December 3, 2024
DU LLBEnvironmental LawSemester 6

Divya Pharmacy v Union of India, High Court of Uttarakhand, WP3437/2016, Decided on 21 December 2018.Sudhanshu Dhulia, J

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“Divya Yog Mandir”, is a Trust, registered under
the Registration Act, 1908, and “Divya Pharmacy”, which is the sole petitioner
before this Court is a business undertaking of this Trust. The Pharmacy
manufactures Ayurvedic medicines and Nutraceutical products, at its
manufacturing unit at Haridwar, Uttarakhand.

  1. It is an admitted fact that “Biological Resources” constitute the main ingredient
    and raw materials in the manufacture of Ayurvedic and Nutraceutical products.
    Petitioner is aggrieved by the demand raised by Uttarakhand Biodiversity Board
    (from hereinafter referred to as UBB), under the head “Fair and Equitable Benefit
    Sharing” (FEBS), as provided under the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (from
    hereinafter referred to as the Act), and the 2014 Regulations framed therein.
  2. Petitioner’s case is simple. UBB cannot raise a demand, under the Head of “Fair
    and Equitable Benefit Sharing” (FEBS), as the Board neither has the powers nor
    the jurisdiction to do that and, secondly, the petitioner in any case is not liable to
    pay any amount or make any kind of contribution under the head of “FEBS”. This
    argument of the petitioner is based on the interpretations of “certain provisions” of
    the statute, which we may now refer.
  3. The Biological Diversity Act, 2002 is a 2002 Act of the Parliament, with three
    basic objectives: (A) Conservation of Biological Diversity. (B) Sustainable use of
    its components. (C) Fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the use
    of biological resources.
  4. In this writ petition, we are presently only concerned with the third objective
    which is fair and equitable benefit sharing (from hereinafter referred to as FEBS).
  5. Under the Act, certain class of persons, cannot undertake an activity, related to
    biodiversity in India, in any manner, without a “prior approval” of the National
    Biodiversity Authority (from hereinafter referred to as NBA). The persons who
    require prior approval from NBA are the persons defined in Section 3 of the
    Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (from hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’)…
  6. A bare reading of the above provision makes it clear that prior approval of NBA
    is mandatory for persons or entities who have some kind of a “foreign element”
    attached to them. Either they are foreigners or even if they are citizens, they are
    non-residents, and in case of a body corporate again a “non-Indian” element is
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    attached to it. Persons having a foreign element have therefore been kept in a
    distinct category.
  7. Fair and equitable benefit sharing (FEBS) thus has not been precisely defined.
    Its definition is based on reference to other provisions of the statute, where again it
    is given by way of illustration in sub-section (2) of Section 21, where “payment of
    monetary compensation” is one of the means of grant of this benefit.
  8. Before NBA grants approval under Section 19 or under Section 20 of the Act,
    it has to ensure that the terms and conditions for granting the approval are
    such which secure equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of
    “Biological Resources”. In other words, FEBS would only arise if an approval is
    being taken under Section 19 and 20 of the Act, and in no other contingency. All
    the same, both Sections 19 & 21, are the sections meant for only “foreign entities”,
    who require approval from NBA in one form or the other. These provisions do not
    apply in case of the petitioner which is purely an Indian Company.
  9. Under Section 19 and 20 of the Act, a prior approval is required from NBA,
    only by persons who have been defined under Section 3(2) of the Act. Such
    persons are the ones who are not citizens of India, or though a citizen of India are
    still non-resident Indian, and if it is a body corporate, association or organization,
    it is not incorporated or registered in India, or if incorporated or registered in India
    under any law for the time being in force, it has a non-Indian participation in its
    share capital or management. To put it simply prior approval for NBA is only
    required when there is a “foreign element” involved.
  10. For an Indian entity such as the petitioner, the provision is given in Section
    7 of the Act, which speaks of “prior intimation” to be given, that too not to NBA
    but to the State Biodiversity Board (SBB)…
  11. As the petitioner does not fall in any of the categories as defined under subsection (2) of Section 3, there is no question of a prior approval from NBA by the
    petitioner, and logically therefore there is no question of any contribution under
    FEBS, as a contribution under FEBS only comes from those who require a prior
    approval from NBA.
  12. The petitioner would also argue that the State Biodiversity Board (SBB) has no
    power to impose FBES in respect of persons referred in Section 7 of the Act of
    2002, i.e. in respect of “Indian entities”. Even NBA does not have the powers
    under the Act, to delegate these powers to SBB, as the NBA itself is not authorised
    to impose FEBS on an “Indian entity”. In short the petitioner would argue that
    there is no provision in the Act where a contribution in the form of “fee”/monetary
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    compensation, or a contribution in any manner is required to be given by an Indian
    entity. FEBS is only for foreigners! The statute is clear about it. Sri Parthasarthy
    would finally submit that the elementary principle of statutory interpretation is to
    give plain meaning to the words used. Reliance is placed on a decision of the
    Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Jharkhand and another v. Govind
    Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437. Para 17 of the said judgment reads as under:
    “17. Where, therefore, the “language” is clear, the intention of the legislature is to
    be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what has
    been said in the statute as also what has not been said. A construction which
    requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in
    rejection of words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception,
    including that of necessity, which is not the case here.”
  13. To the contrary, the learned counsel for the SBB Sri Ritwik Dutt would submit
    that FEBS is one of the three major objectives sought to be achieved by the Act of
    2002, and this has always to be seen as a continuation of the long history of
    international conventions and treaties, which preceded the parliamentary
    legislation. The Act and the Regulations framed therein are a result of our
    international commitments. Reference here is to the Rio de Janeiro Convention
    and Johannesburg Declaration, and most importantly Nagoya Protocol. The
    learned counsel for the SBB would argue that there is no distinction between a
    “foreign entity” and an “Indian entity”, as far as FEBS is concerned, and if a
    distinction is made between a foreign entity and Indian entity in this respect, it
    would defeat the very purpose of the Act, and would also be against the
    international treaties and conventions to which India is a signatory. The learned
    counsel would submit that whereas a foreign entity under Section 3 has to take
    prior approval of NBA before venturing into this area, an Indian entity has to give
    “prior intimation” to SBB before venturing into this area, under Section 7 of the
    Act. The regulation and control, as far as Indian entity is concerned, is given to
    SBB under the Act, and therefore it is the SBB which is the regulatory authority in
    case of an Indian entity, such as the petitioner, and FEBS is being imposed by
    SBB as one of its regulatory functions.
  14. The functions of SBB are defined under Section 23 of the Act of 2002…
  15. The powers of SBB are given under Section 24 of the Act of 2002…
  16. Learned counsel would argue that under sub- section (a) of Section 23 of the
    Act of 2002, powers are given to the SBB to advise the State Government in this
    area of biodiversity, whereas in sub-section (b) of Section 23, the SBB has got
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    powers to regulate the grant of approvals or otherwise to request for commercial
    utilization or bio-survey and bio-utilisation of any biological resource by Indians.
    The powers given under Sub-section (c) of Section 23 of the Act of 2002 are
    general powers given to SBB to carry out the provisions of the Act or as may be
    prescribed by the State Government.
  17. Sub-section (b) of Section 23 has to be read with Section 7 of the Act of 2002
    and reading of the two provisions together would mean that although an Indian
    entity has only to give “prior information” (as against “prior approval” to NBA, in
    case of a foreign entity), it does not mean that SBB has no control over an Indian
    entity. Section 23 stipulates that SBB has powers to “regulate by granting of
    approvals or otherwise requests for commercial utilization or bio-survey and bioutilisation of any biological resource by Indians”. Regulation by imposition of fee
    is an accepted form of regulatory mechanism, the learned counsel for SBB would
    argue. This has again to be seen with sub-section (2) of Section 24, where the
    SBB, in consultation with the local bodies and after making such enquiries can
    prohibit or restrict any such activity, if it is of opinion that such activity is
    detrimental or contrary to the objectives of conservation and sustainable use of
    biodiversity or equitable sharing of benefits arising out of such activity.
  18. Learned counsel would then rely on Section 52A of the Act of 2002, which is a
    provision for appeal before the National Green Tribunal, inter alia, against any
    order passed by NBA or SBB regarding determination of benefit sharing. Learned
    counsel would therefore emphasise that the very fact that an Appellate Authority
    has been provided, inter alia, against any order which has been passed by the SBB
    regarding FEBS, would imply that SBB has powers to impose FEBS.
  19. Reliance has also been placed on Section 32 of the Act, which provides for
    constitution of State Biodiversity Fund, where, inter alia, all sums received by the
    State Biodiversity Board or such other sources have to be kept, hence a holistic
    reading of the entire provisions of the Act, would show that SBB has got an
    important role to play, particularly in the field of FEBS, the learned counsel for the
    SBB would submit.
  20. The Act ensures that funds are available with the SBB for protection and
    regeneration of biological diversity, so that long term sustainability is ensured and
    the indigenous and local communities get incentives for benefit of conservation
    and use of biological resources.
  21. The importance of FEBS has then been emphasised by the learned counsel for
    SBB relying upon the preamble of the Act of 2002, (which refers to the Rio de
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    Janeiro Convention of 1992), where “Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing” is one of
    the three important posts of the entire movement of conservation of biodiversity,
    and one of the main purposes of the statute.
  22. The learned counsel for the SBB would then argue that in the present context,
    a simple and plain reading of the statutory provisions may not be correct. The
    definition clause of the Act of 2002 starts with the words “In this Act, unless the
    context otherwise requires”. The learned counsel would hence argue that the
    definitions of different words and phrases given in Section 2 of the Act of 2002,
    are the ones which have to be applied under normal circumstances, but when
    the application of the definition looses its purpose, the context requires a different
    examination.
  23. Thereafter the learned counsel for the SBB emphasised the importance of
    International Conventions in construing domestic legislations, apart from the Rio
    de Janeiro Convention and Johannesburg Declaration, and particular emphasis was
    given to Nagoya Protocol of 2010 for the reason that in the Nagoya Protocol, the
    entire emphasis was on “fair and equitable benefit sharing” and the importance of
    indigenous and local communities in this regard.
  24. In short, in the concept of FEBS, no distinction is made between a foreign
    entity and an the Indian entity, and the only distinction which the Act makes
    within Indian entities is in proviso to Section 7 of the Act of 2002 where an
    exception has been created for local people and communities in that area,
    including growers and cultivators of biodiversity, and vaids and hakims, who have
    been practicing indigenous medicine.
  25. The above stand taken by the SBB is adopted by the remaining respondents
    such as Union of India and the State of Uttarakhand.
  26. Having heard the rival submissions, it is clear that at the heart of the dispute
    here is the interpretation of what constitutes “fair and equitable benefit sharing”,
    and whether this liability can be fastened on an Indian, or an Indian company.
  27. The petitioner is an Indian company, without any element of foreign
    participation, either in its share capital or management, and therefore has
    challenged the imposition of an amount by the SBB, under the head of “fair and
    equitable benefit sharing”, precisely on the ground that an Indian entity cannot be
    subjected to this burden. The entire argument of the petitioner rests on a textual
    and legalistic interpretation, particularly of the term “Fair and Equitable Benefit
    Sharing”.
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  28. In the first blush it seems only obvious that the law here does not subject an
    Indian entity to FEBS. But what seems obvious, may not always be correct.
    The definition of FEBS in the statute and its implementation
  29. The entire case of the petitioner, as placed by its learned counsel Sri
    Parthasarthy, moves on the definition clause of “Fair and Equitable Benefit
    Sharing” and based on that he would argue that “Fair and Equitable Benefit
    Sharing” would not involve an Indian entity.
  30. The question is whether the context here requires a plain and textual
    interpretation. It is true that in normal circumstances, a definition has to be
    interpreted as it is given in the definition clause, but Section 2 of the Act, which
    defines various expressions in the Act opens with some important words, which
    are, “unless the context otherwise requires”. Meaning thereby that it is not
    mandatory that one should always mechanically attribute an expression as
    assigned in the definition clause. Yes, ordinarily this must be done, but when such
    an interpretation results in an absurdity, or where it defeats the very purpose of the
    Act, then it becomes the duty of the Court to assign a “proper meaning” to the
    words or the phrase, as the case might be. It is for the reason that the Legislature,
    for abundant precaution, by and large in all statues, start the definition clause with
    the words “unless the context otherwise requires”, or such similar expressions.
  31. G.P. Singh in his Classic, Principles of Statutory Interpretations* explains this
    aspect as follows:
    “…where the context makes the definition given in the interpretation clause
    inapplicable, a defined work when used in the body of the statute may have to be
    given a meaning different from that contained in the interpretation clause; all
    definitions given in an interpretation clause are therefore normally enacted subject
    to the qualification – ‘unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,
    or ‘unless the context otherwise requires’.”
  32. But then before a different meaning is given to a definition, reason must be
    given as to why it is being done. It is also true that in a case where the application
    of a definition as given in the definition clause makes the provision unworkable or
    otiose, it must be so stated, that the definition is not applicable because of the
    contrary context.** * 12th Edition, page 191 ** Justice G.P. Singh: Principles of
    Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edition, page 192
  33. The frequently cited case in this regard is Venguard Fire and General
    Insurance Co. Ltd., Madras v. Fraser & Ross, AIR 1960 SC 971. In the said case,
    the Hon’ble Apex Court, explained this position as under:
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    “It is well settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject
    to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created
    them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the
    word defined is said to mean a certain thing, It is possible for the word to have a
    somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the
    subject or context. That is why all definitions in statues generally being with the
    qualifying words, similar to the words used in the present case, namely, ‘unless
    there is anything repugnant in the subject or context’. Therefore, in finding out of
    the meaning of the word, “Insurer” in various sections of the Act (Insurance Act,
    1938) the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause.
    But this is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning
    may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the
    word had been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the
    definition section, namely ‘unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
    context’. In view of this qualification, the Court has not only to look at the words
    but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words
    relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the
    use of the words under the circumstances.”
    What is fair and equitable benefit sharing and the importance of
    international treaties?
  34. Indigenous and local communities, who either grow “biological resources”, or
    have a traditional knowledge of these resources, are the beneficiaries under the
    Act. In return for their parting with this traditional knowledge, certain benefits
    accrue to them as FEBS, and this is what FEBS is actually all about.
  35. This benefit the “indigenous and local communities”, get under the law is over
    and above the market price of their “biological resources”.
  36. But to fully appreciate the concept of FEBS, we may have to go back to the
    legislative history behind the enactment and the long struggle, by and on behalf of
    the local and indigenous communities.
  37. At this juncture, it may also be worthwhile to mention that India is a country
    which is extremely rich in biodiversity. It is one of the top 17 megadiverse
    countries of the world.1 Megadiverse, as the word suggests, would mean “having
    great diversity”, and a megadiverse country must have atleast 5000 species of
    endemic plants and must border marine ecosystem2. Significantly, apart from
    USA, Australia and China, which are in the list of 17 top megadiverse countries of
    the world, due to their size alone, the remaining countries in this pool, are the
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    developing countries, such as India, Colombia, Ecuador, etc. It is the developing
    world which has raised a long struggle in conserving its biological resources, and
    to save it from exploitation and extinction.
  38. The effort of the world community for a sustainable biodiversity system goes
    back to the United Nations conference on human environment, which is better
    known as Stockholm conference of 1972. It was the first United Nations
    conference, which focused on international environment issues. The Stockholm
    manifesto recognised that earth’s resources are finite and there is an urgent need to
    safeguard these resources.
  39. Twenty years later in 1992 due to the combined efforts of the developing
    nations, United Nation Convention of Rio de Janeiro was signed, of which India is
    a signatory. The preamble of the convention recognised and declared the
    importance of biological diversity for evolution and the need for its conversation.
    It also raised concern and cautioned the world, that biological diversity is being
    reduced significantly by unchecked human activities. The Preamble also
    recognises “the close and traditional dependence of many indigenous and local
    communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and the
    desirability of sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional
    knowledge, innovations and practices relevant to the conservation of biological
    diversity and the sustainable use of its components.”
  40. The first Article of the Rio de Janeiro Convention declares its objectives as
    follows: “The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its
    relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable
    use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out
    of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic
    resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account
    all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate finding.”
  41. Ten years later, in 2002, the world community again took stock of the
    movement, this time at Johannesburg, South Africa. The conference resulted in an
    important declaration known as “Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable
    Development, 2002″. The Johannesburg Declaration reasserts the challenges it
    faces in the world regarding conservation of biodiversity.
    What is important for us is that at Johannesburg the vital role of indigenous people
    in the field of sustainable development was reasserted. It also recognized that
    sustainable development requires a long-term perspective and broad-based
    participation in policy formulation, decision-making and implementation at all
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    levels. Though technically Johannesburg declaration may not be a treaty, yet it is
    an important milestone in this movement.
  42. The same year i.e. in 2002 our Parliament, in recognition of its international
    commitments, enacted the Biological Diversity Act, 2002, which was published in
    the Gazette of India on 01.10.2003. The Preamble of the Act shows the purpose of
    bringing the legislation in India…
  43. At this juncture, we must emphasize the importance of international treaties
    and conventions on municipal laws. The Constitution of India emphasizes this
    aspect. Article 51 (c) of the Constitution states as under:-
    “51. Promotion of international peace and security:- The State shall endeavour to
    (c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of
    organised peoples with one another;”
  44. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.N. Godavarman v. Union of
    India (2002) 10 SCC 606 has emphasised the importance of international
    conventions and treaties as under:
    “Duty is cast upon the Government under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to
    protect the environment and the two salutary principles which govern the law of
    environment are : (i) the principles of sustainable development, and (ii) the
    precautionary principle. It needs to be highlighted that the Convention on
    Biological Diversity has been acceded to by our country and, therefore, it has to
    implement the same. As was observed by this Court in Vishaka v. State of
    Rajasthan in the absence of any inconsistency between the domestic law and the
    international conventions, the rule of judicial construction is that regard must be
    had to international conventions and norms even in construing the domestic law.”
  45. In a recent judgment in the case of Commr. Of Customs v. G.M.
    Exports reported in (2016) 1 SCC 91, the Hon’ble Apex Court sums up this aspect
    in para 23 of its judgment, which reads as under:-
    “23. A conspectus of the aforesaid authorities would lead to the following
    conclusions:
    (1) Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India is a Directive Principle of State
    Policy which states that the State shall endeavour to foster respect for international
    law and treaty obligations. As a result, rules of international law which are not
    contrary to domestic law are followed by the courts in this country. This is a
    situation in which there is an international treaty to which India is not a signatory
    or general rules of international law are made applicable. It is in this situation that
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    if there happens to be a conflict between domestic law and international law,
    domestic law will prevail.
    (2) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a
    statute is passed pursuant to the said treaty, it is a legitimate aid to the construction
    of the provisions of such statute that are vague or ambiguous to have recourse to
    the terms of the treaty to resolve such ambiguity in favour of a meaning that is
    consistent with the provisions of the treaty.
    (3) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a
    statute is made in furtherance of such treaty, a purposive rather than a narrow
    literal construction of such statute is preferred. The interpretation of such a statute
    should be construed on broad principles of general acceptance rather than earlier
    domestic precedents, being intended to carry out treaty obligations, and not to be
    inconsistent with them.
    (4) In a situation in which India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and
    a statute is made to enforce a treaty obligation, and if there be any difference
    between the language of such statute and a corresponding provision of the treaty,
    the statutory language should be construed in the same sense as that of the treaty.
    This is for the reason that in such cases what is sought to be achieved by the
    international treaty is a uniform international code of law which is to be applied by
    the courts of all the signatory nations in a manner that leads to the same result in
    all the signatory nations.
    It is in the light of these principles that we must now examine the statute in
    question.”
  46. In the light of the above, we have to understand the importance of the 2002
    Act as it is a result of our international commitments.
  47. India is a party to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity signed
    at Rio on 5th of June 1992. Being a signatory to the International treaty, India was
    under an obligation to give effect to the provisions of the treaty. Article 8 of the Rio
    Convention is regarding IN-SITU Conservation. Article 8 (j) and (k) are relevant for
    our purposes here. It reads as follows:
    “Article 8. IN-SITU CONSERVATION Each Contracting Party shall, as far as
    possible and as appropriate: (j) Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve
    and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
    communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and
    sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the
    approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and
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    practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the
    utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.
    (k) Develop or maintain necessary legislation and/or other regulatory provisions
    for the protection of threatened species and populations.”
  48. Further Article 15 of the Rio Convention relates to – Access to Genetic Resources.
    Clause (1) & (7) of the above Article, read as under:- “Article 15. Access to Genetic
    Resources
  49. Recognizing the sovereign rights of the States over their natural resources, the
    authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national
    governments and is subject to national legislation.
  50. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures,
    as appropriate, and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19 and, where necessary,
    through the financial mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21 with the aim of
    sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the
    benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources
    with the Contracting Party providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon
    mutually agreed terms.”
  51. Being a signatory to the Rio Convention, India was committed to bring
    appropriate legislation in the country in order to give effect to the provisions of the
    treaty. It was in this background and on these international commitments that the
    Parliament enacted the Biological Diversity Act in 2002.
  52. Another important international convention must be referred here, which is
    Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
    Sharing of Benefits arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological
    Diversity. The Nagoya Protocol of 2010 is a supplementary agreement to the 1992
    Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity.
  53. It must be stated, even at the cost of repetition, that the conservation of
    biological diversity has three main pillars or objectives. The first is the
    conservation of biological diversity, the second is sustainable use of its
    components and the third is fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of
    utilisation of genetic resources. Nagoya Protocol of 2010 focuses on the third
    component (with which we are presently concerned), which is fair and equitable
    sharing of genetic material, including the traditional knowledge associated with
    the genetic resources and the benefits arising out from their use.
  54. The preamble of Nagoya Protocol, inter alia, recognised the “importance of
    promoting equity and fairness in negotiations and mutually agreed terms between
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    providers and users of genetic resources”. It also recognised “the vital role that
    women play in access and benefit-sharing and affirming the need for the full
    participation of women at all levels of policy-making and implementation for
    biodiversity conservation.” Article 5 of the Nagoya Protocol describes “fair and
    equitable benefit- sharing”…
  55. Who are to be the beneficiaries of this FEBS? The protocol here speaks of the
    “local and indigenous communities”. They are the ones that need this protection
    and they are the ones who were at the centre of concern at Nagoya.
  56. Article 7 of the Nagoya Convention reads as under…
  57. Article 12 of the Nagoya Protocol reads as under…
  58. Article 15 of the Nagoya Protocol reads as under…
  59. Article 16 of the Convention reads as under…
  60. In the above background of our international commitments, we find that as
    the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 is a follow up to the Rio Convention of 1992,
    similarly, the Regulations of 2014, is a consequence of the Nagoya Protocol. By
    the Regulations, the commitments at Nagoya are being enforced. In fact the
    Preamble of the 2014 Regulations* mentions that the Regulations are in pursuance
    of the Nagoya Protocol.
  61. The concept of FEBS, as we have seen, is focused on the benefits for the “local
    and indigenous communities”, and the Nagoya Protocol makes no distinction
    between a foreign entity and an Indian entity, as regards their obligation towards
    local and indigenous communities in this regard. Consequently the “ambiguities”
    in the national statute have to be seen in the light of the International treaties i.e.
    Rio and Nagoya and a purposive rather than a narrow or literal interpretation has
    to be made, if we have to arrive at the true meaning of FEBS. In our case
    the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 has been enacted not merely in furtherance of
    an International treaty but it is rather to enforce a treaty obligation and therefore in
    case there is any difference between the language of a municipal * Guidelines on
    Access to Biological Resources and Associated Knowledge and Benefits Sharing
    Regulations, 2014.
    Law and corresponding provision of the treaty, “the statutory language should be
    construed in the same sense as that of the treaty”. This is what has been held by the
    Hon’ble Apex Court in Commr. Of Customs v. G.M. Exports.1
  62. After going through the entire history of this movement, which is a movement
    towards the conservation of biological diversity, one gets a sense that the main
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    force behind this movement which resulted in the international conventions and
    finally the municipal legislations, is the protection which the developing countries
    required from the advanced countries in this particular field. All the same, the
    rights of “indigenous and local communities” were extremely important and
    emphatically declared in the Nagoya Protocol. These rights have to be protected,
    equally from outside as well as from within.
  63. The focus of the Nagoya Protocol is on FEBS, and protection of indigenous
    and local communities, and the effort is that the indigenous and local communities
    must get their fair and equitable share of parting with their traditional knowledge
    and resources. India being a signatory to the Rio and the Nagoya Protocol, is
    bound to fulfill its international commitments and make implementation of FEBS
    effective and strong.
  64. Having said this, however if we make a plain reading of the provisions, and
    take a very conservative and textual approach to the interpretation of the relevant
    statutory provisions, we would find that the Act does make a distinction between a
    “foreign entity” and a “domestic entity”, as far as FEBS is concerned, particularly
    when we read the definition of FEBS. But will that be the correct approach!
  65. A simple textual interpretation as submitted by the petitioner would indeed
    show that the petitioner which is not a foreign entity is not liable to contribute to
    FEBS and the powers to impose FEBS lie only with the NBA.
  66. But then a plain and textual interpretation here defeats the very purpose, for
    which the law was enacted! The Purposive Interpretation
  67. The entire controversy before this Court, ultimately revolves around the
    interpretation of certain provisions of Biological Diversity Act, 2002, such as what
    constitutes “Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing”, and whether such a demand can
    be made by the State Biodiversity Board, or such powers can be delegated by the
    National Biodiversity Authority. Over the years, the Courts have been relying on a
    theory of “interpretation”, which is now well known as the “purposive
    interpretation of law”. The Hon’ble Apex Court has applied the theory of the
    “purposive interpretation” not only in its interpretation of the Constitution, but also
    in its interpretation of ordinary statutes.
  68. It is true that in the above case, the principle of purposive interpretation of law
    were applied while interpreting constitutional provisions, but it must be stated that
    the principle of purposive interpretation are equally applicable while interpreting
    ordinary statutes. In fact, principle of purposive interpretation is applicable not
    310
    only in interpreting the Constitution and the statutes, but also in the interpretation
    of a will or a contract.
  69. It would be important to note that the purposive interpretation of law becomes
    particularly relevant when the legislation, which requires interpretation, is a
    socially or economically beneficial legislation. Here in the case at hand, it is clear
    that behind the very concept of FEBS lies the concern of the legislatures for the
    “local and indigenous communities”. FEBS in the form of a “fee” or by any other
    means is a benefit given to the indigenous and local communities by the Act, and
    the Regulations, which again have to be examined in the light of the international
    treaties where the importance of FEBS has been explained.
  70. The imposition of FEBS for the local and indigenous communities can also be
    appreciated by way of an illustration. In Uttarakhand, in fact in the entire Central
    Himalayan region, there is a “herb” or “biological resource”, found in the high
    mountains, called “Yarsagumba”. Its local name is “Keera Jadi”, which is said to
    be an effective remedy for various ailments. It is also known as the “Himalayan
    Viagra”.
  71. The local and the indigenous communities in Uttarakhand, who reside in the
    high Himalayas and are mainly tribals, are the traditional “pickers” of this
    biological resource. Through ages, this knowledge is preserved and passed on to
    the next generation. The knowledge as to when, and in which season to find the
    herb, its character, the distinct qualities, the smell, the colour, are all part of this
    traditional knowledge. This knowledge, may not strictly qualify as an intellectual
    property right of these communities, but nevertheless is a “property right”, now
    recognised for the first time by the 2002 Act, as FEBS. Can it be said that the
    Parliament on the one hand recognised this valuable right of the local
    communities, but will still fail to protect it from an “Indian entity”. Could this ever
    be the purpose of the legislature? “Biological resources” are definitely the property
    of a nation where they are geographically located, but these are also the property,
    in a manner of speaking, of the indigenous and local communities who have
    conserved it through centuries.
  72. In the light of what we have discussed above, we shall now examine and
    finally determine whether in view of the above provisions of law, the State
    Biodiversity Board (i.e. SBB) has got power to impose “Fair and Equitable Benefit
    Sharing (FEBS)” in respect of persons who have got no foreign element attached
    to them, such as the petitioner, and whether the National Biodiversity Authority
    (i.e. NBA) has got powers to delegate to SBB power to impose FEBS to persons
    who are covered by Section 7 of the Act.
    311
  73. As the power to impose FEBS has been given to the SBB by the Regulations
    framed by the NBA i.e. 2014 Regulations, which is presently under challenge, let
    us refer to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Regulations.
  74. The NBA has got powers to frame Regulations under Section 64 of the Act of
  75. Section 64 of the Act of 2002 reads as under:
    “64. Power to make regulations. – The National Biodiversity Authority shall, with
    the previous approval of the Central Government by notification in the Official
    Gazette, are regulations for carrying out the purposes of this Act.”
  76. This provision is again to be read along with sub-section (1) of Section 18,
    which is reproduced below:
    “18. Functions and powers of National Biodiversity Authority. – (1) It shall be the
    duty of the National Biodiversity Authority to regulate activities referred to
    in sections 3, 4 and 6 and by regulations issue guidelines for access to biological
    resources and for fair and equitable benefit sharing.”
  77. Under sub-section (2) of Section 21, the benefit sharing can be given effect to
    in all or any of the manner provided therein, such as, grant of joint ownership of
    intellectual property rights, “transfer of technology”, etc. where “payment of
    monetary compensation and other non-monetary benefits of the benefit claimers as
    the National Biodiversity Authority may deem fit” is one of the manners in which
    benefit sharing can be determined. Further for this, under sub-section (4), the NBA
    has power to make regulation…
  78. Primarily what has been challenged is Regulation 2, 3 & 4 of the 2014
    Regulations, which read as under:
    “2.Procedure for access to biological resources, for commercial utilization or for
    bio-survey and bio-utilization for commercial utilization. – (1) Any person who
    intends to have access to biological resources including access to biological
    resources harvested by Joint Forest Management Committee (JFMC)/Forest
    dweller/ Tribal cultivator/ Gram Sabha, shall apply to the NBA in Form-I of the
    Biological Diversity Rules, 2004 or to the State Biodiversity Board (SBB), in such
    form as may be prescribed by the SBB, as the case may be, along with Form ‘A’
    annexed to these regulations.
    (2) The NBA or the SBB, as the case may be, shall, on being satisfied with the
    application under sub-regulation (1), enter into a benefit sharing agreement with
    the applicant which shall be deemed as grant of approval for access to biological
    312
    resources, for commercial utilization or for bio-survey and bio-utilization for
    commercial utilization referred to in that sub-regulation
  79. Mode of benefit sharing for access to biological resources, for commercial
    utilization or for bio-survey and bioutilization for commercial utilization.– (1) Where the applicant/ trader/
    manufacturer has not entered into any prior benefit sharing negotiation with
    persons such as the Joint Forest Management Committee (JFMC)/ Forest dweller/
    Tribal cultivator/ Gram Sabha, and purchases any biological resources
    directly from these persons, the benefit sharing obligations on the trader shall be in
    the range of 1.0 to 3.0% of the purchase price of the biological resources and the
    benefit sharing obligations on the manufacturer shall be in the range of 3.0 to 5.0%
    of the purchase price of the biological resources:
    Provided that where the trader sells the biological resource purchased by him to
    another trader or manufacturer, the benefit sharing obligation on the buyer, if he is
    a trader, shall range between 1.0 to 3.0% of the purchase price and between 3.0 to
    5.0%, if he is a manufacturer: Provided further that where a buyer submits proof of
    benefit sharing by the immediate seller in the supply chain, the benefit sharing
    obligation on the buyer shall be applicable only on that portion of the purchase
    price for which the benefit has not been shared in the supply chain.
    (2) Where the applicant/ trader/ manufacturer has entered into any prior benefit
    sharing negotiation with persons such as the Joint Forest Management Committee
    (JFMC)/ Forest dweller/ Tribal cultivator/ Gram Sabha, and purchases any
    biological resources directly from these persons, the benefit sharing obligations on
    the applicant shall be not less than 3.0% of the purchase price of the biological
    resources in case the buyer is a trader and not less than 5.0% in case the buyer is a
    manufacturer:
    (3) In cases of biological resources having high economic value such as
    sandalwood, red sanders, etc. and their derivatives, the benefit sharing may
    include an upfront payment of not less than 5.0%, on the proceeds of the auction
    or sale amount, as decided by the NBA or SBB, as the case may be, and the
    successful bidder or the purchaser shall pay the amount to the designated fund,
    before accessing the biological resource.”
  80. Option of benefit sharing on sale price of the biological resources accessed for
    commercial utilization under regulation
    2.– When the biological resources are accessed for commercial utilization or the
    bio- survey and bio-utilization leads to commercial utilization, the applicant shall
    313
    have the option to pay the benefit sharing ranging from 0.1 to 0.5 % at the
    following graded percentages of the annual gross ex-factory sale of the product
    which shall be worked out based on the annual gross ex-factory sale minus
    government taxes as given below:-
    Annual Gross ex-factory sale of product Benefit Sharing Component

Up to Rupees 1,00,00,000 0.1%


Rupees 1,00,00,001 up to 3,00,00,000 0.2%


Above Rupees 3,00,00,000 0.5%


  1. The above provisions in the Regulations, provide for a benefit sharing
    obligation, for any person, who wants to have access to “biological resources”,
    which is a certain percentage of the purchase price. The petitioner which is an
    Indian entity is also obliged to pay an amount as FEBS to the SBB. Therefore the
    challenge to Regulations 3, 4 & 5.
  2. As per Section 7 of the Act of 2002, no person, who is a citizen of India or a
    body corporate, association or organization which is registered in India, can obtain
    any biological resources for commercial utilization, etc. without giving a prior
    intimation to the SBB concerned. Only local communities, vaids and hakims are
    exempted from this provision.
  3. Thereafter sub-section (b) of Section 23 of the 2002 Act is relevant for our
    purposes, which reads as under:
    “23. Functions of State Biodiversity Board. – The functions of the State
    Biodiversity Board shall be to –
    (a)….
    (b) regulate by granting of approvals or otherwise requests for commercial
    utilization or bio-survey and bio-utilisation of any biological resource by Indians.”
  4. At this juncture, it must be stated that regulating an activity in form of
    demand of a fee is an accepted practice recognised in law. Therefore, in case the
    314
    SBB as a regulator, demands a fee in the form of FEBS from the petitioner when
    the petitioner is admittedly using the biological resources for commercial
    purposes, it cannot be said that it has no powers to do so. As far as vesting of this
    power through a Regulation by NBA is concerned, we must take resort to Section
    21(2) (f) and sub-section (4) of Section 21, already referred above. Under subsection (2) of Section 21, NBA, has powers, subject to any regulation, to
    “determine the benefit sharing”.
  5. What is Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing cannot be looked through the
    narrow confines of the definition clause alone. The concept of FEBS has to be
    appreciated from the broad parameters of the scheme of the Act and the long
    history of the movement for conservation, together with our international
    commitments in the form of international treaties to which India is a signatory.
    Once we do that, we find that Under Section 2(f) and sub-section (4) of Section
    21, the NBA has got powers to frame regulations in order to give payment of
    monetary compensation and other non- monetary benefits to the benefit claimers
    as the National Biodiversity Authority may deem fit, in form of Regulations and
    the State Biodiversity Board in turn has powers and duties to collect FEBS under
    the regulatory power it has under Section 7 read with Section 23 (b) of the Act.
  6. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that SBB has got powers to
    demand Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing from the petitioner, in view of its
    statutory function given under Section 7 read with Section 23 of the Act and the
    NBA has got powers to frame necessary regulations in view of Section 21 of the
    Act. The challenge of the petitioner to the validity of the Regulations fails. This
    Court holds that the Regulations 2, 3 and 4 of the Guidelines on Access to
    Biological Resources and Associated Knowledge and Benefits Sharing
    Regulations, 2014 only clarifies and follows what is there in the Act and it is intra
    vires the Act.
  7. It is made clear that this Court has given no findings on the retrospective
    operation of the above provision, since there is no such demand by SBB as of
    now. This aspect is left open.
  8. The writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
  9. No order as to costs.

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