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L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
- The Appellants were found guilty of committing contempt by the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan at Jodhpur. Simple imprisonment of two months and fine of Rs. 2,000/- each was imposed.
Aggrieved by the said judgment, the Appellants have filed these Criminal Appeals. - The Appellants along with Sheopat Singh belong to the Marxist Communist Party. Sheopat Singh died
during the pendency of these proceedings. It is relevant to mention that Appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are
advocates. A prominent trade union activist of Sri Ganganagar District Shri Darshan Koda was
murdered on 18.12.2000. Some of the accused were granted anticipatory bail in February, 2001 by the
High Court of Rajasthan. The Appellants addressed a huge gathering of their party workers in front of
the Collectorate at Sri Ganganagar on 23.02.2001. Whileaddressing the gathering, the Appellants
made scandalous statements against the High Court which were published in Lok Sammat newspaper
on 24.02.2001. The offending statements made by the Appellants (from the translated version) are
summarized as under:
“Appellant No. 1 – “Ex MLA Het Ram Beniwal said that, there are two types of justice in the courts.
A thief of Rs.100/- cannot get bail, if the lathi and gandasi is hit then the courts ask for the statements
of the witnesses and diary, but Miglani and Gurdayal Singh committed the murder, even then
anticipatory bail had been taken on the application without diary.”
“Appellant No. 2 – “Navrang Chaudhary, Advocate, District President, CITU said that the general
public has lost confidence in the law and justice.”
“Appellant No. 3 – “MCP Leader Bhuramal Swami namingthe judge of the High Court said in
attacking way that all around there is rule of rich people whether it is bureaucracy or judiciary.”
“Appellant No. 4 – “Sarpanch Hardeep Singh told that there was influence of money behind the
anticipatory bail of the accused.”
The Advocate General gave his consent to Respondent No.1 for initiation of contempt proceedings on
16.01.2002. Thereafter, Respondent No.1 filed a Contempt Petition in the High Court. It was stated by
Respondent No. 1 in the contempt petition that baseless allegations of bias and corruption were made
by the Appellants against the judiciary. He also alleged that the Appellants were guilty of a systematic
campaign to destroy the public confidence in the judiciary. - The Appellants filed a common counter denying the allegations made against them. The appointment
of the Special Public Prosecutor in the case of the murder of Shri Darshan Koda was in dispute and
the Appellants contended that they were agitating for appointment of another competent lawyer as
Special Public Prosecutor. They accused Respondent No.1 of initiating contempt proceedings only to
harass and victimize them as they were agitating for a change of the Special Public Prosecutor.They
denied making any defamatory statements against the judiciary. A compact disc (CD) was produced
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on 15.07.2003 which was a video recording, of the press conference held on 15.05.2002 at Sri
Ganganagar by the third Appellant and Sheopat Singh. The said press conference was also telecast on
ETV (Rajasthan). The High Court viewed the CD after taking consent from both sides in the presence
of the third Appellant and Sheopat Singh. The High Court directed a transcript of the video to be
prepared and be kept on record. - The High Court framed three questions for consideration which are as follows:
Whether statement published in “LokSammat” dtd. 24.2.2001 published from Sri
Ganganagar amounts to criminal contempt?
Whether editor’s liability for whatever is published in the newspaper is absolute or he is
not liable for faithful reproduction of the statement made by somebody else in the news
reporting?
Whether it is proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of material on record that
respondents No.2 to 6 did make the statements attributed to them respectively so as to hold
them liable for contempt?” - In view of the disparaging remarks made by the Appellants against the judges of the Rajasthan High
Court, the High Court held that the statement published in Lok Sammat on 24.02.2001 amounts to
criminal contempt. The scathing remarks made by the Appellants have a tendency of creating a doubt
in the minds of the public about the impartiality, integrity and fairness of the High Court in
administering justice. According to the High Court, the scurrilous attack made by the Appellants
against the judiciary lowers the authority of the Court. - In view of the unconditional apology tendered at the earliest point of time by Respondent No. 1, the
Editor of Lok Sammat, the High Court discharged the notices against him in the contempt petition.
The High Court answered the third point against the Appellants and heldthem guilty of contempt as
the case was proved against them beyond reasonable doubt. The entire evidence on record was
scrutinized carefully by the High Court to reach this conclusion. The press conference held by the
third Appellant was highlighted by the High Court to conclude that the highly objectionable
statements were, in fact, made by the Appellants on 23.02.2001. As the Appellants denied having
made any statements against the judiciary in their reply to the contempt petition, the journalists
demanded an explanation. The third Appellant stated that they stood by what was said on 23.02.2001.
The High Court held the Appellants guilty of committing criminal contempt and sentenced them to
simple imprisonment of two months and fine of Rs. 2000/- each. - We have heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate for the Appellants. As Respondent No. 1 who was
the petitioner in the contempt petition was unrepresented, we requested Ms. Aishwarya Bhati,
Advocate to assist the Court to which she readily agreed.Apart from making oral submissions Ms.
Bhati also gave a written note. Mr. Bhushan submitted that statements attributed to the Appellants
only represent fair criticism which would not amount to contempt. According to him, the Appellants
were in an agitated mood due to the murder of one of their leaders and the mishandling of the criminal
case connected to that murder. Criticism of class bias and improper administration of justice cannot be
considered to be contempt. He referred to a statement attributed to the fourth Appellant who alleged
influence of money in the grant of anticipatory bail to the accused and explained that statement as
having been made in a different context altogether. He stated that the influence of money was against
the authorities and police force and not attributed to the judiciary. He also stated that the statement
made by the third Appellant who named the judge who granted anticipatory bail and accused the
judiciary of being partial to rich people does not tantamount to contempt. Strong reliance was placed
on Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association v. R. K. Jain, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 281 by Mr.
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Bhushan tocontend that the Courts should not be sensitive to fair criticism. He also stated that the
power of punishing for contempt has to be exercised sparingly. - Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned Amicus Curiae, submitted that the judgment of the High Court does
not warrant any interference as the entire evidence was dealt with in detail. She submitted that all the
relevant factors were taken into account by the High Court including the statements made by the
Appellants which ex facie demonstrated contempt, the stand of the editor of the newspaper that they
have scrupulously and correctly reported the statements in the newspaper and non denial of the
Appellants addressing the public meeting at the Collectorate of Sri Ganganagar. She also submitted
that the High Court took note of the press conference of the third Appellant and Sheopat Singh on
15.05.2002 and the affidavits of 5 journalists and one deed writer who were witness to the
meetingon23.02.2001. She placed reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in Bal KishanGiri v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 280 to contend that vituperative comments
undermining the judiciary would amount to contempt. She also relied upon Vijay Kumar Singh v.
Union of India, reported in (2014) 16 SCC 460to contend that the apology was made only for the
purpose of avoiding punishment and was not bona fide. To avoid prolixity, we are not referring to
other judgments cited by the learned Amicus Curiae. She referred to the affidavits filed by the
Appellants in this Court apologizing for the statements and even they do not demonstrate any genuine
contrition. She submitted that an apology by the contemnors should be tendered at the earliest
opportunity and it should be unconditional. - Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) defines
criminal contempt as follows:
“2. Definitions.In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,
(1) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by
visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which –
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii)interferes or tends to interfere with, or
obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;” - Section 5 of the Act is as under:
“5.Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.
“A person shall not be guilty of contempt ofcourt for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any
case which has been heard and finally decided.”
(1) Section 12 of the Act is as under:
“12. Punishment for contempt of court (1)
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology
being made to the satisfaction of the court.
Explanation.-An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if
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the accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a
sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a
court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt,
the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of
imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be
detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a
company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of
the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to such
punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised
all due diligence to prevent its commission. - Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the contempt of court referred to
therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with
the consent or Connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager,
secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also
be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced with the leave of the
court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.
Explanation.-For the purpose of sub-sections (4) and (5),-
(a)” company” means anybody corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals ; and
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.
(2) We are, in the present case, concerned with Section 2(c)(i) of the Act which deals with scandalizing or
lowering the authority of the Court. It has been held by this Court that judges need not be protected
and that they can take care of themselves. It is the right and interest of the public in the due
administration of justice that have to be protected. Se AsharamM.Jainv. A. T. Gupta,
reported in (1983) 4 SCC 125, “Vilification of judgeswould lead to the destruction of the system of
administration of justice. The statements made by the Appellants are not only derogatory but also
have the propensity to lower the authority of the Court. Accusing judges of corruption results in
denigration of the institution which has an effect of lowering the confidence of the public in the
system of administration of justice. A perusal of the allegations made by the Appellants cannot be
termed as fair criticism on the merits of the case. The Appellants indulged in an assault on the
integrity of the judges of the High Court by making baseless and unsubstantiated allegations. They are
not entitled to seek shelter under Section 5 of the Act. The oft-quoted passage from Ambard v.
Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C.is that “[j]ustice is not a cloistered virtue:
she must beallowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary
men.” The Privy Council “The path ofin the same judgment held as follows:
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criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of
the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of
justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to
impair the administration of justice, they are immune.” [Emphasis ours]
In Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. R. K. Jain (supra) this Court held in paragraph 23 as follows:
“Ordinarily, the Court would not use the powerto punish for contempt for curbing the right of freedom of
speech and expression, which is guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. Only when
the criticism of judicial institution transgresses all limits of decency and fairness or there is total lack
of objectivity or there is deliberate attempt to denigrate the institution then the court would use this
power.”
(3) Every citizen has a fundamental right to speech, guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of
India. Contempt of Courtis one of the restrictions on such right. We are conscious that the power
under the Act has to be exercised sparingly and not in a routine manner. If there is a calculated effort
to undermine the judiciary, the Courts will exercise their jurisdiction to punish the offender for
committing contempt. We approve the findings recorded by the High Court that
the Appellants have transgressed all decency by making serious allegations of corruption and bias
against the High Court. The caustic comments made by the Appellants cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be termed as fair criticism. The statements made by the Appellants, accusing the
judiciary of corruption lower the authority of the Court. The Explanation to sub-Section 12 (1) of the
Act provides that an apology should not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or
tendered at a belated stage, if the accused makes it bona fide. The stand taken by the Appellants in the
contempt petition and the affidavit filed in this Court does not inspire any confidence that the apology
is made bona fide. After a detailed consideration of the submissionsmade by both sides and the
evidence on record, we are in agreement with the judgment of the High Court that the Appellants are
guilty of committing contempt of Court. After considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case including the fact that the contemptuous statements were made in 2001, we modify the sentence
to only payment of fine of Rs. 2,000/- each.
(4) The Appeal is dismissed with the said modification. - Criminal Appeal No. 464 of 2006, which concerns the same facts as reported in another newspaper,
stands disposed of in terms of Criminal Appeal No.463 of 2006. - We record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Advocate as Amicus
Curiae.
[ANIL R. DAVE]
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
