November 7, 2024
Advocacy, Professional Ethics and AccountancyDU LLBSemester 6

Pushpaben & Others v. Narandas V. Badiani & Another1979 AIR 1536

J. Fazalali, Syed Murtaza
JUDGMENT:
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.-This is an appeal under S. 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter called the Act) against an order of the High Court of Bombay
convicting the appellants for a Civil Contempt and sentencing them to one month’s simple
imprisonment. The facts of the case have been fully detailed by the High Court and it is not
necessary for us to repeat the same all over again. It appears that Respondent No. 1 had given a loan
of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellants on certain conditions. Somehow or other, the loan could not be
paid by the appellants as a result of which Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint under S. 420I.P.C.
against the appellants. While the complaint was pending before the Court of the Magistrate, the
parties entered into a compromise on 22-7-1971 under which the appellants undertook to pay the
loan of Rs. 50,000/- with simple interest @ 12% per annum on or before 21-7-1972. An application
was filed before the Court for allowing the parties to compound the case and acquit the accused.
The Court after hearing the parties, passed the following order:-
“The accused given an undertaking to the court that he shall repay the sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the
complainant on or before 21-7-1972 with interest as mentioned on the reverse. In view of the
undertaking, I permit the compromise and acquit the accused”.
It is obvious, therefore, that the Court permitted the parties to compound the case only because of
the undertaking given by the appellants.
Thereafter, it appears, that the undertaking was violated and the amount of loan was not paid to the
Respondent No. 1 at all. The respondent, therefore, moved the High Court for taking action for
contempt of Court against the appellants as a result of which the present proceedings were taken
against them. The High Court came to the conclusion that the appellants had committed a wilful
disobedience of the undertaking given to the Court and were, therefore, guilty of civil contempt as
defined in S. 2(b) of the Act. Hence, this appeal before us.
Mr. V. S. Desai appearing in support of the appeal has raised two short points before us. He has
submitted that there is no doubt that the appellants had violated the undertaking but in the
circumstances it cannot be said that the appellants had committed a wilful disobedience of the
orders of the Court. So far as this point is concerned, we fully agree with the High Court. In the
circumstances, the appellants undoubtedly committed wilful disobedience of the order of the
court by committing a serious breach of the undertaking given to the Court on the basis of which
alone, the appellants had been acquitted. For these reasons, the first contention put forward by Mr.
Desai, is overruled.
It is, then, contended that under S. 12(3), normally the sentence that should be given to an offender
who is found guilty of civil contempt, is fine and not imprisonment, which should be given only
where the Court is satisfied that ends of justice require the imposition of such a sentence. In our
opinion, this contention of learned counsel for the appellants is well-founded and must prevail. Subsection 3 of S. 12 reads thus :-
188
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil
contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of
imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be
detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit”.
A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt that the
Legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The
statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it think
that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it
must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment
alone is called for in a particular situation Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while
sentence of fine is the rule.
Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any special reason
why the appellants should be sent to jail by sentencing them to imprisonment. Furthermore,
respondent No. 1 before us despite service, has not appeared to support the sentence given by the
High Court. Having regard to these circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the present case,
squarely falls in the first part of S. 12(3) and a sentence of fine alone should have been given by the
High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal to this extent that the sentence of imprisonment passed
by the High Court is set aside and instead the appellants are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-
each. In case of default, 15 days simple imprisonment. Four weeks time to pay the fine.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed in part.

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