Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen(1964) 7 SCR 555 : AIR 1965 SC 155

Case Summary

Full Case Details

P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

2. The first point which calls for our decision in this appeal is whether the Tribunal was right in
   holding that the facts proved against Raghavan did not attract the provisions of Standing Order 22(viii) of
   the certified standing orders of the appellant. The said standing order provides that without prejudice to
   the general meaning of the term “misconduct”, it shall be deemed to mean and include, inter alia,
   drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour within or without the factory. It is
   common ground that the alleged assault took place outside the factory, and, in fact, at a considerable
   distance from it. The Tribunal has held that the assault in question can be treated as a purely private
   matter between Raghavan and Augustine with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result of
   which Standing Order 22(viii) cannot be invoked against Raghavan. Mr Menon who has appeared for the
   respondent before us, has contended that in construing standing orders of this character, we must take care
   to see that disputes of a purely private or individual type are not brought within their scope. He argues
   that on many occasions, individual employees may have to deal with private disputes and sometimes, as a
   result of these private disputes, assault may be committed. Such an assault may attract the relevant
   provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but it does not fall under Standing Order 22(viii). In our opinion, this
   contention is well-founded. It would, we think, be unreasonable to include within Standing Order 22(viii)
   any riotous behaviour without the factory which was the result of purely private and individual dispute,
   and in course of which tempers of both the contestants became hot. In order that Standing Order 22(viii)
   may be attracted, the appellant should be able to show that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some
   rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim.

• This appeal by special leave raises a short question about the
  validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil
  Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K.K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the 14th
  of November, 1955. The appellant is a public limited concern engaged in the industry of soaps and toilet
  articles. It owns three factories in addition to 12 sales offices. One of these factories is located at
  Tatapuram, Ernakulam, in the State of Kerala. Mr Raghavan was working with the appellant at its factory
  at Tatapuram. It was reported to the appellant that on 12th November, 1955, Mr Raghavan and another
  employee of the appellant, Mr Mathews by name, waylaid Mr C.A. Augustine, the Chargeman of the
  Soap Plant of the company’s factory at Tatapuram while he was returning home after his duty in the
  second shift and assaulted him. That is why charge-sheets were issued against both Messrs Raghavan and
  Mathews on 14th November, 1955. Pursuant to the service of the charge-sheets, two officers were
  appointed by the appellant to hold an enquiry; but the respondent Union represented to the appellant that
  justice would not be done to Raghavan and Mathews unless somebody outside Tatapuram was invited to
  hold the enquiry. Thereupon, the General Manager of the appellant appointed Mr Y.D. Joshi, who is a
  Law Officer of the appellant in the Head Office, to hold the enquiry. Mr Joshi held the enquiry from 27th
  to 30th December, 1955, and subsequently, he made his report to the General Manager of the appellant on
  7th January, 1956. At that time, an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and its
  employees, and so, the appellant applied to the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the dismissal of Messrs
  Raghavan and Mathews. The Tribunal approved of the dismissal of Raghavan, but did not accord its
  approval of the dismissal of Mathews. Acting in pursuance of the approval accorded by the Tribunal, the
  appellant dismissed Raghavan with effect from 14th November, 1955. Not satisfied with the order of
  dismissal, the respondent raised an industrial dispute in regard to the propriety and validity of the said
  dismissal of Raghavan and that has become the subject-matter of the present reference which was ordered
  on the 3rd of December, 1958. It is on this reference that the Industrial Tribunal has held that the
  appellant was not justified in dismissing Raghavan, and so, has ordered his reinstatement. This is the
  order which has given rise to the present appeal by special leave.

2. In the present case, however, it is quite clear that the assault committed by Raghavan on Augustine
   was not a purely private or individual matter. What the occasion for this assault was and what motive
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   actuated it, have been considered by the domestic Tribunal and the findings of the domestic Tribunal on
   these points must be accepted in the present proceedings, unless they are shown to be based on no
   evidence or are otherwise perverse. Now, when we look at the report of the Enquiry Officer, it is clear
   that on the evidence given by Mr M.M. Augustine and K.T. Joseph it appeared that the assault was
   committed by Raghavan on C.A. Augustine, because he was in favour of the introduction of the Incentive
   Bonus Scheme. It appears that the introduction of this incentive bonus scheme was approved by one set of
   workmen and was opposed by another, with the result that the two rival unions belonging to these two
   sets respectively were arrayed against each other on that question. The evidence of the two witnesses to
   whom we have just referred clearly shows that when Raghavan assaulted C.A. Augustine, he expressly
   stated that Augustine was a black-leg (Karinkali) who was interested in increased production in the
   company with a view to obtain bonus; and the report further shows that the Enquiry Officer believed this
   evidence and came to the conclusion that the assault was motivated by this hostility between Raghavan
   and C.A. Augustine. In fact, the charge framed clearly suggested that the assault was made for that
   motive. It was alleged in the charge that Augustine was assaulted to terrorise the workmen who had been
   responsible for giving increased production under the incentives bonus scheme. According to the charge
   such acts were highly subversive of discipline. The Enquiry Officer has held that in the light of the
   evidence given by M.M. Augustine and K.T. Joseph, the charge as framed had been proved. This finding
   clearly means that the assault was not the result of a purely individual or private quarrel between the
   assailant and his victim, but it was referable to the difference of opinion between the two in regard to the
   introduction of the incentive bonus scheme on which the two unions were sharply divided. Therefore, if
   Raghavan assaulted Augustine solely for the reason that Augustine was supporting the plea for more
   production, that cannot be said to be outside the purview of Standing Order 22(viii).
3. The next point which needs to be considered arises out of a plea which has been strenuously urged
   before us by Mr Menon that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct
   the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and so, the Tribunal was entitled to go
   into the evidence itself and decide whether Raghavan’s dismissal was justified or not. The legal position
   in this matter is not in doubt. If it appears that the domestic enquiry was not conducted in accordance with
   the principles of natural justice and a reasonable opportunity was not, for instance, given to Raghavan to
   lead evidence in support of his defence, that would be a valid ground on which the Tribunal can discard
   the finding of the domestic enquiry and consider the matter on the merits uninfluenced by the said
   finding. Unfortunately for the respondent, however, on the material on record it is very difficult to sustain
   the finding of the Tribunal that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the
   principles of natural justice.
4. The whole of this contention is based on the fact that Raghavan wanted to examine two witnesses,
   Messrs M.P. Menon and Chalakudi. It appears that Raghavan told the Enquiry Officer that he wanted to
   examine these two witnesses and he requested him to invite the said two witnesses to give evidence. The
   Enquiry Officer told Raghavan that it was really not a part of his duty to call the said two witnesses and
   that Raghavan should in fact have kept them ready himself. Even so, in order to assist Raghavan, the
   Enquiry Officer wrote letters to the two witnesses. Mr Menon replied expressing his inability to be
   present before the Enquiry Officer, and the Enquiry Officer communicated this reply to Raghavan, so that
   for Raghavan’s failure to examine Menon no blame can be attributed to the enquiry officer at all. In
   regard to Chalakudi, it appears that he sent one letter addressed to the Enquiry Officer and it reached him
   on the 31st December, 1955, the day on which he was leaving for Bombay. This letter was not signed,
   and so, the Enquiry Officer took no action on it and gave no time to Chalakudi to appear three or four
   days later as had been suggested in that unsigned letter. The Tribunal thought that this attitude on the part
   of the Enquiry Officer was unsympathetic and that introduced an element of unfairness in the enquiry
   itself. We are unable to appreciate how such a conclusion can follow on facts which are admitted. We do
   not think the Enquiry Officer was called upon to accept an unsigned letter and act upon it. Besides, the
   Enquiry Officer had gone to Ernakulam from Bombay for holding this enquiry, because the respondent
   Union itself wanted that the enquiry should be held by some other officer outside the local station and it
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   was known that the Bombay Officer would go back as soon as the enquiry was over. In such a case, if
   Raghavan did not take steps to produce his witnesses before the Enquiry Officer, how can it be said that
   the Enquiry Officer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice? Mr
   Menon has suggested that the Enquiry Officer should have taken steps to get the witnesses M.P. Menon
   and Chalakudi brought before him for giving evidence. This suggestion is clearly untenable. In a domestic
   enquiry, the officer holding the enquiry can take no valid or effective steps to compel the attendance of
   any witness; just as the appellant produced its witnesses before the officer, Raghavan should have taken
   steps to produce his witnesses. His witness Menon probably took the view that it was beneath his dignity
   to appear in a domestic enquiry, and Chalakudi was content to send an unsigned letter and that to so as to
   reach the Enquiry Officer on the day when he was leaving Ernakulam for Bombay. It would be
   unreasonable to suggest that in a domestic enquiry, it is the right of the charge-sheeted employee to ask
   for as many adjournments as he likes. It is true that if it appears that by refusing to adjourn the hearing at
   the instance of the charge-sheeted workman the Enquiry Officer failed to give the said workman a
   reasonable opportunity to lead evidence that may in a proper case be considered to introduce an element
   of infirmity in the enquiry; but in the circumstances of this case we do not think it would be possible to
   draw such an inference.
   The record shows that the Enquiry Officer went out of his way to assist Raghavan; and if the
   witnesses did not turn up to give evidence in time it was not his fault. We must accordingly hold that the
   Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry suffered from the infirmity that it was
   conducted contrary to the principles of natural justice.
5. Let us then consider whether the dismissal of Raghavan is actuated by mala fides or amounts to
   victimisation. In regard to the plea of victimisation, the Tribunal has definitely found against the
   respondent. “I do not for a moment believe”, says the Tribunal, “that the management foisted a case
   against the ex-worker. Regarding the allegation of victimisation, there is no sufficient evidence in the case
   that the management or its Manager Mr John was motivated with victimisation or unfair labour practice”.
   This finding is quite clearly in favour of the appellant. The Tribunal, however, thought that because the
   Enquiry Officer did not give an adjournment to Raghavan to examine his witnesses, that introduced an
   element of mala fides. It has also observed that since the case against Raghavan did not fall within the
   purview of Standing Order 22(viii) and yet, the appellant framed a charge against Raghavan under that
   standing order, that introduced another element of mala fides. It is on these grounds that the conclusion as
   to mala fides recorded by the Tribunal seems to rest.
6. In regard to the first ground, we have already held that the Tribunal was not justified in blaming the
   Enquiry Officer for not adjourning the case beyond 31st December, 1955. In regard to the second ground,
   we are surprised that the Tribunal should have taken the view that since in its opinion, Standing Order
   22(viii) did not apply to the facts of this case, the framing of the charge under the said standing order and
   the finding of the domestic Tribunal in favour of the appellant on that ground showed mala fides. It seems
   to us that the Tribunal has completely overlooked an elementary principle of judicial approach that even if
   a judge or tribunal may reach an erroneous conclusion either of fact or of law, the mere error of the
   conclusion does not make the conclusion mala fide. Besides, as we have just indicated, on the merits we
   are satisfied that the Tribunal was in error in holding that Standing Order 22(viii) did not apply.
   Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that the dismissal of Raghavan was mala fide, cannot possibly be
   sustained.
7. There is one more point which has been pressed before us by Mr Menon. In Phulbari Tea Estate
   v. Workmen [(1960) 1 SCR 32], this Court has held that even if a domestic enquiry is found to be
   defective, the employer may seek to justify the dismissal of his employee by leading evidence before the
   Tribunal to which an industrial dispute arising out of the impugned dismissal has been referred for
   adjudication. Mr Menon contends that by parity of reasoning, in cases where the employee is unable to
   lead his evidence before the domestic Tribunal for no fault of his own, a similar opportunity should be
   given to him to prove his case in proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. In our opinion, this
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   contention is not well-founded. The decision in the case of Phulbari Tea Estate proceeds on the basis
   which is of basic importance in industrial adjudication that findings properly recorded in domestic
   enquiries which are conducted, fairly, cannot be re-examined by industrial adjudication unless the said
   findings are either perverse, or are not supported by any evidence, or some other valid reason of that
   character. In such a case, the fact that the finding is not accepted by the Industrial Tribunal would not
   necessarily preclude the employer from justifying the dismissal of his employee on the merits, provided,
   of course, he leads evidence before the Industrial Tribunal and persuades the Tribunal to accept his case.
   That, however, is very different from a case like the present. In the case before us, the enquiry has been
   fair; the Enquiry Officer gave Raghavan ample opportunity to lead his evidence. If a reasonable
   opportunity had been denied to the employee, that would have made the enquiry itself bad and then the
   employer would have been required to prove his case before the Industrial Tribunal, and in dealing with
   the dispute the Industrial Tribunal would have been justified in completely ignoring in the findings of the
   domestic enquiry. But if the enquiry has been fairly conducted, it means that all reasonable opportunity
   has been given to the employee to prove his case by leading evidence. In such a case, how can the court
   hold that merely because the witnesses did not appear to give evidence in support of the employee’s case,
   he should be allowed to lead such evidence before the Industrial Tribunal. If this plea is upheld, no
   domestic enquiry would be effective and in every case, the matter would have to be tried afresh by the
   Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are not prepared to accede to Mr Menon’s argument that the Tribunal
   was justified in considering the merits of the dispute for itself in the present reference proceedings. Since
   the enquiry has been fairly conducted, and the findings recorded therein are based on evidence which is
   believed, there would be no justification for the Industrial Tribunal to consider the same facts for itself.
   Findings properly recorded at such enquiries are binding on the parties, unless, of course, it is known that
   the said findings are perverse, or are not based on any evidence.
8. There is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have
   taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry
   should have been stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal proceedings. As this Court has
   held in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan [(1960) 3 SCR 227], it is desirable that if
   the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a
   criminal court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal
   case. It would be particularly appropriate to adopt such a course where the charge against the workman is
   of a grave character, because in such a case, it would be unfair to compel the workman to disclose the
   defence which he may take before the criminal court. But to say that domestic enquiries may be stayed
   pending criminal trial is very different from anything that if an employer proceeds with the domestic
   enquiry in spite of the fact that the criminal trial is pending, the enquiry for that reason alone is vitiated
   and the conclusion reached in such an enquiry is either bad in law or mala fide. In fairness, we ought to
   add that Mr Menon did not seek to justify this extreme position. Therefore, we must hold that the
   Industrial Tribunal was in error when it characterised the result of the domestic enquiry as mala fide
   partly because the enquiry was not stayed pending the criminal proceedings against Raghavan. We
   accordingly hold that the domestic enquiry in this case was properly held and fairly conducted and the
   conclusions of fact reached by the Enquiry Officer are based on evidence which he accepted as true. That
   being so, it was not open to the Industrial Tribunal to reconsider the same questions of fact and come to a
   contrary conclusion.
9. The result is, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Industrial Tribunal is set aside and
   the reference made to it is answered in favour of the appellant.