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JUDGMENT:
The instant criminal appeals arising from a common judgment relating to the same incident, depict a
rare, unfortunate and condemnable act of the police officials who contrary to the duty enjoined upon
them to protect and maintain law and order, indulged in the act of attacking in a pre-planned and
calculated manner Shri D.N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, in his court room and
Chambers on 18th November, 1997 at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar.
In Sessions trial No. 592 of 1992, the Investigating Officer (Jokhu Singh) was examined as a
witness on 7th May, 1997 in the Court of Shri D.N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Bhagalpur. As the cross-examination could not be concluded the case was adjourned to 26th
May, 1997. Thereafter the case was adjourned to several dates but this witness did not appear for
the cross-examination. A show cause notice was issued against Jokhu Singh through Superintendent
of Police, Madhepura, requiring him to appear on 11th June, 1997. In spite of that Jokhu Singh did
not appear. On 14th July, 1997, a wireless message was sent to him through Superintendent of
Police to appear in the court on 5th August, 1997. Once again the witness did not turn up. The
Court, therefore, having no other option issued a notice to Jokhu Singh to show cause why
proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) be not initiated
against him. Ultimately, on 27th August, 1997 the case was adjourned to 20th September, 1997 and
to procure his presence, non-bailable warrant was issued. On this date also the witness did not turn
up. He did not file reply to the show cause notice either. On 17th November, 1997, Jokhu Singh
appeared in the court in the afternoon. Having regard to the previous order of non-bailable warrant
of arrest, he was remanded to judicial custody. A petition for bail was filed on his behalf after the
court hours. It was directed that the same be placed for hearing on the next date.
Shri K.D. Choudhary, one of the appellants who was an office bearer of the Policemen’s
Association at District Level and was posted as SHO of the Police Station in the evening of the
same day went to the Chambers of Shri Barai for release of Shri Jokhu Singh on execution of a
personal bond. Shri Barai did not agree. Thereafter he approached the District Magistrate and on the
basis of his advice he met the District Judge and renewed his demand for release of Jokhu Singh,
which was declined.
On 18th November, 1997, when the bail petition of Jokhu Singh was taken up, the learned counsel
appearing on his behalf made a prayer seeking withdrawal of the bail application. Accordingly, the
bail application was dismissed as withdrawn. Soon thereater, a large number of police officers
(without uniform), armed with lathis and other weapons and shouting slogans against Shri Barai,
barged into his court room. The court peon Shri Bishundeo Sharma who tried to shut the door was
brutally assaulted. Shri Barai apprehending danger to his life, rushed to his Chambers and managed
to bolt the door. Unruly mob forcibly broke open the door, overpowered the bodyguard and
assaulted Shri Barai. They reiterated their demand for unconditional release of Jokhu Singh. Due to
the manhandling Shri Barai felt dizziness and became unconscious. It was due to timely arrival of a
team of doctors that his life was saved.
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On the next day, on return from Banka, District & Sessions Judge also enquired into the matter and
submitted a detailed report before the High Court.
On 19th November, 1997, on the basis of the report sent by the 5th Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Bhagalpur dated 18th November, 1997, Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 24 of
1997 was registered and placed before a Bench of the High Court for admission. After hearing, the
Court arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case of criminal contempt was made out against
the contemners. Accordingly proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act were initiated and a
direction was issued to the Registry to issue notices to the above referred persons along with a copy
of the report, containing allegations against the concerned persons, calling upon them to show cause
as to why suitable action be not taken against them for the alleged misconduct.
On 25th November, 1997, all the contemners appeared through their respective advocates.
Besides the departmental proceedings, different criminal cases were also lodged against them.
On behalf of some of the contemners a request was made to keep the contempt matter in abeyance
until the conclusion of the proceedings initiated under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code,
the departmental proceedings and the report of the Commission constituted under the Commission
of Inquiry Act. The request was declined by the High Court. It was held that the pendency of a
criminal case or judicial inquiry could not constitute a bar to the continuation of the contempt
proceedings. But before adjourning the proceedings to the next date and having noticed that all the
contemners and their advocates were present and every body was condemning the occurrence, the
Court expressed the desire that some of the responsible officers like Superintendent of Police,
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Inspector of Police Kotwali Shri K.D. Choudhary and SubInspector of Police Ms. Shashi Lata Singh and Sergeant Major of Police Line Ranjit Pandey should
disclose details of the occurrence which had taken place in the court premises on 18th November,
1997 and if possible, identify more names of such persons, who, according to them, had taken part
at the time of occurrence.
On 10th December, 1997, all the contemners appeared and filed additional or supplementary replies
to show cause notice. The Superintendent of Police in his supplementary reply disclosed names of
14 more police officials and constables, who, as per his inquiry, had also taken part along with the
main persons named earlier.
Appellants who were convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act and visited with the punishment
of simple imprisonment have filed five different appeals.
Learned counsels appearing for the appellants in different appeals, apart from the merits in
individual appeals, which we shall deal with later, have raised some common points challenging the
correctness of the impugned judgment. The same are:
(i) the alleged contempt is that of a court subordinate to the High Court and the allegations made
constitute an offence under Section 228 IPC, and therefore the jurisdiction of the High Court to take
cognizance of such a case is expressly barred under proviso to Section 10 of the Act;
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(ii) that the High Court cannot take suomotu notice of the contempt of a court subordinate to it. The
procedure given in the High Court Rules and Orders for initiation of proceedings for contempt of
subordinate court having not been followed the entire proceedings are vitiated and liable to be
quashed;
(iii) the standard of proof required in the criminal contempt is the same as in a criminal charge and
therefore the charge of criminal contempt has to be proved by holding a trial as in a criminal case.
The appellants could not be convicted on the basis of evidence by way of affidavits only. The
witnesses should have been examined in Court and in any case the appellants should have been
given an opportunity to cross- examine the persons who had deposed against them on affidavits to
verify the version of the incident as according to them there were conflicting versions of the
incident;
(iv) reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the appellants either to defend
themselves or put forward their case; and
(v) affidavits of independent witnesses which were on record have not been dealt with by the High
Court.
Answer to the first point would depend upon the interpretation to be put on Section 10 of the
Act.Section 10 which deals with the power of the High Court to punish for the contempt of
subordinate courts.
According to the learned counsels appearing for the appellants the proviso to Section 10 means that
if the act by which a party is alleged to have committed contempt of a subordinate court constitutes
offence of any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court is
precluded from taking cognizance of it. According to them in the present case the allegations made
amounts to an offence under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and consequently the jurisdiction
of the High Court is barred.
We do not find any force in this submission. The point raised is concluded against the appellants by
a judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. The State of
Madras, 1952 SCR 425 wherein it was held that sub-section (3) excluded the jurisdiction of the
High Court to take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court
subordinate to it only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt are punishable as
contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not where these acts merely
amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided in the Indian Penal
Code.
On an examination of the decisions of several High Courts in India it was laid down that the High
Court had the right to protect subordinate courts against contempt but subject to this restriction, that
cases of contempt which have already been provided for in the Indian Penal Code should not be
taken cognizance of by the High Court. This, it was stated, was the principle underlying section
2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. This Court then observed that it was not necessary to
determine exhaustively what were the cases of contempt which had been already provided for
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intheIndian Penal Code; it was pointed out, however, that some light was thrown on the matter by
the provision of section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers any civil, criminal
or revenue court to punish summarily a person who is found guilty of committing any offence
under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the view or presence
of the court. The later decision of Brahma Prakash Sharma ([1953] S.C.R. 1169) explained the true
object of contempt proceedings.
Mukherjea J. who delivered the judgment of the Court said (at page 1176) :
“It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various Judges that the object of
contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which
they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests
would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is
lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is
weakened.”
It was also pointed out that there were innumerable ways by which attempts could be made to
hinder or obstruct the due administration of justice in courts and one type of such interference was
found in cases where there was an act which amounted to “scandalising the court itself” : this
scandalising might manifest itself in various ways but in substance it was an attack on individual
Judges or the court as a whole with or without reference to particular cases, causing unwarranted
and defamatory aspersions upon the character and ability of the Judges. Such conduct is punished as
contempt for the reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence
of the people in the courts which are of prime importance to the litigants in the protection of their
rights and liberties.”
These two judgments have been followed recently in Arun Paswan, S.I. vs. State of Bihar
&Others[2003 (10) SCALE 658]. We respectfully agree with the reasoning and the conclusions
arrived at in these cases.
“Criminal contempt” is defined in Section 2 (c) of the Act.
Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code provides forIntentional insult or interruption to public servant
sitting in judicial proceeding
What is made publishable under Section 228, IPC is the offence of intentional insult to a Judge or
interruption of court proceedings but not as a contempt of Court. The definition of criminal
contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would either scandalize the court or
which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice. It would also include any act which
lowers the authority of the Court or prejudices or interferes with the due course of any judicial
proceedings. It is not limited to the offering of intentional insult to the Judge or interruption of the
judicial proceedings. This Court observed in Delhi Judicial Service Association Vs. State of Gujarat
&Ors. , 1991 (4) SCC 406:
“…The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The Court has the
duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is
entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not to protect the dignity of the Court
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against insult or injury, but, to protect and vindicate the right of the public so that the administration
of justice is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. The power to punish for
contempt is thus for the protection of public justice, whose interest requires that decency and
decorum is preserved in Courts of Justice. Those who have to discharge duty in a Court of Justice
are protected by the law, and shielded in the discharge of their duties. Any deliberate interference
with the discharge of such duties either in court or outside the court by attacking the presiding
officers of the court, would amount to criminal contempt and the courts must take serious
cognizance of such conduct.”
In the present case, a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge was attacked in a pre-planned and
calculated manner in his court room and when he tried to protect himself from physical harm by
retiring to his chambers, by chasing him there and causing injuries to him. The raising of slogans
and demanding unconditional bail for Jokhu Singh further compounded the offence. The Courts
cannot be compelled to give “command orders”. The act committed amounts to deliberate
interference with the discharge of duty of a judicial officer by intimidation apart from scandalizing
and lowering the dignity of the Court and interference with the administration of justice.The effect
of such an act is not confined to a particular court or a district, or the State, it has the tendency to
effect the entire judiciary in the country. It is a dangerous trend. Such a trend has to be curbed. If for
passing judicial orders to the annoyance of the police the presiding officers of the Courts are to be
assaulted and humiliated the judicial system in the country would collapse.
The second contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court cannot on its own
motion take action of a criminal contempt of a subordinate court. According to the learned counsels
the High Court can take cognizance of a criminal contempt under Section 15 (2) of the Act of a
subordinate court only on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by
the Advocate General. Since the procedure as laid down in the High Court Rules and Orders had not
been followed the very initiation of proceedings for contempt was vitiated and therefore liable to be
quashed. We do not find any force in this submission as well. This point also stands concluded
against the appellants by a decision of this Court in S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P.
Lucknow, Vs. Vinay Chandra Misra, [1981 (1) SCC 436]. In this case an advocate filed a petition
before the High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act alleging that the appellant therein as a
Member of Revenue Board made certain contemptuous remarks, viz., nalayakgadhesaale ko jail
bhijwadunga; kis idiot ne advocate banadiyahai and acted in a manner which amounted to criminal
contempt of the Court of Revenue Board, in which he (the advocate) was the counsel for one of the
parties. The advocate requested the High Court to take suomotu action under the Contempt of Court
Act against the member of the Revenue Board or pass such orders as it deemed fit. The question for
determination was whether the High Court was competent to take cognizance of contempt of a
subordinate court when it was moved by a private petitioner and not in accordance with either of the
two motions mentioned in Section 15(2). Analyzing Section 15 (2) of the Act and in reading it in
harmony with Section 10 of the Act it was held:
- A comparison between the two sub-sections would show that whereas in sub-section (1) one of
the three alternative modes for taking cognizance, mentioned is “on its own motion”, no such mode
is expressly provided in sub-section (2). The only two modes of taking cognizance by the High
Court mentioned in sub-section (2) are : (i) on a reference made to it by a subordinate court; or (ii)
on a motion made by the Advocate General, or in relation to a union territory by the notified Law
Officer. Does the omission in Section 15(2) of the mode of taking suomotu cognizance indicate a
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legislative intention to debar the High Court from taking congnizance in that mode of any criminal
contempt of a subordinate court ? If this question is answered in the affirmative, then, such a
construction of sub-section (2) will be inconsistent with Section 10which makes the powers of the
High court to punish for contempt of a subordinate court, coextensive and congruent with its power
to punish for its own contempt not only in regard to quantum or prerequisites for punishment, but
also in the matter of procedure and practice. Such a construction which will bring Section 15(2) in
conflict with Section 10, has to be avoided, and the other interpretation which will be in harmony
with Section 10 is to be accepted. Harmoniously construed, sub-section (2) of Section 15 does not
deprive the High Court of the power of taking cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate
court, on its own motion, also. If the intention of the legislature was to take away the power of the
High Court to take suomotu cognizance of such contempt, there was no difficulty in saying so in
unequivocal language, or by wording the sub-section in a negative form. We have, therefore, no
hesitation in holding in agreement with the High Court, that sub-section (2) of Section 15, properly
construed, does not restrict the power of the High Court to take cognizance of and punish contempt
of a subordinate court, on its own motion.”[Emphasis supplied]
We respectfully agree with the view taken in this judgment and hold that the High Court could
initiate proceedings on its own motion under the Contempt of Courts Actagainst the appellants.
The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the standard of proof
required in the criminal contempt is the same as in a criminal charge and therefore the charge of
criminal contempt has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That the appellants could not be
convicted on the basis of the affidavits filed. That the witnesses should have been examined in
Court and in any case the appellants should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the
persons who had deposed against them on affidavits to verify the version of the incident as
according to them there were conflicting versions of the incident. It was emphasized that justice
must not only be done, but must be seen to be done by all concerned to establish confidence that the
contemners will receive a fair, just and impartial trial. We do not find any substance in this
submission as well. High Court in its order has noted that the learned counsels appearing for both
the parties have taken a stand that all possible fair and proper opportunities were extended to them.
In view of the statements made by the counsels for the parties it will not be open to the counsels for
the parties at this stage to take the stand that in the absence of cross-examination of the concerned
persons, reliance could not be placed on the statements which were made on oath. Learned counsel
who had appeared for the contemners before the High Court did not claim the right of crossexamination. Only at the stage of arguments a submission was made that opportunity to crossexamine the concerned persons was not given which vitiated the trial. High Court rejected this
contention by holding that such a stand could not be taken at that stage of the proceedings. It has
been held in Arun Paswan case (supra) that a party which fails to avail of the opportunity to crossexamine at the appropriate stage is precluded from taking the plea of non- observance of principles
of natural justice at a later stage. Such a plea would not be tenable.
It has repeatedly been held by this Court (Ref: 1995 (2) SCC 584) that the procedure prescribed
either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the Evidence Act is not attracted to the
proceedings initiated under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court can deal
with such matters summarily and adopt its own procedure. The only caution that has to be observed
by the Court in exercising this inherent power of summary procedure is that the procedure followed
must be fair and the contemners are made aware of the charges levelled against them and given a
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fair and reasonable opportunity. Having regard to the fact that contempt proceedings are to be
decided expeditiously in a summary manner the convictions have been recorded without extending
the opportunity to the contemners to cross examine those who had deposed against them on
affidavits. Though the procedure adopted in this case was summary but adequate safeguards were
taken to protect the contemners’ interest. The contemners were issued notices apprising them of the
specific allegations made against them. They were given an opportunity to counter the allegations
by filing their counter affidavits and additional counter/supplementary affidavits as per their
request. They were also given opportunity to file affidavits of any other persons which they did.
They were given opportunities to produce any other material in their defence which they did not do.
Most of the contemners had taken the plea that at the relevant time they were on duty in their
respective Police Stations though in the same town. They also attached copies of station diaries and
duty chart in support of their alibi. The High Court did not accept the plea of alibi as all these
papers had been prepared by the contemners themselves and none of the superior officer had
supported such a plea. The evidence produced by the respondents was rejected in the face of the
reports made by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Director General of Police coupled
with affidavits of Mr. Barasi, the Additional District and Sessions Judge, two court’s officials and
affidavits of some of the lawyers who had witnessed the occurrence.
The contempt proceedings have to be decided in a summary manner. The Judge has to remain in
full control of the hearing of the case and immediate action is required to be taken to make it
effective and deterrent. Immediate steps are required to be taken to restore order as early and
quickly as possible. Dragging the proceedings unnecessarily would impede the speed and efficiency
with which justice has to be administered. This Court while considering all these aspects held in In
re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemner), 1995 (2) SCC 584, that the criminal contempt
no doubt amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the
procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute law in the country has always been
summary. It was observed that the need was for taking speedy action and to put the Judge in full
control of the hearing. It was emphasised that immediate steps were required to be taken to restore
order in the court proceedings as quickly as possible. To quote from the above-referred to case
“However, the fact that the process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz.,
that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree of precision with
which the charge may be stated depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific
allegations is made clear or otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is not
always necessary to formulate the charge in a specific allegation. The consensus of opinion among
the judiciary and the jurists alike is that despite the objection that the Judge deals with the contempt
himself and the contemner has little opportunity to defend himself, there is a residue of cases where
not only it is justifiable to punish on the spot but it is the only realistic way of dealing with certain
offenders. This procedure does not offend against the principle of natural justice, viz., nemo judex
in sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the
administration of justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against
misconduct. The Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of the case and he must be able
to take steps to restore order as early and quickly as possible. The time factor is crucial. Dragging
out the contempt proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralyses
the court for a time and indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency with which justice is
administered. Instant justice can never be completely satisfactory yet it does provide the simplest,
most effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing with disruptive conduct in court. So long
as the contemner’s interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity of being heard
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in his defence, even summary procedure in the case of contempt in the face of the court is
commended and not faulted.”
In the present case the High Court had decided to proceed with the contempt proceedings in a
summary manner. Due opportunity was afforded to all the contemners and after verifying and cross
checking the material available before it, coming from different reliable sources the High Court
convicted only nine persons out of twenty six persons arrayed as contemners before it. The High
Court took due care to ascertain the identity of the contemners by cross-checking with the affidavits
filed by the different persons. It is also based on the independent reports submitted by the Director
General of Police and Superintendent of Police. We do not find any fault in the procedure adopted
by the High Court in conducting the proceedings in the present case. For the survival of the rule of
law the orders of the courts have to be obeyed and continue to be obeyed unless overturned,
modified or stayed by the appellate or revisional courts. The court does not have any agency of its
own to enforce its orders. The executive authority of the State has to come to the aid of the party
seeking implementation of the court orders. The might of the State must stand behind the Court
orders for the survival of the rule of the court in the country. Incidents which undermine the dignity
of the courts should be condemned and dealt with swiftly. When a judge is attacked and assaulted in
his court room and chambers by persons on whose shoulders lay the obligation of maintaining law
and order and protecting the citizen against any unlawful act needs to be condemned in the severest
of terms. If judiciary has to perform its duties and functions in a fair and free manner, the dignity
and the authority of the courts has to be respected and maintained at all stages and by all concerned
failing which the very constitutional scheme and public faith in the judiciary runs the risk of being
lost.
It was urged with some vehemence that principles of natural justice were not observed in as much
as opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who had deposed on affidavits is concerned it may be
stated that no such opportunity was asked for in the High Court at trial stage. It was for them to ask
for such an opportunity to cross examine the parties who had deposed against them on affidavit.
Since the contemners did not avail of the opportunity at the trial stage the plea of non-observations
of principles of natural justice is not tenable. Appellants were made aware of the procedure which
was adopted by the High Court. They were given full opportunity to put forth their point of view.
Each of them filed detailed affidavits along with evidence in support thereof. They had attached
their duty charts showing that they could not have been present at the place of occurrence as they
were on duty somewhere else. High Court has considered and discussed the entire evidence present
on the record before recording the conviction. The contention that the affidavits of independent
witnesses were not considered cannot be accepted. Only those were convicted against whom
corroboration of the fact of their presence and participation in the incident was confirmed from
more than one source.
Plea that reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the appellants is equally
untenable. We find from the record that all the material (affidavits, show cause notice etc.) which
were brought on record was properly served on the learned advocates appearing for the contemners.
It is unfortunate that neither the criminal proceedings nor the disciplinary proceedings or the inquiry
under the Commission of Inquiry Act have been concluded. No doubt the appellants had been
suspended initially but in due course they have been reinstated. Some of them have retired as well.
Inaction on the part of the authorities resulted in emboldening others to commit similar acts. In
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Arun Paswan (supra), proceedings for criminal contempt were initiated against the appellant therein
pursuant to the complaint lodged by the District & Sessions Judge, Sasaram addressed to the
Registrar General of the High Court of Patna. What is being emphasised is that had timely action
been taken by the authorities and the criminal proceedings concluded in time, incident, as referred
to above, where slogans were raised “District Judge Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai” could have
been avoided.
The incident with which we are dealing with took place on 18th November 1997. The incident
which has been dealt with in the case of Arun Paswan, S.I. (supra) is dated 20th January, 2002.
Both the incidents have taken place in the State of Bihar, one in Bhagalpur and the other in
Sasaram. The manner in which the police personnel belonging to middle level of police
administration and entrusted with such responsibilities as require theirs coming into contact with
public day to day persuades us to make observation that there is something basically wrong with the
police in Bihar. Misconduct amounting to gross violation of discipline committed not by a single
individual but by so many collectively and that too by those who have formed an association
consisting of members of a disciplined force in uniform was not promptly and sternly dealt with by
the State or its senior officials so as to take care to see that such incident, even if happened, remains
solitary incident. Faced with the initiation of contempt proceedings, the persons proceeded against
did not have the courtesy of admitting their guilt and tendering an apology which if done could have
been dealt with mercy. They decided to contest, of course the justice administration system allows
them the liberty of doing so and they had every right of doing so but at the end it has been found
that their pleas were false and their denial of charges was aimed at prolonging the hearing as much
as they could. We are shocked to learn that the criminal courts seized of trial of the accused persons
on substantive charges for offences under the penal law of the land are awaiting the decision of this
appeal? Why for? Neither the High Court nor this Court has ever directed the proceedings before
the criminal Courts to remain stayed. The criminal Court shall have to decide on the charges framed
against the accused persons on the basis of the evidence adduced in those cases and not on the basis
of this judgment.
Though we have found no merit in any of the pleas raised on behalf of the appellants and we have
formed an opinion without hesitation that the appeals are to be dismissed, this is a case the facts
whereof persuade us to place on record certain observations of ours.
In the constitutional scheme the judiciary is entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution
and the laws. Apart from interpreting the Constitution and the laws, the judiciary discharges the
function of securing maintenance of law and order by deciding the disputes in a manner acceptable
to civilised and peace loving society. In order to maintain the faith of the society in the rule of law
the role of the judiciary cannot be undermined. In a number of cases this Court has observed that
foundation of the judiciary is the trust and confidence of the people of the nation and when such
foundation or trust is rudely shaken by means of any disrespect by the very persons who are
required to enforce the orders of the court and maintain law and order the people’s perception of
efficacy of the systems gets eroded.
The Judges are as a jurist calls ‘paper tigers’. They do not have any machinery of their own for
implementing their orders. People, while approaching the Court of law which they regard as temple
of justice, feel safe and secure whilst they are in the Court. The police personnel is deployed in the
Court campus for the purpose of maintaining order and to see that not only the Judges can work
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fearlessly in a calm, cool and serene atmosphere but also to see that anyone coming to the Court too
feels safe and secure thereat. Every participant in court proceedings is either a seeker of justice or
one who comes to assist in administration of justice. So is the expectation of the members of the
Bar who are treated as officers of the Court. We shudder to feel what would happen if the police
personnel itself, and that too in an organised manner, is found to be responsible for disturbing the
peace and order in the Court campus, for causing assault on the Judges and thus sullying the temple
of justice apart from bringing a bad name to an indispensable organ of the executive wing of the
State.
The police force is considered by the society as an organised force of civil officers under the
command of the State engaged in the preservation of law and order in the society and maintaining
peace by enforcement of laws and prevention and detection of crime. One who is entrusted with the
task of maintaining discipline in the society must first itself be disciplined. Police is an agency to
which social control belongs and therefore the police has to come up to the expectations of the
society.
After all, what the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had done Jokhu Singh had appeared as a witness.
His cross-examination was not concluded without which his testimony was liable to be excluded
from being read in evidence. The learned Judge had exhausted practically all means for securing the
presence of the witness. He would neither attend nor make any communication to the Court. Even
the threat of initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act did not deter him from
abstaining. To secure his presence a non-bailable warrant had to be issued. He avoided the service
of non-bailable warrant of arrest and appeared in the Court in the late hours. He was not apologetic
and felt that he was above the process of the Court. It cannot be said that the higher authorities of
police were not aware of the behaviour of Jokhu Singh. Either they knew about it or they should
have known about it. Instead of offering the bail, Jokhu Singh was busy managing for the Judge
being approached or influenced by extra legal methods. Jokhu Singh and his confederate decided to
take the law in their own hands and assault the Judge and anyone who came in their way. We do not
think that any of the appellants deserve any sympathy or mercy.
We trust and hope that this case would set in motion the thinking process of the persons occupying
higher echelons in police administration specially in Bihar and take care to ensure that such
incidents do not recur in future.
We direct the disciplinary authorities before whom the disciplinary proceedings are pending and the
criminal Courts before whom the prosecutions are pending against the appellants to conclude the
proceedings and the trial at the earliest. The Commission holding the enquiry under
theCommissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 would also do well to conclude its proceedings at the
earliest. We request Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna to watch and if necessary
monitor the proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry and issue directions to the criminal courts to
expeditiously conclude the pending criminal cases.
The appeals are dismissed. The appellants who are on bail shall forthwith surrender to their bail
bonds and taken into custody to serve out the sentences as passed by the High Court of Patna. The
Director General of Police, Bihar is directed to ensure compliance with this order by securing
presence of all the appellants to serve out the sentences passed on them by the High Court.
