Case Summary
| Citation | Bowers v. Gloucester Corporation (1963) 1 Q.B. 883 |
| Keywords | section 50 of Town Police Clauses Act, strict interpretation rule, taxi driver, offences, license, any offence, wide meaning, ambiguous |
| Facts | The Respondent was a licensed hackney carriage driver (taxi driver) who committed several offenses under section 50 of the Town Police Clauses Act. As a result, the licensing authority revoked his license. The Respondent was convicted of one offense for allowing the use of a vehicle without a license and was also found guilty of four other offenses related to the licensing authority’s by-laws. These included not having a taximeter, failing to display a statement of fares, and obscuring the license number from public view. The Recorder of Gloucester ruled that section 50 was ambiguous and, since it is a penal section, its interpretation should favor the Respondent. The Recorder believed there needed to be a second conviction for the same offense before the license could be revoked.. |
| Issues | Whether the Watch Committee had the power to revoke the Respondent’s license under Section 50 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, given his convictions for different offences under the Act and the by-law? |
| Contentions | Mr. Bowers, Respondent, argued that Section 50 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, is a penal provision that can lead to punishment, such as losing his livelihood. He claimed it should be interpreted strictly in his favor. He contended that the phrase “conviction for the second time… for any offence” should mean two convictions for the same specific offence under the Act, not any two different offences. While he had several convictions, he pointed out that only one was directly under the Act, and the other four were for breaking by-laws set by the licensing authority. He argued that these should not count against him for the revocation of his license based on just one conviction under the Act. The Corporation argued that the phrase “any offence” in Section 50 should be interpreted in its plain and ordinary sense. The term “any” truly means any type of offence committed under the provisions of the Act or any relevant special Act pertaining to their licensing powers. They pointed out that if the provision were interpreted to require two convictions for the exact same offence, it could lead to absurd outcomes. For instance, a driver who is clearly unfit and consistently violates different regulations might be able to avoid revocation of their license. |
| Law Points | The court concluded that the recorder had come to an incorrect decision. The term “offence” refers to “any offence,” which can be interpreted in a literal sense. It was deemed unnecessary for there to be two convictions for the same offence for the authority to revoke a license to take effect. The court reasoned that a statutory provision is only ambiguous—thus requiring an interpretation that favors the citizen in a penal context—when all appropriate methods of interpretation leave the matter unclear. In this case, the natural meaning of “any offence” was evident. Additionally, the court considered the mischief rule of statutory interpretation, which clearly indicates that strict oversight should be maintained over taxicab drivers and proprietors. It would be unreasonable for someone to demonstrate unfitness by committing multiple different offences, yet still have their license remain intact. |
| Judgement | The court held that the watch committee did have the power to revoke the license based on the Respondent’s convictions. The case was remitted back to the Recorder to consider the matter on its merits. |
| Ratio Decidendi & Case Authority |
Full Case Details
LORD PARKER C.J. – This is an appeal by case stated from a decision of the recorder of Gloucester who quashed a revocation of a hackney carriage license which had been adjudicated by the watch committee of the Gloucester Corporation.
The matter arises in this way. The respondent has been for a number of years a hackney carriage proprietor licensed in that regard by the watch committee. It is unnecessary to go into the history, but the powers and functions of the commissioners under the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, in regard to hackney carriages are now exercised by the corporation’s watch committee. The watch committee on February 12, 1962, revoked a license held by the respondent, being No. 31. They did that in purported exercise of powers under section 50 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, in regard to hackney carriages are now exercised by the corporation’s watch committee. The watch committee on February 12, 1962, revoked a license held by the respondent, being No. 31. They did that in purported exercise of powers under section 50 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, which is in these terms : “The commissioners may, upon the conviction for the second time of the proprietor or driver of any such hackney carriage for any offence under the provisions of this or the special Act with respect to hackney carriages, or any bye-law made in pursuance thereof, suspend or revoke, as they deem right, the license of any such proprietor or driver”.
This respondent had been found guilty in the past of one offence against the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, in that he permitted the use of a vehicle without a hackney carriage license. He had also been convicted of four offences against the licensing authority’s by-laws, those offences being of a different character. In order of date, the offence first committed was a contravention of the Act to which I have referred. The second was a contravention of by-law 12 in that he did not have a taximeter; the third was a contravention of by-law 15, in that there was not exhibited any statement of fares. The next was that he caused or suffered the number of the license to be concealed from the public view whilst plying for hire, which was a breach of by-law 9. Finally, he failed to have a taximeter fitted and so placed that letters and figures thereof were plainly visible to a passenger; that, unlike the second offence, was a case in which he did have a taximeter, but failed to comply with the provisions of the by-law in paragraph (iv) in regard to the letters and figures being visible. It was in those circumstances that the watch committee revoked this license.
On appeal before the recorder, the recorder took the view that section 50 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, was at any rate ambiguous, and he felt that, being a penal section, it should be given an interpretation most favourable to the appellant before him. The argument advanced before the recorder was that there had to be a conviction for the second time of the same offence, that although a taxi driver might be convicted of 40 or more offences against the by-laws and 10 or more offences against the Act, yet unless any two of them were convictions in regard to the particular paragraph of the by-law or the particular section in the Act, there was no power to revoke the licenses.
In my judgment the recorder came to a wrong conclusion in this case. It may be, and I think it is, a matter of first impression. When I first read these words, it seemed to me that any offence means what it says, “any offence”, and that it is quite unnecessary, before the power of revocation arises, that there should be two convictions for two identical offences. It seems to me that that is so on general principles of construction. I think that this is a typical case where, in argument before the court, a confusion has arisen between a provision which is ambiguous and a provision which is difficult to interpret. It may well be that many sections of Act are difficult to interpret, but can be interpreted by the proper canons of construction. A provision can only be said to be ambiguous, in the sense that if it be a penal section it would be resolved in a manner most favourable to the citizen, where having applied all the proper canons of interpretation the matter is still left in doubt.
In the present case it seems to me, first, that, approaching this on ordinary canons of interpretation, “any” must be given the wide meaning which it undoubtedly bears. Secondly, the mischief aimed at by the Act, which is clearly that a strict control should be kept on taxicab drivers and proprietors, can also be taken into account, together with the complete absurdity which arises bearing in mind the mischief aimed at, if a man can show himself to be utterly unfitted to be a taxicab driver or proprietor by committing 30, 40 or 50 offences, and yet not have his license revoked because he has always committed a different offence.
In my judgment “any” means what it says. There is clearly power here to revoke the license and the matter should go back to the recorder with the direction that there was power to revoke, and then he should then consider the matter on its merits.
Appeal allowed with costs.
