September 29, 2024
Advocacy, Professional Ethics and AccountancyDU LLBSemester 6

Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India(2003) 2 SCC 45

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S.N. VARIAVA, J – All these petitions raise the question whether lawyers have a right to strike
and/or give a call for boycott of court/s. In all these petitions a declaration is sought that such strikes
and/or calls for boycott are illegal. As the questions vitally concerned the legal profession, public
notices were issued to Bar Associations and Bar Councils all over the country. Pursuant to those
notices some Bar Associations and Bar Councils have filed their responses and have appeared and
made submissions before us.

  1. In Writ Petition (C) No. 821 of 1990, an interim order came to be passed. This order is
    reported in Common Cause, A Regd. Society v. Union of India [(1995) 1 SCALE 6]. The
    circumstances under which it is passed and the nature of the interim order are set out in the order.
    The relevant portion reads as under:
    “2. The Officiating Secretary, Bar Council of India, Mr C.R. Balaram filed an affidavit
    on behalf of the Bar Council of India wherein he states that a ‘National Conference’ of
    members of the Bar Council of India and State Bar Councils was held on 10-9-1994 and
    11-9-1994 and a working paper was circulated on behalf of the Bar Council of India by Mr
    V.C. Misra, Chairman, Bar Council of India, inter alia on the question of strike by lawyers.
    In that working paper a note was taken that the Bar Associations had proceeded on strike
    on several occasions in the past, at times, State-wide or nationwide, and ‘while the
    profession does not like it as members of the profession are themselves the losers in the
    process’ and while it is not necessary to sit in judgment over the wider question whether
    members of the profession can at all go on strike or boycott of courts, it was felt that even if
    it is assumed that such a right enures to the members of the profession, the circumstances in
    which such a step should be resorted to should be clearly indicated. Referring to an earlier
    case before the Delhi High Court, it was stated that the Bar Council of India had made its
    position clear to the effect
    ‘(a) the Bar Council of India is against resorting to strike excepting in rarest of
    rare cases involving the dignity and independence of the judiciary as well as of the
    Bar; and (b) whenever strikes become inevitable, efforts shall be made to keep it
    short and peaceful to avoid causing hardship to the litigant public.’
    It was in response to the above that a consensus emerged at the Bar at the hearing of the
    matter that instead of the court going into the wider question whether or not the members of
    the legal profession can resort to strike or abstain from appearing in cases in court in which
    they are engaged, the court may see the working of the interim arrangement and if that is
    found to be satisfactory it may perhaps not be required to go into the wider question at this
    stage. Pursuant to the discussion that took place at the last hearing on 30-11-1994, the
    following suggestions have emerged as an interim measure consistent with the Bar Council
    of India’s thinking that except in the rarest of rare cases strike should not be resorted to and
    instead peaceful demonstration may be resorted to avoid causing hardship to the litigant
    public. The learned counsel suggested that to begin with, the following interim measures
    may be sufficient for the present:
    (1) In the rare instance where any association of lawyers including statutory Bar
    Councils considers it imperative to call upon and/or advise members of the legal
    profession to abstain from appearing in courts on any occasion, it must be left open to
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    any individual member/members of that association to be free to appear without let,
    fear or hindrance or any other coercive steps.
    (2) No such member who appears in court or otherwise practises his legal
    profession, shall be visited with any adverse or penal consequences whatever, by any
    association of lawyers, and shall not suffer any expulsion or threat of expulsion
    therefrom.
    (3) The above will not preclude other forms of protest by practising lawyers in
    court such as, for instance, wearing of armbands and other forms of protest which in no
    way interrupt or disrupt the court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the
    litigant. Any such form of protest shall not however be derogatory to the court or to the
    profession.
    (4) Office-bearers of a Bar Association (including Bar Council) responsible for
    taking decisions mentioned in clause (1) above shall ensure that such decisions are
    implemented in the spirit of what is stated in clauses (1), (2) and (3) above.
  2. Mr P.N. Duda, Senior Advocate representing the Bar Council of India was good
    enough to state that he will suggest to the Bar Council of India to incorporate clauses (1),
    (2), (3) and (4) in the Bar Council of India (Conduct and Disciplinary) Rules, so that it can
    have statutory support should there be any violation or contravention of the aforementioned
    four clauses. The suggestion that we defer the hearing and decision on the larger question
    whether or not members of the profession can abstain from work commends to us. We also
    agree with the suggestion that we see the working of the suggestions in clauses (1) to (4)
    above for a period of at least six months by making the said clauses the rule of the court.
    Accordingly we make clauses (1) to (4) mentioned above the order of this Court and direct
    further course of action in terms thereof. The same will operate prospectively. We also
    suggest to the Bar Councils and Bar Associations that in order to clear the pitch and to
    uphold the high traditions of the profession as well as to maintain the unity and integrity of
    the Bar they consider dropping action already initiated against their members who had
    appeared in court notwithstanding strike calls given by the Bar Council or Bar Association.
    Besides, members of the legal profession should be alive to the possibility of Judges of
    different courts refusing adjournments merely on the ground of there being a strike call and
    insisting on proceeding with cases.”
    The above interim order was passed in the hope that better sense could prevail and lawyers
    would exercise self-restraint. In spite of the above interim directions and the statement of Mr P.N.
    Duda, the Bar Council of India has not incorporated clauses (1) to (4) in the Bar Council of India
    (Conduct and Disciplinary) Rules. The phenomenon of going on strike at the slightest provocation
    is on the increase. Strikes and calls for boycott have paralysed the functioning of courts for a
    number of days. It is now necessary to decide whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a
    call for boycott of court/s.
    4.Mr Dipankar Gupta referred to various authorities of this Court and submitted that the
    reasons why strikes have been called by the Bar Associations and/or Bar Councils are:
    (a) confrontation with the police and/or the legal administration;
    (b) grievances against the Presiding Officer;
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    (c) grievances against judgments of courts;
    (d) clash of interest between groups of lawyers; and
    (e) grievances against the legislature or a legislation.
    Mr Gupta submitted that the law was well established. He pointed out that this Court has declared
    that strikes are illegal. He submitted that even a call for strike is bad. He submitted that it is time
    that the Bar Council of India as well as various State Bar Councils monitor strikes within their
    jurisdiction and ensure that there are no call for strikes and/or boycotts. He submitted that in all
    cases where redressal can be obtained by going to a court of law there should be no strike.
  3. The learned Attorney-General submitted that strike by lawyers cannot be equated with strikes
    resorted to by other sections of the society. He submitted that the basic difference is that members
    of the legal profession are officers of the court. He submitted that they are obliged by the very
    nature of their calling to aid and assist in the dispensation of justice. He submitted that strike or
    abstention from work impaired the administration of justice and that the same was thus inconsistent
    with the calling and position of lawyers. He submitted that abstention from work, by lawyers, may
    be resorted to in the rarest of rare cases, namely, where the action protested against is detrimental to
    free and fair administration of justice such as there being a direct assault on the independence of the
    judiciary or a provision is enacted nullifying a judgment of a court by an executive order or in case
    of supersession of judges by departure from the settled policy and convention of seniority. He
    submitted that even in cases where the action eroded the autonomy of the legal profession e.g.
    dissolution of Bar Councils and recognized Bar Associations or packing them with government
    nominees, a token strike of one day may be resorted to. He submitted, even in the above situations
    the duration of abstention from work should be limited to a couple of hours or at the maximum one
    day. He submitted that the purpose should be to register a protest and not to paralyse the system. He
    suggested that alternative forms of protest can be explored e.g. giving press statements, TV
    interviews, carrying banners and/or placards, wearing black armbands, peaceful protest marches
    outside court premises etc. He submitted that abstention from work for the redressal of a grievance
    should never be resorted to where other remedies for seeking redressal are available. He submitted
    that all attempts should be made to seek redressal from the authorities concerned. He submitted that
    where such redressal is not available or not forthcoming, the direction of the protest can be against
    that authority and should not be misdirected e.g. in cases of alleged police brutalities, courts and
    litigants should not be targeted in respect of actions for which they are in no way responsible. He
    agreed that no force or coercion should be employed against lawyers who are not in agreement with
    the “strike call” and want to discharge their professional duties.
  4. Before considering the question raised it is necessary to keep in mind the role of lawyers in
    the administration of justice and also their duties and obligations as officers of this Court. In the
    case of Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1984) 1 SCC 722], the High Court had
    directed that a criminal trial goes on from day to day. Before this Court it was urged that the
    advocates were not willing to attend day to day as the trial was likely to be prolonged. It was held
    that it is the duty of every advocate who accepts a brief in a criminal case to attend the trial day to
    day. It was held that a lawyer would be committing breach of professional duties if he fails to so
    attend.
  5. In the case of K. John Koshy v. Dr Tarakeshwar Prasad Shaw [(1998) 8 SCC 624], one
    of the questions was whether the court should refuse to hear a matter and pass an order when
    counsel for both the sides were absent because of a strike call by the Bar Association. This Court
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    held that the court could not refuse to hear the matter as otherwise it would tantamount to the court
    becoming a privy to the strike.
  6. Thus the law is already well settled. It is the duty of every advocate who has accepted a
    brief to attend trial, even though it may go on day to day and for a prolonged period. It is also
    settled law that a lawyer who has accepted a brief cannot refuse to attend court because a boycott
    call is given by the Bar Association. It is settled law that it is unprofessional as well as unbecoming
    for a lawyer who has accepted a brief to refuse to attend court even in pursuance of a call for strike
    or boycott by the Bar Association or the Bar Council. It is settled law that courts are under an
    obligation to hear and decide cases brought before them and cannot adjourn matters merely because
    lawyers are on strike. The law is that it is the duty and obligation of courts to go on with matters or
    otherwise it would tantamount to becoming a privy to the strike. It is also settled law that if a
    resolution is passed by Bar Associations expressing want of confidence in judicial officers, it would
    amount to scandalising the courts to undermine its authority and thereby the advocates will have
    committed contempt of court. Lawyers have known, at least since Mahabir Singhcase that if they
    participate in a boycott or a strike, their action is ex facie bad in view of the declaration of law by
    this Court. A lawyer’s duty is to boldly ignore a call for strike or boycott of court/s. Lawyers have
    also known, at least since Ramon Servicescase [(2001) 1 SCC 118], that the advocates would be
    answerable for the consequences suffered by their clients if the non-appearance was solely on
    grounds of a strike call.
  7. It must also be remembered that an advocate is an officer of the court and enjoys special
    status in society. Advocates have obligations and duties to ensure smooth functioning of the court.
    They owe a duty to their clients. Strikes interfere with administration of justice. They cannot thus
    disrupt court proceedings and put interest of their clients in jeopardy. In the words of Mr H.M.
    Seervai, a distinguished jurist:
    “Lawyers ought to know that at least as long as lawful redress is available to aggrieved
    lawyers, there is no justification for lawyers to join in an illegal conspiracy to commit a
    gross, criminal contempt of court, thereby striking at the heart of the liberty conferred on
    every person by our Constitution. Strike is an attempt to interfere with the administration of
    justice. The principle is that those who have duties to discharge in a court of justice are
    protected by the law and are shielded by the law to discharge those duties, the advocates in
    return have duty to protect the courts. For, once conceded that lawyers are above the law
    and the law courts, there can be no limit to lawyers taking the law into their hands to
    paralyse the working of the courts. ‘In my submission’, he said that ‘it is high time that the
    Supreme Court and the High Courts make it clear beyond doubt that they will not tolerate
    any interference from any body or authority in the daily administration of justice. For in no
    other way can the Supreme Court and the High Courts maintain the high position and
    exercise the great powers conferred by the Constitution and the law to do justice without
    fear or favour, affection or ill will.”
  8. It was expected that having known the well-settled law and having seen that repeated strikes
    and boycotts have shaken the confidence of the public in the legal profession and affected
    administration of justice, there would be self-regulation. The abovementioned interim order was
    passed in the hope that with self-restraint and self-regulation the lawyers would retrieve their
    profession from lost social respect. The hope has not fructified. Unfortunately strikes and boycott
    calls are becoming a frequent spectacle. Strikes, boycott calls and even unruly and unbecoming
    conduct are becoming a frequent spectacle. On the slightest pretence strikes and/or boycott calls are
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    resorted to. The judicial system is being held to ransom. Administration of law and justice is
    threatened. The rule of law is undermined.
  9. It is held that submissions made on behalf of the Bar Council of U.P. merely need to be
    stated to be rejected. The submissions based on the Advocates Act are also without merit. Section 7
    of the Advocates Act provides for the functions of the Bar Council of India. None of the functions
    mentioned therein authoriseparalysing of the working of courts in any manner. On the contrary, the
    Bar Council of India is enjoined with the duty of laying down standards of professional conduct and
    etiquette for advocates. This would mean that the Bar Council of India ensures that advocates do
    not behave in an unprofessional and unbecoming manner. Section 48-A gives a right to the Bar
    Council of India to give directions to the State Bar Councils. The Bar Associations may be separate
    bodies but all advocates who are members of such Associations are under disciplinary jurisdiction
    of the Bar Councils and thus the Bar Councils can always control their conduct. Further, even in
    respect of disciplinary jurisdiction the final appellate authority is, by virtue of Section 38, the
    Supreme Court.
  10. In the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India [(1998) 4 SCC 409], it has been
    held that professional misconduct may also amount to contempt of court (para 21). It has further
    been held as follows:
    “79. An advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court may also, as already
    noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct in a given case but it is for the Bar Council of
    the State or Bar Council of India to punish that advocate by either debarring him from
    practice or suspending his licence, as may be warranted, in the facts and circumstances of
    each case. The learned Solicitor-General informed us that there have been cases where the
    Bar Council of India taking note of the contumacious and objectionable conduct of an
    advocate, had initiated disciplinary proceedings against him and even punished him for
    ‘professional misconduct’, on the basis of his having been found guilty of committing
    contempt of court. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of the State or Bar
    Council of India, as the case may be, when apprised of the established contumacious
    conduct of an advocate by the High Court or by this Court, would rise to the occasion, and
    take appropriate action against such an advocate. Under Article 144 of the Constitution ‘all
    authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court’.
    The Bar Council which performs a public duty and is charged with the obligation to protect
    the dignity of the profession and maintain professional standards and etiquette is also
    obliged to act ‘in aid of the Supreme Court’. It must, whenever facts warrant, rise to the
    occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the contemner advocate. It
    must act in accordance with the prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn by
    this Court to the contumacious and unbecoming conduct of an advocate which has the
    tendency to interfere with due administration of justice. It is possible for the High Courts
    also to draw the attention of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional
    misconduct of a contemner advocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed in the
    manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. There is no justification to
    assume that the Bar Councils would not rise to the occasion, as they are equally responsible
    to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of law and prevent any interference in
    the administration of justice. Learned counsel for the parties present before us do not
    dispute and rightly so that whenever a court of record records its findings about the conduct
    of an advocate while finding him guilty of committing contempt of court and desires or
    refers the matter to be considered by the Bar Council concerned, appropriate action should
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    be initiated by the Bar Council concerned in accordance with law with a view to maintain
    the dignity of the courts and to uphold the majesty of law and professional standards and
    etiquette. Nothing is more destructive of public confidence in the administration of justice
    than incivility, rudeness or disrespectful conduct on the part of a counsel towards the court
    or disregard by the court of the privileges of the Bar. In case the Bar Council, even after
    receiving ‘reference’ from the Court, fails to take action against the advocate concerned,
    this Court might consider invoking its powers under Section 38 of the Act by sending for
    the record of the proceedings from the Bar Council and passing appropriate orders. Of
    course, the appellate powers under Section 38 would be available to this Court only and not
    to the High Courts. We, however, hope that such a situation would not arise.
  11. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, to prevent the
    contemner advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is
    much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise as an
    advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct
    of an Advocate-on-Record, this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court
    Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practise as an Advocate-on-Record because that
    privilege is conferred by this Court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power
    to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to
    suspending or revoking his licence to practise as an advocate in other courts or tribunals.”
    Thus a Constitution Bench of this Court has held that the Bar Councils are expected to rise to the
    occasion as they are responsible to uphold the dignity of courts and majesty of law and to prevent
    interference in administration of justice. In our view it is the duty of the Bar Councils to ensure that
    there is no unprofessional and/or unbecoming conduct. This being their duty no Bar Council can
    even consider giving a call for strike or a call for boycott. It follows that the Bar Councils and even
    Bar Associations can never consider or take seriously any requisition calling for a meeting to
    consider a call for a strike or a call for boycott. Such requisitions should be consigned to the place
    where they belong viz. the waste-paper basket. In case any Association calls for a strike or a call for
    boycott the State Bar Council concerned and on their failure the Bar Council of India must
    immediately take disciplinary action against the advocates who give a call for strike and if the
    Committee members permit calling of a meeting for such purpose, against the Committee members.
    Further, it is the duty of every advocate to boldly ignore a call for strike or boycott.
  12. It must also be noted that courts are not powerless or helpless. Section 38 of the Advocates
    Act provides that even in disciplinary matters the final appellate authority is the Supreme Court.
    Thus even if the Bar Councils do not rise to the occasion and perform their duties by taking
    disciplinary action on a complaint from a client against an advocate for non-appearance by reason
    of a call for strike or boycott, on an appeal the Supreme Court can and will. Apart from this, as set
    out in Ramon Servicescase every court now should and must mulct advocates who hold vakalats
    but still refrain from attending courts in pursuance of a strike call with costs. Such costs would be in
    addition to the damages which the advocate may have to pay for the loss suffered by his client by
    reason of his non-appearance.
  13. The Bar Council of India has since filed an affidavit wherein extracts of a joint meeting of
    the Chairmen of various State Bar Councils and members of the Bar Council of India, held on 28-9-
    2002 and 29-9-2002, have been annexed. The minutes set out that some of the causes which result
    in lawyers abstaining from work are:
    (I) Local issues
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  14. Disputes between lawyer/lawyers and the police and other authorities.
  15. Issues regarding corruption/misbehaviour of judicial officers and other authorities.
  16. Non-filling of vacancies arising in courts or non-appointment of judicial officers for a
    long period.
  17. Absence of infrastructure in courts.
    (II) Issues relating to one section of the Bar and another section
  18. Withdrawal of jurisdiction and conferring it to other courts (both pecuniary and
    territorial).
  19. Constitution of Benches of High Courts. Disputes between the competing District and
    other Bar Associations.
    (III) Issues involving dignity, integrity, independence of the Bar and judiciary
    (IV) Legislation without consultation with the Bar Councils
    (V) National issues and regional issues affecting the public at large/the
    insensitivity of all concerned.
  20. At the meeting, it is then resolved as follows:
    “RESOLVED to constitute Grievance Redressal Committees at the taluk/sub-division
    or tehsil level, at the district level, High Court and Supreme Court levels as follows:
    (I)(a) A committee consisting of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India or his nominee,
    Chairman, Bar Council of India, President, Supreme Court Bar Association, AttorneyGeneral of India.
    (b) At the High Court level a committee consisting of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of
    the State High Court or his nominee, Chairman, Bar Council of the State, President or
    Presidents of the High Court Bar Association, Advocate-General, Member, Bar
    Council of India from the State.
    (c) At the district level, District Judge, President or Presidents of the District Bar
    Association, District Government Pleader, member of the Bar Council from the district,
    if any, and if there are more than one, then senior out of the two.
    (d) At taluk/tehsil/sub-division, seniormost Judge, President or Presidents of the
    Bar Association, Government Pleader, representative of the State Bar Council, if any.
    (II) Another reason for abstention at the district and taluk level is arrest of an
    advocate or advocates by the police in matters in which the arrest is not justified.
    Practice may be adopted that before arrest of an advocate or advocates, President, Bar
    Association, the District Judge or the seniormost Judge at the place be consulted. This
    will avoid many instances or abstentions from court.
    (III) IT IS FURTHER RESOLVED that in the past abstention of work by
    advocates for more than a day was due to inaction of the authorities to solve the
    problems that the advocates placed.
    (IV) IT IS FURTHER RESOLVED that in all cases of legislation affecting the
    legal profession which includes enactment of new laws or amendments of existing
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    laws, matters relating to jurisdiction and creation of tribunal, the Government both
    Central and State should initiate the consultative process with the representatives of the
    profession and take into consideration the views of the Bar and give utmost weight to
    the same and the State Government should instruct their officers to react positively to
    the issues involving the profession when they are raised and take all steps to avoid
    confrontation and inaction and in such an event of indifference, confrontation etc. to
    initiate appropriate disciplinary action against the erring officials and including but not
    limited to transfer.
    (V) The Councils are of the view that abstentions of work in courts should not be
    resorted to except in exceptional circumstances. Even in exceptional circumstances, the
    abstention should not be resorted to normally for more than one day in the first
    instance. The decision for going on abstention will be taken by the General Body of the
    Bar Association by a majority of two-third members present.
    (VI) It is further resolved that in all issues as far as possible legal and constitutional
    methods should be pursued such as representation to authorities, holding
    demonstrations and mobilising public opinion etc.
    (VII) It is resolved further that in case the Bar Associations deviate from the above
    resolutions and proceed on cessation of work in spite or without the decision of the
    Grievance Redressal Committee concerned except in the case of emergency the Bar
    Council of the State will take such action as it may deem fit and proper, the discretion
    being left to the Bar Council of the State concerned as to enforcement of such decisions
    and in the case of an emergency the Bar Association concerned will inform the State
    Bar Council.
    The Bar Council of India resolves that this resolution will be implemented strictly
    and the Bar Associations and the individual members of the Bar Associations should
    take all steps to comply with the same and avoid cessation of the work except in the
    manner and to the extent indicated above.”
  21. Whilst we appreciate the efforts made, in view of the endemic situation prevailing in the
    country, in our view, the above resolutions are not enough. It was expected that the Bar Council of
    India would have incorporated clauses as those suggested in the interim order of this Court in their
    disciplinary rules. This they have failed to do even now. What is at stake is the administration of
    justice and the reputation of the legal profession. It is the duty and obligation of the Bar Council of
    India to now incorporate clauses as suggested in the interim order. No body or authority, statutory
    or not, vested with powers can abstain from exercising the powers when an occasion warranting
    such exercise arises. Every power vested in a public authority is coupled with a duty to exercise it,
    when a situation calls for such exercise. The authority cannot refuse to act at its will or pleasure. It
    must be remembered that if such omission continues, particularly when there is an apparent threat to
    the administration of justice and fundamental rights of citizens i.e. the litigating public, courts will
    always have authority to compel or enforce the exercise of the power by the statutory authority. The
    courts would then be compelled to issue directions as are necessary to compel the authority to do
    what it should have done on its own.
  22. It must immediately be mentioned that one understands and sympathises with the Bar
    wanting to vent their grievances. But as has been pointed out there are other methods e.g. giving
    press statements, TV interviews, carrying out of court premises banners and/or placards, wearing
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    black or white or any colour armbands, peaceful protest marches outside and away from court
    premises, going on dharnas or relay fasts etc. More importantly in many instances legal remedies
    are always available. A lawyer being part and parcel of the legal system is instrumental in
    upholding the rule of law. A person cast with the legal and moral obligation of upholding law can
    hardly be heard to say that he will take the law in his own hands. It is therefore time that selfrestraint be exercised.
  23. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right of appearance in courts is still
    within the control and jurisdiction of courts. Section 30 of the Advocates Act has not been brought
    into force and rightly so. Control of conduct in court can only be within the domain of courts. Thus
    Article 145 of the Constitution of India gives to the Supreme Court and Section 34 of the Advocates
    Act gives to the High Court power to frame rules including rules regarding condition on which a
    person (including an advocate) can practise in the Supreme Court and/or in the High Court and
    courts subordinate thereto. Many courts have framed rules in this behalf. Such a rule would be valid
    and binding on all. Let the Bar take note that unless self-restraint is exercised, courts may now have
    to consider framing specific rules debarring advocates, guilty of contempt and/or unprofessional or
    unbecoming conduct, from appearing before the courts. Such a rule if framed would not have
    anything to do with the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Councils. It would be concerning the
    dignity and orderly functioning of the courts. The right of the advocate to practise envelopes a lot of
    acts to be performed by him in discharge of his professional duties. Apart from appearing in the
    courts he can be consulted by his clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for, he can
    draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits or any other documents, he can participate in any conference
    involving legal discussions, he can work in any office or firm as a legal officer, he can appear for
    clients before an arbitrator or arbitrators etc. Such a rule would have nothing to do with all the acts
    done by an advocate during his practice. He may even file vakalat on behalf of a client even though
    his appearance inside the court is not permitted. Conduct in court is a matter concerning the court
    and hence the Bar Council cannot claim that what should happen inside the court could also be
    regulated by them in exercise of their disciplinary powers. The right to practise, no doubt, is the
    genus of which the right to appear and conduct cases in the court may be a specie. But the right to
    appear and conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the court must and does have major
    supervisory and controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested of control or
    supervision of conduct in court merely because it may involve the right of an advocate. A rule can
    stipulate that a person who has committed contempt of court or has behaved unprofessionally and in
    an unbecoming manner will not have the right to continue to appear and plead and conduct cases in
    courts. The Bar Councils cannot overrule such a regulation concerning the orderly conduct of court
    proceedings. On the contrary, it will be their duty to see that such a rule is strictly abided by. Courts
    of law are structured in such a design as to evoke respect and reverence to the majesty of law and
    justice. The machinery for dispensation of justice according to law is operated by the court.
    Proceedings inside the courts are always expected to be held in a dignified and orderly manner. The
    very sight of an advocate, who is guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional
    conduct, standing in the court would erode the dignity of the court and even corrode its majesty
    besides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts. The
    power to frame such rules should not be confused with the right to practise law. While the Bar
    Council can exercise control over the latter, the courts are in control of the former. This distinction
    is clearly brought out by the difference in language in Section 49 of the Advocates Act on the one
    hand and Article 145 of the Constitution of India and Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act on the
    other. Section 49 merely empowers the Bar Council to frame rules laying down conditions subject
    to which an advocate shall have a right to practise i.e. do all the other acts set out above. However,
    299
    Article 145 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to make rules for regulating
    this practice and procedure of the court including inter alia rules as to persons practising before this
    Court. Similarly Section 34 of the Advocates Act empowers High Courts to frame rules, inter alia to
    lay down conditions on which an advocate shall be permitted to practise in courts. Article 145 of the
    Constitution of India and Section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute
    right to an advocate to appear in a court. An advocate appears in a court subject to such conditions
    as are laid down by the court. It must be remembered that Section 30 has not been brought into
    force and this also shows that there is no absolute right to appear in a court. Even if Section 30 were
    to be brought into force control of proceedings in court will always remain with the court. Thus
    even then the right to appear in court will be subject to complying with conditions laid down by
    courts just as practice outside courts would be subject to conditions laid down by the Bar Council of
    India. There is thus no conflict or clash between other provisions of the Advocates Act on the one
    hand and Section 34 or Article 145 of the Constitution of India on the other.
  24. In conclusion, it is held that lawyers have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott,
    not even on a token strike. The protest, if any is required, can only be by giving press statements,
    TV interviews, carrying out of court premises banners and/or placards, wearing black or white or
    any colour armbands, peaceful protest marches outside and away from court premises, going on
    dharnas or relay fasts etc. It is held that lawyers holding vakalats on behalf of their clients cannot
    refuse to attend courts in pursuance of a call for strike or boycott. All lawyers must boldly refuse to
    abide by any call for strike or boycott. No lawyer can be visited with any adverse consequences by
    the Association or the Council and no threat or coercion of any nature including that of expulsion
    can be held out. It is held that no Bar Council or Bar Association can permit calling of a meeting for
    purposes of considering a call for strike or boycott and requisition, if any, for such meeting must be
    ignored. It is held that only in the rarest of rare cases where the dignity, integrity and independence
    of the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest abstention
    from work for not more than one day. It is being clarified that it will be for the court to decide
    whether or not the issue involves dignity or integrity or independence of the Bar and/or the Bench.
    Therefore in such cases the President of the Bar must first consult the Chief Justice or the District
    Judge before advocates decide to absent themselves from court. The decision of the Chief Justice or
    the District Judge would be final and have to be abided by the Bar. It is held that courts are under no
    obligation to adjourn matters because lawyers are on strike. On the contrary, it is the duty of all
    courts to go on with matters on their boards even in the absence of lawyers. In other words, courts
    must not be privy to strikes or calls for boycotts. It is held that if a lawyer, holding a vakalat of a
    client, abstains from attending court due to a strike call, he shall be personally liable to pay costs
    which shall be in addition to damages which he might have to pay his client for loss suffered by
    him.
  25. It is now hoped that with the above clarifications, there will be no strikes and/or calls for
    boycott. It is hoped that better sense will prevail and self-restraint will be exercised. The petitions
    stand disposed of accordingly.
  26. Hence, it is directed that (a) all the Bar Associations in the country shall implement the
    resolution dated 29-9-2002 passed by the Bar Council of India, and (b) under Section 34 of the
    Advocates Act, the High Courts would frame necessary rules so that appropriate action can be taken
    against defaulting advocate/advocates.

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