Mrityunjoy Das &Anr v. Sayed HasiburRahaman&OrsAIR 2001 SC 1293

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Bench: Umesh C. Banerjee, S.N. Phukan
BANERJEE, J.
The introduction of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in the statute book has been for purposes of
securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general for due and proper administration of justice
in the country. It is a powerful weapon in the hands of the law courts by reason wherefor it must
thus be exercised with due care and caution and for larger interest.
Incidentally, a special leave petition (1416/1997) was filed before this Court by
PaschimBangaRajyaBhumijibiSangh against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court pertaining to
the question of constitutionality of certain provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Amendment
Acts 1981 and 1986. The said Sangha filed an Interlocutory Application being I.A.No.3 OF 1999
for issuance of certain directions which inter alia reads as below:
(a) direct the State of West Bengal and its Revenue Authorities not to initiate any proceedings for
vesting of the land against the members of the Petitioner Sangha and if any vesting proceeding has
been already initiated against the members of the Petitioner Sangha in that event not to pass any
order and maintain status-quo in respect of the land in question in all respect till the disposal of the
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1416 of 1997 pending before this Honble Court or in alternative
clarify that the order dated 20.3.1998 as quoted in paragraph 19-20 will apply only to the parties
thereto and not to the members of the Petitioner No.1 Sangha.
The Interlocutory Application was heard on 29th October, 1999 and this Court was pleased to pass
an order therein to the following effect: At the request of Learned counsel for the Applicants four
weeks time is granted to enable him to put on record appropriate information regarding members of
the Sangha for whom the application is moved and the nature of the stay required.
In the meantime Learned Counsel for the Respondent will also take appropriate instructions in
connection with this I.A. Subsequently on 16th December, 1999, this Court in I.A.No.3 passed an
interim order to the effect as below: Having heard Learned counsel for the parties, by way of an
interim order, it is directed that status-quo regarding possession on spot shall be maintained by both
the sides in connection with the members of the Petitioner-Sangha who were before the High Court
in the Writ Petition out of which the present proceedings arise.
(Emphasis supplied) In the meantime, learned senior counsel for the respondent-State of West
Bengal will verify the list of these members, (Emphasis supplied ) which is furnished to him by
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner and subject to that verification further orders will be passed after
three months.
To be placed after three months.
In the application (I.A.No.3) a further order was passed on 17th April, 2000 which reads as below:
We have heard learned senior counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. Shanti Bhushan and Learned Senior
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Counsel for respondent-State of West Bengal, Mr. Ray, Learned Senior Counsel for respondentState of West Bengal is right when he says that some more time is required as 13,000 persons are
listed and they have to ascertain about their existence on the spot. We grant time up to the end of
July, 2000. I.A. will be placed in the second week of August, 2000. In the meantime, at the request
of Learned Counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. Shanti Bhusan we grant additional interim relief in
continuation of our earlier order dated 16.12.1999 to the effect that if in the meantime, any vesting
orders have been passed in respect of the lands of members of Petitioner Sangha who were before
the High Court in the matter out of which the present proceedings arise, then those vesting orders
shall not be implemented until further orders.”
It is this order which is said to have been violated and thus bringing the orders of this Court into
ridicule. The factum of violation is said to have been deliberate since in spite of the order as above
and even after the service of the order dated 17th April, 2000 to the authorities of Land Reforms
Department, Government of West Bengal for its compliance, the Petitioner No.1 being a resident of
village Amriti, District, Malda, West Bengal and a life member of the
PaschimBangaRajyaBhumijibiSangha was served with a notice dated 5.4.2000 under Section 57 of
the West Bengal Land Reforms Act together with Section 14-T (3) of the said Act read with Rule 4
of the Rules framed thereunder by the Revenue Officer Cell, Malda asking to submit details of land
held by him and his family members since 7.8.1969 and particulars of land transferred by him after
that date. The records depict that a reply to the said notice was furnished as early as 30th April,
2000 alongwith the certification of membership of the Sangha and copy of the order dated 16th
December, 1999 passed by this Court. It further appears that a hearing did take place and the
Revenue Officer passed an order of vesting on 17th April, 2000. Subsequently, on the factual
matrix, it appears that by the notice dated 26th April, 2000 issued by the Revenue Officer,
possession of 37.47½ acres of land was directed to be made over to the Land Revenue Authority on
27.4.2000. It has been the definite case of the petitioners that in spite of receipt of both the orders
dated 16th December, 1999 and 17th April, 2000, the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer, English
Bazar, Malda came on the site and took possession of the said land. Similar is the situation as
regards the land belonging to petitioner No.2 and possession 20.76 acres of land was also obtained
by the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer, English Bazar, Malda. This act of obtaining possession
from the applicants herein is stated to be a deliberate violation of this Courts order and thus cannot
but be ascribed to be contemptuous in nature.
The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law since
the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be led to be distorted. The respect
and authority commanded by Courts of Law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the
entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect for the judiciary is
undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged by the people for what the judiciary does, but
in the event of any indulgence which even can remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the
society is bound to lose confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit
the trust and confidence of the people in general.
The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed at this juncture viz., the burden and standard
of proof. The common English phrase he who asserts must prove has its due application in the
matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the standard
of proof, be it noted that a proceeding under the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of
the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act is quasi criminal, and as such, the standard of proof
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required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond
reasonable doubt. The observations of Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale (1969 3 All ER 1062) lend
support to the aforesaid. Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale stated:
A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it,. It
must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time- honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond all
reasonable doubt. It is not proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told lies.
There must be some further evidence to incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies
can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some other evidence. Where there are
two equally consistent possibilities open to the Court, it is not right to hold that the offence is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In this context, the observations of the Calcutta High Court in ArchanaGuha v.
RanjitGuhaNeogi (1989 (II) CHN252) in which one of us was a party (Banerjee, J.) seem to be
rather apposite and we do lend credence to the same and thus record our concurrence therewith.In
The Aligarh Municipal Board and Others v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and Others (1970 (III)
SCC 98), this Court in no uncertain term stated that in order to bring home a charge of contempt of
court for disobeying orders of Courts, those who assert that the alleged contemners had knowledge
of the order must prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. This Court went on to observe that in
case of doubt, the benefit ought to go to the person charged.In a similar vein in V.G. Nigam and
others v. KedarNath Gupta and another (1992 (4) SCC 697), this Court stated that it would be rather
hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of contempt jurisdiction on
mere probabilities.
Having discussed the law on the subject, let us thus at this juncture analyse as to whether in fact, the
contempt alleged to have been committed by the alleged cotemners, can said to have been
established firmly without there being any element of doubt involved in the matter and that the
Court would not be acting on mere probabilities having however, due regard to the nature of
jurisdiction being quasi criminal conferred on to the law courts. Admittedly, this Court directed
maintenance of status quo with the following words the members of the petitioner Sangha who were
before the High Court in the writ petition out of which the present proceedings arise. And it is on
this score the applicant contended categorically that the intent of the Court to include all the
members presenting the Petition before this Court whereas for the Respondent Mr. Ray contended
that the same is restricted to the members who filed the writ petition before the High Court which
culminated in the initiation of proceeding before this Court. The Counter affidavit filed by the
Respondents also record the same. The issue thus arises as to whether the order stands categorical to
lend credence to the answers of the respondent or the same supports the contention as raised by the
applicants herein Incidentally, since the appeal is pending in this Court for adjudication, and since
the matter under consideration have no bearing on such adjudication so far as the merits of the
dispute are concerned, we are not expressing any opinion in the matter neither we are required to
express opinion thereon, excepting however, recording that probabilities of the situation may also
warrant a finding, in favour of the interpretation of the applicant. The doubt persists and as such in
any event the respondents being the alleged contemners are entitled to have the benefit or advantage
of such a doubt having regard to the nature of the proceeding as noticed herein before more fully.In
view of the observations as above, we are not also inclined to go into the question of apology. On
the wake of the aforesaid, this Contempt Petition fails and is dismissed without however, any order
as to costs.