Case Summary
| Citation | U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi AIR 1971 SC 1002 |
| Keywords | Article 53, 75, 85 of the constitution, Lok Sabha dissolution, caretaker |
| Facts | The Lok Sabha was dissolved by the President on the recommendation of P.M. “Indira Gandhi,” which was dissolved one year prior to the actual dissolution. After the dissolution, the PM and other ministers held their respective posts. Petitioners filed a writ challenging their posts. |
| Issues | Whether council of ministers and P.M. is entitled to hold posts even after dissolution of Lok Sabha? |
| Contentions | Petitioner/Appellant argued that Article 85(2)gave power to dissolve houses, so how can P.M. and his council hold their posts? Article 75(3) says that the Council of Ministers shall be held responsible collectively. So, how can they be held accountable to the people when there is no Lok Sabha? Article 53(1) gives the president the power to handle executive functions, so it is not essential for the respondent to hold office, especially in the absence of the Lok Sabha. Respondent argued that even after the dissolution of Lok Sabha, the PM and his council of ministers can hold their offices as “caretakers” of the country. The very same thing happened in England, where they followed the system of Responsible Government. |
| Law Points | SC held that the President cannot function for the government alone as per Article 75. President makes decisions with the consultation of P.M. and his councils, as the true power lies in the hands of the council of ministers. The importance of responsible government also applies here. |
| Judgement | The court held that P.M. and his council of ministers could hold their posts as a “caretaker” even after Lok Sabha’s dissolution. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
[It is essential to have a Council of Ministers under Article 74(1) even at a time when the
House of the People has been dissolved or when its term has expired.]
A writ of quo warranto was prayed in this appeal against the continuation of Mrs.
Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister since the House of the People had been dissolved.
The appellant contended that under the Constitution, as soon as the House of the
People was dissolved under Article 85(2), the Council of Ministers, i.e. the Prime Minister
and the other Ministers, ceased to hold office. This argument was based upon the wordings
of Article 75(3), which prescribes that: “the Council of Ministers shall be collectively
responsible to the House of the People”. The question is, “how can the Council of Ministers
be collectively responsible to the House of the People when it has already been dissolved
under Article 85(2)?” It was contended that while carrying out its functions, no void would
be created because the President can exercise the executive power of the Union either
directly, or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with Article 53(1) of the
Constitution.
S.M. SIKRI, C.J.: 3. It seems to us that a very narrow point arises on the facts of the present
case. The House of the People was dissolved by the President on December 27, 1970. The
respondent was the Prime Minister before the dissolution. Is there anything in theConstitution,
and in particular in Article 75(3), which renders her carrying on as Prime Minister, contrary to
the Constitution? It was said that we must interpret Article 75(3)according to its own terms,
regardless of the conventions that prevail in the United Kingdom. If the words of an Article are
clear, notwithstanding any relevant convention, effect will, no doubt, be given to the words.
But it must be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution and not an Act of Parliament,
a Constitution which establishes a Parliamentary system of Government with a Cabinet. In
trying to understand one may well keep in mind the conventions prevalent at the time the
Constitution was framed.
[The Court quoted Paras. 13 and 14 of Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab,
AIR 1955 SC 549.]
In A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras [AIR 1970 SC 1102], it was urged on behalf of the
appellants in that case that “the Parliament has conferred power under Section 68(C) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to a designated authority. That power can be exercised only by that
authority and by no one else. The authority concerned in the present case is the State
Government. The Government could not have delegated its statutory functions to anyone else.
The Government means the Governor aided and advised by his Ministers. Therefore the
required opinion should have been formed by the Minister to whom the business had been
allocated by ‘the Rules’. It was further urged that if the functions of the Government can be
discharged by anyone else then the doctrine of ministerial responsibility which is the very
essence of the cabinet form of Government disappears; such a situation is impermissible under
our Constitution.”
- Speaking on behalf of the Court, Hegde, J., repelled the contentions in the following words:
“We think that the above submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants are without
force and are based on a misconception of the principles underlying our Constitution.
Under our Constitution the Governor is essentially a constitutional head, the administration
of State is run by the Council of Ministers. But in the very nature of things, it is impossible
for the Council of Ministers to deal with each and every matterthat comes before the
Government. In order to obviate that difficulty the Constitution has authorised the
Governor under sub-article (3) of Article 166 to make rules for the more convenient
transaction of business of the Government of the State and for the allocation amongst its
Ministers, the business of the Government. All matters, excepting those in which Governor
is required to act in his discretion, have to be allocated to one or theother of the
Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister. Apart from allocating business among the
Ministers, the Governor can also make rules on the advice of his Council of Ministers for
more convenient transaction of business. He cannot only allocate the various subjects
amongst the Ministers but may go further and designate a particular official to discharge
any particular function. But this again he can do only on the adviceof the Council of
Ministers. The Cabinet is responsible to the Legislature for every actiontaken in any of the
ministries. That is the essence of joint responsibility.” - Let us now look at the relevant Articles of the Constitution in the context of which we must
interpret Article 75(3) of the Constitution. Chapter I of Part V of the Constitution deals with the
Executive. Article 52 provides that there shall be a President of India and Article 53(1) vests
the executive power of the Union in the President and provides that it shall be exercised by him
either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with this Constitution. The
last five words are important inasmuch as they control the President’s action under Article
53(1). Any exercise of the executive power not in accordance with the Constitution will be
liable to be set aside. There is no doubt that the President of India is a person who has to be
elected in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitutionbut even so he is bound
by the provisions of the Constitution. Article 60 prescribes the oath oraffirmation which the
President has to take. It reads:
“I, A. B., do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will faithfully execute the
office of President (or discharge the functions of the President) of India and will to the
best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law and that I will
devote myself to the service and well-being of the people of India.” - It will be noticed that Article 74(1) is mandatory in form. We are unable to agree with the
appellant that in the context the word ‘shall’ should be read as ‘may’. Article 52 is mandatory.
In other words “there shall be a President of India”. So is Article 74(1). The Constituent
Assembly did not choose the Presidential system of Government. If we were to give effect to
this contention of the appellant we would be changing the whole concept of the Executive. It
would mean that the President need not have a Prime Minister and Ministers to aid and advise
in the exercise of his functions. As there would be no ‘Council of Ministers’, nobody would
be responsible to the House of the People. With the aid of advisers he would be able to rule
the country at least till he is impeached under Article 61.
- It seems to us that we must read the word ‘shall’ as meaning ‘shall’ and not ‘may’. If Article
74(1) is read in this manner the rest of the provisions dealing with the Executive must be read
in harmony with. Indeed they fall into place. Under Article 75(1), the President appoints the
Prime Minister and appoints the other Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister, and under
Article 75(2) they hold office during the pleasure of the President. The President has not said
that it is his pleasure that the respondent shall not hold office. - Now comes the crucial clause three of Article 75. The appellant urges that the House of
People having been dissolved this clause cannot be complied with. According to him it follows
from the provisions of this clause that it is was contemplated that on the dissolution ofthe House
of People the Prime Minister and the other ministers must resign or be dismissed by the
President and the President must carry on the Government as best as he can with theaid of
the Services. As we have shown above, Article 74(1) is mandatory and, therefore, the President
cannot exercise the executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. We
must then harmonise the provisions of Article 75(3) with Article 74(1) and Article 75(2). Article
75(3) brings into existence what is usually called “Responsible Government”. In other words
the Council of Ministers must enjoy the confidence of the House of People. While the House
of People is not dissolved under Article 85(2)(a), Article 75(3) has full operation. But when it
is dissolved the Council of Ministers cannot naturally enjoy the confidence of the House of
People. Nobody has said that the Council of Ministers does not enjoy the confidence of the
House of People when it is prorogued. In the context, therefore, this clause must be read as
meaning that Article 75(3) only applies when the House of People does not stand dissolved or
prorogued. We are not concerned with the case where dissolution of the House of People takes
place under Article 83(2) on the expiration of the period of five years prescribed therein, for
Parliament has provided for that contingency in Section 14 of the Representation of Peoples
Act, 1951. - On our interpretation other articles of the Constitution also have full play, e.g. Article 77(3),
which contemplates allocation of business among Ministers, and Article 78, which prescribes
certain duties of Prime Minister.
12. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
