Case Summary
| Citation | Omprakash v. Radhacharan2009 (7) SCALE 51 |
| Keywords | self acquired property of female, sec 15 HSA |
| Facts | A fifteen year old Hindu girl was thrown out of the matrimonial home after her husband died of snake bite after three months of the marriage. She took shelter with her parents, was educated by them and then took a job. Her in-laws never bothered to inquire about her, let alone look after her, and there was a complete snapping of relations. Concededly, she was driven out of her matrimonial home immediately after the death of her husband. After that she never stayed in her matrimonial home. At her parental home, she was given education. She got an employment. She died intestate on 11.7.1996, leaving behind huge sums in various bank accounts, besides her provident fund and a substantial property. |
| Issues | The issue in this case was that by whom the property of Narayani shall be inherited whether by her parents or parents in law? Will the self-acquired property of a Hindu woman dying intestate come under the scope of the term “property”, mentioned in Section 15(1) of Hindu Succession Act 1956? |
| Contentions | |
| Law Points | In case of a Hindu female having self-acquired property section 15(1) will apply and not section 15 (2). The first sub-section i.e., 15(1) applies on intestacy. A Hindu female can also make a will. In case, therefore, when such Hindu female dies intestate, normal rules of succession will apply. The claim of her mother and then the brother was negatived by the Supreme Court in favour of her late husband’s brothers, i.e., the in-laws on the ground that as per the provision of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is the heirs of the husband who have a legal right to inherit the property of an issueless married Hindu woman and her parents cannot inherit in their presence. |
| Judgement | The self-acquired property of a Hindu woman dying intestate will come under the scope of the term “property”, mentioned in Section 15(1) of Hindu Succession Act 1956. So, the self-acquired property of a Hindu woman dying intestate will be inherited by heirs of her parents in laws, if at the time of her death neither of her children nor children of pre diseased son or daughter nor husband is alive. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority | Court also consider Bhagat Ram vs Teja Singh |
Full Case Details
S.B. SINHA, J. – 2. One Smt. Narayani Devi was married to one Dindayal Sharma in the year
1955. She became widow within three months of her marriage. Concededly, she was driven out of
her matrimonial home immediately after the death of her husband. After that she never stayed in
her matrimonial home. At her parental home, she was given education. She got an employment.
She died intestate on 11.7.1996. She had various bank accounts; she left a huge sum also in her
provident fund account.
3. Ramkishori, mother of Narayani, filed an application for grant of succession certificate in
terms of Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act. Respondents herein also filed a similar
application. It now stands admitted that all her properties were self acquired.
4. The question which arose for consideration before the courts below as also before us is as
to whether sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, “the Act”)
or sub-Section (2) thereof would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.
5. There is no doubt or dispute that the properties of the deceased were self-acquired ones and
were not inherited from her parents’ side. Appellants before us are her brothers, the original
applicant being the mother of the deceased having died. Respondents are the sons of sister of the
Narayani’s husband.
6. Mr. N.R. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would contend
that in a case of this nature where the husband of the deceased or her in-laws had not made any
contribution towards her education or had not lent any support during her life time, sub-Section
(2) of Section 15 of the Act should be held to be applicable. It was urged that the Parliamentary
intent as contained in clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Act should be the guiding
factor for interpreting the said provision.
7. Mr. Arvind V. Savant, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent,
however, would support the impugned judgment.
8. Section 15 provides for the general rules of succession in the case of female Hindus. It
lays down the mode and manner in which the devolution of interest of a female shall take place.
Section 16 provides for the order of succession and manner of distribution amongst the heirs of a
female Hindu, stating that the same shall be according to the rules specified therein.
9. It has not been disputed that the respondents are the heirs and legal representatives of
Dindayal, husband of Narayani. Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 lays down the ordinary rule of
succession. Clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Section 15 providing for a non-obstante clause,
however, carves out an exception viz. when the property is devolved upon the deceased from her
parents’ side, on her death the same would relate back to her parents’ family and not to her
husband’s family. Similarly, in a case where she had inherited some property from her husband or
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from her husband’s family, on her death the same would revive to her husband’s family and not to
her own heirs. The law is silent with regard to self-acquired property of a woman. Sub-section (1)
of Section 15, however, apart from the exceptions specified in sub-section (2) thereof does not
make any distinction between a self-acquired property and the property which she had inherited.
It refers to a property which has vested in the deceased absolutely or which is her own. The selfacquired property of a female would be her absolute property and not the property which she had
inherited from her parents.
10. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the
Act would apply and not the sub-Section (2) thereof.
This is a hard case. Narayani during her life time did not visit her in-laws’ place. We will
presume that the contentions raised by Mr. Choudhury that she had not been lent any support
from her husband’s family is correct and all support had come from her parents but then only
because a case appears to be hard would not lead us to invoke different interpretation of a
statutory provision which is otherwise impermissible.
It is now a well settled principle of law that sentiment or sympathy alone would not be a
guiding factor in determining the rights of the parties which are otherwise clear and
unambiguous.
In M.D., H.S.I.D.C.v. Hari Om Enterprises [2008 (9) SCALE 241], this Court held:
“54. This Court applied the doctrine of proportionality having regard to a large
number of decisions operating in the field. This Court, however, also put a note of
caution that no order should be passed only on sympathy or sentiment.”
In Subha B. Nair v. State of Kerala [(2008) 7 SCC 210], this Court held:
“21. This Court furthermore cannot issue a direction only on sentiment/sympathy.”
In Ganga Devi v. District Judge, Nainital [(2008) 7 SCC 770], this Court held:
“22. The court would not determine a question only on the basis of sympathy or
sentiment. Strictosensu equity as such may not have any role to play.”
If the contention raised by Mr. Choudhury is to be accepted, we will have to interpret subsection (1) of Section 15 in a manner which was not contemplated by the Parliament. The Act
does not put an embargo on a female to execute a will. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 would apply
only in a case where a female Hindu has died intestate. In such a situation, the normal rule of
succession as provided for by the statute, in our opinion, must prevail.
For the aforementioned purpose, the golden rule of interpretation must be applied.
11. This Court in Bhagat Ram v. Teja Singh [(1999) 4 SCC 86], held as under:
“6. On perusal of the two Sub-sections we find that their spheres are very clearly
marked out. So far Sub-section (1), it covers the properties of a female Hindu dying
intestate. Sub-section (2) starts with the words ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in
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Sub-section (1)’. In other words, what falls within the sphere of Sub-section (2), Subsection (1) will not apply. We find that Section 15(2)(a) uses the words ‘any property
inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother’. Thus property inherited by a
female Hindu from her father and mother is carved-out from a female Hindu dying
intestate. In other words any property of female Hindu, if inherited by her from her father
or mother would not fall under Sub-section (1) of Section 15. Thus, property of a female
Hindu can be classified under two heads : Every property of a female Hindu dying
intestate is a general class by itself covering all the properties but Sub-section (2)
excludes out of the aforesaid properties the property inherited by her from her father or
mother.
7. In addition, we find the language used in Section 15(1) read with Section 16
makes it clearly, the class who has to succeed to property of Hindu female dying
intestate. Sub-section (1) specifically state that the property of a female Hindu dying
intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in Section 16. So, in case Subsection (1) applies, then after the death of Santi, Indro can not inherit by succession but it
would go to the heirs of the pre-deceased husband of Santi.”
12. For the aforementioned reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed
accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to
costs.
