Case Summary
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Full Case Details
RANGANATH MISRA AND M. N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.
- The appellant is an employee in the Balihari Colliery of respondent 1 and in 1986 was working as an
electrical helper. On the allegation that he physically assaulted a supervising officer by name S. K.
Mandal, he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings as also a criminal prosecution. Since the
disciplinary proceeding as also the criminal trial were taken simultaneously, the appellant filed a civil
action in the court of Munsif at Dhanbad asking for injunction against the disciplinary action pending
criminal trial. On December 6, 1986, the Munsif made an order staying further proceedings in the
disciplinary action till disposal of the criminal case. The appeal of Respondent 1 against the order of
learned Munsif was dismissed on March 31, 1987, by the appellate court. Thereupon Respondent 1
moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The High Court by its order dated July 7,1987 held :
“First information report was lodged against the opposite party (appellant) and the same was
pending before the competent court. Meanwhile the petitioners (respondents) started
departmental proceeding against the opposite party. The opposite party filed a suit before the trial
court for declaration that appointment of the Enquiry Officer was illegal and for restraining the
petitioners permanently from continuing with the departmental proceeding during the pendency
of the criminal case. That was allowed by the trial court and confirmed by the lower court. There
is no bar for an employer to proceed with the departmental proceeding with regard to the same
allegation for which a criminal case is pending.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below were wrong in granting injunction in
favour of the opposite party.
In the result, this application is allowed and the order impugned is set aside.”
- According to Mr Jain for the appellant, the legal position settled by this Court supported the stand
that the disciplinary action had to be stayed till the criminal case was over. He relied upon the decisions in
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, [AIR 1960 SC 806] and Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Workmen [AIR 1965 SC 155]. He also referred in the course of his submission to the decisions of
different High Courts in support of his propositions. Two cases out of the several ones of the High Courts
he relied upon are Kushi Ram v. Union of India [1974 Lab IC 553] and Protect Manager, ONGC v.
Lalchand Vazirchand Chandna [(1982) 1 SLR 654]. Pathak, C.J., as he then was, in the Himachal case
indicated that fair play required the postponing of the criminal trial and Thakkar, J. as our learned Brother
then was in the Gujarat case had also taken a similar view. - Mr Jain contended that we should settle the law in a strait-jacket formula as judicial opinion
appeared to be conflicting. We do not propose to hazard such a step as that would create greater hardship
and individual situations may not be available to be met and thereby injustice is likely to ensue. - In the Delhi Cloth & General Mills case, it was pointed out by this Court:
“It is true that very often employers stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial
courts and that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer
must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an
employee. In Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. M/s Newsman’s Printing Works this was the view
taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave
nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the
employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the
criminal case may not be prejudiced.”
In Tata Oil Mills case. Gajendragadkar, C.J., spoke for a three Judge Bench thus:
“There is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears
to have taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the
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domestic enquiry should have been stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal
proceedings. As this Court has held in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan,
it is desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic
enquiry is being tried in a criminal court, the employer, should stay the domestic enquiry pending
the final disposal of the criminal case.”
In Jang Bahadur case this Court said:
“The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether the employee is guilty of the charges on
which it is proposed to take action against him. The same issue may arise for decision in a civil
or criminal proceeding pending in a court. But the pendency of the court proceeding does not bar
the taking of disciplinary action. The power of taking such action is vested in the disciplinary
authority. The civil or criminal court has no such power. The initiation and continuation of
disciplinary proceedings in good faith is not calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of
justice in the pending court proceeding. The employee is free to move the court for an order
restraining the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings. If he obtains a stay order, a wilful
violation of the order would of course amount to contempt of court. In the absence of a stay order
the disciplinary authority is free to exercise its lawful powers.” - The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to support the position that while there
could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be
appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of
cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the
court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such
simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the court will decide in the
given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted,
pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard
and fast, strait-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the
particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary
to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline. - In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the
same set of facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the
High Court was not right in interfering with the trial court’s order of injunction which had been affirmed
in appeal. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is vacated and that of the trial court as
affirmed in appeal is restored.
