreement has not been achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party

possessing the necessary competence. Maritime delimitation cannot be effected unilaterally

by either of the States concerned.

An agreement establishing a maritime boundary is usually expressed in written form. The

Court considers, however, that the “agreement” referred to in Article 15, Article 74,

paragraph 1, and Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Convention may take other forms as well.

The essential question is whether there is a shared understanding between the States

concerned regarding their maritime boundaries.

The jurisprudence relating to acquiescence and tacit agreement may be of assistance when

examining whether there exists an agreement that is not in written form regarding the

maritime boundary between two States. In this regard, the Court recalls that acquiescence is

equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may

interpret as consent. If the circumstances are such that the conduct of the other State calls for

a response, within a reasonable period, the absence of a reaction may amount to acquiescence.

This is based on the principle qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset. In

determining whether a State’s conduct calls for a response from another State, it is important

to consider whether the State has consistently maintained that conduct. In evaluating the

absence of a reaction, duration may be a significant factor.

The Court observes that it has set a high threshold for proof that a maritime boundary has

been established by acquiescence or tacit agreement. It has thus emphasized that since the

establishment of a permanent maritime boundary is a matter of grave importance, evidence of

a tacit legal agreement must be compelling. Acquiescence presupposes clear and consistent

acceptance of another State’s position. To date, the Court has recognized the existence of a

tacit agreement delimiting a maritime boundary in only one case, in which the parties had

acknowledged in a binding international agreement that a maritime boundary already existed.

In the present case, the Court uses the criteria it has identified in earlier cases and examines

whether there is compelling evidence that Kenya’s claim to a maritime boundary at the

parallel of latitude was maintained consistently and, consequently, called for a response from

Somalia. It then considers whether there is compelling evidence that Somalia clearly and

consistently accepted the boundary claimed by Kenya.

In this respect, the Court notes that Somalia and Kenya present arguments regarding the

Proclamations by the President of the Republic of Kenya dated 28 February 1979 and 9 June

2005 (hereinafter the “1979 Proclamation” and the “2005 Proclamation”), Kenya’s 2009

Submission to the CLCS and their respective domestic laws. They also refer to other conduct

of the Parties in the period between 1979 and 2014. The Court examines these arguments in

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turn.

The Court observes that the 1979 and 2005 Proclamations both claim a boundary at the

parallel of latitude, but Kenya’s legislation refers to a boundary along a median or

equidistance line. Moreover, in Notes Verbales of 26 September 2007 and 4 July 2008, Kenya

requested Somalia to confirm its agreement to a boundary along the parallel of latitude, but it

has not been shown that Somalia provided such confirmation. Furthermore, Kenya’s 2009

Submission to the CLCS and a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter the “MOU”)

signed by the two States that same year recognize the existence of a maritime boundary

dispute between the Parties. Finally, the negotiations held between the Parties in 2014 and

Notes Verbales of Kenya in 2014 and 2015 also indicate a lack of agreement between the

Parties on their maritime boundaries. In light of the foregoing, the Court considers that Kenya

has not consistently maintained its claim that the parallel of latitude constitutes the single

maritime boundary with Somalia. It thus concludes that there is no compelling evidence that

Kenya’s claim and related conduct were consistently maintained and, consequently, called for

a response from Somalia.

The Court also considers that Somalia’s conduct between 1979 and 2014 in relation to its

maritime boundary with Kenya, in particular its alleged absence of protest against Kenya’s

claim, does not establish Somalia’s clear and consistent acceptance of a maritime boundary at

the parallel of latitude. In this regard, the Court is of the view that, contrary to what is claimed

by Kenya, it cannot be inferred from the Parties’ positions during the Third United Nations

Conference on the Law of the Sea that Somalia rejected equidistance as a possible method of

achieving an equitable solution. Moreover, there is no indication that Somalia accepted the

boundary claimed by Kenya during the bilateral negotiations held in 1980 and 1981.

Furthermore, although Somalia’s Maritime Law of 1988 refers to a boundary for the

territorial sea which follows “a straight line toward the sea from the land as indicated on the

enclosed charts”, this phrase is unclear and, without the charts mentioned, its meaning cannot

be determined. The Court also notes that the 2009 MOU, Somalia’s 2009 submission of

preliminary information to the CLCS, a letter from Somalia dated 19 August 2009 and

addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Somalia’s 2014 objection to

the consideration by the CLCS of Kenya’s submission all mention the existence of a maritime

boundary dispute between the Parties. Finally, the Court adds that the context of the civil war

that afflicted Somalia, depriving it of a fully operational government and administration

between 1991 and 2005, must be taken into account in evaluating the extent to which it was in

a position to react to Kenya’s claim during this period.

In addition, the Court examines other conduct of the Parties between 1979 and 2014

concerning naval patrols, fisheries, marine scientific research and oil concessions, and

considers that it does not confirm that Somalia has clearly and consistently accepted a

boundary at the parallel of latitude.

In conclusion on this question, the Court finds that there is no compelling evidence that

Somalia has acquiesced to the maritime boundary claimed by Kenya and that, consequently,

there is no agreed maritime boundary between the Parties at the parallel of latitude. It

therefore rejects Kenya’s claim in this respect.

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IV. MARITIME DELIMITATION (PARAS. 90-197)

In view of this conclusion, the Court turns to the delimitation of the maritime areas

appertaining to Somalia and Kenya.

A. Applicable law (para. 92)

The Court first recalls that both Somalia and Kenya are parties to UNCLOS, and the

provisions of the Convention must therefore be applied in determining the course of the

maritime boundary between the two States.

B. Starting-point of the maritime boundary (paras. 93-98)

The Court notes that although the Parties initially proffered divergent views on the

appropriate approach to defining the starting-point of the maritime boundary, those views

evolved in the course of the proceedings and are now by and large concordant. Taking into

account the views of the Parties, the Court considers that the starting-point of the maritime

boundary is to be determined by connecting the final permanent boundary beacon, known as

Primary Beacon No. 29, or “PB 29”, to a point on the low-water line by a straight line that

runs in a south-easterly direction and that is perpendicular to “the general trend of the

coastline at Dar Es Salam” in accordance with the terms of the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement.

C. Delimitation of the territorial sea (paras. 99-118)

The Court then turns to the delimitation of the territorial sea. It notes that Somalia submits

that this delimitation is to be effected pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention, whereas

Kenya maintains that the maritime boundary in the territorial sea already exists at the parallel

of latitude. The Court recalls that it has already concluded that no such boundary was agreed

between the Parties. It also observes that Kenya, in its Counter-Memorial, referred to the

1927/1933 treaty arrangement and stated that it “provided for the establishment of [a]

boundary of the territorial sea”. The Court notes, however, that neither Party asks it to

confirm the existence of any segment of a maritime boundary or to delimit the boundary in

the territorial sea on the basis of the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement. It recalls that in their

legislation concerning the territorial sea neither Party has referred to the terms of the

1927/1933 treaty arrangement to indicate the extent of the territorial sea in relation to its

adjacent neighbour.

The Court further notes that the agenda of the meeting between Somalia and Kenya, held on

26 and 27 March 2014, to discuss the maritime boundary between the two countries, covered

all maritime zones, including the territorial sea, and that, in a presentation attached to the

report on that meeting, Kenya referred to Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the Convention as relevant

to maritime delimitation, emphasizing that Article 15 provides for delimitation through a

“[m]edian line for [the] territorial sea unless there is an agreement to the contrary based on [a]

claim by historical title and or special circumstances”. In light of the above, the Court

considers it unnecessary to decide whether the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement had as an

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objective the delimitation of the boundary in the territorial sea.

The Court recalls that the delimitation methodology is based on the geography of the coasts of

the two States concerned, and that a median or equidistance line is constructed using base

points appropriate to that geography. It explains that, although in the identification of base

points the Court will have regard to the proposals of the parties, it need not select a particular

base point, even if the parties are in agreement in that respect, if it does not consider that base

point to be appropriate. It may select a base point that neither party has proposed. The Court

further recalls that it has sometimes been led to eliminate the disproportionate effect of small

islands by not selecting a base point on such small maritime features. As the Court has stated

in the past, there may be situations in which the equitableness of an equidistance line depends

on the precaution taken to eliminate the disproportionate effect of certain islets, rocks and

minor coastal projections.

In the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers it appropriate to place base

points for the construction of the median line solely on solid land on the mainland coasts of

the Parties. It does not consider it appropriate to place base points on the tiny arid Diua

Damasciaca islets, which would have a disproportionate impact on the course of the median

line in comparison to the size of these features. For similar reasons, nor does the Court

consider it appropriate to select a base point on a low-tide elevation off the southern tip of Ras

Kaambooni, which is a minor protuberance in Somalia’s otherwise relatively straight

coastline in the vicinity of the land boundary terminus, which constitutes the starting-point for

the maritime delimitation.

The Court then gives the geographic co-ordinates of the base points that it places on the

Parties’ coasts for the construction of the median line. The resulting line starts from the land

boundary terminus and continues out to the point (Point A) at a distance of 12 nautical miles

from the coast. That median line is depicted on sketch-map No. 5 (reproduced in Annex 2).

The Court observes that the course of the median line corresponds closely to that of a line “at

right angles to the general trend of the coastline”, assuming that the 1927/1933 treaty

arrangement, in using this phrase, had as an objective to draw a line that continues into the

territorial sea, a question that the Court need not decide.

D. Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf within 200

nautical miles (paras. 119-177)

1. Delimitation methodology (paras. 119-131)

The Court then proceeds to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the

continental shelf within 200 nautical miles from the coasts of the Parties, noting that the

relevant provisions of the Convention for this exercise are contained in Article 74 of

UNCLOS for the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and Article 83 for the

delimitation of the continental shelf. It observes that those provisions are of a very general

nature and do not provide much by way of guidance for those involved in the maritime

delimitation exercise. The goal of that exercise is to achieve an equitable solution. If two

States have freely agreed on a maritime boundary, they are deemed to have achieved such an

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equitable solution. However, if they fail to reach an agreement on their maritime boundary

and the matter is submitted to the Court, it is the task of the Court to find an equitable solution

in the maritime delimitation it has been requested to effect.

The Court recalls that, since the adoption of the Convention, it has gradually developed a

maritime delimitation methodology to assist it in carrying out its task. In determining the

maritime delimitation line, the Court proceeds in three stages, which it described in the case

concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine). In the first stage,

the Court will establish the provisional equidistance line from the most appropriate base

points on the parties’ coasts. In the second, the Court will consider whether there are factors

calling for the adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve

an equitable result. In the third and final stage, the Court will subject the envisaged

delimitation line, either the equidistance line or the adjusted line, to the disproportionality

test. The purpose of this test is to assure the Court that there is no marked disproportion

between the ratio of the lengths of the parties’ relevant coasts and the ratio of the parties’

respective shares in the relevant area to be delimited by the envisaged line, and thus to

confirm that the delimitation achieves an equitable solution as required by the Convention.

The Court observes that the three-stage methodology is not prescribed by UNCLOS and

therefore is not mandatory. It has been developed by the Court in its jurisprudence on

maritime delimitation as part of its effort to arrive at an equitable solution, as required by

Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention. The methodology is based on objective, geographical

criteria, while at the same time taking into account any relevant circumstances bearing on the

equitableness of the maritime boundary. It has brought predictability to the process of

maritime delimitation and has been applied by the Court in a number of past cases. The threestage methodology for maritime delimitation has also been used by international tribunals.

The Court will nonetheless abstain from using the three-stage methodology if there are factors

which make the application of the equidistance method inappropriate, for instance if the

construction of an equidistance line from the coasts is not feasible. This is not the case in the

present circumstances, however, where such a line can be constructed.

Moreover, the Court does not consider that the use of the parallel of latitude is the appropriate

methodology to achieve an equitable solution, as suggested by Kenya. A boundary along the

parallel of latitude would produce a severe cut-off effect on the maritime projections of the

southernmost coast of Somalia.

The Court therefore sees no reason in the present case to depart from its usual practice of

using the three-stage methodology to establish the maritime boundary between Somalia and

Kenya in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf.

2. Relevant coasts and relevant area (paras. 132-141)

(a) Relevant coasts (paras. 132-137)

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The Court begins by identifying the relevant coasts of the Parties, namely those coasts whose

projections overlap. It states that, using radial projections which overlap within 200 nautical

miles, it has identified that the relevant coast of Somalia extends for approximately 733 km

and that of Kenya for approximately 511 km.

(b) Relevant area (paras. 138-141)

The Court notes that the Parties disagree as to the identification of the relevant area. It recalls

that it has explained on a number of occasions that the relevant area comprises that part of the

maritime space in which the potential entitlements of the parties overlap. The Court also

recalls its observation that the relevant area cannot extend beyond the area in which the

entitlements of both parties overlap. In the present case, the Court is of the view that, in the

north, the relevant area extends as far as the overlap of the maritime projections of the coast

of Kenya and the coast of Somalia. The Court considers it appropriate to use the overlap of

the 200-nautical-mile radial projections from the land boundary terminus. As far as the

southern limit of the relevant area is concerned, the Court notes that the Parties agree that the

maritime space south of the boundary between Kenya and Tanzania is not part of the relevant

area. The relevant area, as identified by the Court for the purpose of delimiting the exclusive

economic zone and the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles from the coasts, measures

approximately 212,844 sq km.

3. Provisional equidistance line (paras. 142-146)

The Court next constructs the provisional equidistance line. It identifies the appropriate base

points for the construction of this line within 200 nautical miles of the coasts. The provisional

equidistance line constructed on the basis of these base points begins from the endpoint of the

maritime boundary in the territorial sea (Point A) and continues until it reaches 200 nautical

miles from the starting-point of the maritime boundary, at a point (Point 10′) the co-ordinates

of which are given in the Judgment. The line thus obtained is depicted on sketch-map No. 9

(reproduced in Annex 2).

4. Whether there is a need to adjust the provisional equidistance line (paras. 147-174)

The Court considers whether there are factors requiring the adjustment or shifting of the

provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable solution. It recalls that Kenya

perceives the provisional equidistance line as inequitable while Somalia sees no plausible

reason for adjusting the line and believes that it would constitute an equitable boundary.

The Court notes that Kenya, by invoking various factors which it considers relevant

circumstances in the context of this case, has consistently sought a maritime boundary that

would follow the parallel of latitude. The Court has already concluded that no maritime

boundary between Somalia and Kenya following the parallel of latitude was established in the

past. Nor has the Court accepted the methodology based on the parallel of latitude for

establishing the maritime boundary between the Parties as advocated by Kenya. Kenya would

now like to achieve the same result by a major shifting of the provisional equidistance line,

changing its south-easterly direction to an exclusively easterly direction. The Court considers

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that such a shifting of the provisional equidistance line, as argued for by Kenya, would

represent a radical adjustment while clearly not achieving an equitable solution. It would

severely curtail Somalia’s entitlements to the continental shelf and the exclusive economic

zone generated by its coast adjacent to that of Kenya. A line thus adjusted would not allow

the Parties’ coasts to produce their effects in terms of maritime entitlements in a reasonable

and mutually balanced way.

The Court begins by considering those factors, relied on by Kenya, which are nongeographical in nature. First, as far as Kenya’s security interests are concerned, the Court

observes that boundaries between States, including maritime boundaries, are aimed at

providing permanency and stability. This being so, the Court believes that the current security

situation in Somalia and in the maritime spaces adjacent to its coast is not of a permanent

nature. The Court is therefore of the view that the current security situation does not justify

the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. Moreover, the Court recalls its statement

in a previous case that legitimate security considerations may be a relevant circumstance if a

maritime delimitation was effected particularly near to the coast of a State. This is not the

case here, as the provisional equidistance line does not pass near the coast of Kenya.

The Court also recalls that control over the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf

is not normally associated with security considerations and does not affect rights of

navigation.

Access for Kenya’s fisherfolk to natural resources is another factor which Kenya brought to

the attention of the Court when arguing for the adjustment of the line. The Court explains that

such a factor can be taken into account as a relevant circumstance in exceptional cases, in

particular if the line would likely entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and

economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned. On the basis of the

evidence before it, the Court is not convinced that the provisional equidistance line would

entail such harsh consequences for the population of Kenya in the present case. Moreover, the

Court has to consider the well-being of the populations on both sides of the delimitation line.

In light of the foregoing, the Court cannot accept Kenya’s argument that the provisional

equidistance line would deny Kenya equitable access to fisheries resources that are vital to its

population.

The Court then turns to another argument put forward by Kenya. It contends that the evidence

of the Parties’ long-standing and consistent conduct in relation to oil concessions, naval

patrols, fishing and other activities reflects the existence of “a de facto maritime boundary”

along the parallel of latitude which calls for the adjustment of the provisional equidistance

line. However, the Court recalls that it has already concluded that no maritime boundary

along the parallel of latitude has been agreed by the Parties. There is no de facto maritime

boundary between Somalia and Kenya. The Court therefore cannot accept Kenya’s argument

that, on the basis of the conduct of the Parties, the provisional equidistance line has to be

adjusted so that it coincides with the alleged de facto maritime boundary.

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Finally, the Court considers the two remaining arguments which, according to Kenya, call for

the adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. Kenya submits that the application of an

equidistance line would produce a significant cut-off effect with respect to its maritime areas,

and that the regional context and practice require the provisional equidistance line to be

adjusted.

The Court recalls that both the ICJ itself and international tribunals have acknowledged that

the use of an equidistance line can produce a cut-off effect, particularly where the coastline is

characterized by concavity, and that an adjustment of that line might be necessary in order to

reach an equitable solution. Nevertheless, it considers that any cut-off effect as a result of the

Kenya-Tanzania maritime boundary is not a relevant circumstance. The agreements between

Kenya and Tanzania are res inter alios acta and cannot per se affect the maritime boundary

between Kenya and Somalia. However, the issue to be considered in the present case is

whether the use of an equidistance line produces a cut-off effect for Kenya, not as a result of

the agreed boundary between Kenya and Tanzania, but as a result of the configuration of the

coastline.

The Court observes that if the examination of the coastline is limited only to the coasts of

Kenya and Somalia, any concavity is not conspicuous. However, examining only the

coastlines of the two States concerned to assess the extent of any cut-off effect resulting from

the geographical configuration of the coastline may be an overly narrow approach. Examining

the concavity of the coastline in a broader geographical configuration is consistent with the

approach taken by this Court and international tribunals. In this regard, the Court refers, in

particular, to the two North Sea Continental Shelf cases and the Bangladesh/Myanmar and

Bangladesh v. India cases, before stating that, in the present case, the potential cut-off of

Kenya’s maritime entitlements should be assessed in a broader geographical configuration. In

the Court’s view, the potential cut-off of Kenya’s maritime entitlements cannot be properly

observed by examining the coasts of Kenya and Somalia in isolation. When the mainland

coasts of Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania are observed together, as a whole, the coastline is

undoubtedly concave. Kenya faces a cut-off of its maritime entitlements as the middle State

located between Somalia and Tanzania. The presence of Pemba Island, a large and populated

island that appertains to Tanzania, accentuates this cut-off effect because of its influence on

the course of a hypothetical equidistance line between Kenya and Tanzania. The provisional

equidistance line between Somalia and Kenya progressively narrows the coastal projection of

Kenya, substantially reducing its maritime entitlements within 200 nautical miles. This cut-off

effect occurs as a result of the configuration of the coastline extending from Somalia to

Tanzania, independently of the boundary line agreed between Kenya and Tanzania, which in

fact mitigates that effect in the south, in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental

shelf up to 200 nautical miles.

The Court recalls its jurisprudence and that of international tribunals according to which an

adjustment of the provisional equidistance line is warranted if the cut-off effect is “serious” or

“significant”. In the Court’s view, even though the cut-off effect in the present case is less

pronounced than in some other cases, it is nonetheless still serious enough to warrant some

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adjustment to address the substantial narrowing of Kenya’s potential entitlements. In order to

attenuate this cut-off effect, the Court considers it reasonable to adjust the provisional

equidistance line. In view of these considerations, the Court believes that it is necessary to

shift the line to the north so that, from Point A, it follows a geodetic line with an initial

azimuth of 114o. This line would attenuate in a reasonable and mutually balanced way the

cut-off effect produced by the unadjusted equidistance line due to the geographical

configuration of the coasts of Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania. The resulting line would end at

its intersection with the 200-nautical-mile limit from the coast of Kenya, at a point (Point B)

the co-ordinates of which are given in the Judgment. The line thus adjusted is depicted on

sketch-map No. 11 (reproduced in Annex 2).

5. Disproportionality test (paras. 175-177)

In the final stage, the Court checks whether the envisaged delimitation line leads to a

significant disproportionality between the ratio of the lengths of the Parties’ respective

relevant coasts and the ratio of the size of the relevant areas apportioned by that line. The

Court recalls that the relevant coast of Somalia is 733 km long, and that of Kenya, 511 km

long. The ratio of the relevant coasts is 1:1.43 in favour of Somalia. The maritime boundary

determined by the Court divides the relevant area within 200 nautical miles of the coast in

such a way that approximately 120,455 sqkm would appertain to Kenya and the remaining

part, measuring approximately 92,389 sq km, would appertain to Somalia. The ratio between

the maritime zones that would appertain respectively to Kenya and Somalia is 1:1.30 in

favour of Kenya. A comparison of these two ratios does not reveal any significant or marked

disproportionality. The Court is thus satisfied that the adjusted line that it has established as

the maritime boundary for the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelves of

Somalia and Kenya within 200 nautical miles in the Indian Ocean achieves an equitable

solution as required by Article 74, paragraph 1, and Article 83, paragraph 1, of the

Convention.

E. Question of the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (paras.

178-197)

The Court turns finally to the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200

nautical miles. It first recalls that both Parties have asked the Court to determine the complete

course of the maritime boundary between them, including the continental shelf beyond 200

nautical miles. The Court also recalls that any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200

miles by a State party to UNCLOS must be in accordance with Article 76 of the Convention

and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf established

thereunder.

The Court observes that both States have made submissions on the limits of the continental

shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission in accordance with Article 76, paragraph

8, of UNCLOS. The Court notes that both Somalia and Kenya have fulfilled their obligations

under Article 76 of the Convention. At the same time, the Commission has yet to consider

these submissions and make any recommendations to Somalia and to Kenya on matters

related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelves. It is only after such

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recommendations are made that Somalia and Kenya can establish final and binding outer

limits of their continental shelves, in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS.

The Court emphasizes that the lack of delineation of the outer limit of the continental shelf is

not, in and of itself, an impediment to its delimitation between two States with adjacent

coasts, as is the case here. The exercise by international courts and tribunals of their

jurisdiction regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries, including that of the

continental shelf, is without prejudice to the exercise by the Commission of its functions on

matters related to the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf.

The Court observes that the Parties’ entitlements to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical

miles are to be determined by reference to the outer edge of the continental margin, to be

ascertained in accordance with Article 76, paragraphs 4 and 5, of UNCLOS. The entitlement

of a State to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles thus depends on geological and

geomorphological criteria, subject to the constraints set out in Article 76, paragraph 5. An

essential step in any delimitation is to determine whether there are entitlements, and whether

they overlap. The situation in the present case is not the same as that addressed by the

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case. In that case,

the unique situation in the Bay of Bengal and the negotiation record at the Third United

Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which threw a particular light upon the parties’

contentions on the subject, were sufficient to enable the Tribunal to proceed with the

delimitation of the area beyond 200 nautical miles.

The Court notes that in their submissions to the Commission both Somalia and Kenya claim

on the basis of scientific evidence a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and that their

claims overlap. In most of the area of overlapping claims beyond 200 nautical miles, both

Parties claim that their continental shelf extends to a maximum distance of 350 nautical miles.

The Court further notes that neither Party questions the existence of the other Party’s

entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles or the extent of that claim. Their

dispute concerns the boundary delimiting that shelf between them. Both Parties in their

submissions — Somalia in those presented at the close of the hearings and Kenya in its

Rejoinder — request the Court to delimit the maritime boundary between them in the Indian

Ocean up to the outer limit of the continental shelf. For the reasons set out above, the Court

proceeds to do so.

As regards the relevant circumstances invoked by Kenya for the adjustment of the provisional

equidistance line, the Court observes that it has already considered them earlier and adjusted

the line accordingly in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf up to 200

nautical miles. It recalls that both Somalia and Kenya have claimed a continental shelf

extending up to 350 nautical miles in the greater part of the area of overlapping claims. In

view of the foregoing, the Court considers it appropriate to extend the geodetic line used for

the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf within 200 nautical

miles to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.

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The Court therefore concludes that the maritime boundary beyond 200 nautical miles

continues along the same geodetic line as the adjusted line within 200 nautical miles until it

reaches the outer limits of the Parties’ continental shelves, which are to be delineated by

Somalia and Kenya, respectively, on the basis of the recommendations to be made by the

Commission, or until it reaches the area where the rights of third States may be affected. The

direction of that line is depicted on sketch-map No. 12 (reproduced in Annex 2).

The Court adds that, depending on the extent of Kenya’s entitlement to a continental shelf

beyond 200 nautical miles as it may be established in the future on the basis of the

Commission’s recommendation, the delimitation line might give rise to an area of limited size

located beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast of Kenya and within 200 nautical miles

from the coast of Somalia, but on the Kenyan side of the delimitation line (“grey area”). This

possible grey area is depicted on sketch-map No. 12. Since the existence of this “grey area” is

only a possibility, the Court does not consider it necessary, in the circumstances of the present

case, to pronounce itself on the legal régime that would be applicable in that area. The

complete course of the maritime boundary is depicted on sketch-map No. 13 (reproduced in

Annex 2).

V. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS BY KENYA OF ITS INTERNATIONAL

OBLIGATIONS (PARAS. 198-213)

The Court first examines the Applicant’s argument that, by its unilateral actions in the

disputed area, Kenya has violated Somalia’s sovereignty over the territorial sea and its

sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf.

The Court recalls that Somalia’s submission was made in the context of proceedings

regarding a maritime boundary which had never before been settled, and that the present

Judgment has the effect of fixing the maritime boundary between the Parties. The Court

considers that when maritime claims of States overlap, maritime activities undertaken by a

State in an area which is subsequently attributed to another State by a judgment cannot be

considered to be in violation of the sovereign rights of the latter if those activities were

carried out before the judgment was delivered and if the area concerned was the subject of

claims made in good faith by both States. Somalia complains of surveying and drilling

activities conducted or authorized by Kenya in areas located entirely or partially north of the

equidistance line claimed by Somalia as the maritime boundary.

There is no evidence that Kenya’s claims over the zone concerned were not made in good

faith. Under the circumstances, the Court concludes that it has not been established that

Kenya’s maritime activities, including those that may have been conducted in parts of the

disputed area that have now been attributed to Somalia, were in violation of Somalia’s

sovereignty or its sovereign rights and jurisdiction.

The Court then turns to the Applicant’s argument that Kenya’s activities were in violation of

Article 74, paragraph 3, and Article 83, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS. Under these provisions,

States with opposite or adjacent coasts that have not reached an agreement on the delimitation

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of the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf are under an obligation to “make every

effort . . . during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final

agreement”. The Court considers that the “transitional period” mentioned in these provisions

refers to the period from the moment the maritime delimitation dispute has been established

until a final delimitation by agreement or adjudication has been achieved. The Court recalls

that it is of the view that a maritime delimitation dispute between the Parties has been

established since 2009. Accordingly, the Court only examines whether the activities

conducted by Kenya after 2009 jeopardized or hampered the reaching of a final agreement on

the delimitation of the maritime boundary.

The Court observes that Somalia complains of certain activities, including the award of oil

concession blocks to private operators and the performance of seismic and other surveys in

those blocks, which are of a transitory character. In the Court’s view, these activities are not

of the kind that could lead to permanent physical change in the marine environment, and it

has not been established that they had the effect of jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of

a final agreement on the delimitation of the maritime boundary. Somalia also complains of

certain drilling activities which are of the kind that could lead to permanent physical change

in the marine environment. Such activities may alter the status quo between the parties to a

maritime dispute and could jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement. However,

the Court is of the opinion that, on the basis of the evidence before it, it is not in a position to

determine with sufficient certainty that drilling operations that could have led to permanent

physical change in the disputed area took place after 2009. The Court further notes that, in

2014, the Parties engaged in negotiations on maritime delimitation and that, in 2016, Kenya

suspended its activities in the disputed area and offered to enter into provisional arrangements

with Somalia. In light of these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that the activities

carried out by Kenya in the disputed area jeopardized or hampered the reaching of a final

agreement on the delimitation of the maritime boundary, in violation of Article 74, paragraph

3, or Article 83, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Kenya has not violated its international obligations

through its maritime activities in the disputed area. Since Kenya’s international responsibility

is not engaged, the Court need not examine Somalia’s request for reparation. Somalia’s

submission must therefore be rejected.

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