Case Summary
| Citation | J.H. Jadhav v. Forbes Gokak Ltd (2005) 3 SCC 202 |
| Keywords | section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, Industries, Industrial dispute |
| Facts | The respondent initially promised the appellant a promotion to the position of clerk but later retracted this promise. As a result, the appellant raised an industrial dispute before the Industrial Tribunal, challenging the denial of his promotion, especially since his juniors were promoted. In their written statement, the respondent contested the appellant’s claim, arguing that the individual dispute did not qualify as an industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it lacked support from the majority union or a significant number of workers. The appellant, Mr. Jadhav, responded by asserting that the Gokak Staff Union backed his case. He cited testimony from the union secretary and submitted documents, including letters to the Deputy Labour Commissioner and complaints to the Conciliation Officer. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Tribunal concluded that while the appellant had support from a minority union, the respondent failed to provide evidence showing that the appellant’s performance or efficiency had been taken into account when denying the promotion. The Tribunal upheld the appellant’s claim of unfair treatment, directing the respondent to promote him retroactively to the same date as his juniors’ promotions, along with associated benefits. The respondent then filed a writ petition challenging the Tribunal’s decision, which was dismissed by a single judge of the High Court. Subsequently, the respondent appealed to the appellate court. The appellate court interpreted Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act and found insufficient evidence to establish the appellant’s membership in a minority union or the union’s formal support through a resolution. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s order and upheld the Tribunal’s original judgment, effectively granting the appellant the promotion he had requested. |
| Issues | Whether the dispute will be considered an industrial dispute or not under sec 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? What are the essential conditions for the dispute to be considered an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? |
| Contentions | The appellant alleged that the respondent unfairly denied him a promotion to clerk, while simultaneously promoting his junior colleagues. He further asserted that the Gokak Mills Staff Union supported his claim, providing supporting documentation. The respondent contended that the appellant’s grievance did not constitute an industrial dispute as defined under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, due to the absence of support from a majority union or a substantial portion of the workforce. |
| Law Points | The court clarified the interpretation of ‘the union’ as outlined in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. They referenced the precedent set in M/s Workmen of Dharampal Prem Chand vs. M/s Dharampal Prem Chand (Saughandhi) 1965 (3) SCR 394, establishing that ‘the union’ can include both minority unions of the affected workers and unions that are not directly affiliated with the specific establishment. As a result, the court emphasized that support from a majority union is not a necessary condition for a dispute to be classified as an industrial dispute. Additionally, the justices stated that there is no specific format required to demonstrate union support. While a formal resolution must be provided if its existence is contested in the case, the court will review any evidence of union support presented and evaluate its significance based on the specific circumstances of the case. The Court determined that if the appellant’s services were terminated due to a separate industrial dispute, he would be entitled to the promotion benefits up to his dismissal. If not terminated, he would receive the promotion as originally ordered by the Tribunal. |
| Judgement | The Supreme Court found the High Court’s decision illogical and rejected the respondent’s request to remand the case. It upheld the appeal, overturning the High Court’s order and reinstating the Tribunal’s award with modifications. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
RUMA PAL, J. – 2. The appellant was employed by the respondent. He claimed promotion as a clerk. When this was not granted, the appellant raised an industrial dispute. The question whether the appellant was justified in his prayer for promotion with effect from the date that his juniors were promoted was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the State Government. In their written statement before the Tribunal the respondent denied the appellant’s claim for promotion on merits. In addition, it was contended by the respondent that the individual dispute raised by the appellant was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the workman was neither supported by a substantial number of workmen nor by a majority union. The appellant claims that his cause was espoused by the Gokak Mills Staff Union.
3. Before the Tribunal, apart from examining himself, the General Secretary of the Union was examined as a witness in support of the appellant’s claim. The General Secretary affirmed that the appellant was a member of the Union and that his cause has been espoused by the Union. Documents including letters written by the Union to the Deputy Labour Commissioner as well as the objection filed by the Union before the Conciliation Officer were adduced in evidence. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that in view of the evidence given by the General Secretary and the documents produced, it was clear that the appellant’s cause had been espoused by the Union which was one of the unions of the respondent employer. On the merits, the Tribunal accepted the appellant’s contentions that employees who were junior to him had been promoted as clerks. It noted that no record had been produced by the respondent to show that the management had taken into account the appellant’s production records, efficiency, attendance or behaviour while denying him promotion. The Tribunal concluded that the act of the respondent in denying promotion to the appellant amounted to unfair labour practice. An award was passed in favour of the appellant and the respondent was directed to promote the appellant as a clerk from the date his juniors were promoted and to give him all consequential benefits.
4. The award of the Industrial Tribunal was challenged by the respondent by way of a writ petition. A Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The respondent being aggrieved filed a writ appeal before the appellate court. The appellate court construed Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and came to the conclusion that an individual dispute is not an industrial dispute unless it directly and substantially affects the interest of other workmen. Secondly, it was held that an individual dispute should be taken up by a union which had representative character or by a substantial number of employees, before it would be converted into an industrial dispute neither of which according to the appellate court, had happened in the present case. It was held that there was nothing on record to show that the appellant was a member of the Union or that the dispute had been espoused by the Union by passing any resolution in that regard.
5. The definition of “industrial dispute” in Section 2(k) of the Act shows that an industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the
employment or non-employment or the terms of the employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. The definition has been the subject-matter of several decisions of this Court and the law is well settled. The locus classicus is the decision in Workmen v. Dharampal Premchand (Saughandhi) [AIR 1966 SC 182] where it was held that for the purposes of Section 2(k) it must be shown that: (1) The dispute is connected with the employment or non-employment of a workman. (2) The dispute between a single workman and his employer was sponsored or espoused by the union of workmen or by a number of workmen. The phrase “the union” merely indicates the union to which the employee belongs even though it may be a union of a minority of the workmen. (3) The establishment had no union of its own and some of the employees had joined the union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. In such a case it would be open to that union to take up the cause of the workmen if it is sufficiently representative of those workmen, despite the fact that such union was not exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. An illustration of what had been anticipated in Dharampal case is to be found in Workmen v. Indian Express (P) Ltd. [(1969) 1 SCC 228] where an “outside” union was held to be sufficiently representative to espouse the cause.
6. In the present case, it was not questioned that the appellant was a member of the Gokak Mills Staff Union. Nor was any issue raised that the Union was not of the respondent establishment. The objection as noted in the issues framed by the Industrial Tribunal was that the Union was not the majority union. Given the decision in Dharampal case the objection was rightly rejected by the Tribunal and wrongly accepted by the High Court.
7. As far as espousal is concerned there is no particular form prescribed to effect such espousal. Doubtless, the union must normally express itself in the form of a resolution which should be proved if it is in issue. However, proof of support by the union may also be available aliunde. It would depend upon the facts of each case. The Tribunal had addressed its mind to the question, appreciated the evidence both oral and documentary and found that the Union had espoused the appellant’s cause.
8. The Division Bench misapplied the principles of judicial review under Article 226 in interfering with the decision. It was not a question of there being no evidence of espousal before the Industrial Tribunal. There was evidence which was considered by the Tribunal in coming to the conclusion that the appellant’s cause had been espoused by the Union. The High Court should not have upset this finding without holding that the conclusion was irrational or perverse. The conclusion reached by the High Court is therefore unsustainable.
9. For all these reasons the decision of the High Court cannot stand and must be set aside.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent then submitted that the matter may be remanded back to the Division Bench of the High Court as the Court had not considered the other arguments raised by the respondent while impugning the award of the Industrial Tribunal. It appears from the impugned decision that the only other ground raised by the respondent in the writ appeal was that the grievance of the appellant had been belatedly raised. We have found from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal that no such contention had been raised by the respondent before the Tribunal at all. We are not prepared to allow the respondent to raise the issue before the High Court.
11. The respondent finally submitted that pursuant to disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant in the meanwhile, the appellant had been dismissed from service and that the order of dismissal was the subject-matter of a separate industrial dispute. We are not concerned with the propriety of the order of dismissal except to the extent that the appellant cannot obviously be granted actual promotion today. Nevertheless, he would be entitled to the monetary benefits of promotion pursuant to the award of the Industrial Tribunal which is the subject-matter of these proceedings up to the date of his dismissal. Any further relief that the appellant may be entitled to must of necessity abide by the final disposal of the industrial dispute relating to the order of dismissal which is said to be pending.
12. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court. The award of the Industrial Tribunal is confirmed subject to the modification that the promotion granted by the award will be given effect to notionally for the period as indicated by the award up to the date of the appellant’s dismissal from service. Reliefs in respect of the period subsequent to the order of dismissal shall be subject to the outcome of the pending industrial dispute relating to the termination of the appellant’s services. If the termination is ultimately upheld, the appellant will be entitled only to the reliefs granted by us today. If on the other hand the termination is set aside, the appellant will be entitled to promotion as granted by the award.
