November 7, 2024
Property LawSemester 2

Muhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bibi1932 IA 236

Case Summary

CitationMuhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bibi1932 IA 236
Keywordssection 10 tpa
FactsA person A married with two wives W1 & W2. According to an agreement in their capacity as wives, from this very time be declared permanent owners of the property. With a condition that the said females shall not have power to transfer this property to a stranger; but the ownership thereof as family property shall devolve on the legal heirs of both the above-named wives, from generation to generation. After the death of A and W1, W2 had sold or mortgaged it all before her death, which occurred on July, 26 1914. Her transferees remained in undisturbed possession for nearly twelve years after her death. In March 1926, the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by the respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Fyzabad for the recovery of two-thirds of W2 share from the appellants, in whose possession the properties had come under the alienations above referred to. Respondent is one of the heirs of the W2.
IssuesWas the restriction placed by the agreement deed, upon W2’s power of alienation valid and legally enforceable?
Contentions
Law PointsOn the assumption that W2 took under the terms of the document in question an absolute estate subject only to this restriction, their Lordships think that the restriction was not absolute but partial; it forbids only alienation to strangers, leaving her free to make any transfer she pleases within the ambit of the family.

A condition that W2 would not alienate the property outside the family it was held that the restraint was only partial and such a partial restraint was neither repugnant to law nor to justice, equity and good conscience.

A condition to sell only to specific persons is void, but a condition not to sell outside the family would be a partial restraint.

Concerned the provisions of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act which recognizes the validity of a partial restriction upon a power of disposition in the case of a transfer inter vivos.
JudgementIn their Lordships’ opinion W2 had no power to transfer any part of the properties to the appellants, and upon her death the respondent became entitled to the two-thirds share in the properties which she claims.
Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority

Full Case Details

SIR GEORGE LOWNDES – In 1868, one Sughra Bibi brought a suit against her cousin, Afzal

Husain, claiming a half share in certain immovable properties in Oudh which had been entered in his

name at the post mutiny settlement. The litigation ended in a compromise upon which a decree was

passed in a suit on September 19, 1870. The compromise was in the following terms:

“We are Mussamat Sughra Bibi, plaintiff, claimant of a share in Mahal Shadipur, and

Syed Afzal Husain, lambardar of the aforesaid Mahal, defendant.

Whereas between the parties to the above-mentioned case in which a share is claimed an

amicable settlement has been arrived at to the effect that the plaintiff’s marriage by way of

nikah with the defendant may be performed in the next month, accordingly in view of a

marriage settlement, there no longer exists any dispute regarding a share, and insomuch as the

defendant’s first wife, the daughter of Raja Syed Abbas Ali, deceased, is alive, it has been

settled that both wives should, in accordance with this agreement, in their capacity as wives,

from this very time be declared permanent owners [malik mustaqil] of a moiety each of the

entire Mahal Shadipur, and that the names of Musammat Fatima Begam, the first wife, and

Musammat Sughra Bibi, plaintiff, be entered in the public records as owners of half and

half [bilmunasfa milkiatan]. The said females shall not have power to transfer this property

to a stranger; but the ownership thereof as family property shall devolve on the legal heirs of

both the above-named wives, from generation to generation; and the management and

collections of the entire estate of Shadipur shall be in the hands of their husband, Syed

Afzal Husain, in his capacity of a husband if on the part of the husband there is any act of

neglect or estrangement towards either of the wives, then, in that case, the wife’s only remedy

will be to have the management of her share performed by the Government through the

Court of Wards; but during the lifetime of Afzal Husain neither of the wives shall have the

power on her own authority to have the management of the share which is owned by her

performed by any member of her father’s family, and if in contravention of this agreement

the defendant refuses to marry the plaintiff by way of nikah, then the plaintiff shall in

accordance with this document remain owner of a moiety, and if the plaintiff acts contrary to

the stipulation of nikah, she shall cease to have any rights whatever. If, God forbid, contrary

to custom the divorce of either of the wives takes place, then, even in that case, ownership

shall remain vested in the wives, as before, subject to the conditions mentioned above;

provided that the divorced wife should regard herself as an undivorced wife, and like a

woman without a husband continue to live in the house, and be it understood that the

aforesaid conditions shall apply to whatever share exists in the villages comprised in Mahal

Shadipur, as detailed below:- (1) Shadipur, (2) Ninawan, Behrai, Daudpur, Nandapur,

Qutubpur, Belahri, Daryapur; moreover, whatever property, such as Chitoi and Nausanda

and Musha, pargana Tanda and Halimpur and Lodhna and Nathupur, pargana Surhurpur,

exists at present, or may be acquired in future, shall, during the lifetime of Mir Teg Ali and

myself (the defendant), continue to remain in possession of the defendant, and after me (the

defendant) this property also shall devolve on the two wives or their descendants (aulad) in

equal shares. Hence this agreement is made in writing in order that it may serve as evidence

thereof and the pending case may be decided in accordance with its terms.”

88

Afzal Husain thereafter duly married Sughra Bibi and died in 1872 childless, his first wife

Fatima Begum having predeceased him in 1871. Sughra Bibi took possession of her share in the

properties, but had sold or mortgaged it all before her death, which occurred on July, 26 1914. Her

transferees remained in undisturbed possession for nearly twelve years after her death.

On March 26, 1926, the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by the respondent

in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Fyzabad for the recovery of two-thirds of Sughra Bibi’s share

from the appellants, in whose possession the properties had come under the alienations above

referred to.

The respondent’s case was that under the compromise Sughra Bibi took only a life estate

without power of alienation, and that on her death the half-share passed to her heirs, of whom the

respondent, in right of her mother Zainab Bibi, the sister of Afzal Husain, was one, her share being

two-thirds. The other heirs, taking the remaining third, were said to be certain maternal relatives of

Sughra Bibi, who apparently made no claim, and were not joined as parties to the suit, but it is not

suggested that it is defective on this account. The present appeal therefore is concerned only with twothirds of the property, and the rights of the parties depend in the first instance on the validity of the

alienations by Sughra Bibi, the title of the respondent, if these alienations were invalid, not being

disputed.

A preliminary issue which covered this question was raised and tried by the Subordinate Judge. It

was in the following terms: “Was the restriction placed by the compromise deed dated September 19,

1870, upon Sughra Bibi’s power of alienation valid and legally enforceable?” The learned judge,

after a detailed but not very informing examination of the case law on the subject, held that the

restriction imposed by the deed on the lady’s power of alienation was invalid and inoperative, and he

accordingly answered the issue in the negative.

The hearing of some twenty-eight other issues in the case came subsequently before another

Subordinate Judge, with the result that the suit was dismissed with regard to certain of the properties

claimed, but decreed with regard to others.

Both sides appealed to the Chief Court. The case was heard by Raza and Pullan JJ., who delivered

their judgment on January 4, 1929, allowing the appeal of the present respondent, and dismissing that

of the appellants, with the result that the suit was decreed in full. The questions other than that as to

Sughra Bibi’s power of alienation are not now material. They were in part disposed of by concurrent

findings of fact of the two Courts, and for the rest involve matters subsidiary to the main issue as to

the validity of the alienations.

The learned judges of the Chief Court discussed the meaning of the word malik which has been

used throughout the compromise agreement, but came to the conclusion that having regard to the

express provision that the ladies were not to have power to transfer the property to a stranger, they had

only a “limited ownership,” with a gift over to their heirs. They then considered whether under the

Shia law, by which the parties were governed, such an arrangement would be valid, and came to the

conclusion that it would.

Before the Board the case law has been discussed at great length, but without throwing much light

upon the construction of the particular document with which this appeal is concerned. It was urged for

the appellants that the true effect of the document was to constitute the ladies full owners of the two

moieties of the property, and that the attempt to restrict their power of alienation should be regarded

as repugnant, special reliance being placed upon the judgment of the Board delivered by the late Sir

89

Bonod Mitter in Raghuvnath Prasad Singh v. Deputy Commission, Partabgarh. [LR 56 IA 372]

For the respondent it was contended that, having regard to the decisions of this Board, the use of the

word “malik” did not necessarily imply full ownership, and that reading the document as a whole the

ladies took only life estates with vested remainders in their heirs.

In support of the appellant’s contention it was pointed out that the ladies were to be “malik

mustaqil,” i.e., permanent proprietors, and were to be entered as such in the public records; that their

proprietorship was to take effect from the execution of the document, and that if Afzal Husain refused

to marry Sughra Bibi, she was to “remain owner of a moiety” free from restriction of any kind; that

other property, to which Sughra Bibi had made no claim, was also dealt with; that it was to remain in

the possession of Afzal Husain during his life and the lifetime of his father Tegh Ali, and then was to

“devolve on the two wives or their descendants in equal shares” – again, as the respondent’s counsel

concedes, without restriction. From this it is said to be clear that the draftsman of the document was

quite competent to put a life estate into direct words if that had been the intention of the parties under

the first part of the agreement. It is also suggested that the words upon which the respondent relies as

constituting a gift over to the ladies’ heirs are only explanatory of the restriction against transfer to a

stranger, which immediately precedes them, and it is pointed out with some force that if only life

estates were intended the restriction would not have been confined to the case of strangers.

Their Lordships feel the weight of these contentions, and they might have some difficulty in

holding that Sughra Bibi took nothing more than a life estate. But assuming in the appellants’ favour

that she took an estate of inheritance, it was nevertheless one saddled, under the express words of the

document, with a restriction against alienation to “a stranger.” Their Lordships have no doubt that

“stranger” means any one who is not a member of the family, and the appellants are admittedly

strangers in this sense. Unless, therefore, this restriction can for some reason be disregarded, they

have no title to the properties which can prevail against the respondent.

On the assumption that Sughra Bibi took under the terms of the document in question an absolute

estate subject only to this restriction , their Lordships think that the restriction was not absolute but

partial; it forbids only alienation to strangers, leaving her free to make any transfer she pleases

within the ambit of the family. The question therefore is whether such a partial restriction on

alienation is so inconsistent with an otherwise absolute estate that it must be regarded as repugnant

and merely void. On this question their Lordships think that Raghunath Prasad Singh case is of no

assistance to the appellants, for there the restriction against alienation was absolute and was attached

to a gift by will. It is, in their Lordships’ opinion, important in the present case to bear in mind that the

document under which the appellants claim was not a deed of gift, or a conveyance, by one of the

parties to the other, but was in the nature of a contract between them as to the terms upon which the

ladies were to take. The title to that which Sughra Bibi took was in dispute between her and Afzal

Husain. In compromise of their conflicting claims what was evidently a family arrangement was

come to, by which it was agreed that she should take what she claimed upon certain conditions. One

of these conditions was that she would not alienate the property outside the family. Their Lordships

are asked by the appellants to say that this condition was not binding upon her, and that what she took

she was free to transfer to them.

The law by which this question must be judged is, their Lordships think, prescribed by s. 3 of the

Oudh Laws Act, 1876, and failing the earlier clauses of the section which seem to have no

application, “the Courts shall act according to justice, equity and good conscience,” which has been

adopted as the ultimate test for all the provincial Courts in India. Is it then contrary to justice, equity

90

and good conscience to hold an agreement of this nature to be binding? Judging the matter upon

abstract grounds, their Lordships would have thought that where a person had been allowed to take

property upon the express agreement that it shall not be alienated outside the family, those who seek

to make title through a direct breach of this agreement could hardly support their claim by an appeal

to these high sounding principles, and it must be remembered in this connection that family

arrangements are specially favoured in Courts of equity.

But, apart from this, it seems clear that after the passing of the Transfer of Property Act in 1882, a

partial restriction upon the power of disposition would not, in the case of a transfer inter vivos, be

regarded as repugnant: see s. 10 of the Act. In view of the terms of this section, and in the absence of

any authority suggesting that before the Act a different principle was applied by the Courts in India,

their Lordships think that it would be impossible for them to assert that such an agreement as they

are now considering was contrary to justice, equity and good conscience.

It was said by Lord Hobhouse in Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin (LR 14 IA 89, 96) that

the expression “equity and good conscience” was generally interpreted as meaning English law, if

found applicable to Indian society and circumstances. If this is to be the test there is authority that in

England a partial restriction would not be regarded as repugnant even in the case of a testamentary

gift. So in In re Macleay [LR 20 Eq 186] Sir George Jessel M.R. upheld a condition attached to a

devise in fee that the devisee should “never sell out of the family,” pointing out that this had been the

law from the time of Coke; and in Doe d. Gill v. Pearson [(1805) 6 East 173] Lord Ellenborough in

the King’s Bench affirmed the validity of a similar restriction.

Their Lordships see no reason therefore to hold that the provision in the compromise agreement

that Sughra Bibi should not have power to transfer the properties in suit to a stranger was otherwise

than binding upon her.

Their Lordships have heard much discussion of the question whether the Shia law permits of the

creation of a vested remainder in such an indeterminate body as the heirs of a living person, but, in the

view they take of the appellants’ case, it is unnecessary for them to come to any conclusion upon this

somewhat abstruse problem, or to consider the authorities that have been cited.

In their Lordships’ opinion Sughra Bibi had no power to transfer any part of the properties to the

appellants, and upon her death the respondent became entitled to the two-thirds share in the properties

which she claims. They think that this appeal fails, and that the decree of the Chief Court, dated

January 4, 1929, should be affirmed with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.

Related posts

Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan, AIR 1935 Bom. 412

Beauty Singh

Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 : AIR 1980 SC 1632

Tabassum Jahan

Bodhraj v. State of J. & K. (2002) 8 SCC 45

Tabassum Jahan

Leave a Comment