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Full Case Details
K.N. WANCHOO, J.
- The main contention on behalf of the appellant Company is that the Company was not bound to
wait for the result of the trial in the criminal court and that it could, and did, hold a fair enquiry against the
respondent, and if the respondent refused to participate in it and left the place where the enquiry was
being held, the Company could do no more than to complete it and come to such conclusion as was
possible on the evidence before it. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, urges that
principles of natural justice require that an employer should wait at least for the decision of the criminal
trial court before taking disciplinary action, and that inasmuch as the employer did not do so in this case
the employee was justified in not taking part in the disciplinary proceedings which dealt with the very
same matter which was the subject-matter of trial in the criminal court.
- This is an appeal by special leave in an industrial matter. The appellant is a
Company carrying on the manufacture of textiles. The respondent Kushal Bhan was in the employ of the
Company as a peon. It appears that the cycle of Ram Chandra, Head Clerk of the Folding Department was
stolen on 24-8-1957. The matter was reported to the police. Sometime later, the cycle was recovered from
the railway station cycle stand at the instance of the respondent who took the police there and picked out
the stolen cycle from among 50/60 cycles standing there. This matter was apparently brought to the notice
of the Company in October 1957 and thereupon a charge-sheet was served on the respondent to the effect
that he had stolen the cycle of Ram Chandra, Head Clerk, that it had been recovered at his instance and
that a criminal case was pending against him with the police. He was asked to show cause why he should
not be dismissed for misconduct. The respondent submitted his explanation on 13-10-1957. As his
explanation was unsatisfactory, 14-11-1957 was fixed for enquiry. The respondent appeared before the
enquiry committee but stated that as the case was pending against him, he did not want to produce any
defence till the matter was decided by the court. He further stated that he did not want to take part in the
enquiry and was not prepared to give any answers to questions put to him. When questions were put to
him at the enquiry he refused to answer them and eventually he left the place. The company, however
completed the enquiry and directed the dismissal of the respondent on the ground that the misconduct had
been proved against him. Thereafter an application was made under Section 33(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 14 of 1947, by the Company to the Tribunal for approval of the action taken against the
respondent. The matter came before the Tribunal on 6-5-1958. In the meantime, the respondent had been
acquitted by the criminal court on 8-4-1958, on the ground that the case against him was not free from
doubt. The copy of the judgment of the criminal court was produced before the Tribunal and it refused to
approve the order of dismissal. The Company thereupon applied for special leave to this Court resulting
in the present appeal.
- It is true that very often employers stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial courts
and that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for
the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee. We may,
however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not
simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence
of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. The present, however, is a case of a very
simple nature and so the employer cannot be blamed for the course adopted by him. In the circumstances,
there was in our opinion no failure of natural justice in this case and if the respondent did not choose to
take part in the enquiry no fault can be found with that enquiry. We are of opinion that this was a case in
which the Tribunal patently erred in not granting approval under Section 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act. Besides it is apparent that in making the order under appeal, the Tribunal has completely lost sight of
the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 33(2). We therefore allow the appeal and setting aside the order
of the Tribunal grant approval to the order of the appellant dismissing the respondent. In the
circumstances we pass no order as to costs.
