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J.C. GRILLE, J. – This is an application in revision by R.S. Ruikar who has been convicted
of the abetment of the offence of molestation defined in S. 7, Criminal Law Administration
Act (23 of 1932). He was sentenced to six months’ rigorous imprisonment, and the sentence
was upheld on appeal. The facts found are as follows: The Nagpur Textile Union of which
the applicant is the President had determined on a strike of textile workers in Nagpur, the
ground being that certain conditions in the terms of settlement of a strike in the previous year
1933 had been evaded by the Empress Mills in Nagpur. The strike was ordered, but did not at
first meet with the response which the union desired and consequently a system of picketing
was inaugurated. On 3rd, 4th and 6th May 1934 the applicant made speeches supporting the
strike and in the course of his speeches advocated and encouraged the picketing of the mills
and called for volunteers to carry on the picketing. On the morning of 5th May as a result of a
complaint made by some of the strike committee that two women picketers had been harassed
by the police and driven away, the applicant brought his wife to one of the mill gates and
posted her there with instructions to beat, with her slippers, any one who interfered with her.
Charges were framed under four heads, three relating to the speeches delivered on 3rd, 4th and
6th May 1934 and the fourth relating to the incident of the abetment of picketing by his wife
on 5th May. Proceedings were taken against the applicant on 7th May under S. 107, Criminal
P.C., and it is admitted that after that there were no further activities on his part. He was not
however arrested for the offences of which he has been charged and of which he has been
convicted until the 16th May. The proceedings under S. 107, Criminal P.C., are in abeyance.
The principal contention on behalf of the applicant is that on the facts found against him
in trial and in appeal no offence has been committed as S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act
(23 of 1932) can have no application to purely industrial disputes.
In order to support the view that S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act, has no reference to
picketing in the course of trade disputes, I am asked to refer to the statement of objects and
reasons accompanying the Criminal Law Amendment Act on its introduction, and the
decision in Shantanand Gir v. Basudevanand Gir [AIR 1930 All 225] has been cited as
authority for the proposition that such reference is permissible, and old cases from the C.P.
Law Reports have been cited to show that Judges have made references to Statement of
Objects and Reasons in the past for the purpose of interpreting the law. The only other case
cited by the applicant is Administrator General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick [AIR 1922
Cal 788] and it is contended that their Lordships of the Privy Council, when holding that
proceedings of the legislature in passing a statute are excluded from consideration on the
judicial construction of Indian statutes, thereby implied that a reference to the Statement of
Objects and Reasons is permissible. I am unable to read any such implication in the judgment
of their Lordships. The latest C.P. case cited was Balaji v. Govinda [(1888) CPLR 111] and
in that, as in the previous cases, there was doubt as to the exact meaning or intention of a
particular section. In Shantanand Gir v. Basudevanand Gir which the applicant cites, the
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Judges of the High Court of Allahabad were equally divided on the question whether it was
permissible to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to an Act as
introduced and published and the three learned Judges who held that such a reference was
permissible qualified their observations by the limitation that such a reference could be made
when there was an ambiguity. As the wording of the section under consideration is entirely
plain and unambiguous, it seems to me unprofitable and unnecessary to enter into a discussion
of the question whether such a reference is permissible at all. The section itself makes no
limitation in respect of the parties disputing or the nature of the disputes giving rise to a
situation where picketing is employed, and from the wording of the section itself I am unable
to see that its application is anything but universal.
It is next contended that a perusal of the Act as a whole without any reference to the
Statement of Objects and Reasons would indicate that S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act is
to be utilised only on occasions of combating undertakings which are subversive to the
Government. Now it is true that the bulk of the sections in the Criminal Law Amendment Act
(23 of 1932) do refer to activities subversive to Government and that the Act is a
consolidation of some ordinance which had been issued from time to time and which the
legislature considered necessary to embody as part of the law, but that in itself does not show
that S. 7 cannot be of universal application. There are other sections which are equally of
universal application. I cite S. 10 of the Act which gives the Local Government power to
declare offences committed under certain sections non-bailable and cognizable despite the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Local Government may publish the requisite
notification required by this section at any time when it considers that such proclamation is
necessary in the interests of law and order, but once such a notification has been issued the
section would become operative in law whether the offences falling under these sections were
committed with a subversive object or not. The same criterion would apply to S. 7 of the Act,
the effectiveness of which depends on the publication of the notification by the Government
that the section shall come into force. The requisite notification was published in August
1933.
It is urged that at the time the Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed by the Central
Legislature, assurances were given that S. 7 would not be employed in the case of industrial
disputes. In interpreting the section this Court is precluded from considering any statements
made in the Legislative Assembly or elsewhere on behalf of Government. It is no duty of the
Courts of law to examine, criticise or interpret anything that may be said on behalf of
Government in debate or elsewhere, and it is beyond the competence of this Court to examine
the correctness of the applicant’s assertions. The duty of the Court is to interpret the law as
enacted. Had it been the intention of the legislature to exclude the application of S. 7 from
cases arising out of industrial disputes, it would have said so in explicit terms, more
particularly in view of the nature of the majority of the other sections of the Act which have
their origin in other ordinances. It is next argued that the ordinance out of which S. 7 arose
was enacted with the particular purpose of combating the Civil Disobedience Movement. It is
no doubt true that this was the occasion, but neither the ordinance nor the present Act lays
down any limitation as to the circumstances in which molestation becomes an offence. At the
time of the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 certain persons discovered a gap in the
Indian Penal Code whereby they were enabled to commit acts of intimidation which were not
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punishable by law. Proceedings taken to remedy this deficiency were not directed personally
against such persons who were influenced by motives hostile to Government, but remedied
the defect in law which left open the way for any person who so chose to bring unwarranted
pressure on another person whatever his motive might be. The absence of any provision
preventing molestation was recognised as a definite lacuna in the Criminal law and an
enactment was made to remedy it. That the defect was discovered by the ingenuity of persons
taking part in the Civil Disobedience Movement does not limit the universal applicability of
the remedy, and I am unable to read, as the applicant desires me to read the opening word of
the section “whoever” as “whoever” may be disaffected towards the Government.
The next contention is that there is a definite conflict between S. 7, Criminal Law
Amendment Act and the Trade Unions Act of 1926. It is contended that the valuable right
given to Trade Unions to declare a strike and their immunity from liability for criminal
conspiracy or to civil suits in connection with the furtherance of a strike is taken away if S. 7,
Criminal Law Amendment Act, is held to be applicable to trade disputes. I am unable to see
any conflict. Trade Unions have the right to declare strike and to do certain acts in
furtherance of trade disputes. They are not liable civilly for such acts or criminally for
conspiracy in the furtherance of such acts as Trade Unions Act permits, but there is nothing in
that Act which apart from immunity from criminal conspiracy allows immunity from any
criminal offences. Indeed any agreement to commit an offence would, under S. 17, Trade
Unions Act, make them liable for criminal conspiracy. S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act,
is part of the Criminal law of the land and an offence committed as defined in that section is
an offence to which the concluding sentence of S.17, Trade Unions Act, applies as much as it
would do to an agreement to commit murder. The applicant has cited several passages from
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes which are all eminently acceptable propositions of
law, but have no application to the case in hand. S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act defines
a criminal offence of universal application without restriction and it must be interpreted
according to its plain and obvious meaning, and as it defines a criminal offence it is not in
conflict with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, which remains unimpaired by S. 7,
Criminal Law Amendment Act. In abetting the commission of this offence, an offence which
was undoubtedly committed, the applicant has been correctly convicted.
