September 29, 2024
Advocacy, Professional Ethics and AccountancyDU LLBSemester 6

Kaushal Kishore Awasthi v.Balwant Singh Thakur and Ors.,AIR 2018 SC 199

Case Summary

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Full Case Details

Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
JUDGMENT

  1. Respondent No. 1 herein (the complainant) had lodged a complaint with the Bar Council of
    Chhattisgarh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Bar Council’) on 19.12.2003 against the Appellant,
    who is an Advocate by profession, alleging that the Appellant had acted in a manner which amounts
    to professional misconduct. On that basis, the complainant pleaded that disciplinary action be taken
    against the Appellant. Taking cognizance of the said complaint, a Disciplinary Committee was
    constituted as the reply dated 03.02.2006 filed by the Appellant was found not to be satisfactory.
    After recording the evidence and hearing the parties, the Disciplinary Committee passed final orders
    dated 09.12.2006 holding the Appellant guilty of professional misconduct and, on that basis,
    imposed punishment by suspending his license of practice for a period of two years. The Appellant
    preferred statutory appeal against the said decision of the State Bar Council before the Bar Council
    of India (BCI). Vide the impugned judgment, the BCI has affirmed the finding of the State Bar
    Council as far as holding the Appellant guilty of misconduct is concerned. However, it has reduced
    the term of suspension of license from 2 years to one year along with cost of Rs. 25,000/- to be paid
    to the complainant. Against this order of the BCI, the present appeal is preferred by the Appellant.
  2. A neat plea which is taken by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that even if the allegations
    contained in the complaint are taken to be correct on its face value, these do not amount to
    committing any misconduct as per the provisions of the Advocates Act and Rules framed
    thereunder. We are, therefore, confined to this aspect in the present appeal.
  3. From the complaint which was lodged by the complainant before the State Bar Counsel it can be
    discerned that his allegation was that there was a family dispute, i.e., between the complainant and
    his brothers, in respect of a property which was in the name of their father and was an ancestral
    property. It was stated that after the death of their father on 11.10.1989, the said property was
    divided by the three brothers equally. However, it transpired that before his death, one of the
    brothers of the complainant influenced his father and got registered the said property in the name of
    the complainant’s nephew, i.e., son of that brother, without the consent of other brothers vide sale
    deed dated 25.07.1989. The complainant had approached the Appellant, who is an Advocate, for
    filing the Suit for declaration to declare that the sale deed was null and void as it was prepared
    fraudulently. The Appellant acted as his Advocate and filed the Suit. In the said Suit, the parties
    settled the matter as they agreed for declaring the sale deed as ineffective and requested the Court
    for division of the property. This resulted in passing of decree dated 24.10.1994 by the Court in
    which the complainant was declared owner of 0.03 acres along with kutcha house out of the
    disputed property. Till this stage, there is no quarrel and there is no allegation against the Appellant
    as far as his conducting the said Suit is concerned. However, the complainant further alleged that
    owing to family crises, the complainant suffered some financial crunch in the month of April, 2003,
    and he decided to sell his share of land to one Mr. Narsinghmal, son of Surajmal, for a sum of Rs.
    30,000/- and for the purpose of registration of sale deed, he produced the earlier sale deed before
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    the office of the Deputy Registrar, Dantewada. At that stage, the Appellant produced objection
    letter against the proposed sale deed and objected for registration of the said sale deed on the
    ground that the complainant did not have full ownership of the proposed land and the market value
    was also shown less in the said sale deed. It was stated by the complainant that the Appellant was
    neither an interested party in the said sale deed or in the proposed sale of the land nor was he
    authorised by any. party to raise objections. This act of the Appellant in appearing before the office
    of the Deputy Registrar and objecting to the registration of sale deed was labelled as professional
    misconduct by alleging that the Appellant had paid a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the complainant in the
    year 1996 and Anr. sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the son of the complainant in the year 1999 and for
    repayment of the said amount, the complainant had offered half share of the subject land as security.
    His justification for raising objection, therefore, was that since the land was being sold without
    clearing his debt, it could not be done.
  4. Without prejudice to his defence, the learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that even if the
    aforesaid contents in the complaint are accepted as correct, the act of the Appellant was not as an
    Advocate and, therefore, could not amount to committing misconduct. In order to appreciate this
    contention one may refer to Rule 22 under Chapter II of the Standards of Professional Conduct and
    Etiquette framed by the BCI in exercise of its power Under Section 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act,
  5. This Rule reads as under:
  6. An advocate shall not, directly or indirectly, bid for or purchases, either in his own name or in
    any other name, for his own benefit or for the benefit of any other person, any property sold in the
    execution of a decree or order in any suit, appeal or other proceeding in which he was in any way
    professionally engaged. This prohibition, however, does not prevent an advocate from bidding for
    or purchasing for his client any property which his client may himself legally bid for or purchase,
    provided the Advocate is expressly authorised in writing in this behalf.
  7. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, as per which punishment can be awarded to an Advocate
    for misconduct makes the following reading:
  8. Punishment of advocates for misconduct.–
    . . .
    . . .
    . . .
  9. It is very clear from the provisions of Section 35 that punishment can be awarded to an Advocate
    if he is found guilty of professional or other misconduct. Rule 22 is the relevant Rule in the instant
    case which proscribes an Advocate from directly or indirectly making a bid for or purchase either in
    his own name or in other’s name for his own benefit or for the benefit of any other person any
    property sold in the execution of a decree or order in any suit, appeal or other proceedings in which
    he was in any way professionally engaged.
  10. Admittedly, in the instant case, the complainant was selling the property to the intending buyer
    which was an arrangement between them unconnected with any legal proceedings. The said
    270
    property was not being sold in execution of any decree, in which proceedings the Appellant was
    engaged, as noted above. Insofar as the filing of the Suit by the Appellant on behalf of the
    complainant is concerned, that had resulted into passing of decree and the proceedings had
    concluded. Even as per the complainant’s own admission, it is much thereafter that the complainant
    intended to sell the property in question when he found himself in need of money. It is this sale
    which the Appellant tried to interdict. He was not doing so in the capacity of an Advocate. As per
    him, the complainant was not authorised to sell the property without repaying his debt. Whether the
    Appellant was right in this submission or not, is not relevant. What is relevant is that this act has
    nothing to do with the professional conduct of the Appellant.
  11. Therefore, the very initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant by the State Bar
    Council was improper and without jurisdiction.
  12. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned orders passed by the Bar Council
    of India.

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