Introduction | jurisprudence |
Provision | section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act |
case laws | Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1957 SC 264 : 1957 SCR 152 A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman & Diu AIR 1988 SC 1700 H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994) 5 SCC 737 |
conclusion | present problem |
Who is Workman?
A “workman” is generally defined as a person engaged in manual labour or skilled trade work, often employed in industrial, construction, or technical fields. The term is used in various contexts, such as labour laws, to refer to workers who are employed for physical tasks rather than administrative or managerial roles.
Workman is defined under section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act as, “any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute”.
Key Elements of this Definition:
- Employed in any industry: The person must be working in an “industry” as defined under Section 2(j) of the same Act. This definition of “industry” is quite broad.
- Nature of work: The work performed must fall under one of the specified categories: manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, or supervisory. The actual duties performed are more important than the designation of the employee.
- Hire or reward: The employment must be for wages or some other form of compensation.
- Inclusion of certain terminated employees: Even if a person has been dismissed, discharged, or retrenched due to an industrial dispute, they are still considered a “workman” for the purpose of proceedings related to that dispute.
However, the following are specifically excluded from the definition:
- a. Persons employed in a managerial or administrative capacity.
- b. Persons employed in a supervisory capacity and earning wages exceeding a certain threshold.
- c. Armed forces personnel or police.
- d. Any individual who is not directly engaged in the work specified under the statute.
Importance of the Definition
- Industrial Dispute Protection: only workmen can raise disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act.
- Remedies in case of Termination: workmen are entitled to specific protections against wrongful termination, including compensation and reinstatement.
- Welfare Benefits: laws such as the Factories Act, 1948 and the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, provide benefits and protections to workmen.
Difference between CONTRACT OF SERVICE & CONTRACT FOR SERVICE
Basis | CONTRACT OF SERVICE | CONTRACT FOR SERVICE |
Meaning | An agreement in which employee is bonded by the employer to work under his authority. | An agreement in which an independent contractor work for the employer on a specified project without any supervision. |
Relationship | Employer-Employee (master & servant) | Principal-Contractor (Client-Contractor) |
Payment | Regular wages or salary, often with benefits | Fixed fee, milestone-based payment; benefits usually not provided |
Liability | Employer may be vicariously liable for employee’s actions within scope | Client generally not vicariously liable for contractor’s actions |
Delegation | Employee usually cannot delegate work without permission | Contractor often has more freedom to delegate |
Economic Dependence | Employee often economically dependent on the employer | Contractor may have multiple clients and more economic independence |
Termination | The employment agreement depends on the will of the employer | Termination can take place after end of the contract |
TESTS for Workman
There are two important tests are often applied by the courts for workmen:
- Due Control and Supervision Test
- Predominant Nature of Duty Test
DUE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION TEST
This test examines the extent of control and supervision exercised by the employer over the individual performing the work. The greater the control over not only what work is to be done but also how, when, and where it is to be done, the stronger the indication of an employer-employee relationship, and thus, the likelihood of the person being considered a workman.
Initially, the “control test” was a primary and often decisive factor. However, with the changing nature of work, especially with skilled and specialized jobs, the traditional control test was found to be insufficient. Modern jurisprudence acknowledges that in many professional roles, the employer may not have the expertise to dictate the how of the work, but the relationship might still be that of employer-employee. Therefore, while control and supervision remain important factors, they are not the sole determinants.
Key Aspects Considered:
- – Right to Direct: Does the employer have the right to instruct the worker on the specific methods and manner of performing the tasks?
- – Supervision: Is the worker subject to regular supervision and monitoring by the employer or their representatives?
- – Control over Working Hours and Place: Does the employer dictate the working hours and the location where the work is to be performed?
- – Provision of Tools and Materials: Who provides the necessary tools, equipment, and raw materials for the work? Typically, an employer provides these to their employees.
- – Power to Hire and Fire: While not always directly exercised on a day-to-day basis, the ultimate authority to hire and terminate suggests an employer-employee relationship.
- – Right to Reject Work: Can the employer reject the work if it doesn’t meet their standards and ask for it to be redone?
PREDOMINANT NATURE OF DUTY TEST
This test is crucial when an employee performs a variety of tasks, some of which might fall within the definition of “workman” (manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, supervisory) and others might fall within the exclusionary categories (managerial, administrative, or high-wage supervisory with managerial functions). The test seeks to identify the primary and substantial nature of the work that the employee is employed to do.
Courts apply this test to ensure that employees are classified based on the actual substance of their work rather than their job title or some minor responsibilities. If the predominant nature of the duties falls within the inclusive definition of “workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, they are likely to be considered a workman, entitled to the protections of the Act. Conversely, if the main duties are managerial or administrative, or if they are a supervisor drawing high wages and primarily exercising managerial functions, they would likely fall under the exclusionary clauses.
Key Aspects Considered:
- – Majority of Time Spent: What type of work does the employee spend the majority of their working hours performing?
- – Core Functions: What are the essential and fundamental duties and responsibilities of the employee’s role?
- – Skill Set Required: What are the primary skills and qualifications required for the job?
- – Hierarchy and Reporting Structure: While not definitive, the employee’s position in the organizational hierarchy and who they report to can provide context.
- – Incidental Duties: If an employee performs some tasks that might fall under an excluded category (e.g., a clerk occasionally supervising a junior), these incidental duties do not automatically change their status if their predominant work is clerical.
Case Laws
Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra
Facts: The appellants, lessees of salt works, held a license to manufacture salt, using part of it for chemical production and selling the rest to external buyers. They oversaw the salt manufacturing process and employed a salt superintendent.
Operations were seasonal, relying on rainwater, and the salt works were divided into plots called pattas. Each agaria (salt worker) was assigned a patta, typically retained in subsequent seasons. The appellants provided funds for initial expenses, allowing agarias to level the land and sink wells.
The superintendent monitored water density and collected brine, which was stored until it reached the right density before being released into the pattas. Agarias constructed pans, which were inspected, and salt crystals were approved for harvesting before transport to railway depots for testing. Agarias were paid based on these tests and settled accounts at the season’s end.
In 1950, a dispute arose regarding production conditions, leading the Government of Saurashtra to refer the issue to the Industrial Tribunal. The appellants claimed the agarias were independent contractors, but the Tribunal ruled they were workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellants appealed this decision, but the appeal was stayed due to ongoing proceedings.
They later filed a writ petition in the High Court, which upheld the Tribunal’s ruling. A certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India was granted, and the case was referred to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether agarias appointed in the salt works will be considered as ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
Judgement: The Court emphasized that the fundamental requirement for an individual to be classified as a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is the existence of a relationship similar to that of an employer-employee or master-servant. They relied on the established test from the case Short v. J. & W. Henderson Ltd., which states that the presence and extent of the employer’s right to supervise and control are key factors in determining the nature of the relationship.
Based on the evidence presented, the justices concluded that the appellants exercised control and supervision over the agarias throughout the salt production process, thereby establishing them as ‘workmen.’
In addressing the appellants’ arguments, the justices clarified that an individual can be considered a ‘workman’ even if they are paid on a piece-rate basis, referencing the precedent set in Sadler v. Henlock. They also distinguished between a ‘workman’ and an ‘independent contractor,’ noting that a key characteristic of a ‘workman’ is the personal performance of work. Additionally, the justices responded to the appellants’ claim regarding the agarias’ ability to hire additional labor, clarifying that this does not exclude them from being classified as ‘workmen,’ as long as they personally perform the core work.
The Court reaffirmed the distinction between a ‘workman’ and an ‘independent contractor’ and applied it to the case. Based on the evidence, it concluded that the agarias were correctly classified as ‘workmen’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision, dismissing the appeal and ordering costs, with no valid reason to overturn the Industrial Tribunal’s judgment.
A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman & Diu
Facts: Miss A. Sundarambal, the appellant, was employed as a teacher at the School of the Society of Franciscan Sisters of Mary in Caranzalem, Goa. Her employment was terminated by the management on April 25, 1975.
Following her termination, she initiated an industrial dispute through the conciliation officer; however, the conciliation proceedings were unsuccessful. Government reports indicated that the appellant did not qualify as a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, which is a prerequisite for a matter to be classified as an industrial dispute. Consequently, the conciliation officer declined to refer the case.
Subsequently, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay, challenging the validity of her termination. However, the High Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the government’s assessment that the appellant did not meet the definition of a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. After this, the appellant filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the school will be considered an industry or not under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947?
Whether the appellant will be considered a workman or not under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947?
Judgement: The Bench, referencing the precedent set in University of Delhi & Anr. v. Ram Nath, [1964] 2 S.C.R 703, noted that the University of Delhi and Miranda House College were initially determined not to be ‘industries’ under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, this decision was later overturned in the case of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. R. Rajappa & Others [1978] 3 S.C.R. 207, where the court established that educational institutions do qualify as ‘industries’ under the Act.
Building on the ruling in the Bangalore Water Supply case, the Bench addressed the specific question of whether a teacher working in an educational institution qualifies as a ‘workman’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The court reiterated that a person is considered a ‘workman’ if they perform skilled, unskilled, manual, or clerical work for hire or reward. It emphasized that the nature of the duties performed is paramount, rather than the title held.
The Bench also recognized the exceptions outlined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which specify who is excluded from the definition of a ‘workman.’
Considering these points, the Bench concluded that, even though an educational institution is classified as an ‘industry,’ a teacher, in this instance, does not fall within the definition of a ‘workman’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, ruling the appellant was not a ‘workman’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent’s counsel was directed to pay Rs. 40,000 to settle all claims.
H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz
Facts: The appellants, medical representatives engaged by companies affiliated with the respondents, initiated proceedings before the Labour Court following the termination of their services. The Labour Court adjudicated that medical representatives fell within the statutory definition of ‘workman’ as delineated in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Aggrieved by the Labour Court’s decision, the respondents preferred an appeal before the Industrial Tribunal, pursuant to the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The Industrial Tribunal, upon review, reversed the Labour Court’s ruling, determining that medical representatives did not constitute ‘workmen’ within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Dissatisfied with the Industrial Tribunal’s decision, the appellant medical representatives sought recourse by filing an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the “medical representatives”, are workmen according to the definition of “workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
Judgement: The Supreme Court held that medical representatives did not satisfy the statutory definition of ‘workman’ under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, thereby rendering the appellants’ complaint before the Industrial Court unsustainable. Consequently, the Court upheld the Industrial Court’s dismissal of the complaint.
Notwithstanding this determination, the Supreme Court directed the State Government to treat the appellants’ grievance as an industrial dispute cognizable under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court mandated that the State Government refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal in Bombay, pursuant to Section 10(1)(d) of the said Act, within four weeks from August 11, 1994.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ordered the respondent-managements to make voluntarily payments of one lakh Rs. to each appellant within six weeks from August 11, 1994. In the case, concerning an individual employee’s claim for bonus under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Court directed the respondent-managements to disburse the bonus for the years 1977-78 to 1979-80 as an ex gratia payment within the same six-week period. The Court ruled that the appellant’s complaint under the Maharashtra Act was beyond its jurisdiction, due to medical representatives not being classified as ‘workmen’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.