Case Summary
| Citation | Lee v. Knapp (1967) 2 Q.B. 442 |
| Keywords | section 77(1) of Road Traffic Act, golden rule of interpretation, accident, “stop” word |
| Facts | The defendant, Mr. Knapp, had driven a vehicle around the block in the city where his company’s office was situated. Unfortunately, the van he was driving collided with a parked vehicle. The parked vehicle belongs to Mr. Strachan, who heard the noise, saw his own car through the window, and came down, but the defendant had gone from the site. The defendant stopped his van for a while but did not provide the details to Mr. Strachan. Section 77(1) of Road Traffic Act, says that if anyone on motor vehicle causes accident then he shall stop there and provide necessary details to the person causing injury or bystanders. |
| Issues | Whether the defendant committed a breach of section 77(1) of Road Traffic Act? Whether the interpretation of the word “stop” given by the defendant is correct? |
| Contentions | The defendant contended that the word “stop” in the section means to stop the defendant did and then went but did not mention how much time you have to stop. |
| Law Points | The court interpreted the word “stop” and found that the driver must stop his vehicle for a reasonable time so that necessary information could be provided either to the victim or bystander. The court also referred to the case Noblet vs Condon, where it was held that the driver must stop for a reasonable amount of time to provide his details to bystanders, and the driver stopped for 3-4 minutes does not fall within the meaning of the word “stop.” The court found that Mr. Knapp had not complied with the Act’s requirements, as he had not provided his details or stopped for a reasonable period. The interpretation of this section is that the victim in the road accident could identify the responsible parties involved. |
| Judgement | Court held that the law intended for drivers to remain at the scene of an accident for a sufficient time to allow the exchange of information. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority | Section 77(1) of Road Traffic Act, 1960 if in any case owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on a road accident occurs whereby damage is caused to a vehicle other than that motor vehicle, the driver of the motor vehicle shall stop and, if required so to do by any person having reasonable ground for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle. |
Full Case Details
WINN L.J. – This is an appeal on a case stated by one of the metropolitan stipendiary magistrates in respect of an adjudication made at Clerkenwell magistrates court. It is not necessary to go into the details of the matter. Broadly speaking and in so far as any of the facts are material, what happened was this: the defendant had driven a vehicle round the block in the City in which his company’s office stood for the particular purpose of demonstrating to his own van driver, he being the managing director of a clothing manufacturing company, that a new two-ton van that the company had bought was really quite easy to handle; the driver had been doubtful about that.
The question of law is whether or not by leaving the van when he did, and so soon as he did, and going away himself to his company’s offices, the defendant committed a breach of section 77 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, which provides, so far as material, that if in any case owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on a road an accident occurs whereby damage is caused to a vehicle other than that motor vehicle, the driver of the motor vehicle shall stop and, if required so to do by any person having reasonable ground for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle.
The unfortunate car that had been run into was owned by a Mr. Strachan, who heard the noise and, presumably having looked out of the window and seen that his own car which was parked there was involved, at once went down, and I dare say he did not tarry on his way. When he got there the defendant had gone, but the transport manager came up very shortly afterwards and duly exchanged particulars with Mr. Strachan. The police arrived shortly after that. The police did not see Mr. Kay, the transport manager, it seems, but presumably having been told by Mr. Strachan to whom the car belonged, they came to the offices of the company of which the defendant is the managing director, and interviewed him; he at once admitted that he had driven the van but stated truly enough, in his own understanding of the word, that he had stopped and he admitted that he had not personally given the name and address as required by the section.
The word “stopped” requires to be considered in the section which I have read: “the driver of the motor vehicle shall stop and, if required… give his name…” So far as the court is aware, the word and phrase has not fallen to be considered hitherto in any court in this country, but in South Australia in 1935 in Noblet v. Condon [1935) S.A.S.R. 329], Napier J., now the Chief Justice, sitting in the Supreme Court there, was called upon to construe the same words in section 52 of the South Australia Road Traffic Act, 1934. I pause to make it clear that I have not overlooked the point made by Mr. Owen that the report which I have before me does not disclose whether or not there is in the Australian statute a subsection (2) such as there is in section 77 of the English Act of 1960, which provides that a driver may report an accident to the police within 24 hours, though he must do it so soon as reasonably practicable, if he has not given his name and other particulars at the scene of the accident. The wording of the Australian section 52 (1) is the same in the material respect: “The driver of the motor vehicle shall stop and if required by any person [certain particulars]”.
Napier J. in that case was dealing with an accident where the driver of the vehicle involved had stopped for a period which in the judge’s view might have been, or the justices may have inferred that it was, up to three or four minutes. Napier J. said:
“I should be very sorry to give the impression that a momentary pause will exempt the driver of a motor car which is involved in an accident from the necessity for stoppong to give the particulars contemplated by the section. Upon my view of the section, the obligation is to stop for such a period as may be reasonable to enable the questions to be put, if there is anybody in the victinity who desires to put them…”
I gratefully and respectfully adopt what was said by Napier J. in that decision, and for my own part I, too, think that in section 77 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, the phrase “the driver of the motor vehicle shall stop” is properly to be construed as meaning that the driver of the motor vehicle shall stop it and remain where he has stopped it for such a period of time as in the prevailing circumstances, having regard in particular to the character of the road or place in which the accident happened, will provide a sufficient period to enable persons who have a right so to do, and reasonable ground for so doing, to require of him direct and personally the information which may be required under the section. I think myself that it is the driver’s own personal obligation to stay for such a period as I have indicated, and personally to provide the information.
To my mind it would be wholly unsatisfactory if this were not a personal duty laid upon the driver in his capacity as driver. All kinds of subsequent disputes might arise if some other person such as the transport manager, who was directed by the defendant to provide this information, were to purport to do so on behalf of the driver, and, for example, do it inaccurately or in circumstances in which for some reason or another his authority was repudiated wholly or in part by the driver at a subsequent time.
That being so, I think that upon the facts found by the magistrate he could not but convict. I look in particular at what he said in paragraph 2 of the case:
“I further found that the [defendant] did not remain at the scene of the said accident long enough to give the said Mr. Strachan, or anyone else having reasonable grounds for requiring the said particulars, any opportunity to require them of him, and that the [defendant] did not personally give his name or address”.
He construed the section in this respect in the same way in which I venture to think it should be construed.
