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Full Case Details
Appellant was the Company Secretary of the Haryana Seeds Development Corporation
Ltd., a government company. The short question in this appeal was whether in the course of
the disciplinary inquiry initiated against the appellant by the Corporation on certain charges,
which if established might lead to appellant’s dismissal from service, appellant was entitled
to engage the services of a legal practitioner in the conduct of his defence. The proceedings in
the inquiry were regulated by the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
- Inquiry Authority, by his order dated August 8, 1989 had rejected the prayer made by
the appellant even at the initial stage of the inquiry for permission to engage the services of a
lawyer. Before the High Court, appellant challenged the proceedings in the inquiry on
grounds of denial of natural justice. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine.
M.N. VENKATACHALIAH AND K.N. SAIKIA, JJ.
ORDER - The right of representation by a lawyer may not in all cases be held to be a part of
natural justice. No general principle valid in all cases can be enunciated. In non-statutory
domestic tribunals, Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal in England favoured such a right
where a serious charge had been made which affected the livelihood or the right of a person to
pursue an avocation and observed. Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd.,
(1969) 1 QBD 125, 132:
“I should have thought, therefore, that when a man’s reputation or livelihood is at
stake, he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth. He also has a right to speak by
counsel or solicitor.”
But this was not followed by Lyell, J. in Pett case (No. 2) [(1970) 1 QBD 46]. - But the learned Master of Rolls, however, reiterated his earlier view in Pett case in
Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association Ltd. [1971 Ch D 591, 605-06]:
“Is a party who is charged before a domestic tribunal entitled as of right to be
legally represented? Much depends on what the rules say about it. When the rules say
nothing, then the party has no absolute right to be legally represented. It is a matter
for the discretion of the tribunal. They are masters of their own procedure: and, if
they, in the proper exercise of their discretion, decline to allow legal representation,
the courts will not interfere…. In many cases it may be a good thing for the
proceedings of a domestic tribunal to be conducted informally without legal
representation. Justice can often be done in them better by a good layman than by a
bad lawyer…. But I would emphasise that the discretion must be properly exercised.
The tribunal must not fetter its discretion by rigid bonds. A domestic tribunal is not at
liberty to lay down an absolute rule: ‘We will never allow anyone to have a lawyer to
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appear for him.’ The tribunal must be ready, in a proper case, to allow it. That applies
to anyone in authority who is entrusted with discretion. He must not fetter his
discretion by making an absolute rule from which he will never depart…. That is the
reason why this Court intervened in Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd. Mr
Pett was charged with doping a dog – a most serious offence carrying severe
penalties. He was to be tried by a domestic tribunal. There was nothing in the rules to
exclude legal representation, but the tribunal refused to allow it. Their reason was
because they never did allow it. This Court thought that that was not a proper
exercise of their discretion. Natural justice required that Mr Pett should be defended,
if he so wished, by counsel or solicitor. So we intervened and granted an injunction.
Subsequently Lyell, J. thought we were wrong. He held that Mr Pett had no right to
legal representation. But I think we were right. Maybe Mr Pett had no positive right,
but it was case where the tribunal in their discretion ought to have allowed it. And on
appeal the parties themselves agreed it. They came to an arrangement which
permitted the plaintiff to be legally represented at the inquiry. The long and short of it
is that if the court sees that a domestic tribunal is proposing to proceed in a manner
contrary to natural justice, it can intervene to stop it. The court is not bound to wait
until after it has happened:” - In C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin [(1972) 3 SCR 485], this Court
did not accept the enunciation in Pett case. Referring to Pett case it was observed:
“The rule laid down in Pett case has not commended itself to this Court. In
Kalindi v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co. Ltd. [AIR 1960 SC 914], a question
arose whether in an enquiry by management into misconduct of a workman, the
workman was entitled to be represented by a representative of the Union. Answering
this question this Court observed that a workman against whom an enquiry is being
held by the management has no right to be represented at such an enquiry by a
representative of the Union though the employer in his discretion can and may allow
him to be so represented.” - In the present case, the matter is guided by the Provisions of Rule 7(5) of the Haryana
Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 which says:
“7.(5) Where the punishing authority itself enquires into any charge or charges or
appoints an enquiry officer for holding enquiry against a person in the service of the
government, it may, by an order, appoint a government servant or a legal practitioner
to be known as a “presenting officer” to present on its behalf the case, in support of
the charge or charges.
The person against whom a charge is being enquired into, shall be allowed to
obtain the assistance of a government servant, if he so desires, in order to produce his
defence before the enquiring officer. If the charge or charges are likely to result in
the dismissal of the person from the service of the government. Such person may,
with the sanction of the enquiry officer, be represented by counsel.” - It would appear that in the inquiry, the respondent-Corporation was represented by its
Personnel and Administration Manager who is stated to be a man of law. The rule itself
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recognises that where the charges are so serious as to entail a dismissal from service the
inquiry authority may permit the services of a lawyer. This rule vests discretion. In the matter
of exercise of this discretion one of the relevant factors is whether there is likelihood of the
combat being unequal entailing a miscarriage or failure of justice and a denial of a real and
reasonable opportunity for defence by reasons of the appellant being pitted against a
presenting officer who is trained in law. Legal Adviser and a lawyer are for this purpose
somewhat liberally construed and must include “whoever assists or advises on facts and in
law must be deemed to be in the position of a legal adviser”. In the last analysis, a decision
has to be reached on a case to case basis on the situational particularities and the special
requirements of justice of the case. It is unnecessary, therefore, to go into the larger question
“whether as a sequel to an adverse verdict in a domestic enquiry serious civil and pecuniary
consequences are likely to ensue, in order to enable the person so likely to suffer such
consequences with a view to giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, on his
request, should be permitted to appear through a legal practitioner” which was kept open in
Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar [(1983) 1 SCR 828]. However, it was
held in that case:
“In our view we have reached a stage in our onward march to fair play in action
that where in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal the delinquent officer is pitted
against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to appear through a legal
practitioner the refusal to grant this request would amount to denial of a reasonable
request to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice would be
violated….” - On a consideration of the matter, we are persuaded to the view that the refusal to
sanction the service of a lawyer in the inquiry was not a proper exercise of the discretion
under the rule resulting in a failure of natural justice; particularly, in view of the fact that the
Presenting Officer was a person with legal attainments and experience. It was said that the
appellant was no less adept having been in the position of a Senior Executive and could have
defended, and did defend, himself competently; but as was observed by the learned Master of
Rolls in Pett case that in defending himself one may tend to become “nervous” or “tonguetied”. Moreover, appellant, it is claimed, has had no legal background. The refusal of the
service of a lawyer, in the facts of this case, results in denial of natural justice. - The question remains as to the manner of remedying the situation. Some
circumstances require to be noticed in this behalf. The inquiry was proceeded with and as
many as 13 witnesses have been examined. The examination-in-chief as well as such crossexamination as the appellant himself attempted is on record. They shall remain part of the
record. The examination-in-chief of these witnesses is not vitiated by reason alone of the
circumstance that the appellant did not then have the assistance of a lawyer to cross-examine
them. The situation could be remedied now by tendering the witnesses for further crossexamination by a lawyer to be engaged by the appellant. In order that further protraction of
the inquiry proceedings is avoided we required the appellant to state the names of the
witnesses he wants to be so tendered for further cross-examination. Appellant has filed a list
of eight such witnesses, viz. J.L. Sah Thulgharia, Production Manager; Joginder Singh, Senior
Scale Stenographer; D.M. Tyagi, Executive Engineer; Vakil Singh, Ex-Driver; B.P. Bansal,
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Chief Accounts Officer; Randhir Singh, Manager (Personnel) and R.S. Malik, Ex-Managing
Director. The further proceedings of the inquiry shall be commenced on October 20 and
continued from day to day. - There shall be no necessity for the inquiry authority to issue fresh notices to the
appellant in respect of the further proceedings on that day. The appellant shall appear along
with his lawyer before the inquiry authority on that date and the subsequent dates to which the
proceedings may stand adjourned. Appellant’s lawyer shall be entitled to cross-examine these
witnesses and to address arguments. The inquiry officer shall be at liberty to refuse any prayer
for adjournment which he thinks unreasonable and which in his opinion is intended to protract
the proceedings.
