Administrative Tribunal

Introduction	jurisprudence
Provisions	article 323A and 323B, administrative tribunal act
Case laws	L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association 2010 (5) SCALE 514 Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. (2020) 6 SCC 1
Conclusion	present problem

What is Tribunal?

A tribunal is generally defined as a person or institution with the authority to judge, adjudicate on, or determine claims or disputes. It’s a broader term than “court” and can refer to administrative as well as judicial bodies. Tribunals are often established to provide a speedier, less expensive, and more specialized forum for resolving particular types of disputes compared to traditional courts.

What is Administrative tribunal?

An administrative tribunal is a statutory body created by an act of the legislature to resolve disputes between a citizen and an administrative authority or between two administrative authorities. These tribunals operate within the framework of administrative law but are not part of the judiciary.

The constitutional bedrock for Administrative Tribunals in India lies in Articles 323A and 323B, inserted into the Constitution via the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976. Article 323A specifically empowers the Parliament to enact legislation for the establishment of Administrative Tribunals dealing with disputes concerning the recruitment and conditions of service of public servants under the Union and State governments. This enabling provision led to the enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which facilitated the creation of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) at the national level and allows for the establishment of State Administrative Tribunals (SATs) by respective state legislatures.

Article 323B, on the other hand, provides a broader mandate, enabling both Parliament and State Legislatures to establish tribunals for the adjudication of disputes relating to a diverse range of subjects, including taxation, industrial disputes, land reforms, elections, and pricing of essential commodities. This provision underscores the legislative intent to create specialized adjudicatory bodies tailored to the intricacies of various domains.

Features of Administrative Tribunals:

1. Statutory origin: Tribunals are established by a statute and derive their powers from the legislation that creates them.
2. Specialized jurisdiction: they deal with specific areas such as service matters, taxation, industrial disputes, and consumer rights.
3. Quasi-Judicial nature: Tribunals have the authority to adjudicate disputes and make binding decisions but do not have the full powers of a court.
4. Flexibility in procedure: Tribunals are not bound by strict procedural and evidentiary rules applicable to regular courts
5. Composition: Typically include experts from relevant fields along with judicial members to provide specialized and informed decisions.

Examples of Administrative Tribunals in India

1. Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT): established under Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Deals with disputes and grievances of central government employees regarding recruitment, service conditions, etc.
2. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT): handles appeals under the Income Tax Act, 1961.
3. National Green Tribunal (NGT): deals with environmental protection and conservation of forests.
4. Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT): resolves service-related disputes of armed forces personnel.

Powers of Administrative Tribunal

Section 22 of Administrative Tribunals Act provides for powers and procedures of the tribunal:

1. Quasi-Judicial Powers: Tribunals can summon witnesses, compel the production of documents, and administer oaths, similar to civil courts under CPC.
2. Adjudicatory Powers: they adjudicate disputes related to administrative law, such as service conditions, tax disputes, or environmental regulations. Their decisions are binding, subject to judicial review.
3. Discretionary Powers: Tribunals may exercise discretion in awarding remedies, including compensation or reinstatement in service.
4. Punitive Powers: in certain cases, tribunals can impose fines, penalties, or disciplinary actions against individuals or organisations for violations.
5. Rule-making powers: some tribunals can frame procedural rules to govern their functioning, provided these rules are consistent with the parent statute.
6. Enforcement powers: decisions and orders of tribunals are enforceable as a decree of a civil court.
7. Judicial review: while tribunals cannot challenge the constitutionality of laws, they can review administrative decisions for compliance with legal and procedural standards.
8. Decide the case ex-parte
9. Setting any order passed by it ex-parte

Qualifications and Appointment of members

Section 6 of Administrative Tribunal Act lays down the qualifications and appointment of members of tribunal.

Chairman- (a) he must be judge of High Court, or
(b) he has held the office of Vice President for two years, or
(c) he has held the secretary post to Government, or
(d) he has held any post whose pay scale equivalent to secretary.

Vice-Chairman – (a) he has been the High Court judge, or
(b) has held the secretary post for 2 years to government or any post whose pay scale equivalent to secretary, or
(c) has held additional secretary for 5 years to government or equivalent post.

Judicial Member – (a) has been High Court judge, or
(b) has been a member of Indian legal service and has held a post of Grade 1 for last 3 years.

Administrative Member – (a) has held the post of additional secretary to government or equivalent post for 2 years, or
(b) has been held joint secretary post to government or equivalent post, or
(c) has adequate administrative experience.

Term of Office

According to section 8 of the said Act, Chairman, or vice-chairman, or other members shall hold office for 5 years or until he attains- (a) age of 65 years for chairman or vice-chairman; (b) age of 62 years in case of other members.

Removal and Resignation

As per section 9 of the said Act, the removal and resignation of members can be done. The Chairman, vice-chairman or other members can resign by writing it to the President.
They can be removed by the President on the ground of misbehavior or incapacity after an enquiry made by the Supreme Court judge. They shall have the right to be informed on the charges against them and shall be given a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The central government may make rules to regulate the procedure for the investigation of the charges against them.

Advantages of Administrative Tribunal

1. Expertise: the presence of subject-matter experts ensures informed decisions
2. Efficiency: tribunals provide faster resolutions compared to traditional courts
3. Reduced burden on Courts: by addressing specialized disputes, they reduce the workload of regular courts
4. Cost-effective: simplified procedures make tribunals more affordable than traditional litigation
5. Flexibility: procedural flexibility enables efficient handling of cases.

Demerits of Administrative Tribunal

1. Limited Jurisdictions: tribunals can only adjudicate matters within their statutory domain
2. Lack of Independency: being under the control of the executive may affect their impartiality
3. No precedent: Decisions of tribunals do not hold precedential values like those of courts
4. Limited Appeal Rights: in some cases, decisions can only be challenged in the High Court or Supreme Court
5. Procedural concerns: lack of adherence to established judicial procedures may sometimes lead to arbitrary decisions.

Case Laws

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India

Facts: After Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution came into effect, the Central Administrative Tribunal was established with five different Benches with effect from November 1, 1985. However, even before the establishment of these benches, several petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the articles in question. The petitioners raised various contentions in this regard but the main contention was that the provisions were unconstitutional because they exclude the jurisdiction of the high courts which went against the basic structure of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court through Articles 323-A (2) (d) and 323-B (3) (d) was against the doctrine of judicial review that was a basic feature of the Constitution?
Whether the Tribunals constituted either under Article 323B or Article 323A of the Indian Constitution, have the competence to test the constitutional validity of a statutory rule or provision?
Judgement: The Court held that Tribunals are not substitutes for High Courts but are additional institutions to assist the High Courts in discharging their functions. High Courts’ power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away by the establishment of Tribunals. Tribunals are subject to judicial review by the High Courts. The Tribunals have jurisdiction over service matters of central government employees but cannot encroach upon the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the High Courts.
The court concluded that judicial review is indeed a basic feature of the Indian Constitution. Also, the court relied on the opinion of Dr Ambedkar, who was the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution, on Article 32 where he contended that this Article is the Indian Constitution’s very soul.
Judicial review of legislative action in exercise of power by subordinate judiciary or Tribunals created under ordinary legislation cannot be to the exclusion of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. However, they can perform supplemental – as opposed to substitution – role in this respect.
Tribunals constituted under Articles 323A and 323B have the authority to test vires of subordinate legislation, but they cannot test vires of their parent statutes. All the decisions of tribunals would be under scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts under Articles 226/227. An appeal cannot lie directly to the SC under Article 136. This direction would be operative prospectively.
Court held that Tribunals cannot and will not be a substitute for the power of judicial review that the Constitution bestows upon the High Courts.  Tribunals will remain under the supervision of the High Courts and can in no way be considered as institutions parallel to the High Courts.

Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association

Facts: The President of the Madras Bar Association (MBA) filed appeals challenging the constitutional validity of Chapters 1B and 1C of the Companies Act, 1956, as amended by the Companies (Second Amendment) Act 2002. These amendments established the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). This case, also known as the NCLT case, specifically addressed the constitutionality of these tribunals.
Issue: Whether the Government can transfer the judicial functions traditionally performed by courts to Tribunals?
Whether the constitution of NCLT and NCLAT under Parts 1B & 1C of the Act is valid?
Judgement: The Supreme Court rendered a landmark judgment affirming the constitutional validity of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), subject to specific modifications.  
The Court held that the establishment of these tribunals was constitutionally sound, contingent upon the implementation of safeguards to ensure judicial independence and their proper functioning.
The establishment of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), and the transfer of High Court jurisdiction over company law matters to these tribunals, were deemed valid. However, Parts 1B and 1C of the Companies Act, 1956, in their current form, were held to be unconstitutional.
While the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, successfully transferred original jurisdiction over service matters from High Courts to Administrative Tribunals, the operationalization of Parts 1B and 1C of the Companies Act requires suitable amendments, specifically regarding the qualifications of NCLT and NCLAT members.
The Court mandated that the appointment, tenure, and service conditions of the members be structured to ensure judicial independence and impartiality.

Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd.

Facts: Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017, granted the Union Government extensive authority over the administration of various Tribunals, particularly concerning the service conditions, appointment procedures, tenure security, and qualifications of their members and presiding officers.
The initial matter originated as Writ Petition (Civil) No. 267 of 2012 before the Madras High Court. A three-judge bench of that court, relying on the precedents set in Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association and L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, emphasized the importance of the doctrine of separation of powers and judicial independence. The High Court directed the government to establish an independent committee for the oversight of all Tribunals.
Subsequently, during the pendency of the Madras High Court writ petition, Rojer Mathew filed Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 15804/2017, challenging a judgment of the Kerala High Court. It was argued that appointments to the Debt Recovery Tribunals were not aligned with the constitutional principle of judicial independence.
Additionally, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 279/2017, a Public Interest Litigation filed by Kudrat Sandhu, challenged the vires of Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017. This petition asserted that the amendments to twenty-five different enactments, which significantly altered the qualifications, appointment methods, tenure, salaries, and service conditions of members and presiding officers of various statutory Tribunals, were unconstitutional.
Issue: Is the Finance Act, 2017, specifically its amendments to other enactments and alterations to tribunal personnel’s service conditions, a validly enacted ‘money bill’ under Article 110 of the Constitution?
Whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the present matter?
Judgement: The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the independence of tribunals and ensuring that they are free from executive influence. The court stated that the way that the finance act 2017, amended the rules regarding appointments to tribunals, did not adhere to the standards of judicial independence.
The Court ruled that the provisions of the Finance Act, 2017, relating to tribunal appointments, did not qualify as a “money bill” under Article 110 of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that these provisions were not solely related to taxation or government expenditure, which are the defining characteristics of a “money bill.”
The Court found that the appointment process under the Finance Act, 2017, was deficient and lacked adequate safeguards to ensure the selection of qualified and impartial individuals.
The Court issued guidelines and directions to ensure a transparent and impartial appointment process for tribunal members.
The court stated that before any legislation is passed, that takes away jurisdiction from high courts, that a judicial impact assessment must be conducted.
The court made it clear that the legislature cannot make laws that undermine the independence of the judiciary, when creating tribunals.
The Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the Finance Act, 2017, relating to the appointment and service conditions of tribunal members, were unconstitutional.