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The State Transport Authority, Madras, (“Authority”) issued a notification on July 4,
1956 under Section 57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 calling for applications for the
grant of two stage carriage permits to run as an express service on the route Madras to
Chidambaram.107 applications were received. On May, 8, 1957, the Authority found that
Provincial Transport (Private) Ltd., Madras, was the most suitable amongst the applicants and
granted one permit to it. As regarding the second permit, the authority held that the other
applicants were not suitable and it refused to grant the said permit to anyone of them; it
decided to call for applications afresh under Section 57(2) of the Act.
Against that order, appeals were preferred by 18 claimants for permits before the State
Transport Appellate Tribunal (“the Appellate Tribunal”); amongst them was the appellant
Syed Yakoob and Respondent 1 K.S. Radhakrishnan. The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the
grant of the first permit to the Provincial Transport (Pvt.) Ltd; and so far as the second permit
was concerned, it allowed the appeal preferred by the appellant and directed that the said
second permit should be issued to him; Respondent 1’s claim for the said permit was rejected.
The validity of this order was challenged by Respondent 1 by WP No. 44 of 1959 filed in
the High Court of Madras. Srinivasan, J. who heard the writ petition held that the Appellate
Tribunal had overlooked material considerations in deciding the question of the grant of the
second permit and allowed considerations not germane to the question to vitiate its order.
This order was challenged by the appellant before a Division Bench of the High Court by
filing a Letters Patent Appeal. The Division Bench has held that the order passed by
Srinivasan J. could be sustained on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked
material considerations in favour of Respondent 1, and so, it has affirmed the decision of the
learned Single Judge on that ground alone. In regard to the finding of the Single Judge that an
irrelevant consideration had vitiated the finding of the Appellate Tribunal, the Division
Bench held that the consideration in question was not irrelevant, and so, it differed from the
view taken by Srinivasan, J. In the result, the appeal preferred by the appellant before the
Division Bench was dismissed.
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. – The short question which this appeal raises for our decision
relates to the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing a writ of certiorari while
dealing with orders passed by the appropriate authorities granting or refusing to grant permits
under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (“the Act”).
- The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of
certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal
position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: where orders are passed by
inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to
exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it,
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the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without
giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure
adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is,
however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction
and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of
the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error
of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error
of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the
Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of
law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases,
however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot
be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and
material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the
impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of
fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the
jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 is to issue a writ of certiorari can
be legitimately exercised - It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent
on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but
it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the
record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court
or Tribunal is based on an obvious miss-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or
sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on
reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari.
In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant
statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said
error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the
impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the
Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what
can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the
whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the
face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one
construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not
necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither
possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors
which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and
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upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued
or contravened. - In the present case, the question raised by the appellant presents no difficulty whatever.
The point which was raised before the High Court by Respondent 1 lies within a very narrow
compass; it is a very short and simple question of fact. It appears that in dealing with the rival
claims of the appellant and Respondent 1 for the second permit on the route in question, the
Appellate Tribunal was ultimately influenced by the fact that the appellant had a workshop at
Madras which is one terminus of the route in question, whereas Respondent 1 had a workshop
and a place of business only at Cuddalore which is an intermediate station of the route and did
not possess a workshop at either of the termini of the route; the other terminus being
Chidambaram. In fact, that appears to be the effect of the finding made by the Authority also.
Respondent 1 urged before the High Court that in coming to the conclusion that he had no
workshop at Chidambaram, the Appellate Tribunal had failed to consider material evidence
adduced by him. It is on this narrow ground that a writ has been issued in favour of
Respondent 1. Mr. Setalvad contends that the question as to whether Respondent 1 had a
workshop at Chidambaram is a pure question of fact and the High Court had no jurisdiction to
interfere with the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal and seek to correct it by issuing
a writ of certiorari. In this connection, he relies on the fact that both the Authority and the
Appellate Tribunal have, in substance, found that Respondent 1 had no workshop at either of
the two terminations of the route and the fact that no reasons have been given in support of
the said finding would not justify the interference of the High Court in its jurisdiction under
Article 226. It may be conceded that it would have been better if the Appellate Tribunal had
indicated why it rejected the case of Respondent 1 in regard to his alleged workshop at
Chidambaram, but we do not think that the failure of the Appellate Tribunal to give a reason
in that behalf, or to refer specifically be the evidence adduced by Respondent 1, would, by
itself, constitute such an error in its decision as to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari under
Article 226. In this connection, we ought to add that it has been suggested by Respondent 1
that in dealing with his claim for a permit, admissible evidence which he wanted to adduce
had been excluded by the Tribunal from the record; the argument that some evidence was not
duly considered by the Tribunal, would normally pertain to the realm of the appreciation of
evidence and would, as such be outside the purview of an enquiry in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari under Article 226. - It appears that when Respondent 1 applied for the permit, he sent a letter dated July
11, 1956 in which he has stated that he had a workshop at Chidambaram and that he was
running it in order to maintain the service efficiently and without any breakdown whatsoever.
The argument is that this letter has not been challenged by any party to the proceedings and
has been completely ignored by the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal when they reached
the conclusion that Respondent 1 did not possess a workshop at Chidambarm. As we have a
ready pointed out, neither the Authority nor the Appellate Tribunal has given reasons in
support of the findings of fact recorded by it; but the said fact alone does not, in our opinion,
justify the conclusion of the High Court that the letter in question had not been considered by
the said Authorities, and so, the High Court was not right in issuing a writ of certiorari on that
basis alone.
255 - But apart from this aspect of the matter, the record shows that the assertion of
Respondent 1 that he had a workshop at Chidambaram was contradicted by one of the
claimants for a permit and is entirely inconsistent with the reports submitted to the Authority
and the Appellate Tribunal by the department. D. Kanuiah Pillai, one of the applicants for the
permit, had specifically averred in his application that the other applicants amongst whom
Respondent 1 was included, were all far away from the Headquarters having no workshop at
Chidambaram. Thus, it would not be right to assume that the claim made by Respondent 1
that he had a workshop at Chidambaram was not disputed by any other competitor. What is
more significant, however, is the evidence supplied by the report made by the Regional
Transport Officer, South Arcot. This report is made under different columns. Column 4
speaks about the possession of workshop or repair or maintenance facilities and its location.
The report is made in respect of each one of the applicants. In regard to Respondent 1 under
column 4, the report shows that he was maintaining a workshop as per Government Order at
Cuddalore, and column 5 speaks about, the location of his residence or place of business as
Cuddalore. A similar report has been submitted about the appellant and that shows that the
appellant had workshop facilities at Madras and that he had a residence and place of business
at the terminus. - When the present dispute went before the Appellate Tribunal, a fresh report appears to
have been called for, and this report which has been made by the Secretary, State Transport
Authority, also shows that Respondent 1 had a workshop at Cuddalore on the route, whereas
the appellant had a workshop at Madras. It would thus be clear that on the question as to
whether Respondent 1 had a workshop at Chidambaram, there was his own assertion stating
that he had such a workshop, and there were the two reports made by the Transport Officers
which contradicted the said assertion; the said was also challenged by one of the applicants.
On this state of the record, it was, we think, not permissible to the High Court to consider
these questions of fact and to hold that the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal was a
finding without any evidence. To say that material considerations were ignored by the
Appellate Tribunal in holding that Respondent 1 did not own a workshop at Chidambaram
would be plainly unreasonable when it is remembered that the evidence disclosed a sharp
conflict between the versions of the parties, and the version of Respondent 1 was inconsistent
with the reports made by the Transport Officers which must have been treated as more
reliable by the Appellate Tribunal. There can be little doubt that if Respondent 1 had owned a
workshop at Chidambaram, it would have been mentioned in column 4, because the said
column is obviously intended to indicate all places where the claimant owns a workshop and
possesses repair facilities. - It appears that before Srinivasan, J, the appellant’s learned counsel conceded that the
allegation made by Respondent 1 that he owned a workshop at Chidambaram had not been
challenged before the Transport Authorities, and naturally Srinivasan, J. was considerably
impressed by the said concession; but as the Division Bench which heard the letters patent
appeal has pointed out, the said concession was not correctly made; in fact, the record
distinctly shows that the claim made by Respondent 1 was challenged by one of the applicants
for permit and was plainly inconsistent with the reports to which we have just referred.
Therefore, the concession on which Srinivasan, J. relied has been properly left out of account
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by the Division Bench in dealing with the appeal. The Division Bench thought that apart from
the said concession, it did appear that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked the claim made
by Respondent 1 in his letter of July 11, 1956. As we have already indicated, we find it
difficult to sustain this finding. In our opinion, apart from the fact that the plea raised by
Respondent 1 could not be validly raised under Article 226, even on the merits the said plea is
not well-founded. The question on which Respondent 1 sought for the intervention of the
High Court under Article 226 was a simple question of fact, and we are satisfied that on that
question of fact, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the
claim made by respondent; No. 1 about the existence of a workshop at Chidambaram was not
well-founded; but even if the said finding did not appear to the High Court to be satisfactory,
that would be no reason for issuing a writ under Article 226. There was evidence in support of
the finding of the Appellate Tribunal and it is not a case where the finding based on no
evidence at all. We ought also to add that though the Division Bench was satisfied that the
concession on which Srinivasan J. substantially acted had been wrongly made before him, its
attention does not appear to have been drawn to the reports made by the Transport Officers to
which we have just referred. We have no doubt that if the Division Bench had taken into
account these reports, it would have hesitated to confirm the finding made by Srinivasan J. - It appears that Srinivasan, J. was inclined to take the view that the decision of the
Appellate Tribunal was vitiated by the fact that it took into account certain irrelevant
considerations. The Division Bench has held that the said considerations cannot be said to be
irrelevant. These considerations centre round the question as to whether preference should be
given to the applicant for permit who has his headquarters at the terminus as against another
who has only a branch office at the said terminus. The practice usually followed by the
Tribunals under the Act appears to be to give one mark under column 3 to the applicant who
has his H.Qrs. at the terminus and give only 1/2 mark to an applicant who has only a branch
office at the terminus. Having held that the consideration on which marks are thus allotted
cannot be said to be irrelevant, the Division Bench has indicated that the policy underlying
the said practice may be open to doubt. In our opinion, it would have been better if the
Division Bench had not expressed any opinion on this aspect of the matter, particularly when
it came to the conclusion that the said matter was primarily for the decision of the Appellate
Tribunal. - Mr. Pathak for Respondent 1 argues that the Appellate Tribunal was under an
obligation, in considering the question about the grant of a permit to take into account the
interests of public generally under Section 47(a) and inasmuch as the Appellate Tribunal has
ignored the fact that Respondent 1 owns a workshop at Chidambaram and thereby has refused
his application for a permit the interests of the public generally have been sacrificed. This
argument prima facie appears to be far-fetched and fanciful; but Mr. Pathak urges that the
observations made by the Court in the case of K.M. Shanmugam are in his favour. In our
opinion, the said decision does not lend any assistance to Mr. Pathak’s contention. In that
case, this Court was satisfied that “the Tribunal made a clear error of law inasmuch as it held
that in the case of the first respondent, as it had a branch at Kumbakonam, its other branch at
Mannargudi should be ignored”. The judgment shows that this Court took the view that it was
obviously an untenable proposition to hold that even if a company has a well-equipped office
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on a route in respect of which a permit is applied for, it shall be ignored if the company has
some other branch somewhere unconnected with that route, and it was observed that that was
precisely what Appellate Tribunal had held and that, according to the Court, clearly was an
error apparent on the face of the record. It is in that connection that this Court referred to the
mandatory provisions of Section 47. We do not think that this decision can be legitimately
pressed into service by Mr Pathak in the present case. It is only after it is proved that
Respondent 1 had a workshop at Chidambaram that any subsequent question about the
interests of the public generally can possibly arise. If, as in the present; case, the Appellate
Tribunal has held that Respondent 1 did not own a workshop at Chidambaram, no
consideration of public interests can arise at all, and it is with this question that the present
writ proceedings are concerned. We ought, to add that the decision in the case of K.M.
Shanmugam cannot justify a party whose application for permit has been rejected by the
authorities under the Act, to move the High Court under Art. 226 and invite it to consider all
questions of fact on the plea that the decision on the said questions of fact may assist him to
invoke the provisions of Section 47. That clearly is not the effect of the said decision. - Mr Pathak has also urged that even if we come to the conclusion that the High Court
was not competent to issue a writ in the present proceedings, having regard to the nature of
the questions raised before it by Respondent 1, we should not reverse the decision of the High
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136,
though very wide, is exercised by the Court in its discretion, says Mr Pathak, and he contends
that where the order under appeal furthers the ends of justice, We should not reverse the said
order on technical grounds. We are not impressed by this plea. It may be conceded that in a
proper case this Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 where the
interests of justice patently indicate the desirability of adopting such a course; but we do not
see how a plea of such a kind can be entertained where it is clearly shown that the impugned
orders passed by the High Court are without jurisdiction. If Mr. Pathak’s argument were to be
accepted, in a majority of cases if the High Court interfered with questions of fact in issuing
writs of certiorari against the decisions of special Tribunals, it may always be urged that what
the High Courts have done is in the interests of justice and this Court should not interfere with
the decisions of the High Courts. In the circumstances of the present case, we do not see how
considerations of justice can really arise. The Tribunals of fact have found that Respondent 1
does not own a workshop at Chidambaram and having regard to the other relevant
circumstances which the Tribunals have considered, the fact that he does not own a workshop
at Chidambaram has ultimately proved decisive against Respondent 1 and in favour of the
appellant. If that be so, a decision based on facts found by the Tribunal cannot be reopened on
the plausible plea that a further enquiry should be made because that would be just. If findings
of fact were allowed to be disturbed by High Courts is such writ proceedings, that may lead to
an interminable search for correct findings and would virtually convert the High Courts into
appellate courts competent to deal with questions of fact. That is why we think, in
entertaining petitions for writs of certiorari, it is necessary to remember that findings of fact
recorded by special Tribunals which have been clothed with jurisdiction to deal with them,
should be treated as final between the parties, unless, of course, it is shown that the impugned
finding is based on no evidence. Therefore, we do not think the plea made by Mr. Pathak that
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in the interests of justice we should refrain from setting aside the order under appeal, can be
upheld, - The result is, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside
and the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 is dismissed.
K. SUBBA RAO, J. – I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned
Brother, Gajendragadkar, J. I cannot agree. - The first respondent has a fundamental right to carry on business in transport. The
Motor Vehicles Act is a law imposing reasonable restrictions in public interests on such right.
Under Section 47 of the said Act the Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an
application for a stage carriage permit, have regard, inter alia to the interests of the public
generally. The fact that the first respondent has a separate workshop or at any rate has the
necessary repair and maintenance facilities at one of the termini of the route viz. at
Chidambaram, is certainly a consideration germane to the question of public interests. Indeed,
the scheme of marking system suggested by the Government also recognizes the importance
of such facilities at either of the terminii of the route. If the first respondent had placed before
the authorities concerned the said circumstance in support of his claim for a permit and if that
was ignored or not investigated into by the said authorities, the High Court would certainly
have jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the authorities
and direct them to ascertain whether the claim of the first respondent was true and if it was
true to take that into consideration before issuing the permit to one or other of the claimants
before them. In such an event the High Court would not be interfering with the finding of fact
arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal based on the material placed before it, but would only be
quashing the order on the ground that an important and material circumstance was ignored or
not investigated into by the Tribunal. If a Tribunal ignores or fails to investigate a material
circumstance put forward by a claimant and gives a finding against him, the said finding can
certainly be said to be vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. - In the present case, the State Transport Authority was considering the competing
claim of 107 persons for two permits. The said Authority gave its decision on May 8, 1957.
The first respondent filed his application for a permit on July 11, 1956. On the same day he
addressed a letter to the said Authority to the following effect:
64 “Chidambaram is one of the terminii of this proposed route. A separate office
and workshop are located at Chidambaram in order to maintain the service efficiently
and without any breakdown or whatsoever.”
None of the innumerable applicants in his application denied specifically the claim of the
first respondent that he had a separate office and workshop at Chidambaram. This fact was
conceded before Srinivasan J. though the learned Judge put the concession somewhat higher
than was actually made. Nor did the learned counsel for the appellant go back on the limited
concession before the Division Bench. But one Kanuiah Pillai, who was Applicant 43-D,
stated in his application thus:
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“Applicant 43, 57, 69, 78 and 81 are residents of Chidambaram but No. 57 is a
fleet owner. Nos. 69 and 78 have no workshop. No. 81 is a new entrant. The rest all
are for away from the headquarters having no workshop at Chidambaram.”
Except this vague and implied denial by Kanuiah Pillai there is nothing on the record to
suggest that any other applicant denied the claim of the first respondent. The fact remains that
the appellant did not at any stage of the proceedings refute the claim of the first respondent. - With this background let me first look at the order of the State Transport Authority.
The said Authority has ignored the said letter of the first respondent claiming to have a
workshop at Chidambaram, but it stated in an omnibus clause that the first respondent and
some of the other applicants were residents either in the middle or off the route and they were
not so well situated as an applicant who had facilities at one end of the route with all the
necessary facilities. It may be stated that this is an implied finding against the first respondent,
but the complaint of the first respondent is that it is made in utter disregard of his claim. So
too, the Appellate Tribunal observed in its order disposing of the 18 appeals before it that the
first respondent, who had secured the highest number of marks, including those in Column 1
of the mark list, had his workshop and place of business en-route at Cuddalore and not at
either of the termini of the route. This observation was also made in after disregard of the
claim made by the first respondent that he had a workshop at Chidambaram, one of the
terminii of the route, and though the other applicants, except one, had not denied the said fact.
The High Court, therefore, found on the material placed before it that the said Authority as
well as the Tribunal had failed to consider the specific claim made by the first respondent in
regard to his workshop at Chidambaram and, therefore, rightly set aside the order of the
Appellate Tribunal so that the Appellate Tribunal might consider the claim made by the first
respondent. I do not see any flaw in the reasoning of the High Court. Nor can I say that it has
exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But, Mr Setalvad contended
that there was material before the Tribunal and that the Tribunal gave its finding on the basis
of that material. He relied upon an extract from the report of the Regional Transport
Authority, South Arcot, dated January 31, 1957. That was a report sent by the said Authority
to the State Transport Authority Against the name of the first respondent in column 4 under
the heading “possession of workshop or repair or maintenance facilities and its location” it is
stated, “maintaining a workshop at per G. O. at Cuddalore.” Again in the report sent by the
State Transport Authority to to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, against the name of
the first, respondent in column 8 under the heading “Place of residence or principal place of
business and the nearest distance” the entry is “Cuddalore on the route.” This information
given by the Transport Authority is presumably gathered from the earlier report of the
Regional Transport Authority. Reliance is placed upon a letter dated January 10, 1957 written
by the first respondent to the Secretary, State Transport Authority, in support of the
contention that even the first respondent, though on July 11, 1956, he claimed to have had a
workshop at Chidambaram, did not mention it therein.
But a perusal of that letter shows that he did mention that he had the sector and terminal
qualifications. Basing the argument on the said documents, it was contended that there was
material on which the Appellate Tribunal could have come to the finding which it did viz. that
the first respondent had no workshop at either the termini of the route. Firstly, these
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documents were not expressly relied upon by the Tribunal for holding that the first respondent
had no workshop at Chidambaram. Secondly, these documents were not relied upon by the
appellant either before Srinivasan, J. or before the Division Bench to the effect that the
Appellate Tribunal gave a finding on the basis of the said material. Thirdly, one of the said
documents viz. the letter of the first respondent does not support the contention. The other
two reports did not say that the first respondent had no workshop at Chidambaram. The
officers who made the report did not make any enquiry as regards the fact whether first
respondent had a workshop at Chidambaram on the basis of claim-made by him. There is
therefore, absolutely no evidence to controvert the first respondent’s claim and that is the
reason why the appellant did not place the said documents before the High Court in support of
his contention that there was material before the State Transport Authority and the State
Transport Appellate Tribunal for holding that the first respondent had no workshop at
Chidambaram. A perusal of the two orders shows that presumably in view of the of the
innumerable applications, the specific claim of the first respondent was completely missed by
the Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal. This is, therefore, a clear case of a
finding made by the Tribunal without any evidence to support it and by ignoring a specific
claim made before it. I am, therefore, of opinion that the High Court rightly set aside the order
of the Appellate Tribunal. - The next question is whether this is a fit case for interference under Article 136 of the
Constitution in exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder. Srinivasan J.
and on appeal the Division Bench on the basis of the material placed and the concession made
before them, came to the conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal had ignored the specific
claim set up by the first respondent. The first respondent had secured the highest number of
marks. His claim, if substantiated, would certainly tilt the balance in his favour. The material
placed before us was not relied upon by the appellant before the High Court. The High Court
gave a farther opportunity to the Appellate Tribunal to consider the claim of the first
respondent. Though the High Court quashed the order of the Tribunal, the observation in the
judgment clearly shows that the Tribunal could reconsider the matter. Indeed, learned counsel
for the first respondent conceded that fact. The appellant would have every opportunity to
establish that the first respondent has no workshop at Chidambaram. Instead of following the
straight course, he is trying to shut out further enquiry to arrive at the truth. In the
circumstances I am of the view that this is not a case which calls for the exercise of this
Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction to set aside the order of the High Court.
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed and the Writ Petition
filed by Respondent 1 is dismissed.
