November 22, 2024
DU LLBIndustrial LawSemester 5

The Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. The Workmen(1968) 1 SCR 164 : AIR 1968 SC 224

Case Summary

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Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority

Full Case Details

G.K. MITTER, J.

  1. The first point taken against this award is that it cannot be given effect to as it was
    published beyond the period fixed in the Act. The notification accompanying the gazette
    publication stated that Government had received the award on 14th October, 1966. It was argued
    by Mr Gokhale that in terms of Section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act the award had to be
    published “within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate
    Government”. According to learned counsel, the award having reached Government on 14th
    October, 1966 it should have been published at the latest on 12th November, 1966 as Section
    17(1) of the Act was mandatory. Our attention was also drawn to sub-section (2) of Section 17
    according to which it is only the award published under sub-section (1) of Section 17 that is final
    and cannot be called in question by any court in any manner. We were also referred to Section
    17-A and Section 19. Under sub-section (1) of Section 17-A an award becomes enforceable on
    the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 17 and under sub-section
    (3) of Section 19 an award is to remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on
    which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. From all these provisions it was
    argued that the limits of time mentioned in the sections were mandatory and not directory and if
    an award was published beyond the period of thirty days, in contravention of Section 17(1) it
    could not be given effect to.
  • This appeal by the Remington Rand of India Ltd. against their workmen
    arises out of an award dated 5th October, 1965 made by the Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey
    published in the Kerala Gazette dated 15th November, 1966.
    Keeping the above principles in mind, we cannot but hold that a provision as to time in
    Section 17(1) is merely directory and not mandatory. Section 17(1) makes it obligatory on the
    Government to publish the award. The limit of time has been fixed as showing that the
    publication of the award ought not to be held up. But the fixation of the period of 30 days
    mentioned therein does not mean that the publication beyond that time will render the award
    invalid. It is not difficult to think of circumstances when the publication of the award within
    thirty days may not be possible. For instance, there may be a strike in the press or there may be
    any other good and sufficient cause by reason of which the publication could not be made within
    thirty days. If we were to hold that the award would therefore be rendered invalid, it would be
    attaching undue importance to a provision not in the mind of the legislature. It is well known that
    it very often takes a long period of time for the reference to be concluded and the award to be
    made. If the award becomes invalid merely on the ground of publication after thirty days, it
    might entail a fresh reference with needless harassment to the parties. The non-publication of the
    award within the period of thirty days does not entail any penalty and this is another
    consideration which has to be kept in mind. What was said in Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of
    Andhra Pradesh merely shows that it was not open to Government to withhold publication but
    this Court never meant to lay down that the period of time fixed for publication was mandatory.
  1. Coming to the merits of the case, Mr Gokhale argued that the Tribunal had gone wrong in
    revising the wage scales as it had done. The head of dispute referred to the Tribunal was
    “revision of wages as per award of the Madras Labour Tribunal in 38 of 1960”. The arguments
    advanced in this case were the same as in the Bangalore case (just now disposed of) and the
    Tribunal after noting the phenomenal progress of the Company and the enormous profits it was
    making, came to the conclusion that there was no reason why there should be any disparity in
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    wages between the employees of a branch and the regional office when they were doing the same
    or similar work. In this case also, there was no evidence of comparable concerns. In our view,
    what we have said on this point of the dispute with regard to the Bangalore branch applies
    equally with regard to the Kerala branch and the matter will have to go back to the Tribunal for
    fixing the wages and the adjustment of the workers in the revised scale in the light of the
    observations made in that case bearing in mind Mr Gokhale’s offer on behalf of the Company to
    increase the wages as in the other appeal.
  2. With regard to dearness allowance again, what was said in the Bangalore appeal applies
    equally to this appeal. Here again the Tribunal said:
    “It is also an accepted fact that the cost of living both at Trivandrum and at Ernakulam is
    higher than the cost of living at Madras. Therefore, there is no justification in
    perpetuating the disparity in the payment of D.A. to the workmen working at Madras and
    those working in the Trivandrum Branch.”
    In the result, the Tribunal directed that the workmen of Ernakulam branch should get
    dearness allowance “at the rate at which and in the manner in which” the pay and dearness
    allowance was being paid to the employees of Madras Regional Office. In our view, dearness
    allowance should be the same as decided in the case of the workers of the Bangalore branch.
  3. The scheme for gratuity is the same as in the case of the Bangalore branch with the only
    difference that the maximum fixed was 20 months’ wages after 20 years service. In our view,
    there is no reason why the scheme for gratuity should not be the same in the Ernakulam branch
    as in the Bangalore branch in case of termination of service for misconduct and the qualifying
    period should be 15 years’ service.
  4. Again, on principles already formulated, we hold that leave facilities at Ernakulam should
    be the same as those prevailing at Madras.
  5. Next comes the dispute with regard to the working hours. The working hours of the
    employees of Trivandrum and Ernakulam as prevalent were from 9 a.m. to 1. p.m. and from 2
    p.m. to 5-30 p.m. on week days and from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Saturdays. At Madras the
    Company’s workers work only for five days in a week from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 1- 45 p.m. to 5-
    30 p.m. The total working hours were therefore somewhat less than those at Trivandrum and
    Ernakulam. The complaint of the union before the Tribunal was that although by circular dated
    24th March 1963 the Company had fixed the working hours from 9.30 a.m. for clerks and 9 a.m.
    for mechanics and peons, it was extracting half an hour’s work per day extra contrary to their
    own orders. The Tribunal held that the circular should be given effect to and that the clerical staff
    should work from 9.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 2 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. on working days and from
    9.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Saturdays. We see no reason to disturb this portion of the award.
  6. Another head of dispute related to work load. The complaint of the union was that the
    workload was too heavy and that the method of calculation of workload was arbitrary. According
    to them, the workload fixed by agreement between the Company and its employees in Delhi and
    Lucknow was seven machines per day or 150 machines per month, while the workload at
    Trivandrum was 10 machines per day. According to the Management the workload fixed i.e. 10
    machines per day, was not too much and there was no reason for disturbing the prevailing
    arrangement. But the Management did not deny that during the course of negotiations they had
    agreed to reduce the workload to seven machines per day or 150 machines per month and the
    Tribunal adopted this in the award with a rider that “all the machines attended to, whether new or
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    old, whether under the service contract or not, will be counted for the sake of workload”. No
    satisfactory reason has been adduced as to why we should disturb the award.
  7. The last head of dispute was with regard to “moving staff allowance”. The union
    demanded that workmen who were deputed on tour on Company’s work should be given a day
    off if they had to travel two nights consecutively. Demand was also made that travelling staff
    should be paid overtime for the work done on holidays while on tour at double the normal wages
    for the day. The Management disputed this claim on the ground that it was not possible to
    calculate the number of hours worked by the employee at the out-station while on tour. The
    Tribunal found on examining a mechanic that the jurisdiction of the branch was limited to the
    districts Trivandrum, Quilon, Alleppey and Kottayam and even if he was forced to work on
    holidays he was given overtime wages. The Tribunal held that it was only just and reasonable
    that touring mechanics should be given a day off if they travelled on two consecutive days for
    reaching a place of work and also overtime wages at double the wages for the work done on
    holidays. It appears to us that with the limitation as to jurisdiction noted above, the occasion for a
    mechanic spending two consecutive nights for reaching a place of work will arise very seldom,
    but if it does, there is no reason why he should not get overtime wages as awarded by the
    Tribunal and we see no reason to interfere with this portion of the award.
  8. In the result, the matter will go back to the Tribunal for disposal of the issue as to the
    revision of wage scales and adjustment of the workers in the revised scales. The scheme for
    gratuity will stand modified as indicated in our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 2105 of 1966
    delivered today. The rest of the award will stand. The appellant will pay the respondent the costs
    of this appeal.

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