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JUDGMENT Sethi, J.
- The facts of the case, which are not seriously disputed, are that an organisation, namely, Narmada
BachaoAndolan filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India being Writ Petition No.
319 of 1994 in this Court. The petitioner was a movement or andolan, whose leaders and members
were concerned about the alleged adverse environmental impact of the construction of the sardar
Sarovar Reservoir Dam in Gujarat and the far-reaching and tragic consequences of the displacement
of hundreds of thousands of people from their ancestral homes that would result from the
submerging of vast extents of land, to make up the reservoir. During the pendency of the writ
petition this Court passed various order. By one of the order, the Court permitted to increase the
height of the dam to RL 85 meters which was resented to and protested by the writ petitioners and
others including the respondent herein. The respondent Arundhati Roy, who is not a party to the
writ proceedings, published an article entitled “The Greater Common Good” which was published
in Outlook Magazine and in some portion of a book written by her. Two judges of this Court,
forming the three-judge Bench felt that the comments made by her were, prima facie, a
misrepresentation of the proceedings of the court. It was observed that judicial process and
institution cannot be permitted to be scandalised or subjected to contumacious violation in such a
blatant manner, it had been done by her. The action of the respondent had caused the court much
anguish and when the court expressed its displeasure on the action of the respondent in making
distorted writing or manner in which leaders of the petitioner Ms. Medha Patkar and one
Dharmadikhari despite giving assurance to the court acted in breach of the injunction, the Court
observed:
“We are unhappy at the way the leaders of NBA and Ms. Arundhati Roy have attempted to
undermine the dignity of the Court. We expected better behavior from them.” - Showing its magnanimity, the Court declared:
“After giving this matter our thoughtful consideration and keeping in view the importance of the
issue of resettlement and rehabilitation of the PAFs, which we have been monitoring for the last
five years, we are not inclined to initiate proceedings against the petitioner, its leaders or Ms.
Arundhati Roy. We are of the opinion, in the largest interest of the issues pending before us, that we
need not pursue the matter any further. We, however, hope that what we have said above would
serve the purpose and the petitioner and its leaders would hereafter desist from acting in a manner
which has the tendency to interfere with the due administration of justice or which violates the
injunctions issued by this Court from time to time.” - The third learned Judge also recorded his disapproval of the statement made by the respondent
herein and others and felt that as the court’s shoulders are broad enough to shrug off their comments
and because the focus should not shift from the resettlement and rehabilitation of the oustees, no
action in contempt be taken against them.
103 - However, after the judgment was pronounced in IA No. 14 of 1999 on 15th October, 1999 , an
incident is stated to have taken place on 30th December, 2000 regarding which Contempt Petition
No. 2 of 2001 was filed by J.R. Parashar, Advocate and others. According to the appellations made
in that petition, the respondents named therein, led a huge crowd and held a Dharna in front of this
Court and shouted abusive slogans against the court including slogans ascribing lack of integrity
and dishonesty to his institution.
All the three respondents therein admitted that there was a Dharna outside the gates of this Court on
30th December, 2000 which was organised by Narmada BachaoAndolan and the gathered crowd
were persons who lived in the Narmada Valley and were aggrieved by the majority judgment of this
Court relating to the building of the dam on the Narmada River. - The assertions in the aforesaid contempt petition attributed that the contemnors shouted abusive
slogans against the court including slogans ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to the
institution undoubtedly made the action of the contemnor gross contemptuous and as such the court
had initiated the contempt proceedings by issuing notice. But in view of the denial of the alleged
contemnors to the effect that they had never shouted such slogans and used such abusive words as
stated in the contempt petition, instead of holding an inquiry and permitting the parties to lead
evidence in respect of here respective stand, to find out which version is correct, the court though it
fit not to adopt that course and decided to drop the proceedings. But in the very show cause that had
been filed by the respondent No. 3, Smt. Arundhati Roy, apart from denying that she had not used
any such words as ascribed to her.
However, the Court felt that respondent No. 3 therein (Arundhati Roy) was found to have, prima
facie, committed contempt as she had imputed motives to specific courts for entertaining litigation
and passing orders against her. She had accused courts of harassing her as if the judiciary were
carrying out a personal vendetta against her. She had brought in matters which were not only not
pertinent to the issues to be decided but has drawn uninformed comparisons to make statements
about this Court which do not appear to be protected by law relating to fair criticism. It was stated
by her in the court that she stood by the comments made by her even if the same are contumacious.
For the reason recorded therein, the Court issued notice int he prescribed form to the respondent
herein asking her to show cause as to why she should not be proceeded against for contempt for the
statements in the offending three paragraphs of her affidavit, reproduced hereinearlier. - In her reply affidavit, the respondent has again reiterated what she had stated in her earlier
affidavit. It is contended that as a consequence of the Supreme Court judgment the people in the
Narmada Valley are likely to lose their homes, their livelihood and their histories and when they
came calling on the Supreme Court, they were accused of lowering the dignity of the court which,
according to her is a suggestion that the dignity of the court and the dignity of the Indian citizens
are incompatible, oppositional, adversarial things. She stated:
“I believe that the people of the Narmada valley have the constitutional right to peacefully against
what they consider an unjust and unfair judgment. As for myself, I have every right to participate in
any peaceful protest meeting that I choose to. Even outside the gates of the Supreme Court. As a
writer I am fully entitled to put forward my views, my reasons and arguments for why I believe that
the judgment in the Sardar Sarovar case is flawed and unjust and violates the human rights of Indian
citizens. I have the right to use all my skills and abilities such as they are, and all the facts and
figures at my disposal, to persuade people to my point of view.”
104 - She also stated that she has written and published several essays and articles on Narmada issue
and the Supreme Court judgment. None of them was intended to show contempt to the court. She
justified her right to disagree with the court’s view on the subject and to express her disagreement in
any publication or forum. In her belief the big dams are economically unviable, ecologically
destructive and deeply undemocratic. In her affidavit she has further stated:
“But whoever they are, and whatever their motives, for the petitioners to attempt to misuse
the Contempt of Court Act and the good offices of the Supreme Court to stifle criticism and stamp
out dissent, strikes at the very roots of the notion of democracy.In recent months this Court has
issued judgments on several major public issues. For instance, the closure of polluting industries in
Delhi, the conversion of public transport buses from diesel to CNG, and the judgment permitting
the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam to proceed. Ali of these have had far-reaching and often
unanticipated impacts. They have materially affected, for better or for worse, the lives and
livelihoods of millions of Indian citizens. Whatever the justice or injustice of these judgments
whatever their finer legal points, for the court to become intolerant of criticism or expressions of
dissent would mark the beginning of the end of democracy.
In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm that as a writer I have right to state my opinions and beliefs. As a
free citizen of India I have the right to be part of any peaceful dharna, demonstration or protest
march. I have the right to criticize any judgment of any court that I believe to be unjust. I have the
right to make common cause with those I agree with. I hope that each time I exercise these rights I
will not dragged to court on false charges and forced to explain my actions.” - The High Court in its judgment had concluded that the allegations made against the judicial
officers come within the category of contempt which is committed by “scandalizing the court”. The
learned judges observed on the authority of the pronouncement of Lord Russel in Reg. v. Gray
[(1900) 2 G.B. 36] that this class of contempt is subject to one important qualification. inthe opinion
of the judges of the High Court, the complaint lodged by the contemners exceeded the bounds of
fair and legitimate criticism. This Court referred to various judgments of English Courts and
concluded:
“The position therefore is that a defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so far as the judge is
concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libeler in a proper action if he so
chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the
due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as
contempt. One is a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the
public. It will be injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people
regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants
from placing complete reliance upon the court’s administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause
embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well
established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference
with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely,
or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law.” - Similarly reliance of Shri Shanti Bhushan, Senior Advocate on Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. The
Registrar of Orissa High Court and Anr. [1974 (1) 374] is of no great help to his client. After
referring to the definition of criminal contempt in Section 2(c) of the Act, the court found that the
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terminology used in the definition is borrowed from the English Law of contempt and embodies
certain concepts which are familiar to that law which, by and large, was applied in India. The
expressions “scandalized”, “lowering the authority of the court,” “interference”, “obstruction” and
“administration of justice” have all gone into the legal currency of our sub-continent and have to be
understood in the sense in which they have been so far understood by our courts with the aid of
English Law, where necessary . Sub-clause (i) of the definition was held to embody the concept of
canalization, as discussed by Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition in Volume 8, page 7 at para - Action of scandalizing the authority of the court has been regarded as an “obstruction” of public
justice whereby the authority of the court is undermined. All the three clauses of the definition were
held to justify the contempt in terms of obstruction of or interference with the administration of
justice. It was declared that the Act accepts what was laid down by the Privy Council and other
English authorities that proceedings in contempt are always with reference to the administration of
justice. The canalization within the meaning of Sub-section (i) must be in respect of the court or the
judge with reference to administration of justice. This Court concluded that the courts of justice are,
by their constitution, entrusted with functions directly connected with the administration of justice,
and it is the expectation and confidence of all those who have or likely to have business therein that
the court perform all their functions on a high level of rectitude without fear or favour, affection or
ill-will. It is this traditional confidence in courts of justice that the justice will be administered to the
people which is sought to be protected by proceedings in contempt. The object obviously is not to
vindicate the judge personally but to protect the public against any undermining of their accustomed
confidence in the institution of the judiciary. canalization of the court was held to be a species of
contempt which may take several forms. Krishna Iyer, J. while concurring with the main judgment
authored by Palekar, J. observed that the dilemma of the law of contempt arises because of the
constitutional need to balance two great but occasionally conflicting principles – freedom of
expression and fair and fearless justice. After referring to the judgments of English, American and
Canadian Courts, he observed: “Before stating the principles of law bearing on the facts of
contempt of court raised in this case we would like to underscore the need to draw the lines clear
enough to create confidence in the people that this ancient and inherent power, intended to preserve
the faith of the public in public justice, will not be so used as to provoke public hostility as overtook
the Star Chamber. A vague and wandering jurisdiction with uncertain frontiers, a sensitive and
suspect power to punish vested in the prosecutor, a law which makes it a crime to public regardless
of truth and public good and permits a process of brevimanu conviction, may unwittingly trench
upon civil liberties and so the special jurisdiction and jurisprudence bearing on contempt power
must be delineated with deliberation and operated with serious circumspection by the higher
judicial echelons. So it is that as the palladium of our freedoms, the Supreme Court and the High
Courts, must vigilantly protect free speech even against judicial umbrage – a delicate but sacred
duty whose discharge demands tolerance and detachment of a high order.” - According to him the considerations, as noticed in the judgment, led to the enactment of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which makes some restrictive departures from the traditional law
and implies some wholesome principles which serve as unspoken guidelines in this branch of
law.Section 2(c) emphasizes to the interference with the courts of justice or obstruction of the
administration of justice or scandalizing or lowering the authority of the court – not the judge.
According to him, “The unique power to punish for contempt of itself inheres in a court qua court,
in its essential role of dispenser of public justice. After referring to host of judicial pronouncements,
Krishna Iyer, J., concluded:
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“We may now sum up. Judges and Courts have diverse duties. But functionally, historically and
jurisprudentially, the value which is dear to the community and the function which deserves to be
cordoned off from public molestation, is judicial. Vicious criticism of personal and administrative
act of Judges may indirectly mar their image and weaken the confidence of the public in the
judiciary but the countervailing good, not merely of free speech but also of greater faith generated
by exposure to the actinic light of bona fide, even if marginally over-zealous, criticism cannot be
overlooked. Justices is so cloistered virtue.” - In In Re: S. Mulgaokar Beg, CJ observed that the judiciary is not immune from criticism but
when that criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross mis-statement and made in a manner
which is designed to lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot
be ignored. He further declared”
Krishna Iyer, J. while concurring observed:
“The contempt power, though jurisdictionally large, is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise.
Every commission of contempt need not erupt in indignant committal or demand punishment,
because Judges are judicious, their valour non-violent and their wisdom goes into action when
played upon by a volley of values, the least of which is personal protection – for a wide discretion,
range of circumspection and rainbow of public considerations benignantly guide that power. Justice
if not hubris; power is not petulance and prudence is not pusillanimity, especially when Judges are
themselves prospectors and mercy is a mark of strength, not whimper of weakness. Christ and
Gandhi shall not be lost on the Judges at a critical time when courts are on trial and the people
(“We, the People of India”) pronounce the final verdict on all national institutions. Such was the
sublime perspective, not plural little factors, that prompted me to nip in the bud the proceeding
started for serving a larger cause of public justice than punitive action against a publisher, even
assuming )without admitting) he was guilty. The preliminary proceeding has been buried publicly;
let it lie in peace. Many values like free press, fair trial, judicial fearlessness and community
confidence must generously enter the verdict, the benefit of doubt, without absolutist insistence,
being extended to the defendants. Such are the dynamics of power in this special jurisdiction. These
diverse indicators, carefully considered, have persuaded me to go no further, by a unilateral
decision of the Bench. This closure has two consequences. It puts the lid on the proceedings without
pronouncing on the guilt or otherwise of the opposite parties. In a quasi-criminal action, a
presumption of innocence operates. Secondly, whatever belated reasons we may give for our
action,w e must not proceed to substantiate the accusation, if any. To condemn unheard is not fair
play. Bodyline bowling, perhaps, is not cricket. So may reason do not reflect on the merits of the
charge.” - He further observed that contempt power is a wise economy to use by the Court of this branch
of its jurisdiction. The court will act with seriousness and severity where justice is jeopardized by a
gross and/or unfounded attack on the Judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy
the judicial process. The court should harmonise the constitutional values of free criticism and the
need for a fearless curial process and its presiding functionary, the Judge. - In Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India this Court held that if maintenance of
democracy is the foundation of free speech, society equally is entitled to regulate freedom of speech
or expression by democratic action. Nobody has a right to denigrate others right of person and
reputation. Bonafide criticism of any system or institution including the judiciary cannot be
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objected to as healthy and constructive criticism are fools to augment forensic tools for improving
its function. - Relying upon some judgments of foreign courts and the cherished wishes expressed or
observations made by the Judges of this country it cannot be held as law that in view of the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and expression no-one can be proceeded with for the
contempt of court on the allegation of scandalizing or intending to scandalise the authority of any
Court. The Act is for more comprehensive legislation which lays down the law in respect of several
matters which hitherto had been the subject of judicial exposition. The legislature appears to have
kept in mind to bring the law on the subject into line with modern trends of thinking in other
countries without ignoring the ground realities and prevalent socio-economic system in India, the
vast majority of whose people are poor, ignorant, uneducated, easily liable to be misled. But who
acknowledge have the tremendous faith in the Dispensers of Justice. The Act, which was enacted in
the year 1971, much after the adoption of the Constitution by the People of India, defined criminal
contempt under Section 2(c) to mean:
“Criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by
visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which
i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court, or
ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice
in any other manner.” - This Court has occasion to deal with the constitutional validity of the Act and came to the
conclusion that the same was intra vires. If the constitutional validity of criminal contempt
withstood the test on the touchstone of constitutionality in the light of the fundamental rights, it is
too late to argue at this stage that no contempt proceeding can be initiated against a person on the
ground of scandalizing the authority of the court. - Dealing with the meaning of the word “scandalizing”, this Court in D.C. Saxena’s case (supra)
held that it is an expression of scurrilous attack on the majesty of justice which is calculated to
undermine the authority of the courts and public confidence in the administration of justice.
Dealing with Section 2(c) of the Act and defining the limits of scandalizing the court, it was held:
“scandalizing the court, therefore, would mean hostile criticism of judges as judges or judiciary.
Any personal attack upon a judge in connection with the officer he holds is dealt with under law of
libel or slander. Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or
judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an inroad on the majesty of justice Any
caricature of a judge calculated to lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or tend
to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or the majesty of justice. It would,
therefore, be scandalizing the judge as a judge, in other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias
improper motives to a judge is canalization of the court and would be contempt of the court. Even
imputation of lack of impartiality or fairness to a judge in the discharge of his official duties
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amounts to contempt. The gravamen of the offence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an
affront to the majesty of justice. When the contemnor challenges the authority of the court, he
interferes with the performance of duties of judge’s office or judicial process or administration of
justice or generation or production of tendency bringing the judge or judiciary into
contempt. Section 2(c) of the Act, therefore, defines criminal contempt in wider articulation that
any publication,whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or
otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalises or tends to
scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority or any court; or prejudices, or interferes or
tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other
manner, is a criminal contempt. Therefore, a tendency to scandalise the court or tendency to lower
the authority of the court or tendency to interfere with or tendency to obstruct the administration of
justice in any manner or tendency to challenge the authority or majesty of justice, would be a
criminal contempt. The offending act apart, any tendency if it may lead to or tends to lower the
authority of the court is a criminal contempt. Any conduct of the contemnor which has the tendency
or produces a tendency to bring the judge or court into contempt or tends to lower the authority of
the court would also be contempt of the court.”
“The appellant has contended before us that the law of contempt should be so applied that the
freedom of speech and expression are not whittled down. This is true. The spirit underlying Article
19(1)(a) must have due play but we cannot overlook the provisions of the second clause of the
article. While it is intended that there should be freedom of speech and expression, it is also
intended that in the exercise of the right, contempt of court shall not be committed. The words of
the second clause are:
‘Nothing in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the
State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restriction on the exercise of
the right conferred by the sub-clause… in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to
an offence.’ These provisions are to be read with Articles 129 and 215 which specially confer on
this Court and the High Courts the power to punish for contempt of themselves. Article
19(1)(a) guarantees complete freedom of speech and expression but it also makes an exception in
respect of contempt of court. The guaranteed right on which the functioning of our democracy rests,
is intended to give protection to expression of free opinions to change political and social conditions
and to advance human knowledge. While the right is essential to a free society, the Constitution has
itself imposed restrictions, in relation to contempt of court and it cannot therefore be said that the
right abolishes the law of contempt or that attacks upon judges and courts will be condoned.” - In Sheela Barse v. Union of India &Ors. the Court acknowledged that the broader right of a
citizen to criticise the systemic inadequacies in the larger public interest. It is the privileged right of
the Indian citizen to believe what he considers to be true and to speak out his mind, though not,
perhaps, always with the best of tastes; and speak perhaps, with greater courage than care for
exactitude. Judiciary is not exempt from such criticism. Judicial institutions are, and should be
made, of stronger stuff intended to endure the thrive even in such hardy climate. But we find no
justification to the resort to this freedom and privilege to criticise the proceedings during their
pendency by persons who are parties and participants therein. - The law of contempt itself envisages various exceptions as incorporated in Section
3, 4, 5, 6and 7. Besides the aforesaid defences envisaged under the Act, the court can, in appropriate
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cases, consider any other defence put forth by the respondent which is not incompatible with the
dignity of the court and the law of contempt. - As already held, fair criticism of the conduct of a judge, the institution of the judiciary and its
functioning may not amount to contempt if it is made in good faith and in public interest. To
ascertain the good faith and the public interest, the courts have to see all the surrounding
circumstances including the person responsible for comments, his knowledge in the field regarding
which the comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved. All citizens cannot
be permitted to comment upon the conduct of the courts in the name of fair criticism which, if not
checked, would destroy the institution itself. Litigant losing in the Court would be the first to
impute motives to the judges and the institution in the name of fair criticism which cannot be
allowed for preserving the public faith in an important pillar of democratic set up, i.e., judiciary. In
Dr. D.C. Saxena’s case (supra) this Court dealt with the case of P. Shiv Shankar by observing:
“In P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar this Court had held that administration of justice and judges are
open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society and their
accountability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their office, i.e, to defend and uphold
the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour. Thus the judges must do, in the light given to
them to determine, what is right. Any criticism about the judicial system or the judges which
hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the faith in the objective approach of the
judges and brings administration of justice to ridicule must be prevented. The contempt of court
proceedings arise out of that attempt. Judgments can be criticised. Motives to the judges need not be
attributed. It brings the administration of justice into disrepute. Faith in the administration of justice
is one of the pillars on which democratic institution functions and sustains. In the free market-place
of ideas criticism about the judicial system or judges should be welcome so long as such criticism
does not impair or hamper the administration of justice. This is how the courts should exercise the
powers vested in them and judges to punish a person for an alleged contempt by taking notice of the
contempt suomotu or at the behest of the litigant or a lawyer. In that case the speech of the Law
Minister in a Seminar organised by the Bar Council and the offending portion therein were held not
contemptuous and punishable under the Act. In a democracy judges and courts alike are, therefore,
subject to criticism and if reasonable argument or criticism in respectful language and tempered
with moderation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or public good, no court would
treat criticism as a contempt of court.” - The Constitution of India has guaranteed freedom of speech and expression to every citizen as a
fundamental right. While guaranteeing such freedom, it has also provided under Article 129that the
Supreme Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. Similar power has been conferred on the High Courts of
the States under Article 215. Under the Constitution, there is no separate guarantee of the freedom
of the press and it is the same freedom of expression, which is conferred on all citizens
under Article 19(1). Any expression of opinion would, therefore, be not immune from the liability
for exceeding the limits, either under the law of defamation or contempt of Court or the other
constitutional limitations under Article 19(2). If a citizen, therefore, in the grab of exercising right
of free expression under Article 19(1), tries to scandalise the court or undermines the dignity of the
court, then the court would be entitled to exercise power under Article 129 or Article 215, as the
case may be. In relation to a pending proceeding before the Court, while showing cause to the
notice issued, when it is stated the court displays a disturbing willingness to issue notice on an
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absurd despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition, it amounts to a destructive attack on the
reputation and the credibility of the institution and it undermines the public confidence in the
judiciary as a whole and by no stretch of imagination, can be held to be a fair criticism of the
Court’s proceeding. When a scurrilous attack is made in relation to a pending proceeding and the
noticed states that the issuance of notice to show cause was intended to silence criticism and muzzle
dissent, to harass and intimidate those who disagree with it, is a direct attack on the institution itself,
rather than the conduct of an individual Judge. The meaning of the expressions used cannot come
within the extended concept of fair criticism or expression of opinion particularly to the case of the
contemner in the present case, who on her own right is an acclaimed writer in English. At one point
of time, we had seriously considered the speech of Lord Atkin, where the learned Judge has stated:
“The path of criticism is public way: the wrongheaded are permitted to err therein… Justice is not a
cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken,
comments of ordinary men.” [Andre Paul v. Attorney General (1936), AC 322].
and to find out whether there can be a balancing between the two public interests, the freedom of
expression and the dignity of the court. We also took note of observations of Bharucha, J. in the
earlier contempt case against the present contemner, who after recording his disapproval of the
statement, observed that the Court’s shoulders are broad enough to shrug off the comments. But in
view of the utterances made by the contemnor in her show causes filed and not a word of remorse,
till the conclusion of the hearing, it is difficult for us either to shrug off or to hold the accusations
made as comments of outspoken ordinary man and permit the wrongheaded to err therein, as
observed by Lord Atkin. - In the offending portion of her affidavit, the respondent has accused the court of proceeding
with absurd, despicable and entirely unsubstantiated petition which, according to her, amounted to
the court displaying a disturbing willingness to issue notice. She has further attributed motives to
the court of silencing criticism and muzzling dissent by harassing and intimidating those who
disagree with it. Her contempt for the court is evident from the assertion “by entertaining a petition
based on an FIR that even a local police station does not see fit to act upon, the Supreme Court is
doing its own reputation and credibility consideration harm”. In the affidavit filed in these
proceedings, the respondent has reiterated what she has stated in her earlier affidavit and has not
shown any repentance. She wanted to become a champion to the cause of the writers by asserting
that persons like her can allege anything they desire and accuse any person or institution without
any circumspection , limitation or restraint. Such an attitude shows her persistent and consistent
attempt to malign the institution of the judiciary found to be most important pillar in the Indian
democratic set up. This is no defence to say that as no actual damage has been done to the judiciary,
the proceedings be dropped. The well-known proposition of law is that it punishes the archer as
soon as the arrow is shot no matter if it misses to hit the target. The respondent is proved to have
shot the arrow, intended to damage the institution of the judiciary and thereby weaken the faith of
the public in general and if such an attempt is not prevented, disastrous consequences are likely to
follow resulting in the destruction of rule of law, the expected norm of any civilised society. - On the basis of the record, the position of law our findings on various pleas raised and the
conduct of the respondent, we have no doubt in our mind that the respondent has committed the
criminal contempt of this Court by scandalizing its authority with malafide intentions. The
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respondent is, therefore, held guilty for the contempt of court punishable under Section 12 of the
Contempt of Courts Act. - As the respondent has not shown any repentance or regret or remorse, no lenient view should be
taken in the matter. However, showing the magnanimity of law by keeping in mind that the
respondent is a woman, and hoping that better sense and wisdom shall dawn upon the respondent in
the future to serve the cause of art and literature by her creative skill and imagination, we feel that
the ends of justice would be met if she is sentenced to symbolic imprisonment besides paying a fine
of Rs. 2000/-. - While convicting the respondent for the contempt of the Court, we sentence her to simple
imprisonment for one day and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In case of default in the payment of fine,
the respondent shall undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
